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ABSTRACT 
 
EMILY B. BARAN: Faith on the Margins: Jehovah‘s Witnesses in the Soviet Union and 
Post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, 1945-2010 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
This dissertation examines the shifting boundaries of religious freedom and the nature 
of religious dissent in the postwar Soviet Union and three of its successor states through a 
case study of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. The religion entered the USSR as a result of the 
state‘s annexation of western Ukraine, Moldavia, Transcarpathia, and the Baltic states during 
World War II, territories containing Witness communities. In 1949 and 1951, the state 
deported entire Witness communities to Siberia and arrested and harassed individual 
Witnesses until it legalized the religion in 1991.  
For the Soviet period, this dissertation charts the Soviet state‘s multifaceted approach 
to stamping out religion. The Witnesses‘ specific beliefs and practices offered a harsh 
critique of Soviet ideology and society that put them in direct conflict with the state. The 
non-Russian nationality of believers, as well as the organization‘s American roots, 
apocalyptic beliefs, ban on military service, door-to-door preaching, and denunciation of 
secular society challenged the state‘s goals of postwar reconstruction, creation of a cohesive 
Soviet society, and achievement of communism. In this sense, the state‘s view of the 
Witnesses as a hostile political organization was not without basis. Soviet Witnesses 
demonstrate that, despite repression, believers could and did construct identities and complex 
community networks that challenged the state‘s control over its citizenry. In fact, religion 
was a powerful organizing tool for citizens to create meaning in their lives outside of, and in 
 iv 
opposition to, the official ideology.  
In the post-Soviet context, this project takes a comparative approach by focusing on 
the three successor states with the largest long-standing Witness communities: Russia, 
Ukraine, and Moldova. The Witnesses emerged as one of the fastest growing religions in the 
region and faced growing criticism and hostility from the Orthodox Church and its 
supporters, expressed through an ―anticult discourse‖ that framed Witnesses as a threat to 
democracy, state security, and traditional values. Through legal challenges to their right to 
practice, the Witnesses became a key player in debates over the limits of religious freedom. 
Overall, this dissertation demonstrates the centrality of religious pluralism to the region‘s 
shaky and incomplete transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“„You are my witnesses,‟ declares the Lord, „and my servant whom I have chosen, so that 
you may know and believe me and understand that I am he.‟”  Isaiah 43:10.1 
 
In Pennsylvania in the 1870s, a man named Charles Taze Russell began publishing 
startling news. The biblical events of Armageddon foretold in the Book of Revelation would 
soon begin and the present generation would witness the establishment of Christ‘s rule on 
earth. This millennial prediction brought Russell a wide readership, committed adherents, 
and ultimately gave birth to a new religion, whose followers were initially known simply as 
the Bible Students. In 1881, Russell founded the Zion‘s Watch Tower Tract Society 
(renamed the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society in 1896) to oversee his publishing 
operations.
2
 By the early twentieth century, the faith began to garner significant international 
reach as Russell‘s message attracted European converts. In the 1930s, Russell‘s successor, 
Joseph Franklin Rutherford, led the Bible Students to adopt a more hierarchical 
organizational structure, a heightened sense of urgency in spreading their beliefs to others, 
and a new name, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses.3 After World War II, the religion achieved a truly 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all Bible citations refer to the New International Version. 
 
2
 The two major legal corporations that govern the Jehovah‘s Witnesses deserve a brief explanation. The most 
important corporation is the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, renamed the Watch Tower Bible and Tract 
Society of Pennsylvania in 1955. When the organization moved from Pennsylvania to Brooklyn, New York, it 
formed an additional corporation, the Peoples Pulpit Association, in 1909. This became the Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society in 1939, and the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., in 1939. It is run as 
a subsidiary of the Pennsylvania corporation. A third, subsidiary corporation, the International Bible Students 
Association, founded in 1914, oversees publishing work in the United Kingdom. Jehovah‟s Witnesses: 
Proclaimers of God‟s Kingdom (Brooklyn: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. and 
International Bible Students Association, 1993), 229. This work, Proclaimers of God‟s Kingdom, is the 
organization‘s most recent official history of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. 
 
 2 
global reach with missionaries or offices in nearly every country. Today, the Witnesses claim 
over seven million members worldwide.
4
  
One of these members, Sofiia Fedorivna Derefinko, was a Ukrainian teenager with 
six years of education living in a village outside of L‘viv, then under Polish rule, when she 
first heard about the Witnesses from her cousin during the late interwar period.
5
 Though 
raised Greek Catholic, Sofiia was intrigued by the religious literature her cousin gave her. 
She began attending group Bible studies, ultimately becoming convinced she had found the 
one true faith. She was one of hundreds of Ukrainians in western Poland to convert in the 
years after World War I. All told, several thousand joined the organization during the 
interwar and wartime periods in Eastern Europe.
6
 
At about the same time Sofiia accepted her new faith, Soviet power arrived in western 
Ukraine. Sofiia and her husband, a non-Witness, settled in the city of L‘viv and started a 
family. When World War II broke out, the Red Army mobilized her husband, who spent over 
a year in a German prisoner of war camp.
7
 During this time of war, deprivation, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 For simplicity‘s sake, I use the terms ―organization,‖ ―Watch Tower organization,‖ and ―Witness 
organization‖ interchangeably to refer collectively to the Jehovah‘s Witnesses' religion and legal corporations. 
 
4
 Annual statistics from 2010 put the total membership at 7,224,930. This figure refers to the average number of 
active ―publishers," the term used by the Watch Tower organization to describe members of the faith. 2011 
Yearbook of Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 2011). 
The organization‘s annual yearbooks publish the "service report" for the prior calendar year. 
 
5
 Derefinko‘s (nee Diak) life history is constructed here from the following sources: Archive of Upravlinnia 
Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy v L‘vivs‘kiy oblasti (L‘viv Oblast Security Service Archive, located in L‘viv, 
hereafter referred to as L‘viv SBU archive), spr. P-14905 (her case file), P-31931, and P-33518; Sofiia 
Derefinko, interview by Ruslan Mel‘nyk (Ukraine branch office of Jehovah‘s Witnesses), May 21, 2006, Nove 
selo, Ukraine; and Sofiia Derefinko, interview by author, October 13, 2009, L‘viv, Ukraine. 
 
6
 Exact statistics on the countrywide membership of Witnesses in Eastern Europe do not exist for three basic 
reasons. First, the Witnesses did not develop a clear, consistent policy on counting members until after World 
War II. Second, prior to the late 1940s, the organization did not consistently publish complete statistics when it 
did have this information. Third, after the 1940s, state repression made it impossible for the organization to 
publish data regarding Eastern European countries. My estimates are based on partial data produced by the 
Watch Tower organization in yearly reports and by the Soviet Union in state reports on the organization.  
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universal suffering, Sofiia and her fellow believers gathered to study the Bible and sustain 
themselves on their belief in God. With the war‘s conclusion, they faced mounting pressure 
to cease their religious activity. Most did not yield to this pressure. Arrests began by 1946. 
The Bible study that Sofiia had attended began to lose members due to police repression. 
Sofiia‘s cousin, who had introduced her to the faith, was arrested along with several others 
and sentenced to seven years in a forced labor camp in 1947. With so many men serving long 
terms in forced labor camps, Sofiia and other women had to lead their congregations, 
assuming positions traditionally reserved for men. Sofiia did the best she could, warning 
those gathered secretly in private homes to exercise caution and not to betray one another.  
Despite these instructions, Sofiia‘s name came up in other interrogations of arrested 
members. In 1950, police arrived in the middle of the night to her apartment, confiscated 
several editions of the Witnesses‘ bimonthly magazine, The Watchtower, and arrested her. 
Under interrogation herself, she gave little useful information, minimizing her involvement 
in the organization and providing only the names of those already arrested. With little 
evidence against her, she nonetheless received a sentence of eight years in a forced labor 
camp. Sofiia found encouragement in the presence of several other Witness women 
imprisoned along with her. Using a smuggled-in Bible, they continued to study scripture and 
to celebrate the only holiday recognized by their faith, the yearly commemoration of Christ‘s 
death. In 1956, the state granted Sofiia early release, but not the right to return home. Instead, 
she joined thousands of other fellow believers living in forced exile in small communities 
across Siberia and other distant regions far from her ancestral home. 
                                                                                                                                                       
7
 The sources conflict as to the exact year of her baptism. Under interrogation in 1950, Derefinko claimed to 
have been involved with the Witnesses only since 1947, but in post-Soviet interviews she stated that she had 
joined several years earlier. Most likely, the 1947 date was given in order to minimize her involvement in the 
organization. 
 4 
For the next several decades, Sofiia guarded her faith against myriad external 
pressures from state and society. In the city of Abakan in Siberia, she found other believers 
who formed small congregations that operated underground without the official registration 
required of all religious organizations by the Soviet state. At great personal risk, the Abakan 
Witnesses carried on the practice of preaching the faith and finding new converts. In the post-
Stalin era, the state arrested many Witnesses but spared Sofiia. Still, local police followed her 
actions closely and made it difficult for her to maintain a job. Her son, who had grown up 
without his mother, had no interest in religion, nor initially did her husband. Her husband 
finally converted to the faith in the 1960s, but her son drowned at an early age, never 
reconciling with his mother‘s convictions. By the 1980s, Sofiia finally retired to her old 
village outside of L‘viv, where, a decade later, she witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the creation of an independent Ukraine.  
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Sofiia, now an elderly woman, blind 
and in declining health, felt just as certain about God‘s coming kingdom as she had in her 
youth. Life‘s challenges had only strengthened her faith and motivated her to do more to 
spread her convictions to others. Thousands of fellow Witnesses shared a similar story. They 
not only survived decades of state persecution, but managed to maintain their religious 
beliefs, their communities and way of life, and even to find new converts. This dissertation 
charts their history and tells the story of Witnesses like Sofiia. Equally important, it examines 
the perspectives of and negotiations between Witnesses and state officials on the proper 
limits of religious freedom and dissent from 1945 through the first two decades of post-
Soviet independence.  
 5 
As Sofiia‘s narrative suggests, the history of Soviet Witnesses begins during the 
interwar period in the western borderland territories later annexed to the USSR as a result of 
World War II. Russell‘s teachings won a small, but dedicated following in these lands, which 
included Romanian-controlled Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Polish-controlled western 
Ukraine and western Belorussia, Czechoslovak-controlled Transcarpathia, and the Baltic 
states. Even prior to the war, the organization‘s American roots, apocalyptic beliefs, ban on 
military service, door-to-door preaching style, and denunciation of secular society made it the 
object of public derision and government attacks in most Eastern European states. After the 
war, the Soviet state deemed the Witnesses an anti-Soviet organization guised as a religion. 
Mass arrests of these ―enemies of the state‖ began almost immediately and while believers in 
this period most likely numbered no more than ten thousand, the state from 1949 to 1951 
resolved to exile all Witnesses and their families from the borderland regions to Siberia. 
Following Stalin‘s death in 1953, the state amnestied many members, but continued 
to arrest and harass individual Witnesses until the late 1980s. Official policy classified the 
Witnesses as one of only a handful of religions denied any legal recognition. Despite this 
persecution, the Witnesses proved surprisingly resilient. They kept their children out of 
Soviet youth organizations, served prison time rather than complete mandatory military 
service, printed and distributed illegal literature smuggled in from abroad, maintained a 
cohesive organizational structure, and kept in regular contact with the organization‘s 
international headquarters in Brooklyn, New York. They also achieved slow but steady 
growth in their numbers, with at least 25,000 members by 1985.
8
  
                                                 
8
 The 1985 figure comes from the yearly statistics compiled by the Council for Religious Affairs. State Archive 
of the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or GARF), f. 6991, op. 6, dd. 3130-
3134. 
 6 
          On the eve of the Soviet Union‘s collapse, with a new democratic religious law in 
place, the Soviet state finally recognized the Watch Tower organization, granting it legal 
registration in early 1991.
9
 With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority 
of Soviet Witnesses became citizens of the now independent states of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Moldova. In all three countries, the Witnesses set up legal organizational structures, opened 
branch offices, appointed new leaders, imported literature from abroad, and made the most of 
the nascent democratic climate to openly preach and win over new members. As a result of 
these efforts, the Witnesses emerged as one of the region‘s fastest growing religions, proving 
remarkably adept at adjusting to the changing political and social environment. In 2010, the 
organization had more than 380,000 members across the states of the former Soviet Union. 
This included 157,365 members in Russia, 146,387 members in Ukraine, and 19,918 in 
Moldova.
10
 
The Witnesses provide an essential lens for examining the limitations of the Soviet 
state‘s multifaceted approach to stamping out religion. For the Soviet state, religion was a 
holdover from the country‘s capitalist past and an obstacle to building communism. By their 
refusal to conform or disappear, Witnesses and their provocative religious values and 
practices presented a serious challenge to the state‘s postwar goals of reconstruction, 
renewed progress toward atheist communism, and the construction of a cohesive Soviet 
society. In fact, Witnesses represented perhaps the largest and most complex underground 
organization in the postwar Soviet Union. This suggests the need to reevaluate our focus on 
                                                 
9
 For the Witnesses‘ registration in Soviet Ukraine, see 2002 Yearbook of Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. and International Bible Students Association, 2002). 
For their registration in the USSR, see GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 3164, l. 21.  
 
10
 This figure does not include members in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, where the organization is 
still not legally recognized by the state. In order to protect its members from persecution, the Watch Tower 
Bible and Tract Society does not release data for countries where members have no legal standing. 2011 
Yearbook, 40-47. 
 7 
urban, intellectual, and nationalist dissent in this time period and place greater emphasis on 
minority religious communities and believers. Soviet Witnesses prove that, despite the threat 
of state repression, religion provided a powerful outlet for citizens to construct identities and 
communities that did not conform to Soviet ideology. 
In the post-Soviet context, the Witnesses offer a window into religion‘s role in the 
transition to democracy, in particular how the Witnesses‘ right to practice became a critical 
battleground for determining the legal boundaries of religious freedom in the region. 
Ultimately, the history of the Witnesses provides clear proof that the significance of marginal 
religious groups, as scholar James Richardson writes, ―is not in their numbers but in their 
demonstrations of the limits of tolerance in modern European society.‖11 The struggles of 
post-Soviet Witnesses reveal the central importance of minority religions in setting the 
parameters of democratic freedoms in the transition from Soviet-style authoritarianism. 
 
Historiography on Postwar Religious Life and Policy 
Historical research on religion in Russia and the Soviet Union has focused primarily 
on the predominant religion, Orthodoxy, and on Orthodox sects. During the late Soviet era, 
religious persecution in the postwar USSR received a great deal of international attention, as 
both politicians and American religious leaders sought to draw the plight of Soviet believers 
into the larger debate about international human rights and American-Soviet relations in the 
Cold War. Considerable resources were spent documenting state repression of Christian 
religious organizations, particularly Protestant denominations that occupied a more marginal 
position in the Soviet Union and had the benefit of vocal international faith communities 
                                                 
11
 James T. Richardson and Barend van Driel, ―New Religious Movements in Europe: Developments and 
Reactions,‖ in Anti-Cult Movements in Cross-Cultural Perspective, eds. Anson Shupe and David G. Bromley 
(New York: Garland, 1994), 131. 
 8 
speaking out on their behalf.
12
 Numerous books, articles, and reports, many of them not 
academic, provided valuable information on Soviet religious life. The focus on contemporary 
conditions meant that scholarly analysis and historical background did not always feature in 
these works, which drew primarily from press reports, self-published literature (samizdat), 
and underground sources smuggled out by religious communities. That said, this period 
produced valuable academic research on the contours of religious communities and Soviet 
antireligious work during the postwar era.
13
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new wave of inquiry began as political 
scientists and sociologists attempted to explain and quantify the apparent rise in religiosity in 
the former Soviet states by examining the shifting dynamics between church and state.
14
 The 
opening of government and former Communist Party archives in these states also made 
possible new avenues for historical research. Of particular relevance for this dissertation, 
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some authors have reexamined the history of Protestantism in Russia and the Soviet Union. 
Sergei Zhuk, in his monograph, Russia‟s Lost Reformation, has charted the rise of 
Protestantism in southern Russia and Ukraine, while Heather Coleman has produced a 
detailed study of Baptists from the 1905 revolution to 1929.
15
 Their works, along with the 
groundbreaking study by Laura Engelstein of the self-castrators (Skoptsy) from the late 
eighteenth century to their demise in the 1930s, provide models for exploring the changing 
dynamics of marginal religious communities in response to external political and social 
changes.
16
 Additionally, Tatiana Chumachenko‘s monograph on the Council for Religious 
Affairs from 1943 to 1961 offers valuable insights into the implementation of Soviet 
religious policy and the internal dynamics of the bureaucratic institution charged with this 
task.
17
  
Despite such advances in scholarship on Soviet and Russian religious history, 
Witnesses have received only a brief mention in Western sources. In the Soviet era, this may 
have been due in part to the Witnesses‘ rejection of ecumenicalism, which marginalized their 
cause among the many non-denominational organizations gathering information on state 
repression of religion. Prior to 1991, published information in the West on Soviet Witnesses 
was limited almost entirely to Walter Kolarz‘s 1961 work, Religion in the Soviet Union, 
which contains a brief overview of the organization‘s history based on Soviet press reports.18 
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In the post-Soviet era, the Witnesses‘ struggle for legal recognition in Russia has attracted 
intermittent foreign press coverage, but limited academic attention outside of the region.
19
 
In contrast to their Western colleagues, however, scholars in the former Soviet Union 
have shown considerable interest in documenting the history of Witnesses. Prominent 
religious scholar Mikhail Odintsov has published a collection of archival documents 
concerning Soviet Witnesses. Religious scholar Sergei Ivanenko‘s works include an 
overview of Witness beliefs and practices and a short history of the organization based 
largely on Watch Tower publications and the author‘s interviews with members.20 Nikolai 
Gordienko has produced a slightly more detailed history of the Witnesses from their initial 
arrival in tsarist Russia through the early 1990s.
21
 Konstiantyn Berezhko, a Ukrainian 
historian, has authored a microhistory of the Witnesses in Zhytomyr oblast (region), while A. 
I. Artem‘ev‘s scholarship covers the organization‘s history in Kazakhstan. 22 Pavlo Rurak and 
Oleg Gol‘ko, both Witnesses, have provided autobiographical accounts of their experiences 
in the Soviet era, while Gol‘ko has written more broadly about the organization‘s history in 
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the Soviet Union.
23
 With the exception of the two autobiographical works, all of these 
authors limit their research to a largely descriptive history of the organization‘s activity and 
its persecution by the state. In contrast, my focus in this dissertation is based on 
understanding why the state responded as it did and how the organization and its members 
negotiated their own place within Soviet society in light of their beliefs and changing social 
and political conditions.  
 
Religion as Dissent 
Religion offers a new angle for exploring issues of identity and dissent in the Soviet 
Union. Scholars have debated the limits of Soviet citizens‘ ability and desire to forge 
identities separate from or in opposition to the official ideology. Some of the most innovative 
post-1991 work on Soviet society, primarily focused on the Stalin era, has occurred as part of 
this exploration of Soviet subjectivity, a term borrowed from Michel Foucault, who heavily 
influenced this new field of inquiry in Soviet history.
24
 Ronald Grigor Suny provides a 
succinct definition of subjectivity as ―the way in which a person experiences and understands 
his or her identity‖ in relation to the modern state.25 Earlier scholarship suggested either that 
the Soviet state had largely killed autonomous identities through fear and repression or that 
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Soviet man had developed a dual nature by using the Soviet system to his own advantage 
while privately rejecting its ideology. In a major critique of both concepts, Stephen Kotkin 
argues that citizens learned to ―speak Bolshevik,‖ i.e. to use the language of the official 
ideology in their public lives.
26
 This burgeoning scholarship called on historians to 
reconceive the Soviet Union as a mobilizing and self-mobilized modern civilization, and not 
as a solely or primarily coercive state populated by a fearful citizenry unable or unwilling to 
publicly resist the official ideology.  
Moreover, rather than view Soviet citizens as passive victims, some scholars 
contended that historians should recognize their roles as willing and eager participants in the 
state project. In this regard, Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin extend Kotkin‘s argument 
further, suggesting that the terminology of ―speaking Bolshevik‖ problematically repeats the 
existing conception of Soviet citizens as leading dual lives. In contrast, Hellbeck asserts that 
Soviet citizens ―thought Bolshevik‖ in their private lives as well as spoke it publicly in their 
interactions with state and society. Similarly, Halfin advises historians to accept ―the 
possibility that people mean what they say even when their language is ideological through 
and through, that they can strive to change themselves rather than just alter the reality around 
them to fit their interests.‖27 Like Hellbeck, Halfin posits that citizens actively integrated 
their own identities to fit within the Soviet collective.  
The scholarly focus on Stalinism as a distinct civilization has left open the question as 
to how, or if, these models of subjectivity apply to the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. 
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Anthropologist Alexei Yurchak offers some possible answers, noting that many scholars 
have reproduced problematic binary categorizations of Soviet life, ―such as oppression and 
resistance, repression and freedom, the state and the people, official economy and second 
economy, official culture and counterculture, totalitarian language and counterlanguage, 
public self and private self, truth and lie, reality and dissimulation, morality and corruption, 
and so on.‖ He critiques the tendency to portray the ―unofficial‖ and ―counterculture‖ half of 
reality as uniformly ―good,‖ while suggesting that everything associated with the state and 
officialdom was just as uniformly ―bad.‖ Instead, as with scholars of the Stalin era, Yurchak 
advocates for a more nuanced understanding of how Soviet citizens interacted with the state, 
one that avoids simple boundaries between the two categories and does not privilege dissent 
and resistance over other forms of subjectivity.
28
  
Certainly, all of these scholars have provided a necessary corrective to the previous 
overemphasis on dissent and resistance in Soviet life. This new historical model also 
complements the existing scholarly image of postwar political dissent. Most works focus on 
the urban dissident movement, which emerged from educated Soviet citizens who grew up 
within Soviet reality and were heavily invested in the outcome of its ideological project.
29
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Like most Soviet citizens, these dissenters did not adopt a uniformly dual identity, leading 
separate private and public lives, and most participated, to some extent, in the Soviet project. 
Many, if not most, ―spoke Bolshevik‖ and they negotiated with, rather than rejected, the state 
and its ideology.  
Yet the Witnesses provide a starkly different image of dissent that the Soviet state 
also classified as political. Moreover, they challenge the emphasis in recent scholarship on 
how Soviet citizens negotiated and compromised with the state, rather than how they 
dissented and resisted. In fact, Witnesses refused to conform with even the most basic 
cultural and political norms of Soviet life. Many Witnesses had only a basic education and 
lived in rural areas on the peripheries of Soviet society. Their children did not join the 
Pioneers or participate in after-school activities, their youth did not serve in the military, and 
their adults avoided movie theaters, clubs, houses of culture, village and work meetings, and 
refused to vote in elections. They largely avoided reading Soviet fiction or Soviet newspapers 
and magazines, and did not generally watch Soviet television. Their religious beliefs told 
them that the Soviet state, along with all other secular institutions and governments 
worldwide, would face imminent destruction during Armageddon. Until that time, their goal 
was to follow the Bible instruction to remain ―no part of this world.‖30 
Because Witnesses did not heavily invest themselves in Soviet cultural institutions or 
ways of life and were already marginalized from broader society, unlike other Soviet 
subjects, they openly refused to conform to the system. Thus, while educated professionals 
circulated samizdat (self-published literature) in the cities, Witnesses ran massive 
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underground printing operations to distribute thousands of copies of The Watchtower each 
month across the Soviet Union. They took great personal risk in meeting in secret several 
times a week to discuss this illegal literature. More boldly, they organized a highly complex 
underground organization, with its own finances, leadership structure, and internal reporting 
system that kept careful record of the organization‘s work and membership. While 
intellectual dissidents exercised caution in sharing their views with others who could 
denounce them, Witnesses spoke about their beliefs to complete strangers hoping to convert 
them to the religion. Not surprisingly, Witnesses made up one of the largest categories of 
political prisoners in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, with up to a hundred or more arrested and 
convicted each year for refusal to serve in the military and for illegal religious activity.
31
  
To be sure, religion could serve as a mobilization force for the official ideology. 
Edward Roslof‘s study of Renovationism, though it does not directly engage the subjectivity 
debate, demonstrates that a significant segment of the Russian Orthodox Church did not see 
Orthodoxy as incompatible with the modernizing goals of the Soviet experiment.
32
 Similarly, 
Coleman has suggested that Russian Baptists ―promoted a vision of a Russia where one could 
be at once . . . both Baptist and socialist,‖ freely employing revolutionary language and 
combining it with religious understanding.
33
 Yet Soviet Baptists also spearheaded protest 
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demonstrations against the Soviet state in the late Soviet era and engaged in some of the 
same practices as the Witnesses.
34
 The variegated relationships of religious communities to 
the state reinforces the need to recognize the heterogeneity of subjectivity in the Soviet 
Union, where religion could provide the foundations both for resistance to and participation 
in the Soviet ideological project.   
In sum, Witnesses may have represented only a small fraction of Soviet society, but 
the state saw them as a serious danger to the social and political order. In fact, one scholar 
has dubbed the Witnesses ―the perennial bête noire‖ of the Soviet state.35 Another notes the 
Soviet government‘s ―inordinate attention‖ focused on the organization.36 Rather than 
dismissing the state‘s focus on the Witnesses as misplaced paranoia, this dissertation 
contends that the Witnesses did represent a real threat by their refusal to participate in Soviet 
society and to acknowledge secular authority. More broadly, it argues for the need to 
appreciate the importance of religion and religious communities in shaping Soviet citizens‘ 
identities. The Witnesses demonstrate the myriad ways in which religion powerfully shaped 
individuals‘ relationship with the Soviet state and society.   
 For the post-Soviet era, Witnesses offer a unique perspective on the development of 
freedom of conscience and religious tolerance in the Soviet Union‘s successor states. In this 
period, the Witnesses‘ experiences cannot be understood without reference to a broader, 
global framework, as the Witnesses‘ religious beliefs, insular culture, and open proselytism 
have placed them on the margins of acceptable religious practice since the religion‘s 
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inception over a hundred years ago. In fact, they have been a target of persecution in almost 
every country in which they have appeared. Numerous scholars have noted how court 
decisions involving the Witnesses have shaped the boundaries of freedom of conscience in 
Western democratic countries.
37
 My dissertation builds on this model and applies it to the 
states of Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia, offering a basis of comparison for examining the 
legal challenges faced by the Witnesses in these countries. This approach avoids the potential 
pitfall of viewing state repression of the Witnesses purely as an example of Russian or Soviet 
exceptionalism.  
 Recent scholarship regarding new religious movements and minority religions in 
Europe and North America places the strong backlash against Witnesses by local 
communities, politicians, and, in particular, Orthodox churches in context.
38
 This framework 
makes it possible to delineate what is unique about the post-Soviet responses to the 
Witnesses and what fits within larger Western trends. Europe in the 1990s offered an 
appealing formula of toleration for traditional religions, combined with hostility toward new 
religious movements, which was frequently expressed within an ―anticult discourse‖ that 
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itself borrowed heavily from the earlier American anticult movement of the 1970s. European 
and American anticultism provided a critical model for former Soviet states in framing 
attacks on marginal religions within a democratic discourse, while recent restrictions on the 
Witnesses‘ right to practice in several European nations supplied useful examples for the 
organization‘s critics. Further, Russia‘s continued influence on other former Soviet states 
meant that, as Russia took the lead in adopting stricter legislation and promoting anticult 
rhetoric in its press, other countries in the region followed suit. This dissertation examines 
the international flow of ideas, rhetoric, and public policy on freedom of conscience between 
Europe and former Soviet states.  
 
A Note on Sources 
 Until 1991, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses were an underground organization in the Soviet 
Union, with no legal standing, no right to publish or distribute materials, and no registered 
houses of worship. The Soviet state struggled to gather accurate, up-to-date information on 
Witnesses, while Witnesses in turn did everything in their power to make their activities 
difficult to trace. As such, tracking the Witnesses‘ history requires casting a wide net in 
gathering reliable sources. Archival records constitute the largest source base, in particular 
materials from the national state and former party archives in the capital cities of Moscow, 
Kiev, and Chişinău.39 For local documentation, this dissertation draws on records from two 
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oblast capitals in Ukraine: L‘viv (capital of L‘viv oblast) and Uzhhorod (capital of 
Zakarpattia oblast). L‘viv served as a central hub of Witness life in the immediate postwar 
period and the suburb of Briukhovychi is the current location of the Witnesses‘ branch office 
in Ukraine. Zakarpattia oblast had the highest concentration of Witnesses throughout the 
Soviet era, and the second highest number of members in Ukraine as of 2010.
40
   
In both regional and national state archives, relevant materials appear primarily in 
two collections. First, the Council for Religious Cult Affairs (CRCA), and its successor 
organ, the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), the governmental agency responsible for 
monitoring religious life and overseeing the legal activities of registered religious 
organizations, kept tabs on local Witness communities. Their archives hold yearly estimates 
of total membership, reports on illegal gatherings, and documentation of criminal trials of 
Witnesses for activities related to their religious beliefs. Second, Witnesses were the target of 
relentless atheist propaganda and agitation, particularly by the Communist Party‘s Agitation 
and Propaganda Department (or Agitprop), the Knowledge Society (or Znanie, a mass 
organization of volunteer lecturers), and the Communist Party‘s youth and young adult 
organization, the Komsomol.
41
 These institutions sponsored lecture series and other events to 
promote atheism, exchanged and published advice on successful (and unsuccessful) methods 
of atheist propaganda for Witnesses, and recorded their interactions with believers in the 
course of their agitation work.  
                                                 
40
 In L‘viv, this included the Derzhavnyi arkhiv L‘vivs‘kiy oblasti (State Archive of L‘viv Oblast, or DALO). In 
Uzhhorod, this included the Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zakarpats‘koi oblasti (State Archive of Zakarpattia Oblast, or 
DAZO). As of May 2010, Zakarpattia oblast had roughly 14,600 members, second only to Donets‘k oblast. 
Statistics provided by Ruslan Mel‘nyk of the Ukraine branch office of Jehovah‘s Witnesses.  
 
41
 The Council of Minister created the Knowledge Society in 1947 and tasked it with spreading scientific and 
political knowledge to the population through lectures, exhibits, speeches, and mass media. It also took over the 
responsibilities of the Union of Militant Atheists as the primary purveyor of atheist propaganda. Its full name is 
―the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.‖ GARF, f. R-9547, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 1-5. 
 20 
Although Witnesses faced numerous criminal investigations and trials throughout the 
Soviet era, most documents from security, police, and criminal justice files remain classified 
in both Russia and Moldova. Ukraine, however, has declassified many personal files of 
individuals repressed for political crimes and later rehabilitated by the state. The vast 
majority of convictions under ―political‖ statutes (i.e. crimes against the state) occurred 
during the Stalin era, as a result of which available files on repressed persons are limited 
almost entirely to this period. Regional security archives in L‘viv and Zakarpattia oblasts 
have made available dozens of files on repressed Witnesses. Most files contain information 
on several Witnesses, as the state generally investigated and tried them in groups, not as 
individuals.
42
 Published document collections provide a final archival source, primarily for 
materials relating to the 1949 and 1951 exiles, which remain largely inaccessible in the 
archives.
43
 
The post-Stalin era brought about sustained press and scholarly interest in atheist 
topics and these publications offer another major source of documentation on the Witnesses. 
Under Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev‘s leadership (1953-64), atheist propagandists, agitators, 
and scholars began to tailor their work to address the specific beliefs and practices of 
individual religious communities. Since few Soviet citizens had even heard of the Witnesses 
in the 1950s, this necessitated the production of brochures, pamphlets, books, and films 
describing the basic tenets of Witness beliefs and history, as well as methods for combating 
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this organization and its belief system. While Witnesses appeared only rarely in national 
newspapers, regional and district papers in areas with high concentrations of Witnesses 
devoted an inordinate amount of attention to the organization and its members.
44
 As a source, 
newspapers offer valuable insights into the local activities of Witness communities, their 
clashes with authorities, and the constructed image of the Witnesses as a serious threat to 
state cohesion and public order. For the post-Soviet era, this dissertation similarly draws on 
newspaper and journal articles from both secular and religious presses, as well as on multiple 
published polemical works against the Witnesses.  
 Third, the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society provides a rich source of published 
materials from its inception to the present. Religious literature plays an unusually central role 
in Witness religious life and activity, as demonstrated in Soviet territories where members 
took great risks to smuggle, reprint, and distribute it. Several publications in particular, 
whose press runs span the entire period covered by this dissertation, offer a valuable source 
for understanding what the organization knew about its Soviet members, how it understood 
events within a specific religious perspective, and what strategies it recommended to 
members for responding to persecution. Annual yearbooks publicize the worldwide 
missionary work of the organization and identify obstacles to free practice of the faith 
through country reports. More important, two bimonthly magazines, The Watchtower and 
Awake!, serve as the primary literature used in the religion‘s proselytism work and religious 
services and are translated into most major languages.
45
 The Watchtower prints articles 
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primarily on biblical interpretation and proper conduct for Christians. Published under 
various titles over the years, Awake! offers human interest stories on topical issues. 
Additionally, in the post-Soviet era, the Witnesses‘ official media website posts regular press 
briefings and legal documents on developments in freedom of conscience for Witnesses in 
the region. 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society has 
published multiple first-person narratives of Soviet members in its magazines and produced a 
documentary film on Soviet Witnesses entitled Faithful Under Trials.
46
 With cooperation 
from the national branch offices in L‘viv and Chişinău, I conducted a select number of 
interviews with members to supplement the organization‘s published testimonials. The 
Moldovan branch office also made available dozens of short autobiographies written by 
members in the 1990s. While interviews and autobiographies do not constitute a major 
source for this dissertation, they make it possible to confirm basic facts about the lives and 
activities of Soviet Witnesses and offer a contrast to the state-centered perspective gained 
from archives.  
 Although the Witness organization does not maintain a public archive for researchers 
either at the international or local level, its international press office and the national branch 
offices in all three countries were extremely generous with their time and in making me 
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aware of all available published and archival resources for my research. In addition to 
facilitating interviews with Soviet-era members, the director of the Moldovan branch, 
Anatolie Cravciuc, granted me access to his office‘s large collection of legal documents 
regarding post-Soviet challenges to the Witnesses in Moldovan courts, in particular in the 
Transnistria region. The media representative for the Ukraine branch office, Ruslan Mel‘nyk, 
provided press briefings and newspaper clippings.  
 Ultimately, the challenge of this dissertation has been to construct a narrative history 
of the Witness organization that is both analytical and compelling, and one that accurately 
reflects the motivations and beliefs of both state actors and the Witnesses. By looking at the 
margins of society through the story of a small religious community, I show that historians 
can learn a great deal about the state as a whole, its control over its citizenry, and its priorities 
in enforcing cultural norms and political conformity. At the same time, the experience of the 
Witnesses shows the level of freedom available to citizens not to conform, to create 
alternative communities and cultures, and to push the boundaries of control established by 
the state. The story of the Witnesses demonstrates that, even in the most repressive of 
societies, there is always room to challenge, to create spaces for dissent, and to construct 
meaning outside of official norms.  
 
Note on Transliteration 
 Eastern Europe in the twentieth century experienced multiple border shifts, the birth 
and death of states, and a resultant battle over national and ethnic identities and place names. 
Ironically, Jehovah‘s Witnesses are probably one of the few populations in Eastern Europe 
who have little interest in these debates. For them, loyalty to their faith transcends borders 
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and is the only meaningful affiliation. This position frustrated Soviet officials and presents 
historians with the challenge of how to spell individuals‘ names and how or whether to 
assign them to national or ethnic categories they refused to acknowledge. Oftentimes, 
archival sources differ significantly as to the spelling and national identity of Witnesses. 
With this in mind, I have minimized instances where I identify Witnesses by name, since this 
information adds little if anything to our understanding of their broader history. When 
necessary to name Witnesses, primarily key figures in the organization, I have relied on 
archival and secondary sources to determine their nationality and render their name 
accordingly. When in doubt, I have indicated as such in the text.  
 Regarding place names, I have assigned a single form to all place names throughout 
the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. Thus, all place names within the Ukrainian SSR and Ukraine 
are transliterated from Ukrainian, all names within the Moldavian SSR and Moldova from 
Romanian, and all names within the rest of the USSR and the Russian Federation from 
Russian. To give an example, L‘viv is spelled L‘viv, and never L‘vov. Similarly, Chişinău is 
referred to as such, except in the pre-Soviet era. Lastly, I use the established English 
transliteration for historical figures and places such as Moscow, Crimea, and Kiev. 
 
Overview of Chapters 
Faith on the Margins comprises eight chapters and covers the period from 1945 to 
2010. Chapter 1 provides a short history of the Witness organization‘s genesis in the United 
States, its basic beliefs and institutional structure, and early leadership and development. It 
describes the organization‘s international growth and the interwar creation of local religious 
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communities in Eastern European territories annexed by the Soviet Union as a result of 
World War II.  
Chapter 2 addresses Witness religious life and conflict with the state during the Stalin 
era, from the creation of an underground Soviet Witness organization to the first wave of 
Stalinist repression, and, finally, to the mass exiles of nearly all Witnesses and their families 
to Siberia in 1949 and 1951. It pays particular attention to how Witnesses negotiated the 
difficult terrain of police interrogations in line with their religious beliefs and need for 
survival. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the state‘s establishment of a new religious policy after Stalin‘s 
death in 1953 and on its hard-line measures against Witnesses, such as raids on homes and 
printing operations, criminal trials, and KGB infiltration. It likewise explores the Witnesses' 
organized response to these measures and its construction of a viable underground network.  
 Chapter 4 interrogates the Witnesses‘ everyday practice of their faith and their 
understanding of modern life and Soviet ideology within the framework of their beliefs 
during the post-Stalin era.  
 Chapter 5 investigates the post-Stalin state‘s multifaceted approach to antireligious 
agitation and propaganda, official discourse on the Witnesses in Soviet publications, and 
methods employed by agitators to convert Witnesses into atheist builders of communism. It 
also accounts for how Witnesses challenged atheist agitators and contested official 
constructions of their religion.  
 Chapter 6 charts the Witnesses‘ path to legalization from the late Brezhnev era until 
the Soviet Union‘s collapse in 1991. It identifies reasons why the state chose to pursue 
registration of the Witness organization and conflicting notions of what this registration 
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would entail. In addition, it charts the changing landscape of political life under Gorbachev 
and the increasing space for non-conformity and religious expression during the final years 
of the Soviet Union. 
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the transition to post-Soviet life after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the massive growth in Witness membership in post-Soviet states, state and 
societal reactions to this phenomenon, and the redrawing of boundaries for freedom of 
conscience by independent states.  Chapter 7 covers the post-Soviet transition in Russia, 
while chapter 8 focuses on Ukraine and Moldova. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
JEHOVAH‘S SERVANTS IN SOVIET LANDS: A PREHISTORY 
 
“If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first. If you belonged to the world, it 
would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out 
of the world. That is why the world hates you.” John 15:18-19.  
 
 This Bible passage perhaps provides the best summary of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses‘ 
place in the modern world. The Witnesses have defined themselves as a community set apart 
from the world, yet required to engage it in order to spread their beliefs to others. Their 
proselytism both reinforces their unique identity and triggers hostility from those unreceptive 
to the Witnesses‘ message. Witnesses believe this opposition marks them as true Christians 
and affords them an opportunity to experience a tiny fraction of the persecution Christ 
endured to bring salvation to mankind. Throughout their history, this belief has brought them 
intense state and societal opposition, but also the resolve to withstand such antagonism.  
 The story of the Witnesses in the Soviet Union cannot be understood outside of the 
context of the organization‘s beliefs and worldwide development. This chapter therefore 
provides a brief history of the Witnesses and an overview of their fundamental beliefs and 
practices. It charts their worldwide expansion in the early twentieth century and how they 
made converts and formed communities in territories that later would be annexed by the 
Soviet Union as a result of World War II. Some aspects of their faith and practices will be 
covered in later chapters where they are relevant to specific issues in the Soviet or post-
Soviet periods. 
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From Pennsylvania to the Russian Empire 
The Witnesses‘ history begins in the late 1800s in the United States, during a 
prolonged period of widespread millennial anxiety and prophecy in American religious life. 
Their beliefs formed within this context and borrowed from the ideas of other apocalyptic 
religious movements of this time, in particular the followers of William Miller, who had 
earlier proclaimed that the world would end in 1844. Miller believed that, at that moment, 
Jesus Christ would set up a perfect kingdom and rule over those deemed worthy to live in his 
paradise. Many of Miller's followers faithfully awaited the coming apocalypse, and its failure 
to occur as predicted brought Miller widespread ridicule. The event became known as the 
Great Disappointment. Despite the setback, many followers retained their faith in apocalyptic 
prophecies, forming new religious sects, most prominently, the Adventists.
47
   
Adventism had a powerful impact on Protestant thinkers inclined toward 
millenarianism or chiliasm. In the 1870s, the Adventist message reached a young 
Pennsylvanian businessman, Charles Taze Russell, who, along with another man, began to 
publish new calculations for Armageddon.
48
 Russell believed that, in 1874, Christ had 
returned not in the flesh, but rather in spirit form to gather a select group of worthy Christians 
for his kingdom. Christ‘s return meant that the establishment of the millennial kingdom on 
earth had to be near at hand.
49
 Russell preached that Christians must recognize God by what 
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Russell considered his proper name, Jehovah. In 1881, he began to publish a regular 
magazine, Zion‟s Watch Tower and Herald of Christ‟s Presence, to propagate his 
interpretations of scripture.  
Russell‘s followers, who were known as ―Bible Students,‖ used public talks and Bible 
studies to spread Russell‘s teachings to wide audiences.50 His organization also printed mass 
copies of his booklets, books, and speeches. These two methods—literature distribution and 
free Bible studies and talks—formed the permanent and central missionary strategy for the 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. Russell himself toured the United States and Europe 
to further promote his message and to establish a wider audience. By the turn of the century, 
he had converts throughout the US and had established a sizeable base in Europe, especially 
in England and Germany.
51
 In 1908, the association bought property in Brooklyn and 
established its permanent headquarters there, where it still remains a prominent part of the 
Brooklyn skyline. 
Based on his reading of the Bible, by the mid-1880s, Russell pinpointed 1914 as the 
pivotal year for mankind. When Armageddon failed to materialize that year, Russell and his 
followers reinterpreted the significance of 1914.
52
 They now believed it marked the end of 
the ―Gentile Times,‖ a term they used to mark the date of Christ‘s invisible return to rule as 
king in heaven and the casting out of Satan from heaven to earth. This event ushered in a 
period of tribulation that would end with God‘s defeat of Satan in the battle of 
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Armageddon.
53
 An earthly paradise would be then established for all true Christians. The 
1914 doctrine established for the Bible Students a strong and enduring belief that all existing 
political and religious institutions would meet their demise in the near future, probably in 
their lifetimes. It also helped to attract attention and more people to the religion. The 1914 
date had particular resonance given that World War I began that year, bringing with it 
worldwide upheaval and uncertainty about the future.   
With the Bible Students expanding their global range, Russell‘s message began to 
reach the Russian Empire. An 1887 issue of The Watch Tower reported that the organization 
had mailed literature to Russian territory. Russell visited Kishinev (now Chişinău, the capital 
of Moldova) in 1891 during an extensive tour of Europe, but concluded with disappointment 
that he saw ―no opening or readiness for the truth in Russia.‖54 Upon his return to the States, 
he complained about the ―intolerably tight grip‖ of the tsarist government on its subjects, 
having been subjected to intense scrutiny at every step of his journey.
55
 The organization, 
perhaps heeding the pessimistic conclusions of its leader, continued to send sporadic 
literature to interested persons, but did little else to develop roots in Russian society. Twenty 
years later in 1911, Russell traveled to L‘viv (now located in Ukraine) to give a talk on 
―Zionism in Prophecy,‖ but the angry shouting of local Zionists drowned him out. A few 
attendees requested information, but the trip, as with the one to Kishinev, did not 
immediately yield converts or a new local chapter of the organization. Russell himself wrote 
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of his visit: ―God alone knows what his providences may be in connection with these 
experiences.‖56 
The Russian religious climate presented a unique challenge for Russell and his ideas 
because the Russian Empire already had a religious movement known colloquially as the 
―Jehovists‖ (Iegovisty) based on the writings of Nikolai Sazontovich Il‘in from the mid-
1800s. Both Russell and Il‘in‘s followers championed the use of ―Jehovah‖ as God‘s proper 
name, predicted an imminent Armageddon, rejected all other established Christian religions, 
and mistrusted worldly government, although they differed greatly in their other beliefs and 
practices. Despite state persecution of followers and the exile of Il‘in to the isolated 
Solovetskii monastery in northern Russia, Il‘in‘s writings gained traction in parts of the 
Russian Empire, including Ukraine and the Russian heartland.
57
 The Il‘in movement 
survived well into the Soviet era, although harsh persecution ultimately destroyed all but a 
few of these religious communities. In a sense, Russell had found curiously fertile ground in 
Russia, as Il‘in had already paved the way for Bible Student theology. At the same time, this 
situation caused enduring confusion among locals and officials, who found it hard to 
distinguish between the two groups. In the Soviet era, officials often referred to both groups 
as ―Jehovists,‖ only compounding the problem.58  
Despite initial setbacks, Russell did win his first convert in Russia, and it came from 
an unlikely source. Semion Kozlitskii, an Orthodox seminarian, met Russell after traveling in 
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the United States in 1874. Fully convinced of the truth of Russell‘s message, he returned to 
Russia to tell others in the Orthodox Church what he had learned. Not surprisingly, he 
clashed with church officials, who ultimately had him sent into permanent exile in 1892 for 
his heretical views. Spending the remainder of his life in Kazakhstan, he raised two sons, one 
of whom adopted the faith of his father. Without any access to literature or other believers, 
however, the faith largely died with Kozlitskii and his son, Andrei. Russell‘s beliefs did not 
return to Kazakhstan until the post-World War II era.
 59
   
While Kozlitskii resigned himself to a life in exile, events in St. Petersburg, Russia‘s 
capital, soon ushered in a potential opening for Bible Students. The 1905 Revolution 
prompted the first declaration by Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) of limited religious tolerance 
in the empire. While the decree did not allow non-Orthodox religions to proselytize, the Edict 
of Religious Toleration did recognize the right of subjects to accept a faith other than 
Orthodoxy. It also allowed non-Orthodox faith communities to legally meet, publish 
literature, and establish prayer houses.
60
 Under these eased restrictions, Russell visited 
Finland and the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society received official registration there 
from the tsarist government in 1913.
61
 The advent of World War I, followed by the February 
and October Revolutions of 1917 and Civil War, however, prevented the organization from 
establishing any missionary presence. 
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Transforming Bible Students into Jehovah’s Witnesses 
The interwar period saw the total transformation of Russell‘s Bible Students into 
modern-day Jehovah‘s Witnesses. After Russell‘s death in 1916, Joseph Franklin Rutherford, 
Russell‘s legal counsel, took over leadership of the organization. Rutherford saw the need for 
sweeping changes to create a unified hierarchical structure to oversee operations. While 
many within the ranks balked at the new rules, stricter controls, and mandatory obedience to 
appointed elders, the changes made possible a much more cohesive religious organization 
with greater ability to expand its global reach and to win new members. In 1931, Rutherford 
issued a new name for Russell‘s followers, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, that symbolized the 
commitment of all members to spread Jehovah‘s teachings.  
Under Rutherford, the organization developed many of its modern features. Based on 
passages in Revelation, both Russell and Rutherford preached that a select 144,000 believers 
would ascend to heaven to rule with God after Armageddon. While Russell had focused on 
recruiting members to this select cohort, Rutherford devoted greater attention to the millions 
who would enjoy eternal life in an earthly paradise.
62
 As such, he placed greater emphasis on 
proselytism, in which all members now had to engage, and began the door-to-door 
distribution of The Watch Tower. Rutherford founded a second magazine, The Golden Age, 
later called Awake!, to cover more secular topics and human interest stories, albeit from a 
biblical perspective.
63
 Organizational leaders, known as elders, became appointed, not 
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elected, as part of a new administrative model called ―theocratic government.‖64 Large-scale 
assemblies and conventions acquired more importance as venues to announce new literature, 
pass resolutions, baptize new members, and gather as a faith community.
65
  
During Rutherford‘s tenure the Witnesses developed into a distinct religious 
organization that increasingly stood apart from, and in opposition to, all other Christian 
faiths, finding them abhorrent deviations from the original church. Then, as now, Witnesses 
do not subscribe to the immortality of the soul, the divinity of Christ (whom they describe as 
God‘s first creation), the Trinity, or the existence of hell. Members follow Christ‘s 
instruction to be ―no part of this world‖ and expect persecution for this stance. Likewise, they 
believe that God has allowed Satan to gain control of earthly institutions, churches, and 
governments, irreparably corrupting them. According to the Witnesses, this state of affairs 
will end in Armageddon with God‘s defeat of Satan. Because of this view, Witnesses do not 
vote, serve in the military, hold public office, or engage in ecumenical activities with other 
churches. They accept medical treatment, but since 1945 have rejected blood transfusions, 
even when doing so could cause or hasten death.
66
 They live with the hope that they will 
soon enjoy Christ's millennial kingdom on earth, and with the responsibility of spreading 
their message to as many persons as possible so that others may share in paradise on earth.  
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Communism and the Bible 
 Despite the initial lack of missionary success in Eastern Europe, the Bible Students 
nonetheless steadily printed information about the region in their publications. In the early 
years, Russia and the Soviet Union appeared primarily as a land shrouded in mystery, 
wonder, and danger.
67
 As the organization had little direct contact with this distant territory, 
it based its views largely on conjecture and second-hand reports. Its magazines, which 
featured news briefs from around the world, reprinted stories on such divergent topics as 
homeless children and economic growth.
68
 The organization had little interest in Soviet 
religious repression, as it had no visible practitioners of the faith there. When the subject of 
religion did arise, the coverage tended toward critical articles on the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Showing little sympathy for their plight, a 1922 article wrote, ―Disobedience to 
Christ‘s command has inevitably, in this day of judgment . . . brought upon the Greek clergy 
great hardships, and upon the Russian Church system its destruction.‖69 
Both Russell and Rutherford saw world events as illustrations of unfolding biblical 
prophecies. Rutherford in particular readily commented on current affairs when he felt they 
had religious significance. This included the cause of communism and socialism, 
revolutionary movements, and growing calls for economic and social justice. For Rutherford, 
communism and socialism rested on the false belief that man could achieve lasting justice 
                                                 
67
 Some of the organization‘s news briefs on Russia were sensationalistic and bordered on the bizarre, from an 
alleged deadly nervous disorder said to afflict key Party leaders, to the breeding of a race of giant rats in Russia. 
―Communist Exhaustion in Russia,‖ The Golden Age, 1929, 483, and ―Getting Rid of Rats in Russia,‖ The 
Golden Age, 1929, 581. 
 
68
 ―Soviet Grappling with Bezprizorni,‖ The Golden Age, 1927, 10, and ―Russia‘s Astonishing Development,‖ 
The Golden Age, 1930, 119. 
 
69
 ―Babylon is Fallen--in Russia,‖ The Golden Age, November 8, 1922, 82. The organization uses the term 
―Babylon the Great‖ (Revelation 17-18) to refer to all other Christian churches, which it feels have betrayed 
true Christianity. In this and other articles, the persecution of clergy in the Soviet Union was often depicted as at 
least partially justified. One article praised the arrest of Catholic priests for treason. ―A Glimpse at the News of 
the World: Russia,‖ The Golden Age, April 23, 1924, 460. 
 36 
and peace on earth. In fact, only God could accomplish these goals and would do so at the 
appointed time described in the Bible. Revolution, by its nature, was therefore an affront to 
God.  
The organization itself took a strong stand against both communism in theory and the 
Soviet Union in practice. In 1921, a Bible Student convention passed the following 
resolution:  
Bolshevism, as a great menacing monster, is knocking at the door of every nation, 
and the destruction of all law and order is threatened. To prevent such terrible disaster 
and to save the people from indescribable suffering is the tremendous problem, 
which, we submit, requires more than human wisdom. We therefore suggest that the 
heeding of Divine wisdom and the adoption of the Divine remedy as prescribed by 
God‘s holy Word is vitally essential at this time.70 
 
Rutherford echoed the resolution in a fiery address in 1922. He described the coming 
Armageddon in graphic detail: ―Pictured from the prophetic words of the Lord, I see a 
mighty upheaval, a veritable avalanche of blood and fire, starting in Russia and sweeping 
over the earth.‖71 
In addition to his speeches throughout the US and in Europe, Rutherford was a 
prolific writer, and his views on world events circulated in dozens of books and booklets 
printed in massive press runs of over a million copies. These works, as much as The Watch 
Tower, provided the basis for Witness theology and Bible study through the 1930s and early 
1940s. They enjoyed a longer legacy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as World War 
II cut off access to new publications. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, many Soviet 
Witnesses still relied primarily on these works in practicing and preaching their faith. They 
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played a critical role in shaping members‘ views on the Soviet government and communist 
revolution after the war.  
Most importantly for later Soviet adherents of the faith, Rutherford‘s 1928 volume 
entitled Government laid out clearly his position on Soviet ideology. In it, Rutherford wrote: 
All who calmly and soberly view developments well know that bolshevism can never 
result in a satisfactory government of the people. Bolshevism is doomed to certain 
and complete failure. The same must be said of communism. Such radical movements 
for the establishment of a government of the people can never bring peace, prosperity 
and happiness to the peoples of the nations. 
 
Directly after this condemnation, he continued: ―It is said that the government of the United 
States of America comes nearest of any on earth to being an ideal government. No honest 
man understanding the conditions in the United States can claim that it is a satisfactory 
government.‖72 These passages later came back to haunt Soviet Witnesses, appearing in 
dozens of anti-Witness publications in the Soviet era. The first passage substantiated state 
claims of the organization‘s political aims, and the second passage frequently appeared 
without its second sentence, making it seem as if the Witnesses claimed that America had an 
ideal government. Together, critics saw these statements as proof of the organization‘s pro-
American sympathies, its secret collusions with foreign security services, and of its 
inherently political, and not religious message.
73
  In the immediate postwar period, the L‘viv 
security services questioned several Witnesses at length about their ownership of the 
Rutherford book and later used it as evidence against them in court.
74
  
                                                 
72
 Later in the same work, Rutherford writes that ―the soviet government has not been a success and never can 
be, and is far from being satisfactory to the people who have tried it.‖ J. F. Rutherford, Government (Brooklyn: 
International Bible Students Association and the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1928), 13, 245.  
 
73
 See, for example, F. I. Federenko, Sekty, ikh vera i dela (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965), 253; T. P. Korotkaia et 
al., Iegovizm, ed. M. Ia. Lensu (Minsk: Nauka i tekhnika, 1981), 44; and V. N.  Levnin, Brat‟ia Bruklinskikh 
apostolov: O svideteliakh Iegovy i ikh deiatel‟nosti v stavropol‟skom krae (Stavropol‘: Stavropol‘skoe kn. izd., 
1978), 30-31.  
 
 38 
Government highlights an enduring dilemma for Witnesses in the modern world. In 
their eyes, they maintain a neutral position regarding all politics. Indeed, for them, both of 
the statements cited above make a common point—that worldly government cannot establish 
lasting justice and peace for mankind; only God can do so. Yet it is hardly surprising that, for 
those outside the organization, these statements carry a political message. More broadly, the 
Witnesses‘ choice not to participate in or endorse any government, though done for religious 
reasons, had real political implications. As became increasingly clear in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, neutrality was inherently political.  
Ironically, Rutherford‘s statements brought him into equal trouble with the authorities 
in capitalist countries. His sharp attacks on organized religion, and Catholicism in particular, 
led many to label him and the Witnesses as communists. In the United States, the Supreme 
Court ruled that public schools could expel Witness schoolchildren who refused to say the 
pledge of allegiance before later reversing the decision.
75
 In the 1930s through the early 
1940s, mobs attacked Witnesses in the US as they went about their door-to-door preaching 
work.
76
 Similar violence occurred in Canada, along with the arrests of many members and 
the conviction of a few for sedition, culminating in a wholesale ban on the organization in 
1940. By the end of the 1940s, the violent persecution in the US had largely subsided as the 
Supreme Court passed several landmark rulings protecting the Witnesses‘ right to practice 
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and preach their beliefs. In Canada, state persecution of Witnesses ended with court decisions 
in their favor in the late 1950s.
77
 
Rutherford‘s confrontational style had an impact on the theological focus of believers. 
Christ‘s prediction to his disciples that ―if they persecuted me, they will persecute you also‖ 
had particular resonance with the faithful during the interwar and wartime eras.
78
 For them, 
persecution demonstrated that they were true followers of Christ—unlike other Christians 
who did not face similar opposition. While opposition tested their beliefs, it also gave them a 
renewed trust in Biblical prophecy and the value of their proselytism work. Overall, under 
Rutherford, Witnesses learned two valuable lessons: a true Christian expects hostility from 
the outside world and never gives in to adversaries, regardless of circumstances or potential 
danger.
79
 A 1934 Watch Tower article told readers, ―Where the law of this world contravenes 
God‘s law the faithful must obey God‘s law at any cost.‖80 Opposition set an important 
precedent for how the organization reacted to government challenges to its right to practice. 
Whenever possible, it fought through the legal system, but never let state policy, no matter 
how repressive, stand in the way of keeping the faith.  
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A Missionary to the Soviet People 
 With the 1942 appointment of the organization‘s third president, Nathan H. Knorr, 
the Witnesses became a truly global enterprise with a developed missionary strategy to reach 
all countries. Until then, the organization conducted foreign proselytism work primarily 
through missionaries sent abroad to distribute Watch Tower literature and preach the 
religion's distinct theology. Many of these individuals had no formal training or knowledge 
of the local conditions, and the success rate of such endeavors varied widely. In some 
countries, primarily in Western Europe, this approach yielded large, self-sustaining 
communities. Elsewhere, it failed to extend beyond a few isolated individuals and faltered 
when the missionaries returned home. In the Soviet Union, the latter happened.  
Early efforts in the Soviet Union ran into a sea of problems, from state opposition to 
wartime chaos and instability.
81
 One Polish Bible Student inadvertently found himself on 
Soviet soil after he and his family embarked on a preaching trip to Russia on the eve of 
World War I. When the war began, the borders closed and they were unable to leave. By the 
time the family finally returned to Łódź (now part of independent Poland) in 1921, three of 
their children had died from disease and the father had narrowly avoided arrest by the new 
government.
82
 At the same time in 1921, the Polish branch office in Warsaw sent other 
missionaries into Soviet territory while war still raged between the two infant states. Not 
surprisingly, a subsequent report on the trip described the experience as a total failure, a 
result it blamed on state opposition and ―the conditions of gross darkness which exist 
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there.‖83 Nonetheless, Brooklyn continued to receive mail from interested persons asking for 
publications and had some limited success in shipping literature to these addresses in the 
Soviet Union.
84
 A 1923 letter from inside the Soviet Union informed the organization of ―the 
great need of spiritual food‖ after authorities had confiscated all of the previously sent 
books.
85
   
One Russian, ―Brother Trumpi,‖ wrote to the organization in 1926 expressing the 
belief that it might be possible to get official state permission to legally import literature. In 
response, Rutherford decided to send an official representative, George Young, to assess the 
situation.
86
 A former Presbyterian, Young had left the church after reading Russell‘s sermons 
and devoted his life entirely to spreading Russell‘s teachings around the world. In the 1920s, 
the organization sent him on missions to Latin America and Europe. Then, on August 28, 
1928, he arrived in the Soviet Union. 
Young could not have chosen a less opportune time. Stalin had consolidated power 
within the Communist Party, the country stood on the eve of collectivization, and the state 
was on the brink of enacting a new religious policy. In 1929, it announced the Law on 
Religious Associations, which instituted a strict registration process for all religious 
organizations and made any activity outside of officially recognized bodies illegal. It also 
banned religious instruction of minors and religious charity work. In addition, changes to the 
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constitution barred the distribution of religious propaganda. Protestant religions, which had 
previously enjoyed some freedom to operate under Soviet power, now found themselves no 
longer welcome and subject to intense persecution.
87
 In October, Young sent a letter back to 
his family telling them, ―I have had some interesting experiences but do not know how long I 
will be permitted to remain.‖  
Despite these inauspicious conditions, Young reported that he had managed to 
connect with Bible Students in Kharkiv and had even held a small three-day convention in 
the city. He announced that he had received permission from local authorities to print and 
distribute two booklets.
88
 Young most likely misunderstood the officials because soon after, 
the Soviet state forced him to leave the country. They had no tolerance for a roving 
preacher.
89
 
A year later, the organization published Young‘s detailed report of his experiences in 
The Golden Age. Despite the official guarantee of religious freedom, Young noted that the 
Soviet state did not abide by this principle. He described the government‘s promotion of 
evolutionary theory and the atheist character of the state as major obstacles to establishing a 
strong Christian presence among the local population. For Young and the organization, the 
major religion prior the revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church, did not count as Christian. 
In fact, the report partially blamed the church‘s doctrines for the rise of atheism and 
Darwinism in the Soviet Union. Young believed the church had turned people away from the 
true faith and led them to seek answers elsewhere in revolutionary ideology. While 
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acknowledging Soviet repression of the Orthodox Church, Young derided the religion as 
―unscriptural‖ and its beliefs as eliciting ―a strong feel of revulsion‖ among the population. 
He closed by affirming that mankind, including the Russian people, must wait for 
deliverance from God and not attempt to establish an earthly paradise on their own. He 
wrote: ―Even were it possible for the highest aims of earthly governments, whether 
republican, monarchical, socialistic or soviet, to be realized, yet death reigns over us all. In a 
few years poor feeble man . . . withers like a grass in the field, and, like a helpless worm, 
sinks into death.‖90 With this pessimistic pronouncement on the Soviet project, the 
organization‘s first foray into the Soviet Union ended. 
Later prewar attempts to preach on Soviet territory achieved little, if anything. Upon 
Young‘s return to the United States, the organization appointed Danyil Starukhin, a 
Ukrainian, to oversee all organizational work in the Soviet Union. He failed to make any 
headway in winning registration for the organization.
91
 A third attempt by Anton Koerber, 
who traveled to Russia in 1935, also brought no progress toward legalization.
92
 By 1939, 
while the organization continued to produce Russian-language literature, primarily for 
converts among the Russian émigré population in the West, it had few real members in the 
Soviet Union and no local structure.
93
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Bible Students in Interwar Eastern Europe 
Interwar missionary efforts had far more success in Eastern Europe and created self-
sustaining communities of believers in areas later annexed by the Soviet Union during World 
War II. Three territories had primary importance in this regard. First, an independent Poland 
controlled eastern Galicia and Volyn‘, territories which later became Soviet western Ukraine. 
Second, an enlarged Romanian state oversaw the formerly tsarist Bessarabia until its 
annexation to postwar Soviet Moldavia. Romanian-controlled Bukovina ultimately formed 
part of Chernivtsi oblast in postwar Soviet Ukraine. Third, interwar Czechoslovakia 
governed Transcarpathia until the region‘s wartime annexation to Soviet Ukraine as 
Zakarpattia oblast. All of these regions experienced an influx of missionaries and Bible 
Student literature in the 1920s, followed by escalating obstacles to their work in the early to 
mid-1930s.  
Much smaller communities of believers formed in other soon-to-be Soviet lands, 
namely Polish-controlled western Belorussia and the newly independent Baltic states. Bible 
Students appeared in western Belorussia by the mid-1920s and gained at least a few hundred 
converts by World War II. In the Baltic states, the organization transmitted radio programs in 
Estonia and established a local office in Latvia, winning a small number of converts in the 
region in the face of state opposition in the 1930s. Missionaries also traveled to Lithuania and 
held small conventions there, despite the difficulties posed by martial law in the 1930s. In 
comparison to their Moldavian and Ukrainian counterparts, however, both the Baltic and 
western Belorussian communities had far fewer members and did not recover well from the 
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harsh persecution and exile of the early postwar period. These territories contained only a 
small number of Witnesses until the post-Soviet era.
94
 
The Watch Tower organization directed its interwar efforts in these territories through 
two primary offices: the Central European Office in Bern, Switzerland, and the Northern 
European Office in Copenhagen, Denmark. These two bodies conducted most of the printing 
work in regional languages, allotted personnel to aid in the missionary work, and provided 
oversight. To make its message accessible to the local population, the organization translated 
its primary publications into dozens of European languages, including Romanian, Hungarian, 
Russian, and Ukrainian. It also printed testimony cards in multiple languages to aid 
missionaries who did not speak the local tongues.
95
 
The earliest converts were those who had left Eastern Europe seeking work and better 
living conditions and joined the faith while abroad, primarily in the United States or Canada. 
The interwar era offered them a chance to serve as the first missionaries of their faith in their 
villages and towns. These individuals returned home to spread their new beliefs to neighbors 
and family members, creating an organic and local element to early missionary work that 
helped bring positive results. It enabled these communities to withstand the growing hostility 
to their religion and to survive into the Soviet era.  
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Disillusionment with traditional churches motivated some conversions to the Bible 
Students and later to the Witnesses. For instance, one Ukrainian man joined in 1939 after he 
shared his complaints about Catholic priests with a local Witness, who gave him a book that 
discussed how priests were enemies of God.
96
 A Polish citizen, Antoni Pleszar, wrote to The 
Watch Tower in 1938 to express his dissatisfaction with the Catholic faith of his parents. He 
recalled how, ―being wearied with the confusion of all kinds of interpretation, and with 
continued thirst for knowledge of the truth,‖ he prayed to God to grant him help. Soon after, 
a Witness from the Łódź office visited his home. The Witnesses eagerly published such 
sentiments, which reinforced their condemnation of the Vatican and Roman Catholicism.
97
 
Later, the involvement of local priests in wartime military efforts led some to join the 
Witnesses. When a Catholic priest promised several military draftees in Transcarpathia 
salvation for killing communists, one of the men recalled the Watch Tower publications he 
had read before the war and subsequently joined the faith in 1945.
98
 At least a few converted 
from Protestant religions that had a strong local presence. This trend continued into the 
Soviet period, when Witnesses won many of their converts from Baptist and Adventist 
communities.
99
 
At the same time, some early converts felt similar dissatisfaction with their new 
religion after Rutherford‘s consolidation of power. As a result, the organization experienced 
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heavy turnover in members both in the United States and abroad. For example, Pavlo 
Moshuk joined the faith in the US before returning to Stanislav region (Poland) in 1921. At 
this time, Rutherford propagated the idea that 1925 might very well usher in the millennial 
kingdom and the resurrection of the New Testament patriarchs to life on earth. The 
organization‘s early 1920s campaign was entitled ―Millions Now Living Will Never Die.‖100 
Like many others, Moshuk actively participated in spreading this message. But when 1925 
passed without incident, he apparently disappeared from the fold.
101
 Two years later, the 
Romanian branch office in Cluj also had difficulties with its appointed representative. In 
1930, it reported that, due to this man‘s ―unfaithfulness,‖ members ―have been scattered and 
their confidence greatly shaken.‖102  
Most of those attracted to the faith in these regions appear to have come from among 
the peasant or working-class segments of society in villages and towns. The Romanian 
branch office provided one explanation for why their recruitment came primarily from small 
towns. It was apparently easier to win over local police in such situations and to gain 
permission to hold public meetings.
103
 In this early period, ―pioneers‖ who volunteered full-
time in missionary service did the bulk of the proselytism.
104
 In Eastern Europe, the 
organization found it hard to convince people to serve as pioneers, as few members could 
afford not to work. A 1932 report from Lithuania noted, ―Conditions in this country are so 
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bad that most of their [pioneers‘] time has to be spent in ordinary work in order that 
sufficient food may be obtained.‖105 Czechoslovak representatives expressed frustration that 
their members could not afford to travel to distant locations and that the organization did not 
have the funds to subsidize them. The Romanian branch office wrote to The Watch Tower in 
1920 thanking Rutherford for a gift of twenty-five dollars. The overseer in charge of outreach 
to ethnic Hungarians used the money to buy a proper suit to wear during his preaching 
work.
106
  
Many Soviet publications would later claim that early converts had been bought off 
by the organization, which allegedly promised five dollars to anyone who joined and more to 
those who agreed to recruit others.
107
 These charges likely stemmed from the fact that, during 
this period, the organization did not generally give away its literature for free, as it does 
today. Instead, it suggested that individuals make a modest contribution to cover printing 
costs.
108
 In direct contrast to Soviet accusations, literature costs actually represented a serious 
obstacle to preaching work in Eastern Europe. First, donations did not cover expenses. 
Several reports from local members to Brooklyn stressed the difficulty of finding money to 
print and distribute literature. They noted that many who showed interest could not afford to 
contribute any money for the publications.
109
 One 1924 report from Romania stated that most 
                                                 
105
 1932 Year Book, 146. 
 
106
 J. B. Sima, ―Good News from Roumania,‖ The Watch Tower and Herald of Christ‟s Presence, August 15, 
1920, 254. 
 
107
 M. Kravchenko and G. Sergienko, „Slugy Egovy‟--Slugy imperializmu (L‘viv: Kn.-zhural‘ne vyd-vo, 1960), 
14-15, and A. T. Moskalenko, Sekta iegovistov i ee reaktsionnaia sushchnost‟ (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 
1961), 58-59. 
 
108
 The organization always dictated that those too poor to make a contribution be given the literature free of 
charge. It finally ended the contribution policy entirely in 1990. Since then, it had provided all literature for free 
with no donation expected or requested. Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Proclaimers, 347-50. 
 
109
 ―Annual Report 1921,‖ 377. 
 49 
people ―are so poor that they cannot afford to pay very much for books.‖110 A Polish report 
the following year suggested that perhaps they should switch to offering free literature in 
order to reach more people.
111
 These documents also reveal the poor backgrounds of most 
members, for whom buying a single book represented a major hardship and demonstrated the 
seriousness of their commitment to this new faith. 
 Watch Tower beliefs and social attitudes may also have helped to explain the 
religion‘s appeal among the poor. Both Russell and Rutherford incorporated attacks on big 
business and capitalism into their publications, showing clear sympathies for the plight of the 
working classes.
112
 In a 1929 radio broadcast on the eve of the Great Depression, Rutherford 
railed against the ―oppressive hand‖ of American corporations and the ―silent and cruel 
power‖ of ―Big Finance.‖113 More than other Christian denominations, the Watch Tower 
Bible and Tract Society stressed the impending arrival of God‘s kingdom—which would 
bring justice, peace, and an end to all material want. And unlike other forms of Christianity, 
they believed that paradise would take place on earth, not in heaven.  
In this regard, the faith had similarities with communist ideology, which may partly 
explain why many people suspected its followers of communist sympathies and why the 
Soviet state found the religion so dangerous.
114
 Witnesses were not entirely unique in this 
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regard. Historians have examined how other Soviet religious movements shared common 
ground with communism. Coleman has written about how early Soviet Baptists attempted to 
chart their own Christ-driven ―path to socialism‖ in the wake of the February Revolution.115 
Roslof has examined ―red priests‖ who supported the Soviet state and tried to dramatically 
reform the Orthodox Church.
116
 Yet an important element distinguishes these cohorts from 
the Bible Students, and later Witnesses. While the revolution served as a rallying cry for 
some Baptists and Orthodox priests to participate in building a new, better world and reform 
their own faith communities, Witnesses saw it as evidence of man‘s hubris and an attempt to 
meddle in affairs best left to God. This view left less room for compromise and collaboration 
with the state. 
When Soviet propaganda discussed the initial rise of Witnesses in Eastern Europe, it 
cited the oppressive conditions of capitalism as the leading cause. One work blamed ―the 
socio-political and economic oppression and difficult cultural conditions of life for the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples under bourgeois Polish rule‖ as having led directly to a rise 
in Christian sects.
117
 According to his logic, the oppressed classes sought out religious sects 
as a means to protest against the ruling church and state. This trope played a prominent role 
in explaining why members of the working class and peasantry would have joined a religious 
movement. As will be discussed in later chapters, this view colored how the Soviet state dealt 
with Witnesses in its western borderlands.  
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Russell made his earliest, and perhaps strongest inroads in future Soviet territory in 
Poland. The first community of Bible Students formed as early as 1910 in response to a visit 
by Russell to Warsaw. Restrictive tsarist religious policy, followed by World War I and war 
with the Soviet Union, made it hard to find new members until the 1920s.
118
 After Polish 
independence, Brooklyn reestablished steady contact with followers there and made a serious 
commitment to proselytize in Poland, including the territory of Galicia in eastern Poland, 
with its large Ukrainian population. One of the first converts to the Bible Students there, 
Safat Boruts‘kyi, joined the faith after returning from abroad to the L‘viv region in 1921.119 
He began to preach and recruit new members, who then served as local leaders for the 
Galician Bible Students.
120
 Growth in L‘viv was strong enough to justify the establishment of 
a small city office in the mid-1920s.
121
 In 1926, The Watch Tower reported that forty-two 
people participated in the L‘viv Memorial service that year.122 In 1932, the Polish branch 
office moved from Warsaw to its permanent location in Łódź.123 After World War II, L‘viv 
became the epicenter of Soviet Witness activity, and its leaders continued to report to Łódź 
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for instructions and literature. This Polish channel largely closed in the early 1950s with the 
arrest of its leaders. 
The Watch Tower organization‘s arrival in Poland met with strong resistance both 
from the state and from Catholic clergy, who denounced it as preaching a false religion. 
Some believers suffered violent attacks during their proselytism work.
124
 As early as 1923, 
the annual report from Poland noted that Bible Students there could no longer find meeting 
halls to rent in Galicia, and that members had been reduced to gathering in secret in the 
woods.
125
 State opposition grew by the mid-1930s. In 1933, for example, Polish members 
suffered roughly 100 incidents of state interference in preaching work and another 41 
instances of mob violence. These episodes increased dramatically in the next few years.
126
 
Also in 1933, the organization began to rely on local printers in Łódź after the government 
blocked importation of some of its literature. In a common tactic across Eastern Europe at 
this time, Witnesses regularly changed the names of their publications to avoid 
confiscation.
127
  
In Czechoslovakia, the Watch Tower organization did not have as early or as rapid 
success as in Poland, reporting in 1927 that ―the conditions in that country are not 
favorable.‖128 Three years later, it saw no improvement and blamed the influence of the 
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Roman Catholic Church.
129
 The local overseer for the organization also cited the desperate 
poverty of the existing members, who ―do not have proper clothing besides their frocks.‖ 
Several German volunteers spearheaded the proselytism work and allowed the organization 
to distribute a large quantity of literature to the local population.
130
 Moreover, after the 1933 
ban on Witnesses in Germany, some German Witnesses took refuge in Czechoslovakia.  
Pessimistic early reports notwithstanding, the organization managed to find willing 
converts in several towns in Transcarpathia, a region with a diverse mix of Hungarian, 
Ukrainian, German, Romanian, and Slovak populations. The experiences of one man, 
Shandor Bara, shed light on the conversion process. A Hungarian by nationality, Shandor had 
moved to Argentina in 1927 in search of work. Five years later, he married and returned 
home to Transcarpathia. In police interrogations after World War II, he claimed that, upon 
his return, his wife, already a Witness, convinced him to join the faith and renounce the 
Catholic Church. He may also have come into contact with the Watch Tower organization 
while living abroad.
131
 At around the same time in the early 1930s, the organization built its 
first meeting houses in the region in the villages of Dibrova, Bila Tserkva, and Solotvyno.
132
 
In 1932, the country office held its first major convention in Prague with 1,5000 in 
attendance.
133
 Mounting difficulties in Germany forced the Czechoslovak branch office to 
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adopt greater self-sufficiency by printing its own literature in country and relying much less 
on foreign missionaries.
134
 As a result, the branch experienced strong growth during these 
last years before the war, particularly in its eastern regions, where in 1937 it noted: ―It is 
quite probable that a greater witness is being given amongst the Russian-speaking people in 
Czechoslovakia than in any other part of the earth just at the present time.‖135 
In Bessarabia, located in eastern Romania, the Bible Students made similar advances 
due to the efforts of a few missionaries and active local converts. In 1919, they found perhaps 
their first Bible Student in Ilie Groza, whose neighbor had just returned from abroad with 
some Bible literature. Groza and his family began to hold home meetings to discuss what 
they read and included another village family as well.
136
 Two years later, the Watch Tower 
published a report stating that there were already almost two hundred followers in 
Bessarabia.
137
 Russell‘s message spread to Bukovina in northeastern Romania as early as 
1924 and Brooklyn began to mail publications to over 200 local persons. By 1931, the area 
already had over fifty active proselytizers of the faith.
138
 For example, Alexandru Ardeleanu 
joined during this time after coming into contact with American missionaries. He began to 
receive Watch Tower publications by mail and became the first convert in the village of 
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Pererita.
139
 Local believers, along with foreign missionaries and returning émigrés, headed 
the proselytism efforts into the 1930s. In Khotyn, Oleksii Sandyga led the northern 
Bessarabian Witnesses during the 1930s.
140
 
In Romanian territories, believers faced serious restrictions on their actions upon their 
arrival after World War I. The Bible Students first set up an office in Cluj to oversee 
operations, but ran into continual state and clergy opposition. Annual reports to Brooklyn 
note the difficult conditions.
141
 In 1926, the state banned The Watch Tower in Bessarabia, 
forcing it to publish under a series of other titles to avoid confiscation.
142
 A 1927 report 
stated that police had broken up local meetings and arrested hundreds of male members, 
including almost all of the most active proselytizers. The remaining members had to meet 
clandestinely in the woods.
143
 Many of these methods for operating underground developed 
by Bessarabian believers in the interwar era would become standard practice in the Soviet 
era. 
Still, the organization managed to negotiate a fragile, semi-legal existence through a 
new office in Bucharest, opened in 1932.
144
 However, police harassment and raids continued. 
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By 1936, the annual report noted, ―In no part of the earth do the brethren work with greater 
difficulties than in Rumania.‖145 Finally, in 1937, the Ministry of Religions publicly 
announced a total ban on the Witnesses and their literature. A year later, with Romania now 
under the dictatorial rule of King Carol II, the state shut down the Bucharest office and 
arrested several leading members.
146
 
Throughout Eastern Europe, opposition to the Watch Tower organization stemmed in 
large part from its vocal rejection of other religions, primarily the Catholic and Orthodox 
churches. Its followers attracted attention for their refusal to attend local church services or 
celebrations and for their children‘s non-participation in religious classes in the local schools. 
Similar to the situation in United States and Canada, suspicions that the Witnesses harbored 
communist sympathies were widespread in Eastern Europe at this time. One Polish 
newspaper accused members of ―being covert Communists who sang Bolshevik songs, were 
trained in the Soviet Union, and received payment from there.‖147 In Rutherford‘s 1937 book, 
Enemies, he writes: 
The scarecrow held up throughout the lands now is that of Communism, and it is the 
papacy that is behind that scarecrow movement. Everyone who dares tell the truth 
about the Roman Hierarchy is by that organization denounced as a Communist. The 
facts are that Communism has been encouraged by the Jesuits, the secret order of the 
Roman Catholic Hierarchy, and then used as a camouflage or scarecrow to frighten 
the people to unite in a movement contrary thereto, and which latter movement is 
clearly controlled by the papacy.
148
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The Watch Tower organization overemphasized the role of organized religion, and 
Roman Catholicism in particular, in orchestrating the persecution of its members. The 
organization‘s literature saw the Vatican as the ultimate overlord of Europe, secretly 
masterminding religious policy for all European governments in order to repress true 
Christianity. The Nazis, for example, repeatedly appeared as ―agents of the Roman Catholic 
hierarchy.‖149 Fascism, too, was ―merely a tool and a dupe of the Jesuits.‖150 If many states 
could not apparently distinguish between Witnesses and communists, Witnesses showed a 
similar inability to differentiate among fascists, Nazis, and even communists, all of whom 
they saw as pawns of the Catholic Church.  
Despite opposition, the number of people who joined the Watch Tower organization 
in these future Soviet territories grew steadily in the 1920s and 1930s. The conversion of one 
person often spread throughout the family, then to the neighbors, leading to small areas with 
remarkably high Bible Student or Witness presence. Wilhelm Scheider, the head of the 
Polish branch in the interwar period, compared the growth to ―mushrooms after the rain.‖151 
Until the 1940s, annual reports focused primarily on literature distribution and meeting 
attendance, making it hard to provide accurate counts of baptized members for the interwar 
period. Also, as the organization has noted, ―the seriousness of Christian baptism was not 
fully appreciated‖ during the interwar period and thus, many active converts did not get 
baptized until much later.
152
 A 1934 report did state that over 600 people were in active 
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service in Poland and over 400 in Romania. These members distributed more than 250,000 
items of literature the previous year.
153
 According to the 2002 Yearbook, by 1939 the Polish 
branch had over 1,100 members, about half of them Ukrainians in Galicia and Volyn‘.154 For 
Czechoslovakia, the 1935 report listed an average of 600 people in active service.
155
  
Since not every member participated in proselytism at this time, the actual figures for 
membership during this period were likely much greater. One Soviet-era source states that, 
by the end of the 1920s, more than 70 Bible Student groups functioned in Polish Ukraine and 
Transcarpathia.
156
 Over 370 people attended a Memorial service in 1927 in Transcarpathia 
alone.
157
 In May 1926, the Bible Students held their first convention in the village of Velyki 
Luchky in Transcarpathia with 150 participants. They conducted 20 baptisms of new 
members. Other conventions followed in L‘viv, Volyn‘, Uzhhorod, and Solotvyno, and 
elsewhere.
158
  
These communities, which formed largely on familial and village networks, were 
remarkably strong and committed to the faith. Despite a multitude of Soviet efforts to wipe 
out these Witness strongholds, the seeds planted by Bible Students in the 1920s could not be 
uprooted. In Moldova, the early village communities in Tabani and Caracuşeni continue to 
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have some of the heaviest concentrations of Witnesses in the world. In 2003, 25 percent of 
villagers in Caracuşeni, for example, were Witnesses.159 Similarly, throughout the Soviet 
period, Transcarpathia had by far the highest number of Witnesses of any region in the Soviet 
Union.
160
  
 
Into the Lion’s Den: World War II 
As Eastern Europe shifted increasingly toward authoritarian governments in the 
1930s, the Witnesses found themselves subjected to heightened state interference. It became 
more difficult to print and distribute literature, hold public talks, and rent office facilities. In 
some areas, even meeting in small groups became a real challenge that required ingenuity 
and a certain level of courage. In 1938, the state shut down the Polish branch office in Łódź. 
Romanian Witnesses suffered more, with mass arrests and police raids of homes to uncover 
illegal literature.
161
 Hostility toward the Witnesses also peaked in other parts of Europe. In 
Germany, Witnesses incurred the ire of the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler for their political 
neutrality and their distribution of anti-fascist publications calling attention to religious 
persecution in the German state. This also coincided with growing tension between 
Witnesses and the Canadian and American governments.  
                                                 
159
 In Tabani, roughly 15 percent of villagers were Witnesses as of that same year. 2004 Yearbook, 76-77. 
 
160
 In 1985, the CRA counted 59 groups and 3,381 members in Zakarpattia oblast. GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 
3130, l. 102. To give one specific example, the village of Bila Tserkva had 43 partakers at its 1925 Memorial—
a very high figure for the time. In 1965, the village boasted 143 adult members—the second highest in the 
district. ―Memorial Reports,‖ The Watch Tower and Herald of Christ‟s Presence, August 15, 1925, 248, and 
DAZO, f. 1490, op. 2, spr. 57, ark. 99.  
 
161
 1939 Year Book of the Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Peoples Pulpit 
Association, and International Bible Student Association, 1938), 155-56. 
 
 60 
The rise of opposition worldwide had a significant net effect on the organization‘s 
tone, already rather strident against worldly government and organized religion. It became 
even more defiant immediately following the German state‘s closure of Witness offices in 
Magdeburg. A Watch Tower article portrayed the German government as ―deliberate 
manslayers or persecutors who are of Satan‘s organization,‖ noting that God would destroy 
them for what they had done to true believers.
162
  The organization, correctly anticipating that 
even greater persecution would soon follow, began to instruct members how to practice the 
faith underground. Articles from this time described in clear language what the organization 
expected of all members when dealing with unjust governments and state persecution. They 
advised Witnesses that if thrown in prison, they must preach from their cells and continue 
spreading the faith upon release.
163
 A 1938 article was even more dire: 
The fanatical religionists may kill us now, but the faithful unto death God will 
immediately resurrect to a perfect and glorious life. Jehovah‘s witnesses,164 anointed 
and commissioned of the Lord to perform certain duties, know that they must die 
sometime in order to prove their integrity and to enter fully into the spiritual kingdom 
of the Lord. They are determined, therefore, to die in faith and faithfully devoted to 
God in the performance of duty, and, having this faith, they are blind to everything 
save that of doing the will of God.‖165 
 
Steady coverage of German persecution of Witnesses provided Eastern European 
Witnesses a glimpse of their own future.
166
 In 1933, the Nazi government banned the 
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organization, shut down its branch office in Magdeburg, and by 1936 began sending 
Witnesses to concentration camps. Unlike other concentration camp prisoners, German 
Witnesses could regain their freedom—they simply needed to sign an official document 
renouncing all ties to their religion. Most refused. Even under threat of arrest and 
imprisonment, they continued to publicly distribute illegal literature, including publications 
attacking the Nazi state for its religious intolerance. A 1934 article instructed: ―To obey 
Jehovah‘s law the faithful anointed cannot hide themselves nor can they have an excuse to sit 
quietly in their homes and hum hymns and read books.‖167 Witnesses took this command 
seriously. By 1945, roughly 1,200 German Witnesses had lost their lives due to Nazi 
persecution.
 168
 
With the advent of World War II, Eastern European Witnesses found themselves 
face-to-face with the same hard choices as their fellow believers in Germany. In 1939, the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, and 
Soviet troops occupied eastern Galicia. Soviet forces quickly shut down all legal operations 
of the Witnesses, closing meeting places and local offices. The Witnesses‘ 1941 Yearbook 
reported ominously that ―Poland has sunken into appalling darkness‖ and that Brooklyn had 
lost all contact with its branch office. It expressed confidence, however, that its Polish 
                                                                                                                                                       
1933-1945, trans. James A. Moorhouse (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001); M. James Penton, Jehovah‟s 
Witnesses and the Third Reich: Sectarian Politics under Persecution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2004); and Hans Hesse, ed., Persecution and Resistance of Jehovah‟s Witnesses during the Nazi Regime, 1933-
1945 (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2001). 
 
167
 ―Lions‘ Mouths,‖ 360. 
 
168
 There is some disagreement among scholars as to the number of those imprisoned, interned, and killed 
during the Nazi regime. I am relying on the most recent and extensive study of the German Witnesses by Detlef 
Garbe. He concludes that of the 25,000 to 30,000 members in 1933, roughly 10,000 were imprisoned, and 2,000 
of these people were sent to concentration camps. By the war‘s end, approximately 950 had died in the camps 
and another 250 by execution. Garbe, Between Resistance, 484. 
 62 
brethren would ―be able to stand upright.‖169 In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union, occupying eastern Galicia and Volyn‘ until the arrival of Soviet troops in 1944. The 
pact also led to the 1940 Soviet takeover of Bessarabia and Bukovina until Romanian 
occupying forces arrived in the summer of 1941. While Romania had already banned the 
Witnesses prior to the occupation, the war significantly ramped up persecution. Only 
Witnesses in Transcarpathia did not experience an early wave of Soviet control, as this 
territory instead fell under Hungarian control after the 1938 Nazi annexation of 
Czechoslovakia. Hungary issued an official ban on the Witnesses in December 1939.
170
  
The war had a devastating effect on the local population in all of these territories. The 
Axis powers rounded up and slaughtered the Jewish population, along with suspected 
communists and other categories of people. It also sent large numbers of civilians to work as 
slave laborers for the Reich, including some Witnesses.
171
 Widespread violence, civilian 
casualties, and food shortages created a climate of fear and uncertainty. Some Witnesses 
were injured or died due to air raids, food shortages, illness, or wartime violence. For 
example, one woman spent the war in L‘viv until a shell fragment hit her during a 
bombardment and left her unable to work.
172
 One Witness buried his wife, son, and two of 
his wife‘s two siblings due to famine during the war.173  
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With the advent of occupation, Witnesses lost all contact with Brooklyn and had to 
navigate through waves of persecution without direction or guidance from headquarters.
174
 
By necessity, the organization went entirely underground in these years. It did not reemerge 
in Soviet-controlled territories until 1991. Until the 1950s, many members sustained their 
faith on the same publications they had owned since the 1920s and early 1930s. With so 
many people displaced from their homes, Witnesses struggled to maintain cohesion and 
unity. They met at home in small groups and continued to speak about their faith to others. 
When possible, they conducted baptisms in secret in local rivers, a practice that continued 
into the Soviet era.
175
  
Information about the wartime leadership of the organization remains murky, in part 
because the various regional branches no longer had access to the two major European 
offices. As a result, the organizational structure was fractured in some areas. Poland 
maintained the most coherent organization and its wartime leaders ultimately morphed into 
the first Soviet governing committee once the war ended. During the war, however, its reach 
generally extended only to Polish territories under the German General Government. 
Stanislav Burak oversaw activities for occupied western Ukraine, having served as the 
Galician country servant prior to the war. Born in 1900, Burak joined the Witnesses in the 
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1930s.
176
 He is recognized as the first head of the Soviet Witnesses. Until his arrest and death 
in Lukianovskii prison in Kiev in 1947, Burak attempted to maintain some sense of structure 
and order in a period of chaos and uncertainty about the future.
177
 According to one source, 
he called a conference of leaders in western Ukraine in 1940 to parcel out territorial 
appointments for Witness elders who could then better minister to a divided flock.
178
  
Most of the information on Burak‘s tenure comes from two problematic sources, 
namely postwar KGB interrogations and statements from either former members or members 
of the so-called ―opposition,‖ comprised of a faction of Soviet Witnesses who broke off from 
the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society‘s authority in the late 1950s. In a 1961 internal 
memo circulated among Witnesses in Zakarpattia oblast, oppositionists attacked the legacy of 
the first Brooklyn-appointed leader, likely as a way of undermining trust in the current 
leadership. They accused Burak of promoting a confrontational strategy with the Nazi 
occupying forces. Based on a mistaken belief that Armageddon would occur in 1942, Burak 
allegedly instructed members to store grain and livestock and to refuse draft cards. As a 
result, members were swiftly and brutally repressed.
179
 Petro Tokar‘, who assisted Burak 
during the initial postwar era until his 1947 arrest, made similar claims under interrogation, 
stating also that the organization had removed Burak from the leadership following 1942 and 
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only allowed him to reassume this position after the postwar arrest of another leader, Pavlo 
Ziatek.
180
  
Although it is impossible to determine the veracity of these claims, they reflect a real 
and enduring division among members as to how to interact with the state. In a related 
example, one former Witness claimed that, in 1941, he and other leaders sent out a delegation 
to confront the local German occupying forces only to have all the delegates killed by these 
men.
181
 This story, though perhaps embellished, fits in with the tactics of bold opposition to 
the German regime employed by Witnesses in the 1930s. While former Witnesses and the 
oppositionists framed Burak‘s and other leaders‘ motives as cynical and cruel, they were in 
keeping with the organization‘s own instructions not to compromise with governmental 
authorities. Unable to receive more detailed instructions from Brooklyn, Burak and the initial 
leaders preferred to err on the side of resistance. Once instructions did reach the Soviet Union 
after the war, tactics softened in order to avoid detection and to shield members from 
avoidable arrests.  
The dispute over draft cards highlights the most dangerous aspect of Witness 
resistance during World War II—their refusal to serve in the military or to work in war 
industries. Each wave of invasion led to mandatory military drafts of all able-bodied men. 
The drafts exposed the Witnesses to arrest and imprisonment and, in some cases, execution. 
Parfin Palamarciuc of Bukovina, along with ninety-nine other Romanian Witnesses who 
resisted the draft, received a death sentence from a Chernivtsi court in 1942. Eight of the men 
were shot, and two renounced the religion before the rest received a commutation to twenty-
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five years.
182
 Some Witnesses from Transcarpathia ended up in concentration camps for 
refusal to serve in the Hungarian Army.
183
 Many Witnesses suffered harsh beatings from the 
police, who saw them as having betrayed their homeland. One man, arrested after refusing to 
take a military oath into the Romanian Army in 1943, recalls that police beat him so badly 
that his wife did not recognize him.
184
  
None of the wartime states had any tolerance for foreign-based religious 
organizations that impeded the war effort and preached a radical message that rejected 
national allegiances and patriotism. In Soviet-occupied zones, Witnesses were suspected of 
being Nazi sympathizers, while, in Axis-controlled territories, they were seen as communists. 
In one case, German police accused a Witness man of communist loyalties in 1942 after he 
ignored a call for volunteers for the local gendarme. The police imprisoned him in Chełm, 
Poland, until local villagers intervened with a petition stating that he was not a communist, 
but rather a Jehovah‘s Witness, and he was released.185 Most Witnesses did not share this 
man‘s good fortune. One Moldavian Witness was only twenty years old in 1944 when Soviet 
authorities arrested him and made him dig his own grave. They demanded that he and other 
Witnesses give out information on their leaders. When the Witnesses refused, the soldiers 
marched several of the men out of eyesight and fired their weapons so that the Witnesses 
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would think the men had been executed. When this failed to scare the Witnesses into talking, 
authorities imprisoned the men in concentration camps.
186
  
Women did not escape arrests either when they refused to report for labor 
conscription intended to aid the war effort.  For example, in the village of Feteşti in 
Bessarabia, Simion Ursu and his wife, Maria, were arrested in the fall of 1941 and 
imprisoned until 1945. During this time, their five children under the age of fifteen lived at 
home without parental supervision. Another woman and her daughter from the same village 
ended up in a concentration camp; the daughter did not survive.
187
 When one Witness 
returned from two and a half years in prison in late 1944, some of her five young children did 
not remember her.
188
 Men also faced arrest in such instances. One young man received five 
years in 1944 for refusal to work in a mine that had been mobilized for the Soviet war 
effort.
189
 It is impossible to determine how many men and women suffered this fate, but the 
existing evidence suggests it was not a rare occurrence. 
In Romanian-controlled territories in particular, Witnesses suffered police harassment 
and arrest for refusal to participate in local religious life through the Orthodox Church. Local 
clergy reported Witnesses to the police for not attending church, and some Witnesses were 
beaten and arrested by police on this basis. In the village of Clococenii Vechi, police arrested 
several young Witness men after local church officials accused them of being communists 
for not going to church or making the sign of the cross. After the men refused to renounce 
their faith, the police beat them and then sent them to Chişinău for a court hearing. At the 
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trial, one of the men argued that he could not be a communist because communists do not 
believe in God or in Jesus Christ. This defense was unpersuasive. The court fined the men, 
told them to attend church, and released them.
190
 
For the organization and its members, the wartime persecution seemed to confirm that 
the current ―system of things‖ was coming to a close, and that little time remained before 
God would deliver them into an earthly paradise free from the suffering and hardship that 
now encompassed their lives.
191
 Indeed, the 1941 Yearbook concluded by expressing doubts 
that there would be another issue next year, noting, ―All the surrounding circumstances . . . 
indicate that the battle of Armageddon is near at hand.‖192 This event also promised to issue 
out justice to those who had persecuted the Witnesses and thus taken a stand against God and 
for his adversary, Satan. A 1940 article published in response to the Soviet occupation of 
Bessarabia in 1940 declared of Joseph Stalin: ―All hail to the Creator‘s purpose to obliterate 
all such beastly murderers in the impending battle of Armageddon!‖193  
Among the rest of the population, Witnesses preached that the current chaos could not 
last much longer. They met an increasingly positive reception to their message. Witnesses 
sought out those who had suffered wartime losses, had serious illnesses, or experienced other 
extreme hardships. The Witnesses promised these people that by converting, they could have 
their loved ones restored to life and their needs met in the coming millennial kingdom. For 
those struggling to find order amid the chaos, the Witnesses offered a close-knit faith 
community and a support network. One believer, who later left the organization and became 
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an outspoken opponent of the Witnesses, recalled that he joined in 1943 in part because of 
the ―comforting ‗ideas‘ of the Jehovists,‖ who promised him a paradise on earth.194  
According to multiple sources, World War II saw a substantial growth in Witness 
membership in occupied Eastern Europe.
195
 A 1971 sociological study by the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences in Ivano-Frankivs‘k oblast showed that 28.5 percent of current 
Witnesses had joined in 1941-45.
196
 Ivan Pashkovs‘kyi‘s conversion story is typical of many 
male wartime recruits. Born to poor Ukrainian peasants in a village in the Lublin region of 
Poland, he finished only five years of education at the village school before he began 
working on the farm alongside his father. He met and joined the Witnesses during World 
War II, and spent most of the war as a forced laborer for Nazi Germany. After the war, he 
was arrested in 1947 and sentenced to death before having his sentence commuted to twenty-
five years (due to the state‘s suspension of the death penalty). Released early into exile in 
Siberia in 1956, he later headed the governing committee of the Soviet Jehovah‘s Witnesses. 
From 1963 to 1972, he oversaw the organization‘s work inside the Soviet Union. He served 
on the first legally registered country committee in 1991, and died five years later.
197
  
Sources also show that some wartime conversions happened in POW and 
concentration camps, where German Witnesses were interned and had contact with Russian 
prisoners. One man joined the Witnesses after being sent to a POW camp in Germany, where 
a Witness shared with him a vision of a coming paradise without national divisions or war. 
                                                 
194
 K. Polychuk, ―Smelee rvite pautinu religioznogo mrakobesiia!,‖ Sovetskaia Moldaviia, February 21, 1960, 3-
4. 
 
195
 DALO, f. 3258, spr. P-25018, t. 4, ark. 28; and L‘viv SBU archive, spr. P-31931, ark. 15. 
 
196
 The study was based on a survey of 473 Witnesses and also showed that 20.4 percent had joined prior to 
World War II. GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 378, l. 65. 
 
197
 Pashkovs‘kyi‘s story can be found in TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 637, ark. 42-46; L‘viv SBU archive, spr. 
P-32341; and in Ivanenko, O liudiakh, 247. 
 70 
Upon liberation, he refused to return to uniform in the Red Army and was given seven years 
in prison by a military tribunal in Ukraine.
198
 Michel Reynaud and Sylvie Graffard‘s work on 
Witnesses under the Nazi regime claims that German Witnesses baptized 227 Russian 
women and 73 Ukrainians at the Ravensbrück concentration camp.
199
 Many of these 
members may not have retained their faith after the war when they returned to Soviet 
territories and lost contact with other Witnesses. Those from the western borderlands were 
the most likely to be able to find fellow Witnesses to sustain their faith. One woman first met 
the Witnesses in the Stutthof concentration camp in Germany and was baptized. After the 
war, she returned to her native Ukraine and later served eleven years for anti-Soviet activity 
under Soviet rule.
200
  
 
Conclusion 
The interwar period laid the foundation for the Jehovah‘s Witnesses‘ subsequent 
entrance into the Soviet Union by creating self-sustaining Witnesses communities in several 
regions along the Soviet Union‘s western borders. In the Soviet period, these Witnesses 
remembered their earlier interwar and wartime experiences of persecution by multiple 
authorities as faith-affirming and instructive. Some members had been accused of communist 
sympathies only to serve time for alleged capitalist sympathies a short while later. For 
example, under Romanian rule, Ion Ursoi received a death sentence, later commuted to 
twenty-five years, for refusal to serve in the military. The Red Army liberated him from 
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prison only to promptly reimprison him for refusing to serve in the Soviet armed forces.
201
 
The experience of persecution by multiple regimes taught Witnesses how to respond to state 
pressure and solidified their belief that worldly governments cannot be a force for good and 
that only God can provide just rule. It also strengthened their view that there was little 
meaningful difference between fascism and communism.
202
 Witnesses expected persecution 
as ―true Christians‖ and thus when this occurred, it served as an affirmation of their faith.  
The Witnesses‘ persecution under previous, non-socialist governments was an 
inconvenient fact for Soviet state-sponsored propaganda against the organization. For a state 
promoting the unique sacrifice and triumph of its people and its ideology in World War II, it 
could not acknowledge the Witnesses as fellow victims of Nazi atrocities.
203
 As a result, 
Soviet sources either ignored the war years or falsely claimed that the Nazis had in fact 
supported the Witnesses.
204
 The latter approach offered an easy explanation for how the 
organization gained members during wartime. More important, it created an association with 
Nazism that made Witnesses into a dangerous fifth column. This had particular resonance in 
the postwar era. Amir Weiner has noted how the postwar state tied citizens‘ inclusion in the 
Soviet body politic to their wartime activities. The state demarcated Nazi collaborators as 
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―eternal enemies,‖ a label that justified their violent removal from Soviet society. The 
Witnesses‘ wartime record as draft dodgers put them in a vulnerable position in this regard 
and helps make sense of why the Soviet state responded with such hostility to this religion.
205
 
As the war drew to a close in 1945, many Witnesses, along with their neighbors, 
found themselves within the borders of an expanded Soviet Union, which now encompassed 
the Baltic States, eastern Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia, and Transcarpathia. Convinced 
that Armageddon was just around the corner, most Witnesses steeled themselves for more 
persecution under their new rulers, certain that they would not have long to endure. In the 
end, this new era lasted much longer than they anticipated, and tested not just their faith, but 
their organizational skills in maintaining community under incredible pressure. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
―I WILL BE HIS WITNESS UNTIL DEATH‖: JEHOVAH‘S WITNESSES IN THE 
POSTWAR STALIN ERA 
 
 “I call to the Lord, who is worthy of praise, and I am saved from my enemies.”206 2 Samuel 
22:4.  
 
“Those who had been scattered preached the word wherever they went.”207 Acts 8:4. 
 
The Second World War ushered in a new era for Jehovah‘s Witnesses in Eastern 
Europe. Massive forced resettlement and the redrawing of national borders turned thousands 
of Witnesses into Soviet citizens. The Soviet Union, with its enormous contribution to the 
war effort and heavy casualties, expected and received major concessions to strengthen its 
position in Eastern Europe. Poland‘s prewar borders shifted westward, while the Soviet 
Union gained control of the Baltic states and Poland‘s eastern regions (including eastern 
Galicia and Volyn‘). Czechoslovakia ceded Transcarpathia, and Romania relinquished 
Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. All of these aforementioned territories became part 
of an enlarged Soviet Ukraine.
208
 The Soviet Union also asserted its rule over the Romanian 
territory of Bessarabia and combined it with its prewar Moldavian region to create Soviet 
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Moldavia.
209
 In addition, the Allied Powers agreed to massive forced population transfers to 
create more ethnically homogenous nation-states in Eastern Europe. This included the 
resettlement of ethnic Poles and Ukrainians within the new boundaries of Poland and Soviet 
Ukraine, respectively.
210
  
The Soviet Union‘s eastward expansion swallowed up the prewar Witness 
communities in the western borderlands. At a Baltimore assembly of Witnesses in February 
1946, Watch Tower President Knorr told the crowd that ―at least 1,600 of Jehovah‘s 
witnesses had been taken into Russia and were now there very busily engaged in preaching 
the Theocratic message in that distant land.‖211 In reality, the figure was closer to 6,000 
Witnesses, a fact corrected by the organization in later publications and in line with Soviet 
sources.
212
 Knorr‘s address established the organization‘s optimistic view of Soviet 
expansion as an exciting opportunity for believers to enter a formerly inaccessible territory. 
An article appearing in Consolation (the interim title given to The Golden Age from 1937 to 
1946) a few months after Knorr‘s speech stated, ―Jehovah‘s witnesses rejoice in the good 
news that in the dispersions incident to the war several hundred of Jehovah‘s faithful 
witnesses have been scattered all over Russia and Siberia, and it is certain that at this moment 
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they are everywhere preaching the word.‖213 A Watchtower article from the same year bore 
the subheading: ―Russia Penetrated.‖214 
Brooklyn‘s positive outlook notwithstanding, Soviet power and the territorial changes 
greatly disrupted the close-knit faith communities. Many ethnic Polish Witnesses moved into 
the interior of Poland, while ethnic Ukrainian Witnesses from Poland resettled into Soviet 
Ukraine.
215
 The organization advised members facing possible resettlement that, if asked 
about their nationality, they should state that they are Christians and do not recognize other 
nationalities. Since this strategy was unlikely to prevent resettlement, the organization 
suggested that the believer entrust the matter to God, as ―surely God has other great tasks for 
him.‖216 The Łódź office offered similar advice to Polish members, citing Judges 7:7: ―let the 
other men go, each to his own place.‖ Ivan Pashkovs‘kyi, one resettler who heard this advice, 
recalled years later how he understood this verse to mean that ―for us, our ‗place‘ was 
wherever Jehovah sent us.‖ To prepare for resettlement, Pashkovs‘kyi and others carefully 
concealed literature in their belongings. As a parting gesture, they baptized eighteen 
individuals. As soon as Pashkovs‘kyi and the other Witnesses reached Soviet Ukraine, they 
began to preach—even to the local authorities. Pashkovs‘kyi then took charge of an 
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underground printing operation, for which he suffered arrest in 1947 and served nine years in 
the Gulag.
217
  
Cut off from steady access to Brooklyn or to other European branch offices, Soviet 
Witnesses struggled to adapt to new conditions, while continuing to practice their faith as 
they had prior to the arrival of Soviet power. For Witnesses, state-sponsored persecutions of 
members continued with little, if any, interruption as power shifted from one government to 
another. This constant climate of terror was the norm for the members who joined in the 
immediate prewar or wartime periods, since they had never experienced any semblance of 
religious freedom. Witnesses transferred their old skills of underground religious activity 
learned under previous repressive regimes to the new, Soviet setting. A sense of security and 
calm proved similarly elusive for the population at large in the western borderlands. A 
devastating famine in 1946-47, concentrated in Ukraine, resulted in the widespread starvation 
of an already weakened populace.
218
 Moreover, while victory was declared in May 1945, the 
Soviet state faced stubborn partisan resistance in the newly annexed territories, primarily 
from nationalists who refused to accept Soviet control. Wartime violence and chaos 
continued for several years. The ongoing partisan activity fueled state suspicion of its new 
citizens‘ loyalties and heightened police repression of all forms of dissent.  
Witnesses differed from other Soviet citizens in the immediate postwar era in that 
they did not share in the widespread hopes for liberalization and improvement of living 
conditions. Elena Zubkova writes that ―everybody expected changes after the war. These 
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expectations infused the whole society, enabling people to survive and to hope that a new and 
better life would soon begin.‖219 Seeing the world in much different terms, Witnesses 
believed humanity had suffered, fought, and died since the time of Adam and would do so 
until Christ‘s establishment of the millennial kingdom. Until then, there could be no lasting 
peace and no true justice. While other Soviet citizens may have anxiously awaited more 
peaceful times, Witnesses counted down the days until Armageddon and the destruction of 
the current system. The fact that Witnesses managed to convince others to adopt their 
worldview complicates current notions about postwar Soviet society during late Stalinism.  
This chapter examines relations between the Soviet state and the Witnesses in the 
postwar era until Stalin‘s death in 1953. First, it addresses how the organization, both in 
Brooklyn and in the Soviet Union, responded to changing circumstances in light of its 
religious beliefs and conditions on the ground. Second, the chapter discusses the state‘s 
response to the Witnesses, its knowledge of the organization, its assessment of the threat 
Witnesses posed, and the methods that it used to repress this form of religious belief. Lastly, 
the chapter analyzes how individual Witnesses conducted themselves under the difficult 
conditions of postwar life and persecution, both in practicing their faith and in dealing with 
arrest, interrogation, prison, work camps, and exile.  
 
Creating a Soviet Witness Organization 
Major changes took place in the worldwide Watch Tower organization during the war 
and its immediate aftermath. Following Rutherford‘s death in 1942, Knorr guided the 
Witnesses into the postwar era. That year, the organization had an estimated 115,240 active 
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members worldwide.
220
 Knorr‘s tenure (1942-1977) saw an increased emphasis on global 
missionary efforts. In 1943, the Watchtower Bible School of Gilead opened in Patterson, 
New York to train members for overseas appointments within the organization.
221
 The 
organization invested in new branch offices and printing equipment, while Knorr and his 
secretary, Milton Henschel (Watch Tower president from 1992-2000), toured Europe in the 
winter of 1945-46 to reestablish contact with the European Witness communities and assess 
their needs. The time and money spent on foreign proselytism paid off in steady postwar 
expansion. Membership grew in nineteen European states from roughly 74,000 in 1947 to 
more than 227,000 in 1955.
222
 
Like his predecessor, Knorr publicly affirmed the organization‘s opposition to 
communism. In a keynote speech given to a crowd of over 80,000 people at an international 
convention at Yankee Stadium in the summer of 1950, Knorr blamed Christendom for the 
success of communism. He declared that the failure of Christendom to meet the spiritual 
needs of the population had driven people to seek out other ideologies as a substitute for 
God. Members in attendance unanimously adopted a resolution condemning communism and 
the persecution of Witnesses by communist governments, while countering critics‘ claims 
that the Witnesses were themselves communists.
223
 Under Knorr‘s leadership, communism 
frequently appeared in Watch Tower publications as a false religion led by Stalin, the 
counterfeit messiah. A 1950 article proclaimed that ―this ‗red‘ religion, like the orthodox 
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‗isms,‘ is just another demon religion sponsored by the Devil.‖224 Ironically, if the Soviet 
state viewed the Witnesses as politics guised as religion, Witnesses saw Soviet communism 
as religion masquerading as a political ideology.   
At the war‘s close, Soviet Witnesses did not yet exist as a single, unified 
organization; instead, there were scattered communities of Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovak, 
and Baltic Witnesses, all under Soviet rule. Prior to the war, these members had received 
oversight and literature from their countrywide branch offices, whose officials then reported 
to regional European offices and to Brooklyn. After the war, the Łódź branch office quickly 
assumed primary responsibility for the Soviet Witnesses, acting as the middleman between 
them and Brooklyn. Following a visit to the organization‘s European offices in November 
1945, Knorr released information from Łódź that many of its prewar members ―have now 
been transferred into the depths of Russia‖ and that a similar fate had befallen prewar 
Romania‘s Bessarabian members. He concluded: ―Thus it can be seen how, in the Lord‘s 
providence, he can raise up witnesses in any land, there to hold high the banner of truth and 
make known the name of Jehovah.‖225  
With information filtering in from Łódź for the first time since before the war, the 
Watch Tower organization could finally assess the postwar condition of its membership both 
in Poland and the Soviet Union.
226
 In 1947, an article in Awake! (the new title given to the 
bimonthly magazine, Consolation) eagerly announced that the upcoming yearbook would 
have the first ever report on Soviet Witnesses. The announcement read in part: ―Russia! With 
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all its impervious walls! Yet the gladsome message of God‘s kingdom has found its way 
within!‖227 In contrast to this upbeat pronouncement, and to Knorr‘s enthusiastic vision of a 
new era of Soviet proselytism, the Łódź postwar reports reflected the arduous conditions of 
postwar life and persecution. In the 1948 report, the Polish country servant mourned that 
―reporting on Russia this year grieves my heart‖ and referred to the ―great persecution‖ 
underway against Witnesses.
228
 In 1949, his report stated that a quarter of Soviet Witnesses 
lived in forced labor camps or in exile in Siberia and Kazakhstan.
229
 By 1950, 
communication with Łódź had become so difficult that the office could no longer provide 
any data beyond rough estimates of total members, noting that it had ―very little news‖ on the 
Soviet situation.
230
  
Direct Polish oversight ultimately proved an unworkable solution for the Soviet 
Witnesses, as mounting persecution both in Poland and the Soviet Union made it increasingly 
difficult to smuggle out reports and to smuggle in instructions and literature. For long-term 
survival, the fragmented, newly Soviet communities needed to reorganize themselves as a 
single countrywide entity and create a coherent organizational structure with a clear 
hierarchy and uniformity in beliefs and practices. The Polish branch thus aided the Soviet 
communities in establishing a more independent structure, which mirrored that of the 
worldwide organization, but with some significant modifications to account for the unique 
conditions of Soviet life underground. In the immediate postwar period, European Witnesses 
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had been organized into ―companies‖ of several dozen members, later renamed 
―congregations.‖231 Several companies formed a circuit, several circuits in turn made up a 
district, all of which were under a countrywide branch committee that then reported to the 
world headquarters in Brooklyn. Within a single company, members held large meetings 
three times a week and conducted book studies in small groups.
232
 
In the Soviet Union, police surveillance made it impossible for Witnesses to gather in 
companies on a regular basis. Instead, almost all meetings were held at the study level, which 
became known as a ―circle.‖ Circles comprised roughly a dozen members, often no more 
than a single family and its neighbors, who met in members‘ homes to study literature, teach 
basic beliefs and practices, and provide spiritual guidance. Five to twenty circles formed each 
―group,‖ which was the rough equivalent of a company or congregation. A similar number of 
groups then formed a ―stref‖ (―zone‖ in Polish) of comparable size to a circuit. Several 
circuits made up an okrug (district), whose overseers reported to a country committee headed 
by the country servant.
233
 In 1951, the Soviet Witness organization had 3 districts, 12 
circuits, 181 groups, and 1,071 circles.
234
 Slight alterations or variations notwithstanding, this 
model remained the basic organizational structure for Soviet Witnesses until their 
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legalization in 1991.
235
 It allowed for a clear hierarchy and created order among the disparate 
congregations across the Soviet Union, but it also exposed the leadership to great danger by 
marking certain individuals as authorities in the organization. The Soviet state targeted these 
leaders for arrest and imprisonment.  
Jehovah‘s Witnesses do not recognize a clergy-laity distinction between members, 
but rather appoint ―elders‖ to administer their congregations and ―traveling overseers‖ to 
supervise the operation of congregations within a given circuit or district.
236
 Similarly, in the 
Soviet Union, each rung of the organization, from circle to district, had a responsible 
member, or ―servant,‖ appointed by his superiors, who reported up the chain of command 
through the country committee, which then reported to Łódź or Brooklyn. Despite the 
constraints of operating underground, Soviet Witnesses adhered to the same basic standards 
of accountability practiced by their congregations worldwide. To remain active in the 
Witnesses, all members engaged in proselytism and submitted regular tallies of time spent in 
this work to the appointed elders (i.e. servants). In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, the elders 
consolidated this information and passed it up the hierarchy for use in monthly and yearly 
country reports.
237
 Under Knorr, this practice allowed Brooklyn to keep closer track of its 
membership, proselytism efforts, and literature distribution.  
Reporting created a major potential hazard, however, since these documents, if 
discovered by the police, could seriously compromise the organization. Soviet Witnesses 
took measures to minimize this risk and to shield elders from arrest by employing a large 
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network of couriers who relayed reports and literature, generally written in code, between the 
various leaders.
238
 This allowed them to stay in contact without frequent face-to-face 
meetings and limited the information known by any single believer, restricting how much he 
or she could divulge if arrested and subjected to interrogation. Many knew no one outside of 
their immediate circle of a dozen members.  
Early leadership of the Witnesses fell to members in western Ukraine, perhaps as a 
result of the Polish branch office‘s oversight. In 1945, the Watch Tower organization 
appointed Pavlo Ziatek as the Soviet Union‘s first country servant. Ziatek had been a Witness 
since at least 1929 and was considered a member of the 144,000, the ―anointed class‖ who 
would ascend to heaven to reign with Jesus Christ.
239
 Born in 1905 in Boryslav, a large town 
southwest of L‘viv (then part of Poland), Ziatek spent the war in eastern Poland under Nazi 
occupation. With the arrival of Soviet power, he adopted an undocumented, transient 
existence to avoid arrest.
240
 Despite this precaution, he enjoyed only a brief tenure as country 
servant before his arrest in early 1946. His assistants, Stanislav Burak and Petro Tokar‘, both 
from western Ukraine, assumed responsibility for the organization until their arrests a little 
                                                 
238
 Zakarpattia SBU archive, spr. 149957, t. 1, ark. 235-36; t. 3, ark. 332. 
 
239
 Ivanenko states that Ziatek was baptized in 1925, while Ziatek himself gave 1929 as his date of baptism 
under interrogation. Ivanenko, O liudiakh, 165; L‘viv SBU archive, spr. P-30139, ark. 10-11; and Derefinko, 
interview by author.  
 
240
 L‘viv SBU archive, spr. P-30139, ark. 3, 7, 12. 
 84 
over a year later.
241
 The leadership then changed hands once again, this time to a Polish 
resettler, Mykola Tsyba. His tenure extended from 1947 until his arrest in 1952.
242
  
The arrest of so many responsible members created the need for women to fill 
positions of authority usually reserved for men. The international organization allowed only 
men to serve as elders and overseers (still the practice today), but the Soviet situation led to 
more flexibility on gender roles. In particular, many women served as circle leaders and 
couriers and, less frequently, as group leaders, positions that carried significant personal 
risk.
243
 They also worked in literature production and distribution. Most prominently, Mariia 
Veretel‘nyk, Tsyba‘s assistant during his tenure, oversaw the difficult task of keeping Tsyba 
safe from police detection by finding housing and places for him to meet with other 
members. She prepared countrywide reports on membership and proselytism and briefly led 
instructional lessons on how to conduct effective proselytism, known as ―theocratic service 
courses,‖ in L‘viv oblast.244 Later Soviet propaganda portrayed her as Tsyba‘s girlfriend. In 
fact, many Witness men and women, particularly those in leadership or missionary roles, 
delayed marriage or remained single during this period. The presumed proximity of 
Armageddon made marriage and childbearing matters of secondary concern.
245
 The 
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leadership roles assumed by women meant that they also became frequent targets of arrests. 
The state arrested Veretel‘nyk along with Tsyba and convicted them both in 1952.246 
The establishment of a Soviet country committee did not negate the need for contact 
with Łódź and Brooklyn, although it did make Soviet members less dependent on those 
offices. The committee still relied on Łódź to secure new Watch Tower publications and 
directives from Brooklyn. Not enough literature arrived through resettlers from Poland to 
provide a long-term solution to the ongoing problem.
247
 To obtain new issues of The 
Watchtower, Awake!, and other publications, the Soviet organization gathered donations and 
sent clandestine payments, primarily through Łódź in the Stalin era, to finance literature 
deliveries.
248
 Couriers smuggled money, literature, and instructions across the border, risking 
arrest or death for their actions.
249
 One man, after making several successful smuggling runs, 
apparently drowned, or perhaps was shot, while attempting to cross the Bug River into 
Poland.
250
 Transcarpathian and Moldavian Witnesses used prewar contacts in 
Czechoslovakian and Romanian Witness communities to obtain small batches of literature.
251
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Once items of literature arrived in the Soviet Union, the organization had to find ways 
to reproduce enough copies for its membership, a particular challenge given the 
organization‘s ethnic diversity. To reach most of their members, they needed literature 
printed in Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, Hungarian, Romanian, and the Baltic languages. Elders 
spent much of their time coordinating printing and translation work. They gathered donations 
to purchase printing equipment on the black market.
252
 However, given the crowded quarters 
of Soviet apartments, finding safe locations to store and use the printing equipment presented 
a serious challenge. While some initial printing took place in apartments, a safer option 
proved to be rural locations. Elders constructed secret underground bunkers in Witnesses‘ 
backyards or nearby forests.
253
 Skilled labor was needed to run the operation, as well as a 
continual supply of printing paper and ink—commodities not readily available to average 
citizens. Once printed, couriers distributed a few copies of the literature to each group or 
circle. Individual believers then reproduced the literature by hand so that each household had 
a copy. Each stage of the printing work involved significant risk and was extremely 
vulnerable to police detection. Until the Khrushchev era, access to new literature was 
sporadic at best and most members relied heavily on their existing stock of prewar 
literature.
254
 
The country servant, Pavlo Ziatek, oversaw the creation of these initial Soviet 
underground printing presses, created in L‘viv oblast shortly after the end of the war. Police 
confiscated the first set of printing equipment, stored in the home of Ivanna Haletovych, 
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during an early 1946 raid that also resulted in Ziatek‘s arrest.255 A second printing press, set 
up at roughly the same time, operated in the cellar of a longtime member and pensioner, 
Mariia Shkoda, in L‘viv. Elders likely chose Shkoda, an older woman, in part because she 
would draw less immediate suspicion. Two young members ran the actual operation and 
lived in her home. Police raided her home in the middle of the night in June 1947 and 
arrested her and the two printing press operators.
256
 Under Tsyba‘s leadership, Witnesses 
constructed additional bunkers and other hiding spaces in western Ukraine to store important 
documents, funds, printing equipment, and literature. Tsyba‘s secretary estimated that from 
1948 to 1950, the organization printed 133,000 items of literature on their presses.
257
  
Brooklyn-produced literature remained the centerpiece of meetings, which were held 
at least once a week, more often two or three times a week, depending on the ability of 
members to gather in secret. In order not to arouse suspicion, meetings rarely involved more 
than a single circle and were held late at night or early in the morning. Soviet Moldavia‘s 
procuracy (prosecution office), in the course of gathering evidence against local Witness 
leaders, recorded 192 circle meetings for April 1947 alone. The actual figure was almost 
certainly higher.
258
 In some areas, elders attempted to hold periodic assemblies of members 
and conferences among appointed leaders, although such events carried a high risk of 
discovery and required a great deal of coordination. In Zakarpattia oblast, groups as large as 
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200 people gathered in the unpopulated wooded areas between villages, but such incidents 
were relatively rare.
259
  
 Both Soviet and Witness documents from this time period suggest that Witnesses 
continued to proselytize in their communities and succeeded in finding new members. By 
1946, more than 8,000 people regularly attended meetings, and over 10,000 books and 
pamphlets had been distributed among the population. The Łódź branch office reported that 
Soviet Witnesses spent more than 130,000 hours proselytizing that year.
260
 According to the 
Witness organization, from 1946 to 1949, roughly 4,000 people converted to the faith.
261
 By 
the end of 1949, an estimated 10,000 people were active members.
262
 That same year, Soviet 
Witnesses visited close to 50,000 people and held more than 6,000 Bible studies with 
potential converts.
263
 Beginning in 1951, the organization suspended the practice of 
publishing statistical data for Soviet territories in its annual yearbooks to protect these 
members from further persecution. Instead, it printed a composite figure for the Eastern 
European states where Witnesses had no legal status.
264
 
The figure of 10,000 members in 1949 likely represents only those persons who had 
undergone baptism, which, by the postwar era, had become a necessary rite of passage of all 
                                                 
259
 For large-scale meetings, see L‘viv SBU archive, spr. P-31504, ark. 183, and Zakapattia SBU archive, spr. 
2411, t. 1, ark. 173, 180, 197. 
 
260
 1947 Yearbook, 217-18. 
 
261
 ―Defeating Red Persecution,‖ 38. 
 
262
 Ibid. 
 
263
 Data on proselytism and studies comes from information given by Mariia Veretel‘nyk in 1952. Zakarpattia 
SBU archive, spr. 149957, t. 3, ark. 1. 
 
264
 This practice began with the 1953 Yearbook, after two years without any statistical data. 1953 Yearbook of 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, International Bible Students 
Association, 1952), 31. 
 
 89 
Witnesses worldwide. Witness baptisms are full water immersions performed by an elder, 
usually in swimming pools during conventions. This made it difficult to conduct baptisms 
under heavy police surveillance. Soviet Witnesses continued the wartime practice of using 
local lakes and rivers, typically in the early morning or late at night to avoid attention. The 
difficulties involved meant that some members were not baptized until several years after 
they had begun practicing the faith. Witnesses do not set a specific age for baptism, but 
instead restrict it to those mature enough to understand and commit to the faith.
265
 Thus the 
statistics do not include those who attended meetings but had not yet resolved to undergo 
baptism, or the children of adult members not yet capable of making this decision. The total 
number of people who attended meetings regularly, read Witness literature, and considered 
themselves adherents to the faith, certainly exceeded official membership totals.   
 Proselytism methods varied little from those used during the war and immediate 
prewar period. Witnesses preached to friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. They lent or 
sold organizational publications to interested people and then visited them to discuss what 
they had read. Owing to literature shortages, some members made their own fliers with 
handwritten Bible quotes and brief theological messages, and passed them out to the public. 
One such flier proclaimed the coming battle of Armageddon, promising that all ―people of 
good will‖ will be protected from this destruction.266 In line with Knorr‘s increased emphasis 
on missionary work, a 1945 issue of Informer (Informator), a newsletter published by the 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society and circulated in the Soviet Union, stated that all 
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members, including those not yet baptized, must use all available free time in ―theocratic 
service,‖ i.e. proselytism.267 In 1943, Knorr instituted ―theocratic ministry schools‖ in all 
congregations worldwide to teach members how to engage in effective proselytism.
268
 This 
practice filtered gradually into the Soviet Union in the postwar era.
269
  
Given the postwar conditions, the organization advised Soviet members to avoid 
preaching to known opponents of the religion and to leave only a single brochure with 
interested persons. Even with such precautionary measures, Witnesses faced the possibility 
of denunciation every time they spoke about their religion to others. A single report to the 
police could result in the arrest and conviction of a Witness for anti-Soviet activity. In fact, 
denunciations formed the backbone of many postwar cases against the Witnesses. To limit 
this risk, Witnesses exercised discretion in interacting with people who expressed an initial 
interest in the religion, studying with them in private rather than inviting them to circle 
meetings, until they felt certain the person had made a serious commitment to the faith. 
Sofiia Derefinko, for example, recalls her cousin taking her to a wartime meeting in L‘viv led 
by Ziatek, who, fearing Sofiia would betray them, instructed her cousin to study with her 
alone until baptism. She and Ziatek later joked about the awkward circumstances in which 
they met.
270
 Ultimately, she did attend meetings and, when arrested in 1950, gave the police 
little useful information.
271
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  Many Witnesses faced the additional obstacle of family members who did not agree 
with their religious beliefs or practices. The conversion of one person, after all, put the whole 
family in danger of reprisals from the state. When one woman joined the Witnesses, her 
angry husband demanded that she leave the religion immediately. When she refused, he left 
her and their two children and moved in with another woman, only returning after she 
promised to renounce her faith. In fact, however, she continued to practice her beliefs in 
secret until her arrest in 1950. Brought in for questioning, the husband detailed how she had 
ignored his wishes, even how he beat her in an attempt to force her into submission.
272
 Yet 
even some fiercely opposed family members eventually joined the organization, as happened 
in the case of Derefinko, whose husband was baptized while living with her in exile in 
1955.
273
   
 Those who joined the Witnesses after 1945 had much in common with prewar 
members. Converts frequently came from existing Witness families or joined the 
organization as a family. Most were peasants, unskilled laborers, pensioners, or sellers at 
local markets. Few had more than four years of education at a village school. They typically 
had belonged to other churches or had been raised in religious households prior to joining the 
Witnesses. In later years, Witnesses, dispersed throughout the Soviet Union, converted a 
significant number of Russians and members of other Soviet nationalities. In the Stalin era, 
however, the majority of members were Ukrainian and Romanian. While Soviet propaganda 
portrayed religious communities as composed primarily of women and elderly members, 
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neither seems to have been the case for the Witnesses in the Stalin era.
274
 Both women and 
men, for example, were arrested in considerable numbers. A 1947 Ministry of State Security 
(Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, hereafter MGB) report for L‘viv oblast states 
that, of the twenty-seven Witnesses they arrested that year, just over half were between 
eighteen and twenty-three years old.
275
 Overall, the Witnesses found converts among those 
not strongly invested in Soviet power or its institutions. These individuals had less to lose by 
joining a religious organization and were more receptive to the Witnesses‘ message against 
secular authority.  
 
Soviet Citizens or Jehovah’s Witnesses? 
The sovietization of the western borderlands after the war introduced new institutions 
and modes of life. The state extended its network of Party committees and village councils 
(soviets) to oversee local government and life. Collectivization of agriculture began in 
earnest in 1946 and continued through the late 1940s. The first national postwar elections to 
the Supreme Soviet were held in February 1946.
276
 Education officials remodeled and 
expanded the existing school systems so that schools provided an ideologically sound 
education for children and youth in conformity with the rest of the Soviet Union.
277
 National 
cultural life was sharply constricted in favor of Russification policies. In short, nearly every 
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aspect of daily life in the western borderlands underwent a major transformation in the 
immediate postwar era.   
The Witnesses faced the serious question of how to adapt to these changes while 
remaining faithful to their beliefs. Their initial stance on sovietization was informed 
primarily by wartime experiences and without direct oversight from Brooklyn. During the 
war, Witnesses had affirmed their worldwide commitment to political neutrality when it 
came to wars and conflicts, refusing to serve in the Red Army as it advanced westward 
toward Berlin. After 1945, when the Soviet state amnestied many of these men, some 
returned from prison to their villages with an even greater resolve in their faith. They told 
their fellow villagers that God had saved them, while those who disobeyed God by serving in 
the military had died.
278
 Survival strengthened many Witnesses‘ faith, as they believed that 
God had spared their lives as a reward for resisting military conscription. 
Beyond the military service question, however, Soviet Witnesses lacked a coherent 
position in regard to cooperation with the state and its institutions. Cut off from the rest of the 
worldwide organization, local members had to make major decisions without outside 
guidance. It was a difficult position for them to be in, since they understood their faith 
dictated that the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society decide these matters. In Soviet 
Ukraine and Moldavia, members smuggled out questions to both the Łódź office and 
Brooklyn about what to do under these bewildering circumstances. While they waited for a 
response, however, events demanded that elders make temporary rulings for communities to 
follow. 
Ultimately, the early Witness leadership extended the wartime policy of non-
cooperation with state institutions. Religious doctrine had a critical role in shaping this 
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decision. For Witnesses, the Bible provided clear instruction on church-state relations. They 
deferred to Romans 13:1, which states, ―Everyone must submit himself to the governing 
authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities 
that exist have been established by God.‖ Early Watch Tower publications had interpreted 
―governing authorities‖ (also translated as ―higher powers‖) to mean that mankind, including 
Witnesses, must obey state laws except when doing so would violate God‘s laws. In 1929, 
however, the organization concluded that ―governing authorities‖ refers instead to Jehovah 
and Jesus Christ. While both interpretations required some adherence to secular laws, the 
1929 view suggested a more radical position toward governments and steered members away 
from any involvement in, or even acknowledgment of, secular authority.
279
 A 1949 article 
declared, ―All the nations of the earth are against God and his kingdom. It is therefore 
impossible for a person to be in full accord with the governments of this world and at the 
same time to be in full harmony with God‘s kingdom under Christ. He must serve one or the 
other of the masters, and there can be no compromise.‖280  
In practice, non-cooperation with the Soviet state meant that Witnesses refused to 
vote in local elections, register for the draft, sign petitions, or buy state bonds intended to 
finance reconstruction and the military. They avoided working in large state institutions, 
particularly those with any connection to the military. They generally did not join collective 
farms. As a rule, they did not take part in any Party or state measures, nor join unions, clubs, 
or organizations. A sizeable percentage did not obtain passports. Virtually none signed the 
postwar petitions against nuclear war. Some lived an itinerant existence, traveling from 
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village to village to proselytize, and living off donations or the sale of goods at local 
bazaars.
281
 
In this respect, the Soviet Union‘s subsequent categorization of the Witnesses as a 
serious threat had a basis in reality. Witnesses fundamentally undermined the state‘s postwar 
goals of integrating the western borderlands and transforming its population into patriotic, 
loyal Soviet citizens. For the Witnesses, concepts of citizenship and nationality had no 
meaning; only obedience to Jehovah held any importance. Vasyl‘ Bokoch expressed the 
sentiments of most Witnesses when he stated, ―I live on Jehovah God‘s earth. I do not 
recognize any government territories or any governments, except the government of Jehovah 
God.‖ When asked, most Witnesses refused to identify themselves with a specific 
nationality.
282
 
Similarly, in Soviet elections where the goal was 100 percent participation and 
approval of candidates, the blatant refusal by Witnesses to vote, even if they constituted only 
a small minority of the electorate, threatened the legitimacy of the process. To avoid 
harassment by polling officials, one Witness couple left their home early in the morning on 
elections and spent the entire day walking around the city. They returned at midnight only 
after the polls had closed. Their housing manager told the police that they lived ―as though 
Soviet power did not exist for them.‖283 Indeed, for many Witnesses, it did not. Dmytro 
Vasylyshyn, arrested in 1947, told his interrogator, ―I do not recognize the existing 
government order, but only the theocratic order for which I have voted.‖ Witnesses like 
Vasylyshyn believed they had cast their vote for God at baptism; to vote in Soviet elections 
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would be to deny God‘s authority.284 One Witness told officials at his local polling station, 
―It doesn‘t matter to me who is in power‖ and expressed his unwillingness to vote for any 
earthly government. He told the officials that they could ―do what they wanted with him,‖ 
even put him in prison, but he would not vote. Authorities did eventually arrest him and 
sentenced him to twenty-five years in a labor camp.
285
 
In rural areas with high concentrations of Witnesses, the organization could represent 
a major affront to sovietization of the western borderlands. For example, the Transcarpathian 
village of Bila Tserkva, located on the Romanian border, had an estimated three to four 
hundred members in 1949 when the MGB launched an investigation into Witness activity 
there.
286
 Police interrogated dozens of local Party officials, school teachers, and neighbors, 
who alleged that local Witnesses leaders were primarily rich peasants (kulaks) undermining 
collectivization by their refusal to join the newly created collective farm (kolkhoz) and their 
influence over other believers to do the same.
287
 One Witness allegedly stated, ―Let them 
hang me, but I‘m not joining the kolkhoz. We Jehovah‘s Witnesses will never join the 
kolkhoz and you can stop agitating to us.‖ This man‘s brother similarly declared, ―Why 
should I join the kolkhoz when the kolkhozes will soon perish [i.e. during Armageddon]?‖288 
One Party official from the village noted that as a result of Witness opposition, only 60 of the 
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420 households (dvory) had joined the kolkhoz.
289
 After the arrest of several high-profile 
members, the local soviet submitted forms to the police listing how many acres of land and 
how many heads of livestock each arrested Witness possessed.
290
 
Several informants, including the local school teacher, noted with concern that the 
Witnesses kept their children from integrating into everyday Soviet life and instilled in them 
hostility toward Soviet power. The daughter of one Witness refused to sing the Soviet 
anthem, telling her teacher that the Bible taught her not to ―serve two masters.‖ At an 
induction ceremony into the Young Pioneers (the Party organization for school-age children), 
another Witness child threw off the Pioneer scarf, crying, ―Don‘t, don‘t, take it off!‖ The 
school director noted that the children did not want to read patriotic poems or stories about 
the Red Army, and that he had information that the parents held meetings to indoctrinate 
youth into the faith. He cited cases where his students, when asked where they live, 
responded ―on earth‖ so as to avoid saying ―in the Soviet Union.‖291 When questioned about 
this fact, one Witness, the father of two children, stated simply, ―Jehovah directs my 
children.‖292  
The school situation in Bila Tserkva reflected the Witnesses‘ broader attitude toward 
secular education. Witnesses did not allow their children to join youth organizations or 
participate in extracurricular activities. For them, schools represented a serious danger to a 
child‘s religious upbringing and parents sometimes withheld their children from school or 
withdrew them after they had received a basic education. In the Stalin era, police handled 
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most conflicts between schools and Witnesses by arresting members and collecting evidence 
from teachers and school administrators. 
For the state, incidents such as those in Bila Tserkva proved that Witnesses 
represented a ―hostile political formation‖ attempting to destroy Soviet power.293 The 
Witnesses, in turn, saw the state as a corrupt and satanic institution destined for destruction 
by God in the impending apocalypse. These two views could not be reconciled. Witnesses 
provoked the ire of the state not only because of their refusal to participate in Soviet life, but 
also because their commitment to proselytism led them to share this belief with others. 
Attempts to convince or compel Witnesses to take part in Soviet institutions often provoked 
strong affirmations of faith. One Witness, asked to sign up for a state bond at work, told his 
boss that soon God would destroy all existing power on earth, establish his own authority, 
and save only those who believe in him.
294
 Such openly provocative statements and actions 
exposed Witnesses to arrest and long sentences in labor camps. After one Witness in 
Stanislav oblast declared publicly that she intended to vote for Jesus Christ in the spring 1950 
elections, the Ukrainian security services arrested her.
295
 
As early as 1947, the Watch Tower organization advised Soviet Witnesses to adopt a 
more moderate approach to state relations through a set of instructions known as the ―Ten 
Points,‖ sent through the Łódź office. By early 1948, the Soviet country committee had 
translated and reprinted the Ten Points, distributing copies to regional leaders who then 
shared the information with their circles. The instructions, meant to provide guidance on a 
series of specific issues raised by Soviet members, advised them to accept Soviet passports, 
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register for the draft (although not to actually serve in the Red Army), and join collective 
farms. Not everyone accepted this apparent change in direction. Dmytro Shelever, a circuit 
leader in Zakarpattia oblast, refused to recognize the memo as valid, instead accusing a 
fellow circuit leader of forging the document and of apostasy. Many members sided with 
Shelever and his position, causing a serious rift in the organization that resolved itself only 
with Shelever‘s death in 1949.296 To sort out the situation, country servant Tsyba appointed a 
responsible member, Bohdan Terlets‘kyi, to renew channels of communication between the 
oblast and the country committee, to appoint group and circle leaders, and to reunify the 
organization around the Ten Points.
297
  
 By the end of the Stalin era, almost all Witnesses had adopted the fundamental 
guidelines outlined in the Ten Points. While the instructions dictated greater caution and 
obedience to basic state laws, they did not eliminate most of the grounds used by the Soviet 
state to arrest Witnesses. Witnesses continued to refuse to serve in the military, to vote, to 
sign petitions, to enroll in trade unions, or let their children join Soviet youth organizations. 
They also preached this message to others. These actions fueled the state‘s harsh repression 
of the Witnesses.   
 
Soviet Religious Policy in the Late Stalin Era 
Hoping to further reconcile Witnesses with the state, the Watch Tower organization 
broached the possibility that an understanding could be reached with the Soviet government, 
particularly since several Eastern European states under the Soviet Union‘s sphere of 
influence still had functioning branch offices. Perhaps if the Soviet authorities had accurate 
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information on Witnesses and their purely religious goals, the Brooklyn leadership reasoned, 
they would realize that Witnesses posed no danger to the state. With this in mind, Knorr sent 
instructions through Łódź in 1948 to have Soviet members petition the government for 
registration and the right to worship. In 1949, several men from Ukraine were tasked with 
delivering this document. The petition, available in the Ukrainian state archives, describes 
the Witnesses‘ core beliefs and practices, most importantly their call to preach the good news 
of God‘s kingdom to all people, to print and study religious literature, and to hold Bible 
studies and meetings. It declared that the Soviet Witnesses were all ―loyal citizens of the 
USSR‖ with no political intentions. The petition asked for legalization of the organization 
and freedom of worship for its members, which it overestimated at 20,000.
298
  
The Witnesses‘ attempt to gain legal standing speaks both to the status of church-state 
relations in the postwar era and the Witnesses‘ own unique relationship to secular authority. 
World War II saw the transformation of Soviet religious policy. Stalin loosened restrictions 
on the largest religion in the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox Church, allowing it a 
limited legal existence, and followed this step by opening a path to legalization for other 
religious organizations. In the fall of 1943 and the spring of 1944, the state formed two new 
bodies, the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs (Sovet po delam Russkoi 
pravoslavnoi tserkvi, hereafter CROCA) and the Council for Religious Cult Affairs (Sovet po 
delam religioznykh kul‟tov, hereafter CRCA), to oversee the regulation of religious life.299 
Government-appointed commissioners administered the councils in each oblast or krai 
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(region) and in every union republic. A chief commissioner for the USSR oversaw the entire 
operation and conveyed policy initiatives. During the postwar era, these councils served as 
the face of Soviet religious policy for believers and were responsible for the registration of 
religious communities and the collection of data on religious believers and communities.
300
  
Stalin‘s wartime modus vivendi with the Russian Orthodox Church developed 
gradually into a broader state mandate to register religion and bring it under closer state 
control. Registration of religious associations had been first instituted in the Soviet Union 
under the 1929 Law on Religious Associations, which allowed groups of no less than twenty 
citizens to form a religious association, hold services, conduct religious rites, and use state 
buildings for this purpose.
301
 The postwar era, however, made this right, already granted in 
principle, a reality for a select number of religious communities. As in the 1929 law, the 
registration process required each religious group (a minimum of twenty adult members) to 
submit a request to the newly created CROCA and CRCA. Approval came with many strings 
attached: no meetings outside of approved houses of worship, notification to the state of all 
religious rituals (such as baptisms), no special instruction of minors in religion, no 
proselytism, no charitable work, and no printing or distribution of literature without prior 
state consent and oversight, to name just a few.  
For the Witnesses, registration as defined by the state would have required the 
organization to encourage members to fulfill all civic responsibilities and participate in civic 
life by serving in the military and voting. These terms fundamentally undermined the basic 
practices and beliefs of the Witnesses—a religion based on proselytism, literature study, and 
                                                 
300
 GARF, f. 6991, op. 4, d. 1, l. 4.  
 
301
 Phillip Walters, ―A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy,‖ in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, ed. Sabrina 
Petra Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 13-14.  
 
 102 
non-participation in public life. Further, the CRCA did not consider all religions eligible for 
registration and stated that those whose beliefs and actions are of an anti-state or fanatical 
character were not to be registered. It included ―Jehovists‖ specifically in this 
categorization.
302
 
The Witnesses‘ 1949 petition, therefore, represented a fundamental misunderstanding 
by the organization as to the parameters of Soviet registration. Several sources confirm that a 
delegation of Witnesses attempted to deliver the petition to the Ministry of the Interior 
through the CRCA. They traveled first to Moscow, were rebuffed, and then went to Kiev 
where they also had no success. As the petitioners refused to compromise on any aspects of 
their beliefs and practices, state officials in both locations summarily dismissed the 
request.
303
  Soon after, the men involved were arrested.
304
 A separate group of men submitted 
a parallel petition to the Estonian Supreme Soviet, and met with similar rejection.
 305
 After 
this resounding failure, Knorr abandoned the goal of registration for the Soviet Witnesses for 
the time being.  
The Soviet state understood better than the Witnesses that the organization did not 
meet its guidelines for religious groups. In a 1947 memo to the Ukrainian security services, 
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the CRCA expressed its view that the ―Jehovists‖ were a sectarian group hostile to Soviet 
power and, as such, not eligible for registration.
306
 The Witnesses were not the only religion 
without legal recognition. In 1949, there were an estimated 1,703 unregistered religious 
groups in the USSR, including 598 Muslim groups, 298 Old Believer groups, and over 750 
various Protestant groups. While Witnesses do not consider themselves Protestant, the Soviet 
state categorized them as such. Most Soviet believers belonged to religions theoretically 
eligible for registration, such as Baptists and Muslims, but had been denied approval by the 
CRCA. The rest, the Witnesses and many Old Believer sects, comprised a ―religious 
underground‖ defined for the CRCA by anti-Soviet fanaticism and ineligible for 
registration.
307
 
The CRCA provided the Soviet state with the bulk of its information on potentially 
subversive or dangerous religious communities. The CRCA served as the clearinghouse for 
information on religious organizations outside of the Russian Orthodox Church, from 
synagogues to mosques to Baptist prayer houses. In general, the CRCA had the difficult task 
of assessing the current state of Soviet religious belief. This was of particular importance 
given that wartime expansion had fundamentally altered the prewar religious situation 
through the state‘s acquisition of churches and faith communities in these territories. By 
1949, four out of five registered prayer houses in the USSR were located in areas either 
occupied during World War II or annexed during the war.
308
 Witnesses represented one of 
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several religions with which Soviet authorities had no prewar experience and which they 
quickly marked as dangerous and anti-Soviet. 
Scattered reports of Witness activity did not take long to reach the newly created 
CRCA. In July 1945, a CRCA memo, sent to then Ukrainian Party chief N. S. Khrushchev, 
included the Witnesses on a list of all known religious organizations in Ukraine. That said, it 
took the council some time to sort out the Witnesses‘ beliefs and practices in detail. The 
Witnesses‘ confusing resemblance to the Il‘inist sect made matters even more complex. The 
Ukrainian CRCA could not even decide on the organization‘s proper title for almost a year. 
The July 1945 memo listed Witnesses both as ―Bible Students,‖ their pre-1931 name, and 
―Bodachi,‖ a colloquial Polish term for the Witnesses derived from the Polish verb ―to 
study.‖309 The same report separately mentioned a group of ―Jehovists‖ in Kiev oblast, 
almost certainly a reference to the Il‘inists, and not the Witnesses. Follow-up reports 
confused the matter further, using ―Apocalypsists‖ (Apokalipsisty) to refer to Il‘inists 
and‖Russellists‖ (Russelisty) to refer to a group it categorized as distinct from the 
Witnesses.
310
 By May 1946, the Ukrainian CRCA had figured out that Bodachi, Bible 
Students, Russellists, and Jehovah‘s Witnesses referred to the same organization, although 
CRCA documents continued to employ all of these terms throughout the Stalin era before 
settling on ―Jehovists.‖311 The Moldavian CRCA took even longer, still issuing reports 
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referring to Witnesses as ―Millennialists‖ (Mileonisty) as late as 1948.312 The inability to sort 
out various millenarian groups made it difficult to identify precise locations of Witnesses.
313
  
Despite this confusion, the state quickly gathered information about the Witnesses‘ 
most provocative beliefs and practices. The Witnesses‘ conscientious objection to military 
service was likely the most well-known fact about the organization, appearing in almost 
every CRCA report. Several reports also made note of the Witnesses‘ hostility toward secular 
government and their refusal to vote in local elections.
314
 In 1946, the Ukrainian CRCA sent 
instructions to its regional commissioners asking that they devote special attention to 
identifying Witnesses. It cautioned that the organization represented a ―very dangerous group 
with connections to Banderists and Ukrainian-German nationalists.‖ The CRCA requested 
that commissioners immediately send any available information to the Kiev office. In 
response, the L‘viv commissioner informed the CRCA that he knew of over 500 ―Bodachi-
Russellists‖ who rejected state power and refused to comply with military service and state 
laws. He stated that in areas with high concentrations of Jehovists, local officials had noticed 
abnormally low levels of dairy and grain requisitions, a claim repeated by other Ukrainian 
oblast CRCA commissioners.
315
 A 1946 Volyn‘ oblast CRCA report estimated that it had 
about 275 Witnesses, mostly people who joined since 1938. The Volyn‘ commissioner noted 
that the Witnesses claimed to have no leaders other than Jesus Christ and the Bible.
316
 That 
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same year, the Zakarpattia oblast CRCA identified six villages with 730 Witnesses total, 
including 300 estimated members in the village of Grushevo alone.
317
 Overall, the CRCA 
developed a clear portrait of the organization as one defined by anti-Soviet and anti-state 
fanaticism. 
In an effort to eliminate unregistered religious groups, the CRCA apparently 
considered the possibility of encouraging believers to join registered organizations such as 
the Baptists. A 1948 memo from the deputy chair of the all-union CRCA to the Moldavian 
commissioner asked him to explore the viability of using the registered Baptist and Seventh 
Day Adventist organizations to influence underground sects such as the Reform Adventists 
and Millennialists.
318
  The L‘viv commissioner likewise noted in January 1950 that he had 
encouraged local Baptist leaders to meet with Witnesses in order to convince them to join the 
registered Baptist organization and to abandon ―blind fanaticism,‖ noting that this plan had 
some success but still needed more development.
319
 However, such an approach had its 
weaknesses. One Moldavian report suggested that Witnesses had begun falsely identifying as 
legal Baptists to shield themselves from persecution. Ultimately, this method did not move 
beyond the experimental stage, for reasons not entirely clear in the available sources.
320
 With 
or without state endorsement, however, both Baptists and Witnesses proselytized to one 
another and saw one another as potential converts.  
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 Information about the Witnesses increased significantly once the MGB arrested and 
interrogated large numbers of members starting in 1946 and 1947.
321
 Indeed, the security 
apparatus and the CRCA relied heavily on one another during this period, as both struggled 
to make sense of this new religious community and to assess its potential threat. Certainly, 
the CRCA did not have access to ongoing investigations and interrogations of Witnesses 
contained in the MGB‘s internal files. But both the MGB and the CRCA shared a common 
view that Witnesses represented a serious danger to state security and could not be granted 
legal status as a religious organization. Reporting on the sectarian situation in the fall of 
1946, the Moldavian Central Committee (TsK) sent word to its MGB office that several 
illegal sects existed in Soviet Moldavia, namely the Innokentists, the Reform Adventists, and 
the ―Jehovists‖ or ―Millennialists.‖ The report stated that Jehovists, concentrated primarily in 
the northern districts, held ―extremely fanatical views‖ and considered all governmental 
power to be godless and satanic. A 1947 CRCA briefing estimated that Moldavia had up to 
2,500 members overall, correlating closely with a detailed report from the Moldavian 
procuracy the following year that identified Witnesses in 21 villages, comprising 23 groups 
and 243 circles.
322
  
Similarly, the Ukrainian MGB for L‘viv oblast prepared a report in late 1947 
asserting that the region had as many as 1,000 members, most of them young. These 
believers, it noted, did not recognize any authority other than Jehovah God and Jesus Christ. 
As such, members refused to participate in elections or to join kolkhozes, largely avoided 
work in state institutions, did not pay taxes, and lived primarily off speculation or income 
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from the sale of anti-Soviet religious literature.
323
 The following year, the Ukrainian CRCA 
instructed its regional commissioners to inform the regional interior ministry offices and 
police about all known religious groups.
324
 In response, the all-union CRCA in Moscow 
praised Ukraine‘s initiatives and reiterated the responsibility of oblast commissioners to 
prepare concrete materials on all religious believers and leaders of illegal religious 
organizations, and to pass on this information to the security organs. It also advised the 
CRCA to issue warnings to leaders of non-registered religious organizations and to let the 
local police and Party executive committees handle administrative actions against these 
individuals.
325
  
 Neither the Communist Party nor the state devoted serious attention to atheist 
propaganda during the late Stalin era, despite occasional rhetoric exhorting Party members 
and agitators to conduct such work. Most of the state‘s meager efforts occurred through the 
Party‘s youth organization, the Komsomol, and through the Knowledge Society. A 1950 
report from the Party agitprop department noted that the Knowledge Society, through its 
publishing house, had printed few lectures on atheist themes, and what it had printed was of 
dubious quality and unconnected to specific problems in Soviet society.
326
 The lack of 
literature on religion in general, and unregistered religions in particular, meant that neither 
the Knowledge Society nor the Komsomol had sufficient information to conduct effective 
                                                 
323
 The report was prepared for the Komsomol, given the large number of youth among the Witnesses, and 
intended to shame the Komsomol into more aggressive action against sects. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 444, ll. 
5-8. 
 
324
 DALO, f. 1332, op. 2, spr. 9, ark. 107-08. 
 
325
 DALO, f. 1332, op. 2, spr. 15, ark. 149-50. 
 
326
 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 286, ll. 3-4. 
 109 
atheist propaganda. As a result, both groups largely ignored the problem, giving only 
sporadic lectures to local populations during the Stalin era.
327
  
Komsomol and Party officials recognized the potential threat posed by religious 
proselytism among Soviet youth. A 1950 memo from Moldavian TsK Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev expressed concern about the exposure of youth in Moldavia to ―alien influences, in 
particular the influence of religious organizations,‖ and recommended that the Komsomol 
and Pioneer organizations strengthen their efforts to combat religious ideology.
328
 A 1947  
Komsomol plenum in L‘viv oblast directly blamed weak atheist propaganda for the growth 
of sectarian believers such as the Witnesses. Yet beyond vague calls to instill patriotism and 
improve lecture quality, even L‘viv, the center of Soviet Witness activity, showed little 
initiative to correct the problem.
329
 The CRCA, for its part, told its commissioners to be 
patient as Party and government institutions developed concrete, mass political propaganda 
and agitation to combat religious belief.
330
 In the meantime, the state relied almost entirely on 
repressive measures against unregistered religious organizations. 
 
Faith under Interrogation 
 In the final months of World War II, Soviet police and security services began to 
gather data on individual Witnesses and to arrest members, primarily men who refused to 
serve in the Red Army. By 1946, the security apparatus widened its scope to include all 
Witness believers. Relying in large measure on denunciations made by neighbors and local 
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Party activists, the state arrested and interrogated Witnesses in an attempt to glean details 
about the organization‘s structure, printing operations, leaders, and its ties both to Witnesses 
in neighboring European countries (namely Poland and Romania) and to the worldwide 
headquarters in Brooklyn. Through interrogations and confiscation of organizational reports 
and Watch Tower literature, the state expanded its knowledge of the Witnesses to fuel further 
arrests. The MGB arrested hundreds of members in the immediate postwar period and few of 
these Witnesses escaped long camp sentences.  
Declassified MGB case files from Ukraine make it possible to detail the remarkable 
postwar cat and mouse game between the Witnesses and the security organs. Such materials 
are not available for Soviet Moldavia, where the security service archives remain closed to 
researchers. Although historians know a great deal about the fabrication of cases against 
individuals for anti-Soviet activities and organizations during the Stalin era, the Witnesses 
offer a rare opportunity to see how the state dealt with a real underground organization. The 
state did not need to invent fantastical crimes for the Witnesses, nor did Witnesses need to 
confess to such crimes—the truth was enough to convict them. Some Russian scholars have 
portrayed the postwar repression as ―absurd,‖ stating that the Witnesses broke no laws and 
were harmless religious believers terrorized by a ruthless state.
331
 In fact, Witnesses 
repeatedly violated Soviet laws, which forbade the formation of non-Party organizations, the 
holding of private meetings, the performance of religious rituals by an unregistered religion, 
and the smuggling and distribution of religious literature. Framing the Witnesses primarily as 
random victims does a disservice to the very real crimes (as defined by Soviet law) the 
Witnesses committed in order to practice and defend their faith under Soviet rule. 
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Where Witnesses saw religious practices and beliefs, interrogators saw anti-Soviet 
political activity. A private gathering of a dozen individuals to discuss a Watchtower article 
on God‘s destruction of earthly governments may have been a religious service to Witnesses, 
but it is hardly surprising that the Soviet government ascribed far more sinister motives to the 
event. Similarly, when Witness leaders smuggled reports to Brooklyn on their preaching 
activities and members‘ treatment in Soviet prison camps, the state felt such acts constituted 
espionage and treason. In general, the security services had no understanding or interest in 
theological issues surrounding Armageddon and did not differentiate between religious 
beliefs and political ideology. It is also fair to say that even though Witnesses saw their 
actions as politically neutral, the wholesale rejection of Soviet institutions and norms did in 
fact constitute a political act that the state saw as a serious threat to the Soviet project in the 
western borderlands. 
L‘viv and Zakarpattia oblasts, with the highest concentrations of Witnesses, suffered 
especially heavy arrests. MGB case files from these two regions offer a representative case 
study of state methods against suspected Witnesses, which closely conformed to a set pattern. 
First, the regional security organs gathered materials from the CRCA, the local Party 
organizations, and informants. The latter were often arrested or convicted Witnesses whom 
the police had convinced to give information on their fellow believers. Second, the MGB 
conducted late-night searches of Witnesses‘ homes, hoping to find illegal literature, 
clandestine meetings, or other members living without documentation. Third, once sufficient 
evidence had been gathered, the state arrested Witnesses and sent them to regional security 
prisons for interrogation. Many, if not most, arrests of Witnesses occurred in groups, and 
interrogations could drag on for several months to determine the precise ties among 
 112 
individuals. In cases involving leaders or large numbers of defendants, the MGB often 
preferred to transfer the suspects to Kiev to be handled by republic-level ministry officials.  
L‘viv, the center of early postwar Witness activity, was not surprisingly the MGB‘s 
first target for mass arrests. In February 1946, police arrested several Witnesses, most 
importantly the country servant, Ziatek, after another Witness, already in custody, gave out 
the address of the woman with whom Ziatek lived at the time.
332
 Under repeated questioning, 
Ziatek claimed to be a rank-and-file member with no knowledge of the organization‘s 
structure or leadership. Instead, he used interrogations to preach to investigators about 
Christ‘s kingdom.333 At his trial, he told the court: ―I belong solely to God and do not speak 
against the government because, according to God‘s law, I should do good to all, even to 
those who do evil to me.‖ He received ten years in a forced labor camp.334 Ziatek‘s refusal to 
supply any information saved the remaining leadership in Ukraine from immediate arrest. 
More sweeping arrests in L‘viv followed a year later, after the MGB arrested Petro 
Tokar‘, then assistant to the new country servant, Stanislav Burak, in late June 1947.335 
Under interrogation, Tokar‘ provided detailed charts of all known Witnesses in the L‘viv 
area, their positions in the organization, and, if known, their addresses and physical 
characteristics. In particular, he directed the police to the printing press in Mariia Shkoda‘s 
cellar and offered several possible locations where Burak might have been staying illegally. 
Sure enough, a police raid in July 1947 of a home in the nearby village of Zbois‘ka yielded 
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the arrest of Burak.
336
 The information given by Tokar‘ led to the largest wave of Witness 
arrests in the immediate postwar era. It dealt a severe blow to the organization, temporarily 
decapitated the leadership, and cut off the supply of literature. It may also have had 
international reverberations, as Tokar‘ provided addresses for Polish Witnesses in Łódź, 
including Wilhelm Scheider, the head of the branch.
337
 Here, the Witnesses‘ hierarchical 
structure proved a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it did offer a much more unified 
hierarchy better able to resist attempts at repression and later KGB infiltration. It also 
shielded lower level members during interrogations, since they had no information on 
organizational activity outside of their own small circle. On the other hand, it left the 
organization vulnerable in the case of high level arrests, as with Tokar‘. Even when Witness 
leaders refused to cooperate, police often found detailed reports during searches and raids 
that, although coded, contained critical information on the organization.  
By the late 1940s, the Witness organization in L‘viv had been utterly decimated, its 
leadership arrested in concurrent waves of arrests, and its printing operations discovered and 
shut down. Many of the remaining leaders had gone underground, avoiding their homes in 
order to escape the state‘s clutches. They lived off the charity of other members who hid and 
fed them under great personal risk.
338
 A 1950 CRCA report praised the state‘s measures 
against the Witnesses, while noting that the organization still has ―not been completely 
liquidated.‖339 While the L‘viv community managed to slowly revive in the decades after 
Stalin‘s death, it did not return to its former strength until the waning days of the Soviet 
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Union. Instead, the organization moved its leaders and resources elsewhere. Continued 
growth of the organization, and the increasingly far-flung communities within its control, 
required a more developed structure less dependent on a single leader.  
The limited archival information on arrests in Moldavia shows that the security 
organs conducted mass arrests in 1947 and 1948 to wipe out the existing leadership. The 
MGB detained circuit leader Constantin Shobe, his two assistants, and several group and 
circle leaders in the northern districts. Shobe had previously received a twenty-five-year 
sentence from the Romanian authorities for his Witness activities under occupation, but had 
been liberated by the Red Army in 1944, as had one of his deputies. Arresting Shobe and 
thirteen others in 1947, the Moldavian MGB expanded the case to include other members 
based on information from those already in custody.
340
 Shobe‘s successor lasted only a short 
time before the state arrested and convicted him as well.
341
  
By the late 1940s, the repression of Witnesses extended beyond the Soviet Union‘s 
borders into future Warsaw Pact countries. The sovietization of Eastern Europe sharply 
constricted the limited freedoms enjoyed by citizens of these countries in the immediate 
postwar era. This included the right to freedom of conscience. Witnesses occupied a tenuous 
existence in the region, barely tolerated by the authorities. Polish security services already in 
1946 raided the Polish branch office and briefly detained its staff. While the office continued 
to operate, the state placed its leaders under constant surveillance.
342
 In late 1948, the 
Czechoslovak branch office was shut down, and its officials arrested and sent to labor 
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camps.
343
 In 1949, Romanian authorities closed the Bucharest office.
344
 A year later, 
Hungarian police raided the Budapest branch office and began to arrest its leaders.
345
 
This period coincided with the start of the Cold War, making it perilous for the 
Witnesses to maintain such close ties to their organization‘s headquarters in the United 
States. The most devastating blow occurred in the spring of 1950 with the liquidation of the 
Łódź office and the arrests of its leaders, whom the state publicly tried and convicted of 
American espionage.
346
 That same summer, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
officially banned the Witnesses and launched mass arrests of members.
347
 Show trials of the 
Witness leadership in Poland and the GDR in 1950 increased the pressure on the Soviet 
organization, while cutting it off from its primary source of literature and instructions in 
Łódź. The courts, which convicted the Witnesses of treason and espionage, also created an 
impetus for similar convictions of Soviet Witness leaders. A 1951 CRCA report to the TsK 
described the Witnesses as a ―primary source for the recruitment of spies, saboteurs, and 
other foreign intelligence agents,‖ and referred to the Polish and GDR cases as evidence.348 
In sum, the state hoped to sever the transnational ties between Witness organizations in 
Eastern Europe that had existed prior to World War II. Further, in the post-Stalin era, the 
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organization‘s American connections played a major role in demonizing Witnesses as Cold 
War stooges for the Soviet Union‘s number one enemy.  
In the wake of arrests in L‘viv oblast, the remaining responsible members sought 
other locations as bases for their activities, namely in Stanislav (later Ivano-Frankivs‘k) and 
Zakarpattia oblasts. After the 1951 exile of Witnesses from western Ukraine discussed later 
in the chapter, which excluded Transcarpathia, arrests of Witnesses there increased in 
intensity.
349
 In 1952 and early 1953, the MGB arrested key organizational leaders, primarily 
in Zakarpattia and Stanislav oblasts, including country servant Mykola Tsyba, his secretary, 
Veretel‘nyk, several circuit and group leaders, and their couriers. The arrests netted a huge 
quantity of printing equipment, literature, and donations, wiping out much of the 
organization‘s printing capacity for the immediate future.350  
The interrogation records of arrested Witnesses offer a valuable window into the 
relationship between the Soviet state and Witnesses and how each saw the other. Yet they 
must be treated with caution. The records include only a summary written by the interrogator 
at the conclusion of each session. These sources therefore need to be read with a careful eye 
not only to what is said, but also to what is absent. As many of the Witnesses spoke only 
Ukrainian or Polish (in L‘viv oblast), or Hungarian or Romanian (in Zakarpattia oblast), and 
interrogations took place solely in Russian, Witnesses often relied on a translator or their 
own rudimentary Russian language skills. Thus they had no way to affirm the veracity of the 
protocols they signed at the end of each interrogation session. In addition, interrogators used 
a variety of tactics to coerce information from accused Witnesses. Face-to-face meetings 
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between informants and the accused, and between accused members, were employed as a 
means of pressuring Witnesses to admit to certain actions.  
Interrogators also used physical pressure to force arrested Witnesses to admit to 
crimes. This included sleep deprivation and near starvation, as well as physical abuse.
351
 
While Soviet interrogation records do not directly address these violent practices, implicit 
signs of their use can still be found by careful readers. For instance, nearly every arrested 
member initially refused to divulge information on the organization. Yet days or weeks later, 
after multiple interrogation sessions, some Witnesses changed their minds and started 
talking. It is reasonable to assume that this change resulted in large part from the extreme 
duress suffered by individuals. Questioning also took place at all hours of the day, sometimes 
in the middle of the night, and stretched for long hours at a time. Moreover, one Witness 
leader, Burak, died under investigation in Lukianovskii prison in Kiev. This should say 
enough about the tactics used against accused Witnesses.
352
  
While official Watch Tower publications in the post-Soviet era emphasize the 
stalwart resistance of their Soviet members under investigation, this approach carries with it a 
value judgment that historians would do best to avoid. For Witnesses, true Christians are 
always ―faithful under trials,‖ and this distinguishes them from other believers who they feel 
compromised with Soviet authorities.
353
 A 1950 Awake! article stated that Witnesses ―will 
not knuckle under to communism, nor submit their organization to Red overlordship, nor will 
they swear allegiance to communistic governments, with or without face-saving 
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reservations.‖354 Yet what did ―face-saving reservations‖ mean? Resistance came in many 
forms, and sometimes demanded compromises in order to protect the organization. Existing 
scholarship on the Witnesses has tended to adopt the Witnesses‘ narrative without critical 
examination and to privilege resistance at the expense of what was certainly a more 
complicated scenario. This means that the voices of those who did compromise have been 
entirely absent from the history. Watch Tower literature assumes that those who did not meet 
certain standards of resistance are somehow not real Witnesses, or that they are of a lower 
moral quality. This interpretation separates Witnesses into two camps (those who resisted, 
and those who did not), when the lines between the two were hardly that clear. In the course 
of a single investigation, the same person might resist, compromise, and yield.  Indeed, the 
Witnesses showed remarkable creativity and ingenuity in developing a myriad of strategies 
for coping with interrogations.  
With this consideration in mind, it is possible to examine the diverse ways that 
Witnesses responded under interrogation. Since the prewar period, Watch Tower literature 
taught that persecution and arrests offered opportunities for evangelism. The Ten Points 
reiterated this notion, advising members to use their testimony during court trials to declare 
their fealty to Jehovah. At the same time, it cautioned Witnesses not to give out the names of 
other members, and, when necessary, to take responsibility for all charges upon themselves 
in order to avoid the arrest of others. Compromise, it noted, never honors Jehovah and must 
be avoided.
355
  The sense that persecution had a purpose doubtlessly helped Witnesses to 
remain steadfast in their belief under pressure. Oleksii Tsygan, arrested at the age of twenty-
three, told his interrogator that Witnesses have always faced persecution by secular 
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authorities, and he did not fear sharing the fate of his fellow believers who had already been 
sent to Siberia.
356
 Like Tsygan, arrested Soviet Witnesses almost universally expressed their 
faith in Jehovah and their adherence to the Witness organization when questioned. A 1949 
report on Russia published by the Polish branch office noted that ―because the Lord‘s people 
do not hide their faith or stop from mentioning the name of Almighty God, the opposers [i.e. 
Soviet officials] have an easy job‖ of convicting Witnesses.357  
Many Witnesses preached the news of Christ‘s millennial kingdom to their 
interrogators. One woman, for example, told her interrogator that Soviet power, along with 
all governments, will be destroyed in Armageddon since they are all unjust, do not fulfill 
God‘s commandments, and, as such, are against God‘s kingdom.358 When an interrogator 
asked Pavlo Rurak why his God had not saved him from arrest if he was indeed all-powerful, 
Pavlo replied, ―Tell me, please, if I were free at this moment and wanted to speak with you 
about the Bible here at the MGB, would it be possible?‖ The interrogator responded no. 
Pavlo then quoted from Matthew 10:18: ―Christ said, ‗On my account you will be brought 
before governors and kings as witnesses to them and to the Gentiles.‘‖359 For Pavlo, God had 
facilitated this arrest so that he could preach his faith to his captors who otherwise would not 
have heard this message.  
Beyond acknowledging their faith and basic beliefs, however, almost all arrested 
Witnesses initially refused to answer any other questions (although few maintained this 
stance throughout the entire investigation). Witnesses frequently stated to interrogators that 
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their faith did not allow them to give information regarding the organizational structure and 
leadership. One arrested Witness, who had already admitted her own role in the organization, 
repeatedly refused to name leaders, telling her interrogators that it is a secret of God‘s 
kingdom and betraying this secret would go against her religious beliefs.
360
 The similar 
language used by multiple Witnesses to defend their actions and shield the organization 
strongly suggests that the country committee had successfully disseminated the Ten Points 
instructions to members on how to act when questioned by local authorities and when subject 
to police interrogation. One former Witness admitted under interrogation that she had been 
told to ―hold firm‖ and not betray others if arrested.361 Witnesses who rejected or perhaps 
were not yet aware of the Ten Points demonstrated equal resistance under interrogation. 
These members faced an even greater risk of arrest due to their refusal to join collective 
farms, register for the draft, or obtain passports, all actions that had been recommended in the 
Ten Points to avoid police detection. For them, signing forms, draft cards, or identity papers 
represented an indefensible endorsement of a corrupt and satanic state. Once arrested, they 
similarly refused to sign interrogation protocols, to the deep frustration of their 
interrogators.
362
  
Most Witnesses, realizing that a strategy of total non-cooperation could not save them 
or their already arrested fellow believers from being convicted, and that the police already 
had considerable knowledge of their activities, eventually opted for damage control. They 
tried to limit the broader harm done to the organization and its unarrested members. This 
approach varied greatly depending on the circumstances of the case and the means available 
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to specific individuals. For example, when asked to provide names of other Witnesses, some 
identified members they knew to have already been arrested, or who had died or emigrated to 
Poland.
363
 Some asserted that they had no leaders other than Jehovah God.
364
 Those who did 
give out new names often identified only rank-and-file members to protect elders. Others 
took responsibility for actions likely performed by others in order to shield them. For 
example, after the raid on the printing operation in Shkoda‘s cellar, Pashkovs‘kyi, who 
helped operate the press, took full responsibility, identifying himself as the mastermind 
behind the operation.
365
 The other two people involved in the press stubbornly refused to 
admit to anything beyond the undeniable facts established during the raid. Witnesses often 
claimed to have found literature in order to avoid naming those who had given it to them. 
One man asserted that he found several publications in an abandoned home near Krakow 
while en route to being repatriated from a German work camp in 1945.
366
  
These strategies certainly minimized the harm done to the broader organization, but 
did nothing to help individual Witnesses escape punishment. It took little effort on the part of 
the MGB to convict Witnesses. Almost all members attended circle meetings at private 
homes to study the Bible and religious literature. Likewise, every Witness spoke about the 
faith to someone else. When faced with such clear evidence of specific activities, Witnesses 
frequently invented stories to account for their illegal actions. One Witness, arrested in 1946 
for her involvement in an underground printing operation, justified having printing ink in her 
home by saying that she had bought it by mistake, confusing it with floor paint. She claimed 
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that the printing equipment she owned belonged to her deceased husband, and that the 10,000 
rubles confiscated by the police came from selling clothes.
367
 When police raided a study 
circle in 1947, the homeowner claimed that everyone just happened to come by her home at 
the same time. One man dropped by to sell flour, another to borrow money to buy medicine, 
another to give the homeowner a box she needed to mail a package, and another to pick up a 
frying pan she had borrowed.
368
 Others relied on their low levels of education as a weapon of 
defense, pleading ignorance about the content of literature, claiming not to have actually read 
it or not to have really understood it.
369
 One man initially told interrogators that he was 
illiterate and therefore unable to read the Bible. He later admitted under pressure that he did 
possess basic reading skills and had on occasion read the Bible himself, but only rarely as it 
was difficult for him.
370
 
Witnesses employed similarly creative tactics when it came to questions about their 
baptism into the organization. In the eyes of the state, baptism represented an act equivalent 
to joining an anti-Soviet organization. Baptism into a non-registered religious organization 
was a dangerous affront to Soviet law, but performing such a baptism carried even stiffer 
penalties as it identified the person as a leader, and not merely a member of the organization. 
One Witness, accused of performing a 1948 baptism, claimed that he had simply invited the 
two other people involved to go swimming in a local pond that day. In an exceedingly rare 
turn of events in such investigations, authorities released the man due to a lack of compelling 
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evidence.
371
 Others who were ultimately convicted stated, ―Jehovah God baptized me,‖ or 
said that they had baptized themselves.
372
 Some Witnesses took advantage of having only 
recently become Soviet citizens due to wartime annexations. They changed the dates of 
baptisms so that they occurred prior to the arrival of Soviet power. This in theory meant that 
the Soviet Union had no jurisdiction over such actions. On a practical level, such tactics 
rarely helped members avoid conviction, but they did protect other members from facing a 
similar fate.
 373
 
Only a few Witnesses abandoned the organization after their arrest and provided 
detailed information on their former fellow believers. Some were arrested after already 
having distanced themselves from the organization and thus had less incentive to resist 
demands for information.  In one case, the police interrogated a young woman who had 
recently been expelled from the Witnesses for courting a young man who did not belong to 
the faith. She also had a long history of mental illness and hospitalization. Given these 
circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that she ultimately told the police what she knew 
about several Witness leaders and her older sister, a courier in the organization.
374
  
In some instances, Witnesses both cooperated and stonewalled at various intervals 
during their interrogations. The case of Ivan Nan, arrested in 1949 in Zakarpattia, offers 
insight into members‘ internal conflict over how to maintain their religious principles in the 
face of extreme pressure. Under repeated interrogation, Nan admitted to his interrogator that 
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he had participated in a mass baptism of members in the Tissa River, even naming the 
baptizer in charge of the ceremony. For Nan, this began an agonizing personal struggle not 
just to undo the damage he had done, but more importantly to salvage his own salvation. He 
felt certain he had betrayed the organization. During an all-night interrogation the following 
day, he cried out to his interrogator: ―By my action, I have committed a great crime against 
Jehovah God and will be punished at Armageddon. I have violated my sacred oath as a 
Jehovist that a Jehovist should not give evidence against another Jehovist, nor give evidence 
on the sect‘s actions. Thus, from this day forward, I no longer consider myself a Witness.‖ 
Believing himself beyond redemption, he divulged further information about a secret 
meeting held in the woods and named the meeting‘s organizer. Four days later, he recanted 
these statements, saying ―I was not in control of myself; the devil controlled me. I was not 
speaking with my own voice, but with that of the devil who had possessed me.‖375 Yet 
throughout his interrogations, even when it seemed he had rejected any hope of salvation, he 
refused to sign the interrogation protocols. This act, in keeping with his religious beliefs that 
demanded no acknowledgement of earthly government, suggests that Nan still considered 
himself a Witness. At trial, he had this to say: ―I ask only that Jehovah God hear me.‖376 For 
Witnesses like Nan, their actions placed them in a murky position of having broken their 
vows not to betray the organization without having rejected the organization‘s underlying 
beliefs.  
The case of Petro Tokar‘, whose cooperation with the police led to mass arrests in 
L‘viv, demonstrates the difficulties that men like Nan faced if they wished to remain in good 
standing with the organization despite divulging information. Like Nan, Tokar‘ provided 
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statements to the police that placed other members in danger and led to their arrest and 
conviction. He also remained firm in his adherence to his religious beliefs, not wanting to 
lose his faith as a result of his actions. At trial, Tokar‘ refused to cooperate with the 
authorities or to repeat his earlier statements against fellow believers. Instead, he reaffirmed 
his commitment to his religion. He received a sentence of twenty-five years and was one of 
the few Witnesses not to be granted any sentence reduction during the post-Stalin era. Still in 
prison in 1971, during a review of the initial 1947 case, he once again gave information on 
several of his co-believers, although in much less detail (citing the difficulty in remembering 
names after so much time had elapsed).
377
 Interviewed in the 1990s for a history of the 
Ukrainian Witnesses published in the 2002 Yearbook, Tokar‘ stated that he had been tricked 
by the police into giving out information in 1947. He said the police told him they needed 
membership rolls in order to register the organization.
378
 The original case file does not 
reflect this version of events, instead showing that Tokar‘ initially refused to give any names 
and did so only under repeated interrogation. The example of Tokar‘ reflects the awkward 
position of Witnesses who had failed to live up to the religion‘s standards of non-cooperation 
with the police and may have found it hard to acknowledge this fact to their fellow believers. 
The Tokar‘ case also demonstrates the importance of the court trial for Witnesses. It 
represented the final opportunity for them to bear witness for their faith, even if only to the 
few officials present at the closed hearings. The state tried Witnesses either through special 
sessions of the MGB or through the oblast courts.
379
 It charged Witnesses under statute 54-1a 
                                                 
377
 DALO, f. 3258, spr. P-25018, t. 4, ark. 35-37. 
 
378
 2002 Yearbook 158-59. According to Oleg Gol‘ko, Tokar‘ also claimed to have been tried as a Latin 
American spy. This charge does not appear in any of the interrogation or trial records, nor is it referenced in 
later post-Stalin appeals by Tokar‘ for early release. Gol‘ko, Sibirskii marshrut, 70-72. 
 
379
 DALO, f. 3258, spr. P-25018, t. 2, ark. 268-301. 
 126 
(treason) and statutes 54-10 and 54-11 (anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation).
380
 Conviction 
was a foregone conclusion. Sentences ranged from seven to ten years for low-level members 
to twenty-five years for high-profile leaders or those involved in literature printing and 
distribution. Most served these sentences in forced labor camps in Siberia and the Far East.  
While understanding that their testimony would have little if any effect on the verdict 
and sentence, most Witnesses, even those who had cooperated to some extent with the MGB, 
used the trial to defend themselves and their faith. A 1949 trial in Zakarpattia of seven 
Witnesses provides one example. Defendant Dmytro Marynchan warned the court that God 
would punish those men who persecute the Witnesses, while his co-defendant, Vasyl‘ 
Bokoch, justified his actions by stating that he had followed God‘s instructions. Vasyl‘ noted 
that he lived on Jehovah‘s land and recognized only his authority and that of Jesus Christ. 
Another defendant, Ivan Ona, told the court that all he wanted was to serve Jehovah. All of 
the defendants refused legal counsel, opting instead to rely solely on ―Jehovah‘s 
protection.‖381 They each received twenty-five years and confiscation of their property. At 
other trials, Witnesses used their day in court to proclaim how persecution only strengthened 
their belief in God. At a 1951 trial, defendant Hryhoriy Holiash told the court, ―I was, am 
now, and will always be a Jehovah‘s Witness. God knows all, sees all, and is all-
powerful.‖382 Anton Voitsekhovs‘kyi declared, ―I am very happy that I am being tried. I am 
certain that the hour will come when all powers will obey the one kingdom,‖ a reference to 
his belief that Jehovah would soon establish a millennial kingdom under the authority of 
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Jesus Christ. His daughter, Bronislava, stated, ―I am happy to be a Jehovah‘s Witness and I 
will be His witness until death.‖383  
Upon conviction, Witnesses struggled to survive and maintain their faith in the harsh 
environment of the Gulag. Some, primarily elderly members, died before completing their 
lengthy sentences.
384
 As for nearly all Stalin-era political prisoners, camp life combined 
dangerous, grueling labor with meager rations and inhuman living conditions.
385
 Most 
Witnesses had the good fortune of finding fellow believers in their camps.
386
 They also 
preached and found converts among other political prisoners.
387
 Given the extreme difficulty 
in smuggling in literature to the camps and prisons, Witnesses relied primarily on memory 
and a few handwritten texts for their religious studies and proselytism efforts.
388
 Pavlo 
Rurak, arrested in 1951 and sent to a camp in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, recalled how he and 
other Witnesses held secret meetings to maintain their faith, and how his sister managed to 
sneak a copy of the New Testament into a package she mailed to him, a ―miracle‖ given the 
close police inspection of packages.
389
 
In the Stalin era, hundreds, if not thousands of Witnesses experienced Soviet life from 
behind the barbed wire of camps and the bars of prison cells. They learned to adapt their faith 
to these conditions and to find ways to spread their beliefs and practice their religion. To 
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their fellow prisoners, they offered a chance at spiritual redemption and a community willing 
to accept those cast out from Soviet society. Some prisoners joined the organization after 
hearing the Witnesses‘ message. After Stalin‘s death, as his successor Khrushchev began to 
dismantle the Gulag, the state gave many Witnesses early release from their sentences, while 
it arrested others for illegal religious activity. In short, camps and prisons became an 
enduring feature of Witness life and communities throughout the Soviet era.  
 
Operations North and South 
In 1949 and 1951, the Soviet state, unable to liquidate the Witnesses through targeted 
arrests, undertook two mass exiles of all known Witnesses and their families to Siberia.
390
 
Together, the two actions represent the largest mass exile of an entire religious community in 
the Soviet Union. This was not the first time the state had used this form of repression against 
a religious group, having exiled an estimated 1,000 True Orthodox Christians, a splinter 
group from the Russian Orthodox Church opposed to cooperation with the Soviet state, from 
Riazan', Voronezh, and Orel oblasts in 1944.
391
 However, the 1949 and 1951 exiles of 
Witnesses were on a significantly larger scale. All told, the state removed over 10,000 
Witnesses, many of them children and elderly citizens, from their homes and sent them in 
cattle cars to ―special settlements‖ in distant outposts, primarily Siberia. Told the exile would 
be permanent, Witnesses began the difficult task of rebuilding their lives in new locations.
392
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The Witness exiles represented only one aspect of the Soviet state‘s broader plan for 
sovietization of the western borderlands. As implemented by the state, sovietization involved 
not only integration of its inhabitants into the Soviet body politic, but also the removal of 
people deemed a threat to this process. In addition to arrests, the Soviet state used mass 
deportations to eliminate categories of suspect people from its borders. This approach had a 
long history in the Soviet Union, having been employed during the Civil War to punish 
Cossack populations for their collaboration with White forces, during collectivization to 
liquidate the kulaks (―rich‖ peasants) and quash rural resistance, and from the mid-1930s 
onward to cleanse border regions of suspect nationalities.
393
  
In the aftermath of Soviet occupation and subsequent annexation of the western 
borderlands, the state used exile to remove economic, political, and national elites, whom it 
felt represented a threat to sovietization. From 1939 to 1941, the state sent hundreds of 
thousands of ethnic Poles and Germans, along with suspected counterrevolutionaries and 
nationalists from western Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Moldavia, to resettlement areas 
primarily in Siberia and Central Asia.
394
 After the war, the Soviet state used targeted exiles to 
remove Ukrainian partisans or partisan sympathizers and their families, along with kulaks 
and other suspect social classes from the western borderlands.
395
 As part of these operations, 
Soviet Moldavia implemented plans for to create special settlements for alleged kulaks and 
counterrevolutionaries in Siberia and other distant regions of the Soviet Union.
396
  The 
Moldavian exile, code named ―Operation South,‖ received Politburo approval in early 
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1949.
397
 The state, deciding that members of religious sects represented a significant danger 
to its sovietization efforts, included these communities in the 1949 order.  While the existing 
documents do not list specific religious sects, Witnesses certainly represented the largest 
group out of 4,832 sectarians and their families scheduled for exile.
398
 At least a few 
Witnesses were also exiled not for their religious affiliation, but because they were labeled as 
kulaks or former merchants. 
The state intended the deportations to remove ongoing resistance to Soviet power and 
collectivization.
399
 By targeting the wealthier elements of society, it provided much needed 
land, livestock, and goods to the collective farms, since the state confiscated the property of 
exiled individuals.
400
 As with earlier collectivization campaigns in the Soviet Union, the state 
also applied the term ―kulak‖ to an assortment of people whom it felt threatened the existing 
political and social order.
401
 After the war, the Soviet state identified kulaks as a ―key 
element of resistance‖ to the establishment of Soviet power. By deporting them, the state 
hoped to destroy the lingering partisan and insurgent elements in the western borderlands.
402
 
Regarding the state‘s motivations, Alexander Statiev has argued convincingly that: 
                                                 
397
 Ibid., 341, and Odintsov, Sovet ministrov, 18-19. 
 
398
 The initial exile order included 345 families and 4,832 people from illegal sects. Subsequent materials do not 
specify how many of these individuals were in fact exiled as planned, but do suggest that the actual exile figures 
were slightly lower. Pasat, Trudnye stranitsy, 392-94, 455-56. 
 
399
 Ibid., 375. 
 
400
 Ibid., 436-38.  
 
401
 For historiography on the kulak in Soviet ideology and earlier collectivization campaigns, see Lynne Viola, 
Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 122-25.  
 
402
 Alexander Statiev, ―Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations in the Western Borderlands,‖ The Journal 
of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6 (2005): 988. 
 
 131 
Most Soviet deportations were pragmatic actions of a state facing an insurgency 
challenge and unrestrained in its choice of coercive means. Ideology played an 
important role in the Soviet security policy. In some cases, it limited the scale of the 
deportations but in others it escalated them far beyond rational limits, which only 
fuelled resistance.‖403  
 
Building on Statiev‘s argument, the deportation of Witnesses arguably represented a 
―pragmatic action‖ against an insurgent group that refused to recognize Soviet power or 
conform to Soviet laws, carried out by a state that saw exile as a more efficient and less 
violent means of eliminating resistance than mass killings.  
The Moldavian MGB, charged with carrying out Operation South, relied on its staff 
and on local police to conduct the necessary advance preparations and compile lists of 
exilees. In the spring of 1949, it negotiated train transport to designated exile locations, 
primarily the regions of Kurgan, Tiumen‘, Irkutsk, and Altai.404 Officers set up conveyance 
routes for all persons on their lists from their homes to the loading stations. According to 
official instructions, officers were to visit their assigned addresses on the night prior to exile. 
Upon arrival, they were to inform the family that they were being sent into exile, warn them 
of the consequences of resistance, and then suggest items to pack, such as buckets, saws, and 
axes to be used as tools.
405
 Authorities allowed exilees to pack only essential items. Officers 
would then escort the family under guard to the nearest train station. There, the exilees would 
be loaded onto trains equipped with soldiers and minimal medical personnel.
406
 The MGB 
struggled to keep the plan secret, a difficult task given the reliance on local police, who 
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leaked information by accident or tried to shield friends and family members who belonged 
to the targeted categories by warning them in advance.
407
 
Operation South scattered Moldavian Witnesses across the Soviet Union, fracturing 
the close-knit communities that had existed since the interwar period. The vast majority of 
Witnesses were sent to Kurgan and Tiumen‘ oblasts. Following Operation South‘s 
completion, the MGB prepared reports on local reactions to the exile to gauge the popular 
mood. It found that the exile had provoked widespread fear and anxiety among the 
population, especially among religious believers. One study of religious believers includes a 
statement from a Witness whose relatives had all been subject to the exile, while he had been 
left behind. He remarked, ―Don‘t worry, soon they will no longer punish us,‖ and expressed 
belief that the Soviet Union had already begun mobilizing for a new world war. Other 
believers quoted in this study belonged to religious organizations not subject to exile. They 
expressed the fear that the state intended to use this form of persecution against other 
religions in the future. A Baptist believer, for example, voiced plans to change his address 
and to start selling his property.
408
  
Carried out on July 6-7, 1949, Operation South encountered serious shortcomings as a 
result of the great speed of its planning and execution. The exile targeted an estimated 11,000 
families and 33,000 people, about a third of whom were children.
409
 One source estimates 
that 345 exiled families were Witnesses.
410
 Almost a quarter of all persons who had been 
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slated for exile dodged the order, many of them having been tipped off in advance, while 
others received exemptions due to their status as kolkhoz members or decorated World War 
II veterans. Some of those on the rolls were already deceased or too infirm to travel.
411
 A 
memo sent in late summer 1949 by the Moldavian TsK to the USSR TsK asked for 
clarification as to how to deal with those persons who for various reasons had not been sent 
into exile as planned.
412
 Without clear instructions from Moscow, Moldavian officials were 
not sure what to do with individuals whom the state classified as a threat to state order. 
Continued arrests of Witnesses, both in Moldavia and elsewhere in the western 
borderlands, highlighted the fact that Operation South had failed in its goal to eliminate 
subversive religious sects from this territory. Thus, in late 1950, Soviet MGB Minister V. S. 
Abakumov pressed for approval of a second, broader mass exile of all Witnesses from the 
western borderlands. In a top secret report to Stalin, Abakumov detailed how previous efforts 
to eliminate the Witnesses through mass arrests had failed to destroy the religion. In contrast, 
the organization showed some signs of growth. Abakumov suggested the exile of 3,048 
families and 8,576 persons, including 6,140 persons from Ukraine, 394 from Belorussia, 52 
from Latvia, 76 from Lithuania, 250 from Estonia, and 1,675 from Moldavia.
413
 Documents 
from the Moldovan state archives suggest that the total number of people exiled likely 
exceeded the original figures put forth by Abakumov, as 2,617 people were exiled from 
Moldavia alone, compared to the initial goal of 1,675.
414
 The Watch Tower organization puts 
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the total number of those exiled at 9,500.
415
 As stated earlier, Transcarpathia was not 
included in the 1951 exile order. Unlike the rest of the western borderlands, Transcarpathia 
had not been part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and thus had not been occupied by the 
Soviet Union prior to the 1941 Nazi invasion. This fact likely made the Soviet state view the 
region as distinct from other western borderlands. For reasons not clear from the documents, 
it spared Transcarpathian Witnesses from the mass exile. 
Once approved by the Council of Ministers in February 1951, the plan became known 
as ―Operation North,‖ and closely mirrored the format of the 1949 exile. Thanks to both 
published archival records and Witness sources, a more detailed picture exists of the 1951 
exile than that of its predecessor. Before dawn on April 1, 1951, soldiers visited the homes of 
Witness families, allowed them to pack only the bare essentials, and transported them to local 
train stations where they loaded them onto cattle cars bound for Siberia. The rest of their 
property was confiscated and given to the kolkhozes and local soviets.
416
 It took weeks for 
the long train convoys to reach their final destinations in Irkutsk and Tomsk oblasts. Many of 
the wagons lacked toilets.
417
 Some Witnesses went into exile while pregnant and a few gave 
birth en route to their settlements.
418
 No one apparently made an attempt to flee.
419
 A later 
report smuggled out by Soviet Witnesses to Brooklyn stated that its members had been 
―carried off to the vast taiga, the forest region of Siberia, and settled in a camp for the 
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purpose of having them cut wood. The brothers left behind have great difficulties to take care 
of things, yet they do all they can to go ahead.‖420  
The story of Alexandru Guriţă illustrates how exile was experienced and understood 
by individual Witnesses. Born in 1945 in northern Moldavia, Alexandru was six years old 
when the exile happened, only a short time after his parents finished constructing a new 
home in their village. The family had joined the Witnesses in 1946 upon learning about the 
faith from a family friend. At 3:00 AM on the night of April 1, Alexandru awoke to bright 
lights that seemed to come from the direction of the train station. His parents went outside to 
check on the livestock and determine the source of the disturbance. A few moments later, his 
father, Matvei, came back inside and told the family, ―Get ready. Prepare your things.‖ 
Months earlier, a relative in local government had warned him of the coming exile, telling 
him that if he did not abandon his faith, he and his family would be sent to ―live with the 
polar bears.‖ Matvei had not heeded the warning and showed no surprise when an officer and 
three soldiers arrived and ordered the family to pack what they could carry.  
At daybreak, the soldiers loaded the family onto a truck and took them to the train 
station along with all the other Witnesses from their village. While the trains waited until 
nightfall to depart on the long journey to Siberia, the family‘s relatives gathered to cry and 
see them off. Matvei and his wife assured their relatives that Jehovah would take care of 
them. Then they boarded cattle cars with a layer of straw on the floor and a hole in each 
corner that would serve as toilets for the next few weeks. Not wanting to scare his young son, 
Matvei told Alexandru that they were going to L‘viv, as they had on previous occasions, to 
sell oil at the local market. At each stop en route to Tomsk oblast, Alexandru asked his father 
                                                 
420
 1956 Yearbook of Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, International Bible 
Students Association, 1955), 254-55. 
 136 
if they had reached L‘viv yet. At some of the larger train stations, the family noticed other 
trains from Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. Witnesses from across the many cars sang songs 
together to lift their spirits. Alexandru recalled with pride that he did not see anyone cry on 
the journey, a fact he contrasted with the experience of his uncles, who were deported as 
kulaks in 1949 and allegedly cried the entire trip. During our 2009 interview, he pulled out a 
photograph of Witnesses taken shortly after their arrival in Tomsk oblast. They are smiling 
and laughing in the picture.
421
  
The recollections of a little boy in the midst of such upheaval represent just one of 
dozens of stories of the April exile retold by surviving Witnesses. Most of the stories mirror 
closely the descriptions provided by Alexandru. They note the instant camaraderie among 
Witnesses, many of whom had no idea until that moment that so many others shared their 
beliefs. They recall hanging cloth banners from the car windows proclaiming, ―We are 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses‖ and singing religious songs to encourage one another.422 The fact that 
they alone had been singled out among all other believers for special persecution seemed 
clear evidence that they were God‘s true Christians. In this sense, while the exile tested the 
limits of their physical endurance, it also strengthened their spiritual faith. Just as the Watch 
Tower organization saw the wartime annexation of the western borderlands as God‘s way of 
spreading the truth of the Bible to Russia, many Witnesses saw exile as an opportunity to 
preach their beliefs in Siberia. One man, exiled along with his family during Operation 
South, remembers his father telling him how Jehovah would ―arrange matters so that people 
in far-off Siberia would hear the truth,‖ and that exile made this a reality.423 
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Some recent Witness narratives of the events suggest that Witnesses were given the 
option of renouncing their faith in return for removal from the exile lists.
424
 This parallels the 
earlier experience of German Witnesses, who could sign a formal renunciation statement to 
avoid imprisonment in a Nazi concentration camp. The German example, widely covered in 
Watch Tower publications in the last few decades, may have influenced how Soviet 
Witnesses remembered and constructed their own history. In fact, Operations North and 
South did not allow for any exemptions from exile for those who renounced their faith. 
Soviet soldiers charged with transporting the Witnesses to the trains may have told some 
members to deny their faith out of a mistaken belief that they could save people from further 
persecution once in exile. They may have simply wanted to goad Witnesses into denying 
their faith.
425
 Regardless, soldiers were not authorized to exempt anyone from exile on this 
basis. Even if Witnesses had been given this choice, it would likely have made little 
difference. As one Witness told the soldiers sent to round up his family in 1951, ―I am 
confident that no matter where you take us, our God, Jehovah, will be with us.‖426 
Once in exile, Witnesses struggled to survive in the utterly foreign environment of 
Siberia. Early MVD reports on the 1949 exile described conditions in the special settlements 
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as ―extremely difficult.‖ Several families crowded together into a single room and slept on 
the ground with no bedding. Some lived in chicken coops or dilapidated barracks.
427
 Others 
lived in crude homes dug into the earth (zemlianki) before constructing their own modest 
homes. They tried as much as possible to reconstruct the same living conditions and way of 
life they had known in their Ukrainian and Moldavian villages. For example, Galina Măcuţă, 
born and raised in exile in Tomsk oblast, recalled how the local population borrowed from 
the Moldavian settlers, preparing new culinary dishes and constructing their homes based on 
methods learned from their new neighbors.
428
 Witnesses shared not only recipes and other 
traditions, but also their faith, winning converts from among locals as well as other deported 
special settlers in Siberia. The latter, having suffered similar persecution by Soviet 
authorities, may have been particularly willing to hear the Witnesses‘ message of 
redemption. For example, Oleg Gol‘ko‘s family, exiled from Ukraine as kulaks after World 
War II, met Witnesses when they appeared in their exile settlement in 1951. The family 
eventually joined the faith.
429
 
The MGB closely surveilled the Witnesses‘ settlement communities, conducting 
regular checks to ensure that no one left the area without permission. Freedom of movement 
was limited to within the assigned district. To prevent escapes, no one could settle near 
railroads or borders.
430
 Many of the adults were assigned to work in the timber industry in the 
harsh cold, sometimes leaving their young children alone all day. One Witness, born in exile, 
recalled how her father returned home one day from work to find his baby daughter with her 
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clothes literally frozen to her body.
431
 In the summers, the insects could be as brutal as the 
winter frost.
432
 Since the exile was permanent, young children and those born in the 
settlement communities were added to the exile lists once they reached adulthood.  
The exile operations failed to eliminate the Witnesses from the western borderlands, 
in large part due to the hasty execution of the exile process. Many members escaped exile for 
a variety of reasons. Some were not home or in town during the roundups.
433
 A few lived 
without documentation in order to avoid detection, primarily those holding responsible 
positions within the organization.
434
 Members serving time in prison and forced labor camps 
also managed to avoid being exiled and were sometimes mistakenly released to their villages 
instead of being sent to join their fellow believers in Siberia. A March 1952 memo from the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR clarified that all such persons had to join their families in exile 
after serving their sentences but in reality, this did not always occur. It also made it easy for 
someone to fall through the bureaucratic cracks if the person‘s family did not belong to the 
Witnesses.
435
 In short, the mass exiles demonstrate the limits of control that the Soviet state 
lacked had over its citizens and that at times it struggled simply to keep track of individuals 
and enforce its rules. This became a long-term problem for the Soviet Union in dealing with 
the Witnesses. 
The state‘s exile lists did not always include newer members, particularly unbaptized 
individuals, who then carried on the faith in the western borderlands. To cite one such 
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example, members of the Gojan family in northern Moldavia had undergone baptism only a 
short time before the 1951 exile and their names did not appear on the lists. When they 
discovered that the rest of their village congregation had disappeared overnight, they initially 
thought that perhaps the end of the world had arrived. They realized the truth about what had 
happened when they received letters sent by those in exile.
436
 Some individuals spared from 
exile chose voluntarily to join their fellow believers and family members, preferring this 
option to the isolation of remaining behind.
437
 Some of these people were not Witnesses 
themselves but belonged to or married into Witness families.  
The state mistakenly included at least a few people on its lists who had been 
Witnesses, but had left the organization prior to the exile.
438
 The Rusnac family, for instance, 
was exiled in 1951 based on information from two men who claimed that the family had ties 
to the Witnesses since 1935 and had not voted in recent elections. When the family protested 
the exile in 1953, a follow-up investigation found that they had only briefly been involved 
with the Witnesses and had quit the religion after the arrival of Soviet power in 1940. In fact, 
the family patriarch had voted and served as an agitator prior to elections. The MGB 
recommended that the family be allowed to return from Tomsk oblast to its native village in 
northern Moldavia. Other families who appealed their exile in this manner were not so lucky, 
but the Rusnac family‘s story suggests that the state did attempt to enforce the legal 
parameters of the exile.
439
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The example of the Gojan family points to the heavy burden now shouldered by the 
remaining skeletal communities in the borderlands. The organization demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to replenish its leaders as quickly as the state managed to identify and 
arrest them. For example, when the newly appointed head of the Moldavian Witnesses 
suffered arrest in February 1952, he was immediately replaced by another member, who 
himself was then arrested a few months later, followed by another man whom police 
discovered hiding in a bunker in northern Moldavia in early 1953.
440
 Witnesses also took 
advantage of being excluded from exile to organize printing work and to strengthen their 
communities.
441
 They showed little inclination to abandon their religious practices. In 
November 1952 in the village of Răuțel, Witnesses held a ―congress‖ for members from 
across ten districts in Moldavia at the home of one of the participants. An MGB raid resulted 
in the confiscation of a large quantity of religious literature, as well as the detainment of 
thirty-five persons, of whom fifteen were eventually arrested.
442
 Such incidents illustrate 
Witnesses‘ firm resolve to adhere to their faith regardless of the circumstances.   
Those left behind carried the additional burden of supporting their fellow believers 
now living in the harsh conditions of Siberia, and of collecting information to send to 
Brooklyn to inform the international Witness leadership of what had happened. In the late 
1940s, the Soviet country committee already began keeping track of arrested and exiled 
members. Fellow believers offered what aid they could to those in exile, labor camps, and 
prisons, sending care packages of food, sometimes with literature concealed inside.
443
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Providing for their arrested and exiled members carried significant risk. Some members 
suffered arrest and convictions in part for their role in mailing packages to believers in the 
camps.
444
 Under Burak‘s brief tenure as country servant, the country committee distributed 
forms for members to fill out on relatives or friends who had been exiled or arrested. The 
forms asked for information on arrest dates, sentences, camp locations, living conditions, and 
any letters that arrested members had sent to their relatives. These documents circulated 
among members for several years, and some of this data was smuggled across the border to 
Łódź. 445 Arrests of members in L‘viv and Zakarpattia oblasts led to the discovery of some of 
these reports, which were subsequently used as evidence of espionage.
446
  
Few of these reports actually reached Brooklyn, and the Soviet press provided no 
information on internal Witness persecution, not even acknowledging that Witnesses existed 
in the Soviet Union. A brief 1950 Izvestiia (News) article describing the arrest of the Witness 
leadership in Poland contained no mention of parallel round-ups of Witnesses in Ukraine and 
Moldavia.
447
 The Stalin-era leadership evidently had no desire to broadcast its persecution of 
Witnesses or to use it for propaganda purposes. Even during the Khrushchev-era antireligious 
campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which resulted in the widespread publication of 
anti-Witness propaganda, the exiles remained a state secret. As a result, the Watch Tower 
Bible and Tract Society had limited knowledge of the internal situation in the Soviet Union 
during the late Stalin era. A 1948 Watchtower article reported, ―There are several thousand of 
Jehovah‘s witnesses in Russia, hundreds of them have been sent to Siberia and put into work 
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camps, because they prefer to serve God rather than men and to proclaim a new kingdom of 
righteousness, a new world that will be governed by a righteous overlord, Christ Jesus, and 
not by Communist rulers.‖448 The two exiles shortly after the article‘s publication dealt a 
serious blow to channels of communication between Brooklyn and the Soviet Witnesses. The 
organization apparently was not fully informed of either the 1949 or the 1951 exile until as 
late as 1956. That year, The Watchtower announced that it had recently received information 
about the 1951 exile in the western borderlands, which it reprinted in some detail along with 
accounts of arrests and camp life.
449
  
  As with the prewar and wartime repression of Witnesses, the organization saw Soviet 
persecution as a test of members‘ faith and as a sign that Witnesses were indeed the only true 
Christians, since the satanic Soviet state had singled them out among other religions. The 
Watchtower told believers that ―no question about it, the totalitarian monstrosity exerts a 
great pressure upon those who would stand by their Christian principles. But can they be 
truly said to be Christians if they do not follow Christ Jesus? He did not compromise.‖450 The 
organization disregarded the repression of other religions. One Watchtower article stated, 
―True, some religious clergymen have been jailed in these Communist lands. But these were 
not for righteousness‘ sake. . . . They were imprisoned because of political reasons.‖451 
Another article similarly noted that Witnesses ―do not rush to the public press with cowardly 
sob stories to get world sympathy or agitate a crusade,‖ as other Christians allegedly had.452  
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Likewise, the organization continued to sporadically blame other religions for 
masterminding the state‘s attacks on Witnesses. This reflected the real persecution of 
Witnesses by other religions prior to and during World War II, and their continued animosity 
toward Witnesses. A 1949 Polish report on western Ukrainian Witnesses charged that ―the 
Greek Catholic clergy are the ones that mainly persecute the brethren in this territory.‖453 The 
Vatican remained the Witnesses‘ main target, with the organization going so far as to 
speculate in 1951 that ―if Russia ever surrenders her own selfish ambitions of world 
domination to those of Vatican City, you may expect to see the blood-red paw of the Kremlin 
clasped with that of the pope, who will let bygones be bygones.‖454 Such sentiments showed 
little understanding of the internal dynamics between the Soviet Union and other Christian 
religious organizations. They also reflected the Witnesses‘ utter rejection of ecumenicalism. 
In the post-Stalin era, when international religious leaders and ecumenical organizations 
showed increasing interest in the issue of Soviet religious freedom, the Witnesses did not 
participate and in turn, received little international attention or support for their plight. Post-
Soviet Watch Tower publications have tempered their earlier statements on other Soviet 
religions to reflect a more nuanced and accurate view of the power dynamics between 
churches and the state. They highlight examples where local religious leaders denounced 
Witnesses to the authorities, but do not suggest that religious leaders orchestrated the 
repression of Witnesses by the Soviet state.
455
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 The organization stood firm in its belief that Jehovah God would ultimately reward 
those who had been persecuted for their faith and punish those responsible. In regard to the 
imprisonment of Witnesses in Siberian work camps, the organization declared of Jehovah: 
―Vengeance is His! He will repay harsh totalitarians at Armageddon!‖ This judgment, it 
specified, ―includes Russia, and her red religion of Communism.‖456  
 
Conclusion 
The remarkable activity of postwar Witness communities suggests a need to rethink 
the boundaries of dissent and conformity in the late Stalin era. Certainly, this period 
represents the height of religious repression of Witnesses in the Soviet Union. The Gulag 
reached a peak in the number of prisoners in these years, among them hundreds of Witnesses. 
At the same time, the sheer existence of such a highly organized underground network of 
believers demonstrates that sovietization did not occur without resistance and it did not fully 
eliminate alternative forms of social order and beliefs from its western borderlands. For those 
citizens willing to risk their lives, daily existence could depart quite significantly from 
official norms. While postwar studies have recognized the importance of intellectual and 
national forms of dissent, from Ukrainian partisans to dissident writers, the Witnesses 
represent an overlooked category of religious dissent. Far from simply motivating believers 
to pray and worship in secret, religious faith led Witnesses to organize a complex 
underground organization, run dangerous smuggling operations, and distribute illegal 
literature printed on secret presses. Equally important, it spurred Witnesses to reject the 
sovietization of their minds and deeds, spurning all forms of conformity with Soviet power 
even under threat of death.  
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In this regard, the Soviet state‘s response to Witnesses does not constitute a random 
act of violence against a group of passive religious believers. Rather, the Witnesses offered a 
serious affront to the state‘s attempt to impose order on the western borderlands. Witnesses 
did not vote, serve in the military, join the Party or its youth organizations, go to meetings, 
buy state bonds, or join collective farms, even rejecting Soviet passports in some instances. 
Unlike for many of its political prisoners, the Soviet state did not need to invent crimes 
committed by the Witnesses. The believers were, by the deeply undemocratic standards of 
Soviet law, a vast criminal network hostile to the Soviet state. Whereas the state‘s goal was 
total obedience to the official ideology, even a few dissenting voices could subvert the 
system. This was particularly true in rural areas, where Witnesses had strong communities 
and made up a larger percentage of the local population.  
Framing the Witnesses as a site of resistance to Soviet power is less about 
recognizing the fact that they did resist, but rather in understanding how they resisted. 
Criminal case files reflect the myriad creative methods employed by Witnesses to shield 
themselves, family members, and the Witness organization from persecution, while 
remaining, as much as possible, faithful to their religious beliefs. Stalin-era interrogations 
could be places of contestation, where both sides attempted to inscribe meaning to a set of 
actions and statements. In this context, it was possible for individuals to resist, conform, 
yield, and collaborate, sometimes within the same interrogation. It is important not to 
privilege one of these strategies, but to instead recognize the choices people made when 
placed in the most difficult of circumstances.  
On a practical level, the Soviet Union made a monumental error in its decision to 
arrest and exile the Witnesses. It had taken a small, relatively isolated community of 
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believers and resettled them in disparate regions within the Soviet interior. As The 
Watchtower aptly put it, ―The government has paid their [the exiled members‘] fare to new 
territories to preach the Kingdom message.‖457 This allowed for a strong missionary effort in 
Siberia and created new converts in areas that had never known Witnesses. A 1948 Awake! 
article proclaimed:  
There is a power operating in strange, mysterious Siberia far stronger, more 
invincible than the iron will of the Soviet Kremlin; a power that is making it possible 
for the Siberians . . . to hear the message of that established and reigning Kingdom. 
The proclaimers are themselves prisoners and exiles, consigned to Siberian labor 
camps for being real witnesses of the Most High God.
458
 
 
The post-Stalin Soviet Union would not repeat this mistake and instead developed new 
strategies to deal with the Witnesses and to eliminate or contain religious belief in its 
territories. Yet the Witnesses proved their enduring ability to adapt to new circumstances and 
survive in changing conditions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RELIGIOUS POLICY AFTER STALIN: STATE REPRESSION AND THE WITNESS 
ORGANIZATION‘S RESPONSE 
 
“You adulterous people, don‟t you know that friendship with the world is hatred toward 
God? Anyone who chooses to be a friend of the world becomes an enemy of God.”  
James 4:4 
 
“When the government changed, the officials changed loyalties, but we remained the same.” 
Victor Popovych, Jehovah‘s Witness since 1967.459 
 
 The death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in a new era in Soviet religious policy and 
religious life. Under Stalin‘s successor, N.S. Khrushchev (1953-64), the state brought 
renewed urgency to eliminating religious belief, a task that had been neglected during 
Stalin‘s last years. This neglect was a small part of Khrushchev‘s broader criticism of Stalin, 
which reached full fruition with the 1956 ―Secret Speech‖ denouncing Stalin‘s ―personality 
cult.‖ Khrushchev based his critique in large part on a perception that the Party had strayed 
from its original, Leninist principles and needed to return its focus to the building of 
communism.
460
 The state‘s proclaimed intention to liquidate religion in the near future had 
direct roots in this larger ideological framework. Khrushchev had declared at the Twenty-
first Party Congress in 1961that the current generation would live to see communism by 
1980. When he set this goal, he understood that certain preconditions would have to be met. 
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This included the creation of an atheist society.
461
 Khrushchev‘s vision imbued atheist work 
with a renewed sense of priority and justified the continued repression of religious believers 
as necessary to the all-important task of achieving communism. 
The new religious policy, what I call ―the Khrushchev system,‖ created two basic 
dichotomies. First, it divided all religions into registered and unregistered organizations. 
Registered organizations had to conform to the strictures of the state‘s laws on religious cults 
and consent to strong governmental oversight. Unregistered organizations had no right to 
exist and faced criminal prosecution of their leaders and active members if they continued to 
operate outside of the law. By allowing registration for some and not for others, the state 
hoped to ―divide and rule,‖ eliminating religion as a source of independent authority.462 
Second, the state separated ―rank-and-file‖ or ―ordinary‖ believers from leaders and fanatics. 
The former had to be patiently convinced to abandon their faith, while the latter had to be 
isolated from society through coercive measures. The government intended to pit believers 
against one another by offering better treatment to some, but not all. It encouraged members 
of religious organizations to believe that a few bad seeds in their leadership were at fault for 
inciting conflict with the Soviet state and for preventing registration. It also represented the 
state‘s attempt to justify, both to its own citizens and to the outside world, why it continued 
to imprison believers despite endorsing freedom of conscience in principle. 
While opponents ousted Khrushchev from power in 1964, much of the Khrushchev 
system remained in place until the Gorbachev era. Under Leonid Il‘ich Brezhnev (1964-82), 
the state no longer promised a clear date for achieving communism, however, making the 
battle against religious belief one of lower priority. Yet it employed much of the same 
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rhetoric about religion and continued to deny registration to certain religious organizations. 
As anthropologist Alexei Yurchak notes about this era, ―The form of ideological 
representations—documents, speeches, ritualized practices, slogans, posters, monuments, and 
urban visual propaganda—became increasingly normalized, ubiquitous, and predictable.‖463 
Yurchak‘s words offer an apt description of religious policy and atheist work after 
Khrushchev. The ossification of policy and rhetoric until the late 1970s limited the state‘s 
ability to respond effectively to evolving religious conditions and did little to eliminate 
religious belief among its citizens. This chapter lays out the basic features of the Khrushchev 
system and explores the hard-line tactics of official religious policy, including police tactics, 
KGB infiltration, arrests and imprisonment, and the end of the mass exile. It also describes 
how the Witness organization responded to these tactics and administrative changes in the 
organization.  
 
Khrushchev’s Antireligious Campaigns and Policy 
Religious policy in the Soviet Union stood at a crossroads in 1953. In the late Stalin 
era, the state had allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to resume a limited legal existence, 
and granted some local religious organizations the right to register and operate within the 
confines of the law. At the same time, the wartime annexation of the western borderlands had 
resulted in the sharp increase in the number of churches in the Soviet Union. The Stalinist 
state fiercely repressed religious believers whom it felt represented a threat to Soviet power, 
but it made minimal investment in atheist or antireligious propaganda. The result was a 
growth in religious belief at a time when Soviet society was supposed to be making renewed 
progress toward a communist utopia after the deprivations of World War II.  
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In the spring of 1954, the Communist Party‘s‘ agitprop department assessed the 
neglected state of antireligious efforts, reporting to Khrushchev on the ―unsatisfactory state‖ 
of atheist work. The department blamed the Party for the rise of both Russian Orthodoxy and 
various ―religious sects.‖ The Party, it concluded, had wrongly assumed religion would die a 
rapid and natural death in a socialist society. This had led to a passive attitude toward atheist 
work, resulting in a dearth of public lectures and published articles and books on this subject. 
The report cited the western borderlands for the especially low amount of atheist work in 
these regions.
 464
 
 The state officially announced its recommitment to atheist work in a July 25, 1954, 
Pravda editorial, ushering in the so-called ―Hundred Days Campaign.‖465 Denouncing 
previous ―passivity‖ toward religious belief, the state called for an active ―struggle‖ against 
religion. It demanded increased promotion of the natural sciences and a materialist 
worldview and the exposure of the falsity of religious superstitions and prejudices. This was 
a battle, the editorial informed readers, ―between science and superstition, between darkness 
and light.‖ Previous propaganda, it noted, had been divorced from real life and offended the 
feelings of believers. The new atheist methods would do neither—they would be both 
concrete and tactful. In this sense, the decree harkened back to the earliest Bolshevik policies 
on religion, which also criticized offenses to religious sentiments.
466
 The Party called upon 
all state and Party institutions to participate in a unified front for atheism. It named schools, 
the Komsomol, the Ministry of Culture, and the Knowledge Society as key fronts in this new 
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campaign.
467
 A September editorial in Moskovskaia pravda (Moscow Truth) tied the 
campaign directly to communism, stating: ―The overcoming of religious survivals in the 
consciousness of workers, their adoption of a materialist worldview, will speed the progress 
of our society forward to communism.‖468 Similarly, an August editorial in Sovetskaia 
Moldaviia (Soviet Moldavia) declared of believers: ―We need to patiently, in a comradely 
way help them to free themselves from religious survivals and become fully conscious and 
active builders of communism.‖469 
 Despite the warning against offending religious sentiments, the Hundred Days 
Campaign proceeded to do precisely that as local officials struggled to demonstrate progress 
in the fight against religious belief. This period marked the first mention of the Witnesses in 
many local and regional papers, as newspaper editors attempted to fulfill the Party‘s call to 
make propaganda specific to local conditions. The Transcarpathian regional paper Sovetskoe 
Zakarpat‟e (Soviet Transcarpathia) featured the Witnesses prominently in an article on local 
Christian communities. The article reflects the basic flaws of the Hundred Days Campaign in 
its strident attacks and wild accusations against believers. In particular, it includes a detailed 
denunciation of the Witnesses, whom it accused of preaching the creation of a theocratic 
state and sabotaging collectivization. More problematically, it alleged that the Witnesses had 
actively collaborated with Ukrainian partisans and fascists during the wartime occupation of 
Ukraine, and that Witnesses had ties to American espionage. In the mad rush to produce 
concrete results in the campaign, many individuals, like this journalist, borrowed heavily 
from what little atheist propaganda had been produced in the late Stalin era. In the case of the 
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Witnesses, this meant information from their postwar trials in the USSR and in Eastern 
Europe. Disregarding the instructions of the Party not to offend religious sentiments or 
undermine the loyalty of religious citizens, this article managed to do both. It even claimed 
that Witnesses had attempted to roast a young girl alive as a human sacrifice to Jehovah 
before villagers intervened to save her life.
470
  
By November 1954, the Party realized the need to pull back from its original call to 
action.  On November 20, the TsK passed a new resolution, published in Pravda the 
following day, blaming newspapers, lecturers, and local officials for treating believers in a 
rude manner, using coercive measures against believers, and interfering in internal church 
matters. It stressed that atheist work should be carried out only by qualified personnel. The 
Hundred Days Campaign had accomplished its goal of returning attention to antireligious 
work, but it had little progress to show in the actual reduction of religious belief. While the 
November editorial stated that officials and agitators simply needed to correct their tactical 
mistakes and not abandon atheist efforts, the latter is how officials and agitators at all levels 
perceived it. The Russian Republic (RSFSR) Knowledge Society, for example, noted the 
following year that atheist lectures had declined despite the TsK directive not to abandon 
these efforts.
471
 The antireligious campaign, it seemed, had ended as abruptly as it had 
begun.
472
 For the next two years, the Party-state invested little effort in atheist education. 
Internal struggles for power among the Party leadership and other urgent domestic concerns 
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pushed the antireligious efforts onto the back burner. Dimitry Pospielovsky has described 
this period as ―the most ‗liberal‘ for the Christians since 1947.‖473  
By 1957, however, the Party gradually began to return its attention to atheist 
matters.
474
 The timing coincided with Khrushchev‘s triumph over an attempted ouster and 
the resultant elimination of all major challenges to his rule. In the aftermath of the so-called 
Anti-Party Group‘s defeat, Khrushchev had a greater mandate and freedom to enact reforms 
as he saw fit, including the renewal of the antireligious campaign. The institutions named in 
the original Hundred Days Campaign became the major players in atheist work for the next 
three decades. The Knowledge Society assumed the work of the now defunct Stalin-era 
institution, the League of Militant Godless, incorporating more atheist topics into its lectures 
to educate the public.
475
 In 1957, it doubled its lectures on atheism over the previous year, 
hosting both a ten-day seminar at the all-union level and several dozen republic-level and 
regional seminars to discuss proper approaches to atheist propaganda.
476
  
Within a year, more organized efforts between institutions developed to tackle the 
problem of persistent religious belief. A spring 1958 conference brought together individuals 
from the agitation and propaganda department of the TsK, the Knowledge Society, the 
Komsomol, the CRCA and CROCA, newspaper editors, and publishers. The conference 
participants acknowledged that many people mistakenly thought the November 1954 
resolution cancelled out the July resolution. As a result, these institutions had largely 
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abandoned their atheist work and allowed religious organizations to strengthen their 
proselytism activities.
477
 Now those gathered pledged to correct the problem through 
renewed efforts. In 1959, the Knowledge Society began publication of the journal Nauka i 
religiia (Science and Religion), followed soon after by a Ukrainian-language journal, 
Voyovnychyi ateist (Militant Atheist, later renamed Liudyna i svit, or Man and the World).  
While the state may have pledged to avoid the pitfalls of the Hundred Days 
Campaign, in reality this second wave of antireligious work proved even more damaging to 
believers and definitely offended religious sentiments. Despite voicing a commitment to 
persuasion over coercion, the state did not abandon the latter form, particularly in regard to 
unregistered religious groups. The state was also not above using interventionist tactics to 
reduce the strength of registered religions, including the Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, a 
critical component of the second antireligious campaign was state closure of churches. In 
total, the government shut down over five thousand Russian Orthodox churches as well as 
most of the Church‘s few remaining monasteries, convents, and seminaries. These measures 
disproportionately affected the western borderlands, whose recent annexation to the Soviet 
Union meant they had more churches and more believers than the rest of the country. 
Churches in Ukraine, Moldavia, and Belorussia accounted for five-sixths of those that lost 
their registered status during the Khrushchev era.
478
  
The more limited space for Russian Orthodox worship had the unintended and, from 
the state‘s perspective, undesirable effect of pushing believers from registered churches into 
unregistered religious organizations. Toward the end of the closures in 1963, the Moldavian 
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Komsomol noted that the locales without an active Russian Orthodox Church had the highest 
density of ―sectarian‖ religious belief. It suggested that some Orthodox believers who found 
themselves without a local church joined unregistered sects instead.
479
 An inspector for the 
Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) who visited Moldavia in early 1966 suggested that the 
reduction in Orthodox churches had in fact encouraged the growth of sectarianism in the 
western borderlands. He gave an example from Fălești district where the number of churches 
had decreased from fifty in 1946 to nine in 1966. In the same period, Baptist membership 
more than tripled, while Witnesses, Pentecostals, and other minority religions also increased 
their numbers. The inspector complained that these groups were much harder to deal with 
than the Russian Orthodox Church and more stalwart in their beliefs. The Moscow CRA 
official reading the report, however, underlined not these remarks, but instead the inspector‘s 
comments offering an alternative explanation that blamed the religious situation on the 
legacy of private land ownership.
480
 
At the same time that the state shut down thousands of churches, it elevated the 
importance of registration as the only acceptable channel for organized religious worship. In 
March 1961, the government passed new instructions for the CROCA and the CRCA on how 
to apply the 1929 Law on Religious Associations, which had established the original 
registration guidelines for religious organizations under Stalin. In accordance with the law, 
groups of twenty or more adult believers had the right to petition for registration. If approved 
for registration, they could then legally hold worship services in designated ―prayer houses,‖ 
appoint ministers (sluzhiteli), and collect voluntary donations among their members to cover 
costs directly related to the group‘s operation.  
                                                 
479
 AOSPRM, f. 278, inv. 5, d. 163, ff. 28-29. 
 
480
 GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 8, l. 102. 
 157 
 The instructions also identified numerous restrictions on what registered religious 
groups could and could not do. For example, they could not encourage members to ignore 
their civic duties (such as military service and voting) or tell members not to participate in 
the political, cultural, and social life of the country. They could not use prayer houses to give 
political speeches. They could not use donations for philanthropic purposes or create 
committees or subgroups unrelated to religious rituals. Special prayer meetings for children, 
youth, and women, were prohibited. Registered religious groups could not hold prayer 
services outside of approved buildings without permission. The government reserved the 
right to examine periodically the group‘s financial records, property, and other relevant 
documents. In short, the state offered the carrot of registration to religious groups in 
exchange for greater state control and a narrower sphere of acceptable religious practice. 
Historian Philip Walters has correctly labeled the new policy as one of ―divide and 
rule,‖ defined as the ―granting [of] concessions to registered congregations and even whole 
denominations, while dealing harshly with unregistered and dissident groups.‖481 The 
instructions made it clear that no religion could exist without registration and affirmed that 
the state had not changed its attitude toward religious organizations it considered hostile to 
Soviet power. Most importantly for the Witnesses, Article 23 of the instructions stated that 
those sects whose actions and beliefs ―carry an anti-state and fanatical character‖ did not 
qualify for registration. The list of such groups included, but was not limited to, ―Jehovists,‖ 
Pentecostals, True Orthodox Christians, the True Orthodox Church, and Reform 
Adventists.
482
 While the instructions and Article 23 were not made public, this information 
circulated among the CRCA, whose republic and oblast-level officials clarified to their 
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lower-ranking employees that under no condition were ―Jehovists‖ and other named religious 
organizations to be granted registration.
483
 
The secretive nature of the 1961 instructions allowed the state to claim, as it did 
repeatedly in the post-Stalin era until the advent of glasnost‘, that the state granted full 
freedom of conscience to all believers. This was hardly the case. First, some religions that the 
state was willing to register on a local level as individual congregations, such as the Baptists, 
struggled with whether to accept the restrictive conditions that came with registration. As a 
result, while some Baptist congregations sought and received registration, others refused and 
formed an illegal network of unregistered groups, known as ―Initsiativniki.‖484 Equally 
important, a significant percentage of Orthodox, Baptist, and Muslim religious groups that 
actively sought registration were continually denied at the local level. By 1961, the state had 
registered only 4,424 out of the 10,910 religious groups identified by the CRCA and 
CROCA.
485
 This disparity shrunk gradually over the next two decades. By 1985, 12,438 
groups out of 15,202 had registration.
486
 
The public‘s ignorance of the secret instructions gave the state greater freedom to 
justify its continued persecution of minority religions such as the Witnesses. Antireligious 
propaganda and the Soviet media explained the Witnesses‘ unregistered status as something 
the organization itself wanted. According to this logic, the Witnesses preferred a 
―conspiratorial‖ underground organization in order to carry out their political goals without 
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state hindrance.
487
 Some publications claimed that the state had, in fact, offered to register 
the organization and that the Witnesses had refused.
488
 In one such account, a local Witness 
leader allegedly responded to an invitation to register by the executive committee of the city 
soviet in Nevinnomyssk as follows: ―I‘d rather jump off a bridge into the Kuban [River].‖489 
Overall, the Soviet media suggested that practically all Soviet religious organizations had 
accepted registration and abided by Soviet laws regarding the limits of legal religious 
activity. Only the Witnesses rejected the state‘s generous terms.490  
In truth, Soviet Witnesses saw the legal issue much differently than how the media 
portrayed it and had hopes that Khrushchev‘s new religious policy might allow for a limited 
free practice of their faith. The death of Stalin made it easier for Brooklyn to resume contact 
with Soviet believers. The organization began publishing reports on the Witnesses‘ life in 
Siberian exile and in the prison camps. President Knorr saw potential in the new Soviet 
leadership and felt it advisable to seize this opportunity for legalization. He believed the 
outcome might be different than it was ten years ago when the organization made the same 
request to Stalin. The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society drafted a petition to Soviet 
Premier Nikolai Bulganin asking that the government grant Soviet Witnesses the right to 
establish open channels of communication with Brooklyn, receive and distribute literature 
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from abroad, and practice their faith without hindrance.
491
 At district assemblies worldwide 
from June 1956 through February 1957, a total of 462,936 Witnesses signed copies of the 
petition, which various branch officials attempted to deliver to Russian embassy 
representatives in their home countries.
492
 The entire petition was mailed to Bulganin on 
March 1, 1957.
493
 
The petition contained a ―statement of facts‖ meant to convince the Soviet 
government that the Witnesses‘ religion did not represent a political danger to the country. It 
stated that:  
Jehovah‘s witnesses are recognized as reliable, trustworthy, conscientious workers. 
Thus they do their proper duty as citizens of the country in which they live. They are 
intelligent people who do not believe in all the oppression and misinstruction by false 
religions. They do not steal, they do not get drunk and thus slow down production, 
and they will never engage in any sabotage work.
494
  
 
In an attempt to emphasize further that Witnesses have no interest in political affairs, it noted 
that members ―do not engage in any subversive activity and espionage. They are not 
nationalists, selfish capitalists or imperialists. As true Christians they could never be such, 
nor could they fight for any political doctrine or ideology, be it communist, democratic or 
capitalist.‖ As evidence of this fact, the document referred to the persecution of Witnesses in 
other countries as communists because of their ―neutral position‖ on politics. 
 While the petition sought to reassure the Soviet government, it made no offer to 
modify Witness practices or beliefs in order to reach a compromise on legalization. In fact, it 
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reiterated the right and responsibility of its Soviet members to preach their faith to others, 
noting that they ―will continue doing it [proselytism] at the peril of their lives, under 
persecution and opposition.‖ Similarly, the petition stated directly that Witnesses cannot 
comply with mandatory military service. The petition ended with a declaration that until the 
Soviet state agreed to meet with a delegation from Brooklyn, the organization would ―inform 
the world about Jehovah‘s witnesses in Russian prisoners, penal camps and deportation 
centers.‖ 
The Soviet Union, with no intention of granting the Witnesses any legal toehold in 
the country, most likely read this petition as further proof that the Witnesses represented a 
serious danger and could not be trusted. Indeed, for state officials, the petition demonstrated 
that Soviet members of this organization had sent a foreign organization sensitive 
information on the country‘s prison system. The petition cited detailed information on the 
1951 exile and on the location and numbers of Witnesses in forced labor camps across the 
Soviet Union. It asked that the state free these individuals and allow them to organize 
religious communities. In the eyes of the state, Soviet Witnesses had slandered the Soviet 
Union and appealed for help to an anti-Soviet organization located in the heart of the United 
States, its superpower rival. 
The Soviet government never acknowledged having received the petition and issued 
no official response to the matter. The CRCA received several copies of the petition, 
however, all forwarded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Soviet embassies 
worldwide.
495
 The Witnesses, noting the absence of any action on the government‘s part, 
summarized the situation as follows: ―To the rulers of the Kremlin there is no God. They just 
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worship themselves and the state and try to make slaves of all the people. And especially do 
they try to make slaves of those who believe in a Kingdom of righteousness that will bring 
peace and prosperity to all mankind.‖ The 1957 registration attempt had, like its 1949 
predecessor, failed to achieve any consensus between Brooklyn and Moscow, and only 
furthered mutual mistrust. Neither party would seriously revisit the registration question until 
the mid-1980s. That said, a few individual Witnesses made periodic appeals to the Soviet 
government to stop the persecution of Witnesses, but without a specific plea for registration 
or legalization and without the approval of Brooklyn. For example, one Witness sent a letter 
to the Supreme Court of the USSR in 1959 detailing incidents of violence against Witnesses 
in Ukraine that year.
496
  
As promised in the petition, the Watch Tower organization continued to publish 
detailed information in its annual reports about the arrest and imprisonment of Soviet 
Witnesses.
497
 State attempts to block the communication channels between Brooklyn and 
Witnesses had only sporadic success. In 1958, the TsK cited ―sectarian organizations from 
Brooklyn‖ as one of the major sources of the illegal importation of religious literature into 
the USSR.
498
 A 1960 report listed Awake! and The Watchtower among the most commonly 
imported religious literature sent through the mail.
499
 Witnesses demonstrated an equal 
ability to smuggle out literature and reports. At the 1958 Divine Will International Assembly 
of Jehovah‘s Witnesses held at Yankee Stadium, a Swiss delegate delivered a report on 
behalf of Soviet bloc countries and played a taped message from the Soviet Union for the 
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crowd. The recording comprised two songs and ―a message of hope and warm Christian love 
and greetings‖ from Soviet members.500 
 
Khrushchev-Style Justice 
Beyond the new religious policy, the Khrushchev era saw major changes in the state‘s 
views on and treatment of dissent that directly impacted the Witnesses and other religious 
believers. Most Witnesses heard about these developments from within the Gulag or from 
remote areas of exile in Siberia. In the camps, many struggled simply to survive their prison 
sentences. One man, who spent fourteen years in the Gulag before his release in 1954, 
reported that, of the fellow believers in his camp, ―Many died. I have often witnessed some 
of these half-starved slaves, almost sinking from weakness themselves, carrying one of their 
companions away on a plank, who had been frozen or died of hunger at his job.‖501 
Witnesses may have felt a spiritual meaning behind their plight, unlike other prisoners, but 
they suffered just like everyone else.  By the end of the Stalin era, more than five million 
Soviet citizens lived in camps and special settlements, and these systems were becoming 
unsustainable. In the spring of 1953, the state began making plans to dismantle them. 
To take the issue of special exile first, at around the time of Stalin‘s death, there were 
2,753,356 ―special settlers,‖ the highest number recorded in the Soviet Union since the 
settlements began.
502
 As of May 1953, the MVD recommended drastic revisions to the settler 
policy, suggesting the release of almost all categories of people currently living under this 
directive and the discontinuation of mass exile as a method of punishment. The following 
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year, the Council of Ministers issued orders to liquidate most special settlements. This 
included the oldest settlements, made up of kulaks deported during collectivization. From 
1955 to 1957, the Council signed a series of decrees releasing various exiled nationalities 
from the settlements and allowing them to return to their native lands.
503
  
 Yet while the MVD acknowledged the non-sustainability of mass exile and called for 
a massive reduction in special settlers, it nonetheless assessed each settlement community 
individually. The MVD advised that Witnesses remain in exile.
504
 In fact, the Witnesses 
represented one of the few groups that the state still felt it could not risk returning to the 
general population. The other remaining settlements were for Ukrainian nationalists, alleged 
bandits and their families, those who served in the Anders Army in World War II, and those 
exiled for ―especially dangerous‖ crimes.505 By late 1957, less than 200,000 people remained 
in the special settlements.
506
 The MVD continued to enforce the Stalin-era conditions of exile 
for these groups and added exiled Witness youth to the police registries once those 
individuals reached adulthood.
507
 The refusal of Witnesses in exile to modify their beliefs or 
practices likely played a major role in the MVD‘s decision.508 Further, the concentration of 
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so many Witnesses in a few isolated areas made their communities more noticeable to local 
officials.  
Although Witnesses as a group did not win immediate release from exile after Stalin, 
the state did take seriously individual appeals for the removal of special exile in light of 
extenuating circumstances, such as wrongful exile and advanced age. In one such case, the 
Moldavian KGB and procuracy recommended lifting the exile order from a family that had 
been resettled in Tomsk oblast in 1951. Their review of the family‘s appeal noted that, while 
one female family member had briefly attended Witness meetings in 1948-49, she had never 
been baptized into the religion and no one else in the family had had any involvement with 
the religion prior to exile. The state agreed with the family‘s petition that they had in fact 
never been Witnesses and had been exiled largely by mistake. In another case, the Moldavian 
KGB and procuracy recommended the removal from special exile of an elderly couple who 
lacked any family members in Kurgan oblast to care for them. Two of their sons, both not 
Witnesses, petitioned the state, vowing to support their elderly parents back in their home 
village of Cotiujeni in Moldavia.
509
 Overall, the state, courts, and MVD reviewed numerous 
appeals of exile. In 1956, at the peak of this review process, they ordered the release of 1,121 
Witnesses from exile.
510
  
 The Witnesses were among the last categories of special settlers left in the Soviet 
Union, a fact that says a great deal about how the state viewed them and their potential threat 
to Soviet society. During the Khrushchev era, some state officials already questioned the 
wisdom of the policy. A report from the agitprop department of the All-Union Komsomol in 
1962, for example, stated that ―the practice of mass exile to Siberia of sectarians is generally 
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incorrect and in need of serious corrections.‖ It remarked that children raised in the exile 
communities were likely to become fanatical sectarians.
511
 Similarly, the RSFSR agitprop 
department in 1964 complained that atheist work in Irkutsk oblast suffered from the fact that, 
when Party agitators did convince Witnesses to leave the organization, they remained under 
the exile restrictions along with the rest of their former fellow believers. Agitators thus had a 
hard time convincing Witnesses of the benefits of renouncing their religion.
512
 Finally, in 
September 1965, the Supreme Soviet released the Witnesses from special exile. The decree 
ended administrative surveillance of the Witnesses and restored their freedom of movement, 
but it did not acknowledge wrongdoing by the state. The order specifically stated that the 
state would not return any property to exiled persons. Further, Witnesses could return to their 
home villages only with the permission of the local authorities.
513
  
The post-Stalin transformation of the Gulag introduced liberalizing reforms that 
directly benefitted Witnesses, but it did not end the criminalization of their religious beliefs 
and practices. At the time of Stalin‘s death, the massive network of prisons and forced labor 
camps held roughly two and a half million prisoners, including over a half million ―political‖ 
prisoners, the largest number ever in Soviet history.
514
 Immediately following Stalin‘s death, 
Lavrentii Beria, the head of police and a potential successor to Stalin, issued broad amnesties 
to a million of these prisoners.
515
 Widespread uncertainty, fear, and anticipation, fueled by 
Beria‘s amnesty and speculation about who would succeed Stalin, provoked unrest in the 
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camps. Prisoner uprisings in Noril‘sk, Vorkuta, and Kengir in 1953 and 1954 challenged the 
viability of the system, but were ultimately met with brutal police repression.
516
 
The Witnesses in the camps, like those in exile, viewed the initial reforms with a 
sense of caution, because their commitment to neutrality in all political matters did not allow 
them to participate in prisoner riots for better conditions. At the Kengir camp in Kazakhstan 
in early 1954, roughly eighty Witnesses watched as their fellow inmates took control of the 
camp. The Witnesses, who refused to take up arms in defense of the uprising, found 
themselves in a ―prison within the prison,‖ locked in a barracks on the edge of the camp by 
the rioters.
517
 When troops stormed into the camp on the fortieth day of the uprising, they 
spared the Witnesses from the bloodshed that followed. One Witness who lived through these 
events reflected that the revolt taught him to ―wait on Jehovah‖ and not seek solutions to 
problems elsewhere.
518
  
As millions of prisoners won release from the Gulag, the state also began to question 
the underlying merits of politically motivated convictions in the Stalin era. Beginning in 
1954, and gaining serious momentum after Khrushchev‘s Secret Speech two years later, the 
TsK undertook comprehensive reviews of convictions for state crimes. Within less than a 
year of the speech, review commissions had ―rehabilitated‖ over 600,000 people, declaring 
them innocent and restoring their civil rights.
519
 Overall, the vast majority of political 
prisoners won release from their sentences, if not political rehabilitation, and returned home 
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to their families. Among these former prisoners were many Witnesses. Soviet society did not 
always welcome returnees and often treated them with suspicion or fear.
520
 
The Soviet state maintained its view of the Witness organization as anti-Soviet, 
dangerous, and criminal in character. In this regard, Witnesses constituted a unique class of 
political prisoners and returnees. Unlike most of those convicted of state crimes, the 
Witnesses had been tried largely for activities they did commit and continued to engage in 
upon release from labor camps. As a result, the state saw no basis for rehabilitating the 
Witnesses, which would have been tantamount to decriminalizing their activities. In the 
state‘s view, Witness cases represented one instance in which the state had justly and legally 
applied state crime statutes. After 1953, where the state saw fault in these cases was not in 
the conviction, but in the overly severe nature of the sentences.
521
 On this basis, most 
Witnesses received sentence reductions that allowed them to leave the camps by the mid- to 
late 1950s. For example, the Ukrainian Supreme Court ordered the early release of several 
convicted Witnesses due to the advanced age of one man and the fact that all of the 
individuals had been only rank-and-file members of the organization with no prior 
convictions.
522
 Other Witnesses had simply completed their original sentences of seven to ten 
years by this time.
523
 Some, primarily older individuals, had died in the camps.
524
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In a few instances, the state proved unwilling even to grant sentence reductions. Most 
notably, several state agencies, including the Kiev oblast commission on state crimes and the 
Ukrainian procuracy, reviewed the case of Petro Tokar‘ beginning in early 1955. They all 
found no basis for leniency and early release. A Supreme Soviet commission eventually 
granted his co-defendant early release in 1956, but Tokar‘ served the entire twenty-five years 
of his 1947 sentence.
525
 However, this case represents the exception, rather than the rule. A 
few Witnesses who had renounced their faith appealed their original sentences in lieu of their 
change in circumstances. One man, living under exile in Krasnoiarsk krai, noted of his 
religious faith that both he and his wife had ―got[ten] rid of that nonsense from our heads a 
long time ago and have started on the path of being Soviet people and obeying all Soviet 
laws.‖ In his appeal, he complained that murderers, thieves, and wartime collaborators had 
already been amnestied and freed, but not the Witnesses. The state denied his request to have 
the conviction overturned and the exile status removed.
526
  
As a whole, when Witnesses left the camps, they did so as marked individuals, still 
guilty in the eyes of the law. Most had no choice in where to settle: the state released them 
directly into the special settlements. This happened most commonly when released prisoners 
had immediate family members living in the settlements, but oftentimes ex-prisoners with 
non-exiled families were also sent into exile. One Witness woman, arrested in 1947 and 
released in the mid-1950s, had to settle in Krasnoiarsk krai after having been denied the right 
to return home to L‘viv. Her elderly mother, who had cared for her granddaughter for the 
past seven years, was too frail to make the long journey by train to Siberia to return the 
young girl. The state nevertheless denied the grandmother‘s request to allow her daughter the 
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right to resettle in L‘viv.527 In a few cases, the state allowed Witnesses to return to their home 
villages or to relocate to other locations in the Soviet Union after serving their sentences. 
This was most likely the result of bureaucratic error.
528
 These individuals often found that, 
despite this freedom, local officials refused to grant them registration permits to live in their 
communities, forcing them to live illegally or move somewhere else. As a result, many of 
them chose voluntarily to move to the settlement communities, where they could be with 
their families and fellow believers. 
While many Witnesses regained their freedom, others were already in the process of 
losing theirs through new arrests and trials. Simply put, the actions that led to Stalin-era 
convictions remained illegal after Stalin‘s death. The state may have dismantled much of the 
Gulag, but it had no intention of legalizing what it saw as political dissent. Through the late 
1950s, the state continued to apply state crime statutes (primarily Article 58) to Witnesses, 
resulting in a new round of trials and lengthy camp sentences. Some of those arrested had 
only a few years prior been given early release from the camps for earlier convictions. Vasile 
Ursu, for example, enjoyed only a month of freedom in 1957 before the state rearrested him 
and sentenced him to seven years.
529
 Similarly in a 1959 trial in Mykolaїv oblast, three of 
four defendants had previous convictions for anti-Soviet activity, and two of those had 
additional convictions for refusal to serve in the military during World War II.
530
 Historian 
Walter Kolarz has suggested that the year 1957 marked the start of an ―anti-Jehovist 
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campaign‖ characterized by a significant number of arrests for state crimes that continued 
into the early 1960s.
531
 This coincided with the return of the broader antireligious campaign.  
Eventually, the state began to reduce its reliance on Article 58, using other legal 
means to eliminate religious dissent. By the end of the Khrushchev era, the courts tried few 
Witnesses under Article 58, a change that mirrored the steep reduction in the number of 
convictions for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda during the Khrushchev years.
532
 Still, 
among those convicted for state crimes, Witnesses figured prominently among the 
defendants. For example, in the first quarter of 1960 in the RSFSR, roughly 25 percent of 
convictions for especially dangerous state crimes were of Witnesses, the only religion singled 
out for mention in the quarterly report by the RSFSR procuracy.
533
    
In 1960, the state introduced new statutes into the criminal code to replace Article 58 
as the legal tool used to prosecute believers for religious dissent.
534
 Articles 142 and 143 
criminalized violations of the separations of church and state, and church and school. They 
also technically barred state officials from infringing upon the rights of citizens and from 
interfering in religious rituals that did not disturb the public order.
535
 More important for 
Witnesses, Article 227 made it a criminal offense for leaders of religious organizations to 
incite citizens not to fulfill civic duties or not to participate in the socio-political life of the 
country under the guise of religious beliefs. Religious rituals that could cause harm to 
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individuals were similarly banned under this statute.
536
 To convict Witnesses under Article 
227 was relatively simple, as Witnesses rejected such basic civic duties as military service 
and voting, and avoided socio-political activities such as membership in youth and Party 
organizations. When Witnesses discussed these views among themselves and with potential 
converts, they violated Article 227.  
Even more broadly, the second clause of Article 227 allowed the state to prosecute 
active members of a religious organization if they participated in promoting these illegal 
activities. This second clause gave the state enough leeway to justify investigations into any 
Witness, whether or not they held a responsible position in the organization.
537
 Indeed, an 
RSFSR Supreme Court report on the law‘s application in 1962 to 1964 complained that some 
courts had used the law against ordinary members, considering membership alone sufficient 
for conviction. The report cited the case of a Witness in Irkutsk oblast who had received five 
years under the statute on the sole evidence of having preached to one woman. The Supreme 
Court ordered a retrial.
538
 While this was not a typical case, it demonstrates the wholesale 
criminalization of Witness activity that continued through the late Soviet era. The updated 
criminal code dictated sentences of up to five years imprisonment or exile for persons in 
violation of this law.
539
 The 1964 report also reflects the disproportionate number of 
Witnesses in criminal cases against believers. Of the 169 convictions reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, roughly 33 percent were of Witnesses, second only to Pentecostals with 36 
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percent. Further, the most convictions for Article 227 by region occurred in Tomsk and 
Irkutsk oblasts, the locations of the two Witness special settlements.
540
  
Beyond Article 227, the state used other methods to suppress the Witnesses. The state 
exiled a small number of Witnesses under a May 4, 1961, Supreme Soviet decree against 
―parasites,‖ i.e. persons not engaged in ―socially useful labor.‖ A July 1962 report on 
implementation of the decree noted that, of the almost 250,000 people identified as parasites, 
about 1,200 were leaders of illegal religious sects. Of the 250,000, the state exiled about 
20,000 of the worst offenders.
541
 In one case, a Witness in North Ossetia had been given five 
years of forced labor in exile for parasitism in 1963. The RSFSR Supreme Court, in a review 
of the case, criticized the application of this decree, finding that a conviction under Article 
227 would have been more appropriate.
542
 In addition, Witness men continued to face 
prosecution for refusal to serve in the military, a crime that carried up to five years in 
prison.
543
  
 
Spying on the Faithful 
As the state created a more nuanced, complex strategy for the prosecution of dissent, 
it relied heavily on more long-term strategies to liquidate perceived threats. Police and KGB 
agents infiltrated religious communities, providing critical information to the state while 
undermining these groups from within. The state had used this ―divide and conquer‖ method 
in the 1920s and 1930s against the Russian Orthodox Church, subsidizing and promoting a 
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progressive countermovement in Orthodoxy, known as Renovationism, to weaken the 
church‘s influence.544 It employed the same approach in the postwar era with Protestant 
religions, particularly Baptists, using registration as a wedge to divide believers. In both 
cases, the state exploited genuine differences of opinion over belief and practice to encourage 
schisms. Infiltration of the Witness organization almost certainly began in the Stalin era, but 
it expanded considerably in the post-Stalin period.   
 The Witnesses quickly became aware of such police efforts. The 1956 Yearbook 
reported that ―the Russian government has put many spies in its land, not trusting anyone. 
They filter into every organization, keeping their eyes and ears open for any of Jehovah‘s 
witnesses, for these they want to silence.‖ It further stated, ―there is great distrust among the 
brothers, for many strangers have sneaked into the organization and often betray the 
brothers.‖545 Brooklyn voiced repeated concern in the following years over the danger of 
schism in the organization. The 1959 Yearbook report on Russia declared:  
What the devilish organization [the police] is trying to do is build up a mistrust 
among the brothers so that they will think that within their own ranks there are hateful 
people, those who lie, those who are working for other governments, but if all of 
Jehovah‘s witnesses keep their eyes on God‘s Word, the Bible, and preach what he 
has commanded and continue to do the divine will, then the unity that exists among 
God‘s people will continue and a much greater witness will be given throughout all 
this great territory.
546
 
 
The organizational structure of the Witnesses made the threat of infiltration all the 
more complex, as just one compromised link in the chain could endanger the entire flow of 
authority, information, and literature. A 1959 incident demonstrates this problem. That year, 
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suspicions surfaced among elders regarding the district leader, Mina Dodu, after he 
repeatedly failed to deliver literature on time. Dodu refused to address the problem, and one 
member began to suspect that Dodu‘s courier, who was responsible for transmitting literature 
and reports between Dodu and the country committee, had been co-opted as well. Left with 
no other options, the member circumvented Dodu and the courier and sent a concerned letter 
to the country committee. He was arrested shortly thereafter. The letter writer believed that 
the timing of his arrest proved that the police had acted to prevent Dodu‘s exposure as a 
police agent.
547
 In fact, the man‘s suspicions were correct. Dodu publicly renounced the faith 
soon after. He later served as a witness for the prosecution in trials against local Witnesses 
and helped decode confiscated reports for the police.
548
  
Problems also arose when members falsely suspected another individual of having 
betrayed the organization. Witnesses could quickly find themselves expelled from the 
organization and shunned by fellow believers. Ironically, the alienated Witnesses then 
became more vulnerable to state agents who sought to coerce them into providing 
information. Police often lied to arrested members, telling them that certain individuals had 
betrayed them. This was a useful tool for police who wanted to isolate an active member 
from the organization. Still, at least a few Witnesses displayed remarkable patience in such 
situations. One woman found herself the victim of such police tactics and was expelled from 
the organization as a suspected traitor. Soon after, she was arrested and refused to cooperate 
with the investigation. She still considered herself to be a Witness, even though local 
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members no longer did. Recounting this story in the post-Soviet era, she recalled feeling 
certain that Jehovah would resolve the situation and vindicate her, and tried not to hate those 
who had spread false rumors about her. Upon conviction she found herself in the same labor 
camp as the women who had been tricked into denouncing her as a traitor. Rather than argue, 
they resolved their differences and trusted one another enough to share illegal literature. The 
organization eventually restored the woman as a member.
549
  
 Witnesses responded to the new wave of investigations and trials with many of the 
same tactics employed in the Stalin era. Watch Tower Vice President Frederick W. Franz 
lectured on this theme at the 1955 Triumphant Kingdom Assembly in New York City in 
1955.
550
 The following year, The Watchtower reprinted the basic outline of this message. In 
the piece, the organization told members to pursue a ―war strategy‖ of hiding the truth from 
state persecutors. It advised members to give false information to police to avoid arrest in 
countries where Witnesses lacked legal standing, stating, ―God does not oblige us to show 
the stupidity of sheep and play into the hands of our fighting enemy.‖ At the same time, it 
held to the view that members must tell the truth when under oath in a court of law.
551
  
Franz‘s message quickly made its way to the Soviet Union. A 1956 CRCA report 
from L‘viv cited a memo from Knorr advising members not to give information to police 
and, if necessary, to protect elders by taking full responsibility for any potentially illegal 
actions. Knorr also recommended that convicted members appeal their court sentences to the 
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full extent allowed by the law.
552
 Most Witnesses followed the organization‘s advice not to 
cooperate with the police. Nikolai Kalibaba, arrested in early 1959, recalls that, out of a 
desire to protect other fellow believers, he told investigators he would not identify a single 
person. An investigator then showed him a picture of his brother, asking him to identify him. 
Nikolai refused. Next, he was shown a picture of himself and asked, ―Is this you?‖ Nikolai 
merely responded, ―This person looks like me, but whether it is me or not, I can‘t say.‖553 
A more detailed document, circulated in Zakarpattia oblast in 1960, counseled 
members on how to respond to questioning. The Watch Tower organization, well 
experienced in handling cases of state repression of its members, wanted to make sure that all 
Witnesses knew that they did have rights, even if the Soviet state did not honor them. It cited 
several United Nations (UN) documents, including the 1948 Declaration on Human Rights 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience and a 1952 UN publication listing the Witnesses as a 
recognized religious organization. It also referenced the Soviet constitution, the works of 
Lenin, and the November 1954 resolution ending the Hundred Days Campaign. These 
materials had no practical impact in halting investigations, but they gave Witnesses a means 
to respond to police when questioned.  
On a more practical level, the 1960 memo detailed a list of suggested answers to 
typical questions from investigators. For example, if asked to explain Armageddon, it 
advised Witnesses to respond that it is a biblical term referring to the end of evil on earth and 
the liberation of mankind from oppression, disease, and death. If asked whether they conduct 
subversive activity, Witnesses should respond that they never participate in political or 
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military activities. Other potential questions included why Witnesses do not provide evidence 
to police, what they think about the release of Sputnik, how they view science and religion, 
and whether they receive funds from the Rockefeller family.
554
 These answers may not have 
changed investigators‘ minds, but they taught Witnesses how to defend their faith. 
The trial of Mykola Mandziak provides a fascinating glimpse into early Khrushchev-
era investigations of Witnesses. Mandziak, a Witness since 1930, had only recently returned 
home from a previous term in a labor camp when police conducted a search of his home in 
late 1956. The search revealed a large quantity of religious literature and printing paper 
hidden throughout the home and concealed in a double-bottomed suitcase. To make matters 
worse for Mandziak, he was hosting a Bible study with other Witnesses at the time the police 
arrived to arrest him. The state eventually charged him under Article 58.   
During months of interrogation, Mandziak showed remarkable creativity in evading 
questions by investigators, following the organization‘s admonitions to take responsibility 
and not implicate others. Thus, while he admitted to his own involvement in the organization, 
he refused to identify anyone else as a member, or even to sign the interrogation records. 
Asked about the anti-Soviet content of literature confiscated from his home, he said he had 
not found the free time yet to read it. An unknown man, Mandziak claimed, had dropped off 
the printing paper, asked him to hold onto it, and then never returned. The believers at his 
home that night, Mandziak explained, had come to visit his wife, who had recently broken 
her arm. A fellow prisoner had given him the double-bottomed suitcase as a gift; he had no 
idea it contained a secret compartment filled with literature. After three months of fruitless 
questioning, the investigator declared, ―Your explanations not only do not match reality, but 
                                                 
554
 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 5116, ark. 312-21. 
 179 
are devoid of any logical thought.‖ Mandziak admitted it might seem that way, but stood by 
his statements.  
Even when his own son provided evidence against him concerning previous Bible 
studies held at the home, Mandziak replied that his son must just be confused. These visitors 
had come over to buy fruit and milk from him and just happened to discuss the Bible. His 
wife stood by him, stating that she had no idea what he did during the day because they 
worked different shifts. At his trial in March 1957, Mandziak repeated his statements and 
claimed he was unaware that his religion was illegal in the Soviet Union. The court sentenced 
him to ten years in a forced labor camp, along with confiscation of his property and an 
additional five years of exile from western Ukraine.
555
 Such severe consequences for illegal 
activity did not deter most members from continuing to undertake risky endeavors.  
 
The Dubravnyi Strategy 
Ongoing arrests after Stalin meant that many Witnesses returned to forced labor 
camps, where they preached their beliefs to their fellow prisoners.  As one Witness described 
it: ―The more I suffered, the more I preached,‖ even after receiving additional sentences for 
proselytism.
556
 His story is not unique. Witnesses‘ stubborn refusal to cease religious activity 
challenged camp order and undermined the purported goal of reforming criminals into honest 
Soviet citizens. In the late 1950s, the Soviet state finally took decisive action to address this 
problem. Hoping to isolate Witnesses from other prisoners, it began transferring them to a 
separate zone in the Dubravnyi camp system in Mordovia, an autonomous republic south of 
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Nizhnii Novgorod and west of the Volga River.
557
 Vasile Ursu, sent to a labor camp in 
Mordvovia in the fall of 1957, recalled that, when he arrived, ―many other brothers were also 
incarcerated there, and more were to come.‖558 By the spring of 1961, the Dubravnyi camp 
held a total of 10,458 prisoners, the majority serving sentences for especially dangerous state 
crimes. At the time, it was the only such camp in the RSFSR.
559
 Of this total, 1,892 prisoners 
had been convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Five hundred and twenty-seven 
persons were identified as sectarians or church personnel; most were Witnesses.
560
 
However, as the Stalin-era exiles had shown, attempts to isolate Witnesses could have 
unintended consequences. For imprisoned Witnesses, the Dubravyni camp proved to be an 
ideal setting to commune with fellow believers en masse. One man, sent to Mordovia in 
1963, described the camp as similar to a ―school‖ for studying and growing in his faith.561 
Previously, many of these men had served time in camps with few other Witness prisoners. 
Now they had the support of hundreds of others to sustain them through their sentences. 
Mordovia also made it much easier for Witness elders to minister to their imprisoned flock 
and convert new members. The organization gave the camp its own circuit and appointed an 
―overseer‖ to lead activities. The circuit had twenty-eight study circles, organized into four 
congregations. For the Witnesses, the camps were simply an extension of their preaching 
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work into new locales. A 1960-61 country report from the organization contained a separate 
set of statistics solely for its work within the camps and prisons.
562
  
Further, the Dubravnyi camp simplified the organization‘s difficult and risky task of 
smuggling in illegal literature to imprisoned members since it now could supply hundreds of 
people with a single literature delivery. The inmates copied each piece of literature by hand, 
including the entire Bible. They then distributed the copies to study groups. A few of the men 
had mastered a technique called ―spiderweb writing,‖ which allowed them to copy entire 
issues of The Watchtower onto tiny paper booklets that could fit in a matchbox.
563
 Family 
members who visited their loved ones in the camp added to this growing library by bringing 
in minute hand-copied versions of The Watchtower hidden ―in the heels of their shoes‖ or by 
―braiding thin sheets of paper into their hair.‖564 Frequent searches cost the Witnesses some 
of their publications, but they found ways to shield at least a portion of them from detection. 
In some cases, Witnesses protected their ―spiritual food‖ by hiding the miniature literature 
wrapped in plastic under their tongues during searches.
565
 
 Camp officials quickly realized that the Dubravnyi system had not produced the 
results they had intended. A 1960 evaluation of the camp concluded that officials had failed 
to effectively isolate prisoners from each other or the outside world. It found that 
administrators did not have adequate control over the mail system, allowing prisoners to send 
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correspondence with few limitations. Witnesses and Pentecostal prisoners had both exploited 
this weakness, sending a huge quantity of mail on a daily basis. The camp also had lost 
control over incoming mail. In that year alone, staff confiscated over 300 items of religious 
literature from prisoners.
566
 The 1961 evaluation stated that the roughly 500 religious 
prisoners received 4,850 packages that year weighing 43 tons.
567
  
The RSFSR procuracy followed up its critical evaluation the next year with a decree 
condemning the camp‘s failure to correct these problems. It noted that not only had the camp 
allowed prisoners to receive and distribute illegal religious literature, but it had done little to 
stop inmates from making reproductions of literature or from conducting meetings and 
religious rituals.
568
 In 1962, the camp finally took more decisive measures, transferring 
several prisoners to a stricter regime zone and assigning agitation workers to reform 
prisoners. As a result of these efforts, eighteen prisoners announced they had renounced 
religion and the camp noted a decline in the number of illegal meetings. The camp hesitated 
to declare success, however, admitting that the reduction in meetings was largely the result of 
a shift in tactics by Witnesses. Sensing the increased monitoring, the Witnesses had begun 
gathering in small groups of only three to five people.  
Camp officials stated that it lacked sufficient resources or trained personnel for 
effective agitation work.
569
 The 1961 camp evaluation noted that its religious prisoners 
continued to voice anti-Soviet views. They ignored the administration‘s attempts at 
reeducation, refusing to attend lectures, speeches, or participate in other group activities run 
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by agitators. The evaluation also criticized the poor quality of scientific-atheist work despite 
the clear need for such efforts. The matter was deemed of such importance that it came to the 
attention of the RSFSR procuracy and the RSFSR MVD.
570
 This did little to solve the 
problem, which resolved itself largely through a decrease in long sentences by the late 1960s. 
As Witnesses exited the camps, fewer new prisoners replaced them, and the state stopped 
funneling all Witnesses into Mordovia. 
 
The Witness Organization under Khrushchev 
Although a sizeable number of Witnesses remained in forced labor camps well after 
1953, many regained their freedom and others joined the faith for the first time. As a result of 
arrests, exile, and conversions, the Witness organization faced a much more diffuse and 
growing membership base that required more elders to meet its growing needs. In the 
Khrushchev era, the organization worked to rebuild and extend its administrative structure 
over new territories. To this end, the organization added new circuits, groups, and circles, 
and appointed new elders to lead each of these units. The post-Stalin release of many 
formerly imprisoned Witnesses helped replenish the organization‘s leadership base. They 
also provided proof to believers that God could protect his people from harm. Areas with 
longstanding Witness communities saw a surge in numbers in the late 1960s as individuals 
returned to their home villages.
571
  
By the late 1950s, local officials began to notice the return of Witnesses to their 
communities, and they reacted with alarm. A memo from the CRCA to the Moldavian TsK in 
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1956 reported that ―Jehovists‖ and other sectarians who had been released from prison had 
returned to their communities as ―martyrs.‖572 Similarly, at a 1957 plenum of the Moldavian 
Komsomol, one official complained that newly released Witnesses were proclaiming that 
God had made it possible for them to return home after serving only three years of a twenty-
five-year sentence. When the chair of one village soviet spoke to one of the returning men, he 
asked him if he had seen proof of God. The man replied that God had shown himself by 
freeing him and others.
573
 The dismantling of the Gulag made it possible for such men to 
resume leadership positions in their faith communities with renewed authority. 
Even with the moderate liberalizations of the Khrushchev era, the position of country 
servant faced regular turnover due to police investigations and arrests. Ukrainian Witnesses 
continued to occupy this important role through the late Soviet era, even as the organization 
won new converts in the Russian heartland and in other Soviet Republics. However, the 
organization did appoint country committee members from other regions in later years to 
reflect the religion‘s expansion to new locales. Bohdan Terlets‘kyi, who joined the faith 
during World War II and who had been instrumental in the early postwar leadership, took 
over as country servant in 1952 after the arrest of Mykola Tsyba. Under investigation by the 
KGB in 1955, Terlets‘kyi chose to renounce the organization rather than face a lengthy 
prison sentence. For the next several years, he featured regularly in atheist agitation against 
the Witnesses, publishing articles on the religion and delivering lectures on the inner 
workings of the Witness leadership.
574
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The sudden and dramatic departure of Terlets‘kyi led to the appointment of Mykola 
Dubovyns‘kyi, a man who already had direct experience with police repression. He served 
time from 1944 to 1950 for his involvement with the Witnesses. Assuming leadership in 
1955, he managed to avoid a second arrest for only a short time. A yearlong investigation in 
Stanislav oblast, Ukraine, led to his arrest in January 1957 and a twenty-five-year prison 
sentence.
575
 Fortunately for the organization, this event coincided closely with the release of 
Ziatek from the camps in 1956.  Ziatek resumed his old responsibilities until he was arrested 
again on January 1, 1961.
576
 At that time, the organization made arrangements for yet another 
man, Ivan Pashkovs‘kyi, to take the helm, although Ziatek continued to provide leadership 
from prison. Only with the appointment of Pashkovs‘kyi did the organization enjoy a period 
of stability. Health problems, rather than police intervention, caused Pashkovs‘kyi to 
relinquish responsibility in 1972.
577
  
Renewed communication between Brooklyn and the Soviet Witness leadership 
helped the organization to overcome the challenges of continual arrests and convictions. For 
several years, the Soviet Witnesses had been unable to collect comprehensive membership 
data or to keep track of their preaching work and literature distribution. In the Khrushchev 
era, this work improved, even though it still meant a major risk for elders. Each individual 
Witness submitted regular reports to his or her circle leader on the number of hours spent on 
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proselytism, how much literature was distributed, how many Bible studies were conducted 
with interested people, how many return visits were made to potential new converts, and how 
much money had been donated. Funding for printing materials, travel for leaders, and aid to 
needy members came entirely from voluntary donations made by members.
578
 Circle leaders 
consolidated and transmitted this information up the chain of command, where the country 
committee prepared an overall report and smuggled it out abroad. This system kept the 
international organization better informed on the state of its Soviet branch, although 
Brooklyn did not publish this data to protect Soviet Witnesses. To further shield members, 
Soviet elders employed various systems of encoding to disguise the meaning of data on 
reports if intercepted by the police.
579
 
A 1959-1960 country report confiscated in 1962 provides a detailed portrait of 
Witness activity during the Khrushchev era. It lists over 15,000 pieces of literature 
distributed, 398,540 hours spent in preaching work, 140,709 return visits, 1,866 Bible 
studies, 546,024 rubles donated by members, and over 26,000 pieces of literature printed. 
These data are all the more impressive as they reflect only a fraction of the total efforts in the 
Soviet Union due to divisions in the leadership to be discussed in the next section.
580
 Further, 
the country report for the following year shows substantial growth, particularly in the area of 
printing, with over 60,000 items of literature produced.
581
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These reports reflect the revival and expansion of underground printing presses that 
had been largely paralyzed after the arrests and exiles of the late Stalin era. Much of the 
earlier printing work had involved duplicating pre-1945 literature and publications smuggled 
into Ukraine by Polish resettlers after the war. In the Khrushchev era, regular channels from 
abroad were reestablished to allow for the mass reproduction of new magazines, tracts, and 
books. Hidden in mail packages, carried in by Witnesses disguised as tourists, or smuggled 
over the western borders, the literature had to be translated into the many languages read by 
Soviet Witnesses. Dozens of Witnesses served as translators, making it possible to reach out 
to more communities across the Soviet Union. With the strengthened printing efforts, by the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the organization printed new issues of The Watchtower roughly 
once a month.
582
  
Hiding large scale printing operations was difficult. Exploiting the rural, isolated 
locations of many Witness communities, the organization established secret bunkers in the 
basements and backyards of members and in surrounding uninhabited areas near villages. 
The bunkers were not small, amateur operations. Some of those in Ukraine had electric 
generators and ventilation systems to allow members to work underground day and night. In 
the Moldavian village of Hlina, one Witness set up a printing bunker under the shed in his 
backyard. When discovered in 1957, it contained organizational documents from the country 
committee, reports from all fifteen circuits, financial records, three typewriters, printing 
supplies, and issues of The Watchtower in four different languages.
583
 The organization set 
up one bunker in the mountains outside of the village of Hanychi in Zakarpattia oblast. When 
police discovered it in 1963, it contained two typewriters, two mimeograph machines, 
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mimeograph paper, notebooks, a radio receiver, binoculars, a kerosene lamp, a bed, linens, 
clothes, food supplies, and an electric generator, along with a large quantity of literature in 
Russian, Romanian, and Ukrainian. One young man had run the bunker by himself for three 
years.
584
 
The Witness leadership made concerted efforts to safeguard printing locations and 
protect their operators from arrest. The organization kept members unaware of the details of 
how the literature was produced and by whom, making it impossible for them to betray this 
information accidentally or intentionally to the police. Literature arrived for each circle 
through the appointed elder, but even he often did not know the full name of the person who 
delivered it. Pseudonyms or first names kept identities a secret. The organization also used 
different people for the printing work and the literature distribution. In fact, the person 
delivering the literature to the study circle may have been more than one step removed from 
the actual press.
585
  
The organization also grappled with the difficult task of procuring supplies for its 
presses. Polish Witnesses, disguised as tourists, offered some help by smuggling in 
mimeograph paper in the late 1950s.
586
 In the long run, the organization needed to find other 
methods to meet the growing demand for literature. Soviet Witnesses, finding it impossible 
to buy printing ink and paper in bulk from state stores, paid employees of state printing 
facilities to sell it to them.
587
 For example, elders bought the supplies for two bunkers in 
Zakarpattia oblast in large part from members of the oblast Komsomol. Not surprisingly, the 
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KGB got involved in investigating how Komsomol members had stolen and then sold 
printing supplies to what the state classified as an anti-Soviet organization.
588
 
Those who worked in these printing operations assumed an incredible burden. By the 
early 1960s, the printing presses produced nearly 20,000 items of literature per year.
589
 The 
work itself was grueling for those who labored underground for weeks at end to keep the 
presses running. One man, who worked in a printing operation in Siberia, recalled that he 
―almost never slept‖ between the printing work and his full-time job. Outside of his family 
and a few other Witnesses, no one knew of his involvement. Members from his congregation 
even questioned his commitment to the faith during this time, since they never saw him in the 
evenings.
590
 Housing the literature while it awaited delivery posed similar problems. One 
man in Transcarpathia created a ―theocratic library‖ in the forest near his home, filling milk 
cans with literature and burying in the ground.
591
 Members stored most of the literature in 
their homes, in secret compartments built to hide illegal publications during regular police 
raids. When police did discover underground presses, the responsible individuals faced long 
prison sentences or worse. The 2002 Yearbook states that authorities shot and killed one 
Witness, Ivan Dziabko, during the raid on his bunker in 1963.
592
 Even such severe 
consequences, however, did not deter Witnesses from undertaking these tasks. 
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The Great Witness Schism 
More major problems than arrests and raids threatened the Witness leadership by the 
late 1950s. The 1949 and 1951 removal of Witnesses from the borderlands created a division 
of the membership into ―West,‖ i.e. those members not subject to exile, and ―East,‖ those 
now living primarily in Siberian settlements. The massive distance between the two 
communities strained the unified hierarchical structure, requiring the country committee to 
service both locations. Four of the committee‘s members lived in Ukraine and four in Siberia, 
yet distance limited their ability to communicate effectively with one another.
593
 With the 
organization still led by Ukrainians, the Siberian elders suffered a sense of isolation and lack 
of control. This climate fostered mistrust and misunderstanding. The arrests of high-level 
leaders, including the country servants, hurt the organization‘s ability to respond both to this 
problem and to ongoing police infiltration.  
By the late 1950s, leaders in the Siberian exile community began to question the 
country committee‘s ability and authority to lead the organization. Rumors spread that 
Ziatek, the country servant, had betrayed the organization to the KGB.
594
 Continued arrests in 
both Siberia and the western borderlands added fuel to this suspicion. The conflict took a 
more serious turn in 1958, when several Siberian members met to discuss the situation and to 
air their complaints against Ziatek. Seeing no other attractive option, they decided to appeal 
directly to the Poland branch for permission to form a separate Siberian Witness 
organization. The men‘s smuggled-out letter to the Polish country servant, however, did not 
produce the desired response. Instead, they received a sharp rebuke denouncing the idea of a 
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Siberian Witness organization as ―schismatic‖ and demanding an end to further discussion of 
the matter.
595
 Ignoring this fact and Ziatek‘s own attempts to restore unity, the Siberian group 
stopped reporting to the recognized country committee and halted the flow of information 
from Siberia to Ukraine. Without outside approval, they formed their own country committee 
in 1961.
596
 
The division gradually spread through the lower levels of the organization, as each 
side appealed to members for support. Most Witnesses had little idea that a split had 
occurred, since the same local leaders remained in place and secrecy measures prevented 
them from having any knowledge of what went on in the upper leadership. The Watch Tower 
organization estimates that several thousand members came under the control of the new 
country committee, particularly in Irkutsk and Tomsk.
597
 Although the initial motivation for 
the split had been to form a Siberian country committee, the opposition‘s distrust of Ziatek 
led them to extend their reach beyond Siberia. In short, they hoped to replace the Ziatek 
committee and become the sole authority for Soviet Witnesses. Ultimately, three major 
factions within the Witnesses emerged. Those who followed the Brooklyn-appointed Ziatek 
country committee were dubbed ―Ziatekists‖ (Ziatekovtsy). Those who opposed Ziatek‘s 
leadership and wanted to form a new country committee were known as the 
―opposition‖(oppozitsiia). Its members were sometimes called ―Potashovists,‖ (Potashovtsy) 
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after their most prominent member.
598
 Lastly, those who rejected any need for a centralized 
organization were called ―neutralists‖ (neitralisty). 
The schism lines reveal deep tensions over the serious consequences of the 
organization‘s lack of registration. Many in the oppositionist and neutralist factions felt 
frustrated that no progress had been made with the Soviet government to negotiate an 
agreement that would allow them to practice their faith without fear of persecution. As other 
religions around them openly held services in churches, some Witnesses wondered why this 
option was not possible for them as well. For example, a group of Witnesses calling 
themselves the ―Bible Students in the defense of Truth,‖ circulated fliers in western Ukraine 
in 1961. The fliers denounced the organization‘s leadership for bringing the religion and its 
members into direct conflict with the Soviet state since World War II. They blamed the 
leadership‘s confrontational methods and uncompromising attitude for causing the mass 
exile. The text of the fliers noted that, while other religious faiths had registered with the 
state, the Witnesses had not. As a solution, the fliers suggested that Witnesses rely on the 
Bible, instead of illegal publications like The Watchtower, for their salvation. They 
recommended that members back off from active missionary work that could lead to 
arrests.
599
 
Further complicating matters, the schism coincided with a wave of arrests in Irkutsk 
oblast and western Ukraine and with the liquidation of several major printing operations. 
These actions were the climax of a three-year KGB investigation and infiltration of the 
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Witnesses, which encouraged the schism as part of its ―divide and conquer‖ strategy.600 
While the KGB cannot be held solely responsible for the schism, its actions certainly 
exacerbated divisions and undermined attempts to create unity within the organization.
601
 In 
1965, after the schism had already occurred, the KGB chief for L‘viv oblast wrote that the 
KGB was working to ―split this sect into two hostile factions‖ by fueling tensions between 
the Ziatek and oppositionist groups.
602
 Most damaging, it made a concerted effort to 
convince arrested members, particularly prominent leaders, to turn against fellow believers. 
The weakened unity among Witnesses made it easier for the police to obtain information. 
This KGB method had its greatest success with Konstantin Potashov, the leader 
whose name would ultimately be identified as synonymous with the opposition. In 1958, 
Potashov had just been freed from prison and had settled in the city of Bratsk, Irkutsk oblast, 
among Ukrainian Witnesses.
603
 A Russian born in 1923 in Gorky oblast, he did not come 
from the borderland Witness communities like most leaders.
604
 In fact, his early life had been 
marked by two prison sentences for hooliganism and theft in 1941 and 1948.
605
 While in 
prison in 1949, he converted to the Witnesses and subsequently received three more 
sentences for state crimes related to his religious activities.
606
 Once freed and living in 
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Irkutsk oblast, Potashov oversaw the development of a major printing operation until several 
KGB searches suggested to him that another arrest was near at hand.
607
 In late 1959, fleeing 
police detection, Potashov relocated to Zakarpattia oblast, where he assisted with the 
establishment of several additional printing bunkers.
608
 Meanwhile in Irkutsk, a warrant had 
been issued for his arrest and the investigation into the Irkutsk Witnesses continued.
609
 
Potashov‘s luck finally ran out in early 1962, after KGB raids in Zakarpattia oblast 
uncovered the printing operations.
610
 A police encounter near a bus station in the city of 
Mukachevo led to Potashov‘s arrest. He was carrying a fake passport and a copy of The 
Watchtower. Two months of interrogations yielded little to no information. Eventually, 
however, Potashov began to give evidence, cooperating with the police investigation for 
several months through early November.
611
 Potashov‘s departure from the organization was 
especially damaging given his position as traveling overseer to congregations across the 
Soviet Union.
612
 He was able to provide details on Witnesses in western Ukraine, Siberia, 
and northern Moldavia.
613
 His impact on the organization also survived well after the 1962 
investigation. In later years, Potashov became the country‘s leading anti-Witness agitator, 
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traveling throughout western Ukraine to give talks against the religion and publishing several 
attacks on the organization, including two memoirs in 1966 and 1976.
614
  
Police roundups of Witnesses continued throughout 1962 in the wake of Potashov‘s 
arrest. The organization briefly relocated some printing operations elsewhere, but they did 
not escape discovery for long. KGB raids seized other presses before the organization had 
time to move them.
615
 In December 1962, Potashov and eight other Witness leaders, namely 
members of the oppositionist country committee and printing press operators, were brought 
to trial in Zakarpattia oblast court in Uzhhorod. Potashov and three other defendants gave 
evidence against the organization, while the remaining Witnesses refused to do so. Instead, 
they used the trial as a way to preach their faith in the courtroom. The court granted 
conditional release to those who cooperated; it sentenced the rest to terms of three to seven 
years plus exile.
616
  
The details of the Potashov affair remains murky due to the unavailability of 
complete archival records.
617
 Potashov‘s own distorted accounts of his involvement with the 
organization and the KGB in his later memoirs shed little light on events. This makes it 
difficult to determine Potashov‘s exact position in the organization prior to his arrest. 
Potashov himself claimed to have led the entire Witness organization, a fact disputed by 
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official Watch Tower publications. The existing documentation suggests that he was most 
likely a high-level opposition leader, but not part of the original Siberian committee that 
formed against Ziatek. Further, rumors among Witnesses that Potashov had been a KGB 
double agent from the beginning find little support in the records, which show that he served 
time in prison for his Witness activities beginning in 1949 and extending to 1958.
618
 His 
KGB case file contains no mention of any prior involvement with the KGB.
619
 Ultimately, 
the real position of Potashov mattered less than the mythology both he and the Soviet state 
promoted. For the purposes of atheist propaganda, Potashov was, in his own words, ―believer 
number one‖ in the organization, giving him unique insider authority to denounce the 
Witnesses‘ beliefs and actions.620 
 The schism was not a uniquely Soviet affair. Similar divisions rocked other Soviet 
bloc Witness communities over the same basic issues of mistrust and KGB infiltration. In the 
case of Potashov, the KGB relied on joint efforts with the Polish Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.
621
 The multiple splits between the various country branches made it difficult for 
Soviet believers to sort out whom they could trust abroad, a particular problem given their 
reliance on these contacts for literature and instructions. For example, Polish Witnesses 
visiting their Soviet brethren in 1961 warned them against any contact with Czechoslovak 
members due to a schism that had engulfed that community.
622
 Indeed, already in 1959, over 
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a thousand Czechoslovak Witnesses had left the official organization, despite retaining their 
commitment to the faith.
623
 Similarly, it was not always clear to outsiders who belonged to 
the official organization, and who identified with the opposition. A Polish Witness visiting 
Ternopil‘ oblast in 1960, failing to link up as planned with Ziatek to hand over Watchtower 
prints, gave them instead to local oppositionist leaders. The woman herself reported that 
Poland was in the midst of its own schism, but that she had chosen to support the official 
channel. Despite this, literature continued to be relayed from Poland to the oppositionist 
contacts for at least another year.
624
  
 Changes to Witness doctrine in 1962 exacerbated the schisms across Eastern Europe. 
That year, the organization announced a new interpretation of Romans 13:1, which exhorts 
Christians to obey the ―governing authorities,‖ a term that the organization had earlier taken 
to refer to Jehovah and Jesus Christ. Now, the organization stated that the phrase referred to 
secular authorities, including the Soviet government.
625
 In practical terms, the new 
understanding did not change how the Witnesses conducted their faith and had little impact 
on believers in democratic countries. Witnesses still did not obey laws that went against their 
religious beliefs, such as mandatory military service. Nonetheless, the doctrinal shift 
suggested a more favorable view of world governments. The verse declares that all 
authorities ―have been established by God‖ and that everyone ―must submit himself‖ to them. 
This position, which came in the midst of concerted efforts by the KGB to weaken the 
organization, was received with suspicion by many Witnesses in the Soviet Union and Soviet 
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bloc countries. Some assumed the KGB had planted false literature to convince members to 
cooperate more willingly with the state, particularly since the state had been known to create 
fake literature in the past.
626
 A recent Watch Tower publication on Witnesses in Romania 
described the situation as follows: ―Having suffered much at the hands of brutal rulers, many 
brothers in Romania found the new understanding hard to accept. In fact, some sincerely 
thought that it was a shrewd Communist fabrication intended to make them totally 
subservient to the State.‖627 Many Witnesses in the Soviet Union felt the same way.628 It took 
great effort on the part of the organization to convince the vast majority of members of this 
new view.    
 By 1962, the schism and KGB investigations placed the Witnesses in the most 
precarious position since the Stalin-era persecutions. The 1962 Yearbook report on the Soviet 
Union noted that it had ―been a year of hot persecution for many because the communistic 
government in the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics has set its mind on crushing those 
who worship Jehovah God.‖629 One member described this time as ―the most difficult period 
in the history of Jehovah‘s Witnesses in the USSR.‖630 Over 200 people had been arrested, 
including several members of the country committee, the entire oppositionist country 
committee, couriers, printing workers, and regional leaders. The police had seized at least 
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two bunkers in Irkutsk oblast, and another two in Zakarpattia oblast.
631
 Separate KGB 
operations in Kazakhstan, Armenia, Rivne, Chernivtsi, Kurgan, Cheliabinsk, Perm, 
Arkhangel, Krasnoiarsk, and Stavropol‘ led to trials of elders in these regions.632 More trials 
continued into 1963 and 1964, particularly in Ukraine.
633
  
For the KGB, the success of its multiyear investigation of Soviet Witnesses suggested 
the possibility that the religion could be entirely eliminated in the near future. In fact, a 1962 
memo from KGB chairman Vladimir Semichastnyi to the TsK went so far as to recommend 
legalizing the organization to further fracture and weaken its leadership.
634
 The legalization 
of the religion, he wrote, ―would create the conditions for the liquidation of the underground 
in our country, for the break of believers from the harmful influence of foreign Jehovist 
centers, and would allow us to bring the organization‘s actions under official control, reduce 
its activity, and deprive the sect of the ability to use reactionary literature.‖635 Only days after 
sending this report, however, Semichastnyi regretted having made this bold suggestion, 
perhaps sensing that legalization was not something the TsK would consider. Without 
waiting for a response, he sent a quick memo to the TsK asking that they ignore his report. 
The KGB, he wrote, ―will continue to study this question.‖636 It is impossible to know what 
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prompted Semichastnyi to propose legalization, but it is clear that he had little interest in 
pursuing this agenda without backing from Khrushchev and the Party. 
The KGB was not the only institution to suggest the possibility of registering the 
Witnesses as a means of capitalizing on the schism. A CRA inspector put forth the same idea 
in his 1966 report on religious conditions in Moldavia. He noted the growing presence within 
the Witnesses of those in favor of worshipping Jehovah without Brooklyn leadership. Like 
Semichastnyi, he posited that legalization of neutralist groups within the organization, who 
rejected Brooklyn‘s authority, would heighten ―the influence of socialist reality on the 
religious psychology of the devout Jehovist.‖637 Others, like the Irkutsk oblast prosecutor in 
September 1962, promoted a more moderate strategy. The plan called for continued measures 
to further divide the organization and cause a mass exodus of its members.
638
 It was this 
tactic, not the more daring legalization option, that the state ultimately chose. 
In the end, the Soviet state proved unprepared or unwilling to capitalize fully on its 
gains by legally recognizing and registering the schismatic groups it had helped to create. 
Instead, it chose to rest on its laurels, hoping that the divisions already created would simply 
destroy the organization from within over time.
639
 In a strange twist, the KGB‘s own trials of 
oppositionist leaders had made this outcome unlikely, as they had destroyed the rival country 
committee. Equally problematic, most of the original Siberian committee members 
renounced their faith during this period. Frustrated with the mainline organization, they had 
already rejected the organization‘s authority and were more likely to entertain doubts about 
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the religion itself. Some oppositionists avoided long prison sentences by testifying against 
the organization. Their status as former believers, however, meant they had no authority 
among current Witnesses. This left the opposition incapable of presenting a viable alternative 
to the official organization under Ziatek.  
Further, even if the state had sought registration, it may very well have been 
unsuccessful. The oppositionists and neutralists had no significant differences in beliefs from 
those groups loyal to Brooklyn.
640
 Even neutralist groups often did not recognize Soviet laws 
regarding religious freedom and continued to hold illegal meetings to study the Bible. They 
also, like other Witnesses, refused to serve in the Army or vote.
641
 A 1974 CRA report from 
Kurgan oblast noted that the lines between the groups were rather fluid, with constant 
communication among each other and sharing of literature.
642
 Similarly, a 1984 CRA report 
on neutralists in Chernivtsi oblast stated that local neutralists maintained unofficial contact 
with Ziatek supporters in order to exchange religious literature.
643
 None of the three groups 
sought out registration as a possibility, and none was apparently willing to compromise on its 
basic beliefs in order to win legalization with the state. In short, the state had created multiple 
counter-groups to the Brooklyn Witnesses, but none of them fit the standards for acceptable 
religious belief according to the Khrushchev system.  
The KGB‘s strategy also underestimated the ability of the Witness organization to 
adapt and respond to the schism. Ironically, it was the state itself that offered the conditions 
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for the Witnesses‘ renewal through its concentration of Witness prisoners in the Mordovia 
camp system. By 1961, the camp held many individuals with highly responsible positions in 
the organization, including Dubovyns‘kyi and Ziatek, the two most recent country 
servants.
644
 In particular, by sending Ziatek to Mordovia in 1961, the state gave both sides of 
the schism a rare opportunity to speak directly to one another. Those who had accused Ziatek 
of being a double agent saw with their own eyes that Ziatek received no special favors from 
the authorities and suffered, just like them, for his faith. Gheorghe Gorobeţ, incarcerated in 
Mordovia at this time, recalls the response of an oppositionist to the arrival of Ziatek 
supporters in the camp: ―When he saw that the responsible brothers were still incarcerated, 
he was surprised, for he had been told that we were all as free as birds and living a life of 
luxury sponsored by the KGB!‖645 
The effort to reunite the organization received much needed aid from Brooklyn in 
1962. A year earlier, the country committee, under the leadership of Pashkovs‘kyi, had 
explained the situation to Polish Witness representatives. The Polish branch sent the 
information to Brooklyn, forwarding a response from President Nathan Knorr a year later. 
Knorr wrote: 
Communications reaching me from time to time have indicated that you brothers in 
the U.S.S.R. continue to maintain your strong desire to be faithful servants of Jehovah 
God. But some of you have had problems in trying to maintain unity with your 
brothers. I believe this is because of poor communication facilities and the deliberate 
circulation of false stories by some who are opposed to Jehovah God. 
 
Most importantly, Knorr stated clearly that the worldwide organization in Brooklyn  
 
maintained its trust in Ziatek and other appointed elders. Knorr‘s call for unity and his  
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support of Ziatek helped convince some Witnesses to return to the fold.
646
 
 
The organization also appointed trusted individuals to reach out to schismatic groups 
and restore faith in the country committee. The Witnesses who accepted this task recognized 
its inherent risks; they could be betrayed at any time by those who no longer belonged to the 
organization.
647
 A 1965 L‘viv KGB report identified several regional leaders who were 
spearheading these reunification efforts. The KGB noted that these men held illegal 
gatherings to convince oppositionists to rejoin the organization, and with some success.
648
 
The organization estimates that by 1971, such efforts had led to the return of over 4,500 
members.
649
 
Still, the schism had long-term effects on the organization that extended into the post-
Soviet period. While most members rejoined the main organization by the late 1960s, 
neutralist and oppositionist groups continued to exist. For example, a 1974 report from the 
Zakarpattia KGB office estimated that of the 6,500 Witnesses in the area, more than 5,000 
were Ziatek supporters, 300 were oppositionists, 270 were neutralists, 200 supported a local 
leader‘s independent group, and the rest were of unknown loyalty.650 Witnesses continued to 
work to bring these splinter groups back into the fold into the early 1990s.  
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The Khrushchev System after 1964 
The Soviet state lost further momentum in its quest to eliminate religious belief and 
destroy the Witness organization after 1964, when Politburo members engineered the 
peaceful ouster of Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary. The ouster brought 
Brezhnev to power and ended certain aspects of the antireligious campaign. William Fletcher 
identifies two key changes to religious policy as a result of Khrushchev‘s removal from the 
Party leadership: the end to massive church closures and the more selective use of ―force‖ 
against believers. One of those groups still singled out for force, he notes, was the 
Witnesses.
651
 In general, the new leadership did not fundamentally alter the religious policy 
toward unregistered minority religions like the Witnesses until the late 1970s, and continued 
to use the same basic coercive and persuasive methods to liquidate these religious 
communities. However, the softer stance toward registered religions made the repressive 
tactics against unregistered groups stand out in comparison.  
Nevertheless, just as the Soviet state under Brezhnev backed away from 
Khrushchev‘s famous promise that it would achieve communism in the immediate future, so 
too did it stop predicting the imminent death of religion. Instead, the state focused on gradual 
improvements in atheist educational work and on increasing control over both registered and 
unregistered religious organizations. The shift reflected the failure of Khrushchev‘s 
antireligious campaigns to significantly reduce the number of religious believers in the Soviet 
Union. The policy change also mirrored the new priorities of the Brezhnev state, marked by 
an emphasis on foreign policy, domestic stability, and a crackdown on dissidents. Religious 
activity surfaced as a major issue only to the extent that it intersected with these issues. 
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Brezhnev‘s first decade in power did result in some administrative changes in the 
regulation of religious affairs. Most importantly, the Council of Ministers merged the CRCA 
and the CROC into one body, the CRA, in December 1965. The newly formed CRA reflected 
a growing emphasis on regulation and control of unregistered religious organizations. This 
included a focus on more low-level administrative measures meant to reduce minor 
violations of the law. In 1966, the Supreme Soviet enacted administrative penalties for 
violations of the religious laws. The resolution called on local soviets to issue warnings and 
fines to individuals for offenses such as unauthorized religious gatherings and baptisms. 
Witnesses in particular received multiple summons to appear before the local soviets.
652
 
Those found guilty of these charges received fifty-ruble fines, a considerable sum of money, 
and many members received several fines.
653
  
In line with new focus on administrative measures, the state exhorted local officials to 
keep closer tabs over illegal religious gatherings. A CRA memo from Krasnoiarsk krai 
detailed how to conduct raids of Witness home Bible studies. It instructed police or other 
authorities to arrive at the scene thirty minutes to an hour after the meeting had begun, enter 
the apartment, and take its host into a separate room. The police were to determine from this 
person who actually was in charge of the Bible study, explain that such meetings violated the 
law, and tell all attendants to go home immediately. The memo told authorities to expect 
believers to ignore these commands, perhaps even by praying or singing. Police should wait 
patiently for this to end before demanding more forcefully for believers to disperse. The 
memo advised police not to engage with believers‘ questions or their references to religious 
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matters and Bible citations. Instead, they should simply make a list of all those present and 
arrest those who refused to identify themselves.
654
  
The CRA and Supreme Soviet repeatedly exhorted local officials to deal more 
effectively with the Witnesses. In 1968, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution 
demanding that religious organizations comply with the laws on religion. The resolution 
praised improvements in decreasing church influence, but criticized shortcomings in work 
with ―fanatic‖ sects such as True Orthodox Christians and ―Jehovists.‖ The resolution 
instructed all CRA commissioners to heighten their vigilance in dealing with ―reactionary‖ 
religious organizations by keeping tabs on religious activities, proselytism, sermons, and so 
forth. It told officials to register all eligible organizations and eliminate the rest through 
criminal and administrative sanctions against their leaders.
655
 Partly in response to the all-
union resolution earlier that year, the Ukrainian CRA passed its own resolution in August 
1968 on strengthening the work of party organizations in regard to the ―Jehovists.‖ The 
resolution called on regional CRA commissioners to work with local authorities to identify 
all Jehovist groups, their leaders and activist members, and to send this information to the 
Party organs. Jehovist leaders were to be informed of their duty to obey the law and warned 
to stop all illegal activities; those who refused this order were to be issued warnings or 
fines.
656
  
In 1974, the CRA, faced with continued lack of progress in eliminating Witness 
communities, issued a resolution calling for greater efforts ―to expose and suppress the illegal 
actions of the Jehovist sect.‖ The move did little to solve this problem. Instead, it just 
                                                 
654
 GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 2784, l. 55. 
 
655
 DALO f. 1332, op. 2, spr. 40, ark. 55-68a. 
 
656
 DALO, f. 1332, op. 2, spr. 40, ark. 121-22.  
 207 
increased the number of reports and paperwork from CRA branches and officials without 
improved results.
657
 Overall, the lack of any enforcement mechanisms to compel officials to 
demonstrate real gains in reducing religious belief meant that these resolutions failed to 
suppress Witness communities. Local officials dutifully compiled reports singing the praises 
of their efforts, which their superiors then cited as evidence that the resolutions had the 
intended effect. If the optimism of the reports did not match other evidence on the ground, no 
one seemed willing to invest the necessary time to correct apparent shortcomings. The CRA 
in May 1980 passed another resolution on work among Witnesses that had a similarly 
minimal effect.
658
 Religious scholar Sergei Ivanenko has noted that, from 1980 to 1982, most 
regions simply drew up vague plans for work with Witnesses with no enforcement 
mechanisms or means to determine their success. Ivanenko rightly suggests that this response 
to state resolutions reflected local authorities‘ disinterest in the matter.659  
 Brezhnev-era religious policy delegated greater responsibility for religious policy  
enforcement to the local soviets beyond the task of issuing fines. In 1966, the state prompted 
the creation of local bodies under the executive committees of district and city soviets to 
monitor religious life.
660
 These local religious control commissions became a national 
phenomenon by the late 1960s.
661
 Lacking any independent power to punish believers, their 
primary duty consisted of providing surveillance on local religious activity and reporting any 
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violations of the law to the authorities. The haphazard nature of the commissions‘ 
membership hindered their effectiveness. The commission chair was often the secretary of 
the soviet executive committee, while the other members came from a wide assortment of 
local citizenry. For example, a district commission in Kirovohrad oblast included the local 
radio station editor, the district newspaper editor, a Komsomol secretary, and a judge.
662
 
Members did not usually have training in religious matters. Further, since they had other full-
time jobs and commitments, commission members had little time to devote to educating 
themselves on these issues, and often little desire to do so. Some republics did host seminars 
for commission members to provide guidance and instruction.
663
 Even with training for 
members, however, the commissions proved a crude instrument for a complex religious 
policy based on distinguishing between various religious denominations and between leaders 
and ordinary believers.   
Two reports from different districts in the Komi republic show both the positive and 
negative aspects of the commissions. In the city of Syktyvkar, the republic‘s capital, the 
commission, in existence since 1962, was chaired by the head of the city soviet and included 
members from the police, Party and Komsomol organizations, cultural workers, and 
pensioners. CRA reports praised the members‘ strong working knowledge both of the laws 
governing religious organizations and the responsibilities of the commission. Members met 
once a month to set goals and assign specific tasks. For example, one person took on the task 
of visiting a Baptist prayer service, another of monitoring a baptism, and another of 
surveilling the homes of True Orthodox Christians to identify meeting places. The 
commission members then prepared reports on their work and kept a log of their activities 
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and findings. This allowed the city soviet to respond to violations in a timely and efficient 
fashion and made Syktyvkar‘s efforts a model of exemplary work in the late 1960s. A 1969 
CRA memo gave suggestions to commissions, and much of what it advocated mirrored the 
Syktyvkar example.
664
 
In contrast, Kniazpogostsk district in Komi offers a more typical example of 
commission work. A late 1960s report characterized the local commission as marked by 
indifference and a conciliatory attitude toward religious groups. Its members had no 
familiarity with the local religious situation nor with the relevant laws; they did not even 
have a full understanding of their own responsibilities as commission members. While the 
Syktyvkar commission‘s surveillance work had identified several violations of the law, the 
Kniazpogostsk district commission had provided no useful information to the district soviet. 
The soviet, in turn, had not issued a single fine against believers for more than two years.
665
 
 Yet examples from even the most zealous control commissions like Syktyvkar 
demonstrate the limits of their effectiveness in preventing Witness activities. A 1972 report 
from Kirgizia stated that local commissions established watches over the most common 
meeting spots of unregistered religious groups on three selected days of the week. Atheists, 
teachers, Komsomol members, and local soviet deputies participated in this ―guard duty‖ 
outside the homes of believers. They immediately documented attempts at illegal gatherings 
so that the local soviet could issue fines or other sanctions to the meetings‘ hosts and 
organizers. As a result of these measures, 62 individuals faced administrative hearings in 
1971, and 130 in the first nine months of 1972. These figures impressed officials, who did 
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not take into account the specific nature of Witness study circles, which generally occurred 
only in small groups and often in the middle of the night. Witnesses met in this fashion 
several times each week at different locations. Put in this context, Kirgizia officials had 
clearly identified only a small fraction of the total meetings held during that period.  
In short, state efforts could hope to reduce but not prevent illegal religious worship by 
Witnesses because no locality had the time or personnel needed to stop every meeting.
666
 On 
the most basic level, Witnesses had greater incentive to try new strategies to circumvent the 
law and surveillance than the part-time commission members had to stop these actions. The 
commissions represented one aspect of a losing battle between Witnesses and a state that 
increasingly only went through the motions of enforcing its antireligious policies. 
 
Religious Dissent under Brezhnev 
 In the post-Khrushchev era, Witnesses no longer faced the same scale of trials and 
arrests that they had under the two previous Soviet leaders. Under Brezhnev, courts 
convicted as many as a few hundred Witnesses a year for evasion of military service. More 
commonly, local soviets issued hundreds of fines every year for illegal baptisms and home 
Bible studies. Yet trials for illegal religious activities and for proselytism numbered only a 
few dozen each year during this period. For its part, the Watch Tower organization has noted 
the decreasing number of criminal cases against, and milder sentences of, Soviet Witnesses 
in the 1970s.
667
 This shift reflected a more general decline in arrests of believers in the 
Brezhnev era.  
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Still, criminal investigations and convictions remained a feature of Witness life, albeit 
of a smaller magnitude. Reviews conducted by the Ministry of Justice and the legal 
department of the CRA identified serious shortcomings in how the state applied criminal 
statutes to religious believers. A 1974 review of cases by the Ministry of Justice, for 
example, found that some trials lacked concrete evidence or charges. Courts frequently relied 
almost entirely on a religious group‘s lack of registration, which judges interpreted as 
meaning that the religion was banned in the USSR.
668
 The 1974 review apparently did not 
eliminate such errors, as a 1976 CRA memo repeated the same complaint, citing a case in 
Odessa oblast in which the prosecutor called the Witnesses ―banned by Soviet law.‖669 The 
CRA clarified that no such ban existed and that some religions simply had not met the 
criteria for registration. Another CRA memo criticized the 1981 trial of two Witnesses in 
Donets‘k oblast. In this case, the court had not seriously reviewed the confiscated religious 
literature, including the Bible, before declaring it anti-Soviet. The defendants received a new 
trial, which resulted in a second conviction.
670
 
At the same time, the period saw the rise of a dissident movement within the Soviet 
Union and a subsequent crackdown on dissent by the state. The Party instituted a process of 
partial re-Stalinization defined in part by the state‘s harsh treatment of those who questioned 
the existing system and the official ideology. In 1965, the KGB arrested two prominent 
writers, Andrei Siniavskii and Yulii Daniel‘, for publishing their works abroad. The trial and 
resultant protests from Soviet intellectuals gave rise to a burgeoning dissident movement. 
Participants circulated samizdat (self-published manuscripts) among themselves, met to 
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discuss political issues, and, increasingly in later years, challenged the Soviet state on its 
human rights record both internally and by leaking information to the foreign media. 
 The history of the Witnesses provides a new perspective on Brezhnev-era political 
dissent. Scholars have largely focused on intellectual dissent in this period, while not 
sufficiently including religious communities in discussions. Religious scholar Michael 
Bourdeaux notes in his 1990 work on glasnost that ―while no one would assert that Christian 
protest was the sole motivator of an emergent human rights movement, it unquestionably 
played a role which academic research, even to this day, has never fully acknowledged.‖ 
Bourdeaux focuses primarily on Christian protest movements in the Soviet Union, which the 
Witnesses did not engage in and, in fact, rejected. Yet Soviet Witnesses carried out many of 
the same illegal activities as other underground religious and dissident networks.
671
 Much of 
what dissidents did in the late 1960s and 1970s mirrored what Witnesses had done since their 
arrival in the Soviet Union after World War II. Underground printing presses, illegal 
literature circulation, secret meetings, and the smuggling out of information abroad had all 
been undertaken by Witnesses, and on a much larger scale, decades prior. In fact, illegal 
religious groups such as the Witnesses represented one of the largest, most organized and 
active body of dissenters in the postwar Soviet Union. 
By privileging the stories of intellectual elites and urban populations, the historical 
narrative has lost sight of the importance of largely rural and often uneducated religious 
believers in challenging a hegemonic Soviet ideology and identity. A case in point, scholar 
Robert Hornsby defines ―political dissent‖ as ―acts of protest and criticism that were not 
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predicated on national or religious feeling.‖672 The distinction between different types of 
dissent is necessary, but excluding religion ignores the fact that the Soviet state saw actions 
by unregistered religious groups such as the Witnesses as political, anti-Soviet behavior, and 
not merely as illegal religious activity. 
In this regard, it is not surprising that believers and dissidents often faced the same 
fate in the Soviet system. Like believers, many dissidents suffered police surveillance and 
harassment, and occasionally criminal prosecution or exile. The state employed psychiatric 
hospitals as a means to discredit and isolate both groups.
673
 The use of asylums, rather than to 
prisons, provided the state with cover for its repressive actions. Such measures were taken 
against at least a few Witnesses, although it does not appear to have been a common 
occurrence.
674
 To note one example, the state committed Pavlo Rurak to a psychiatric 
hospital after his third arrest for illegal religious activities in the early 1980s. Pavlo recalled 
the hospital‘s filthy conditions and lack of adequate food, water, and shower facilities. Few 
of the patients had legitimate mental illnesses. Pavlo was the first religious believer the 
hospital administrator had seen. Perhaps for that reason, the man took pity on Pavlo and 
spared him any treatment. After a month, he returned Pavlo to the regular camp system.
675
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Frustrated with continued repression, some religious communities petitioned the state 
in massive numbers for exit visas to leave the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era. In 
particular, the Jewish cause garnered international support and put pressure on the Soviet 
state. The United States Congress added an amendment to the 1974 trade bill tying the right 
to religious emigration to US-Soviet trade relations. Four years later, a group of Siberian 
Pentecostals rushed into the US Embassy and refused to leave until granted asylum abroad. 
They remained at the embassy for almost five years.
676
 These events strained Soviet relations 
with the West, and with the United States in particular. The Witnesses, however, expressed 
no desire to emigrate. In their minds, they still had communities to nourish and preaching to 
do among the local non-Witness population. Unlike other religions, they had little hope that 
relocation to a new country would put an end to their repression. Further, while many 
Protestant religious organizations worked together during this period to publicize Soviet 
religious repression, the Witnesses remained peripheral to these efforts due to their rejection 
of any ecumenical cooperation.  
The Watch Tower organization‘s stance on secular government limited the immediate 
impact of the Helsinki Accords and the international human rights movement on its Soviet 
communities. In 1975, the Soviet Union signed the accords, which promised to respect basic 
human rights, including the right to freedom of conscience, for all citizens. Theoretically, the 
Soviet state already guaranteed these rights through its constitution. As political scientist 
Mike Bowker writes, ―Helsinki simply gave the dissidents another opportunity to highlight to 
the outside world the cavalier attitude of their leaders towards the law.‖677 The Witnesses, 
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however, viewed Helsinki less as an opportunity, and more as another example of how 
governments have mistakenly tried to create a just, peaceful society without God‘s 
intervention. They also saw in the conference a fulfillment of biblical prophecy. A 1975 
Watchtower article stated:  
But the greatest significance of this conference is that it is one more evidence of the 
truthfulness of Jehovah God‘s prophetic Word, the Bible. Nineteen hundred years ago 
God inspired the apostle Paul to write that the day would come when the nations 
would, not only talk of their dire need for ―peace and security,‖ but reach the point 
where they could claim that they had attained it for all the earth.
678
 
 
Thus, where dissidents saw an opening to put pressure on the Soviet state to respect human 
rights, Witnesses saw proof of Jehovah‘s plan to wipe out secular government.  
 As a result, the language of international human rights that emerged from Helsinki 
did not play the same important role for the Witnesses as it did for other dissenting groups in 
the Soviet Union. In general, the Witnesses have historically had a complex relationship with 
international organizations. Official Witness doctrine holds the UN, and its predecessor, the 
League of Nations, to be the ―wild beast‖ described in Revelation, a demonic figure who 
controls world governments and who will be destroyed in Armageddon.
679
 In more recent 
years, the Watch Tower organization has cooperated with the UN to protect its rights to 
freedom of conscience worldwide. Still, the organization‘s hostility to international efforts 
for peace and security have limited media attention or outside support for its struggle for 
religious freedom. For example, a 1985 Helsinki Watch report detailed cases of religious 
repression in the Soviet Union, but only mentioned the Witnesses in passing, despite many 
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arrests and trials of Witnesses in the preceding year.
680
 Academic and popular works on 
Christian religious repression also had little to say about the Witnesses.
681
 Ironically, this 
only solidified the Witnesses‘ own sense of separation from the secular world and from other 
Christian denominations.
682
  
  
Damage Control in the Wake of the Great Schism 
 While international human rights rhetoric and the rise of the dissident movement did 
have a strong immediate impact on the Witnesses, the 1970s did see important changes to the 
Soviet Witness organization. Under Knorr‘s continued tenure as president, the Watch Tower 
Bible and Tract Society introduced a series of measures intended to replace one-man 
leadership with committee control at various levels of the administration. At the highest 
level, the organization in 1971 instituted rule by a committee known as the Governing Body, 
reducing the power of the appointed president.
683
 In 1976, the Governing Body further 
subdivided its oversight by creating several sub-committees and investing them with 
significant responsibilities.
684
 The position of president still existed, but the Governing Body 
controlled most of the decision-making process. The chairmanship rotated on a yearly basis. 
After Knorr died in 1977, Franz, his vice president, served as president until 1992.
685
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The decline in police repression by the late 1960s made contact between the Soviet 
Witness leadership and Brooklyn more regular and less dangerous. Communication between 
the two parties was sufficiently well established to allow for greater Governing Body 
oversight of the Soviet Witnesses. Expanding on the top-level reforms, the Governing Body 
in 1972 announced a new ―elder arrangement‖ that would allow a body of elders, rather than 
a single elder, to oversee congregations. To implement the new policy, Brooklyn directed the 
Soviet country committee to send lists of recommendations for new appointments of 
members to leadership positions. The organization, albeit with some apprehension due to 
fears of police interception, did as requested, successfully instituting the new system without 
the state‘s discovery.686 More elders meant more responsible members who could oversee 
activities and ensure uniformity in beliefs and practices across the Soviet Union. 
Similar changes on the national level further distributed responsibility to more 
individuals and took pressure off the leaders. In 1971, Mykhailo Dasevych assumed the 
position of country servant. He and the other committee members took advantage of the 
increased freedom of movement that came with the end of special exile in 1965. They 
traveled across the Soviet Union, visiting individual congregations, meeting with appointed 
elders, and networking with foreign couriers, who brought in literature and information from 
abroad while visiting family or acting as tourists.
687
 In 1976, the Governing Body introduced 
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modifications in the worldwide administrative structure, eliminating the previous system of 
having a single country servant in charge of each branch and replacing it with rule by 
committee.
688
  
The new country committee, chosen by the international leadership in Brooklyn, 
included three members from Ukraine, two from Russia, and one from Kazakhstan. This 
geographic diversity was in part a natural outgrowth of the organization‘s expansion in the 
Soviet Union. It also reflected a renewed sense of confidence after the schism had 
undermined unity across far-flung territories. The new committee, in part because its 
members did not live in the same location, showed a greater ability to prevent detection, 
elude arrests, and maintain leadership stability, a feat previously not achieved by Soviet 
Witnesses. The careful oversight of the Dasevych committee avoided a repeat of the 
devastation brought on by massive arrests in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. Indeed, if 
Soviet anti-Witness propaganda continued to denounce the early Witness leaders by name, it 
had no such information on the current leaders, a fact that was never acknowledged publicly.  
The administrative restructuring notwithstanding, the Witnesses continued to use 
underground printing presses to duplicate literature, incorporating more advanced methods to 
make this work more efficient.
689
 For example, more modern presses printed on both sides of 
the paper simultaneously, doubling the speed of operation.
690
 Microfilm made smuggling 
literature into the Soviet Union a simpler task, since it was much smaller in size than printed 
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publications and thus harder for police to detect.
691
 By the 1970s, cassette recordings of 
religious speeches also appeared more frequently, allowing talks by elders to circulate 
through the Soviet Union.
692
 Overall, the Witnesses largely refined their time-tested methods, 
which had served them well since the Stalin era.  
 
Conclusion 
 Remembering all he suffered in the late Soviet era, one Moldavian Witness summed 
up the battle between Witnesses and the Soviet state as follows: ―Khrushchev died a long 
time ago and his plan is over, but the Jehovah‘s Witnesses have made wonderful progress in 
this country thanks to Jehovah‘s blessing.‖693 That state had intended to rapidly eliminate 
religious belief through a combination of coercion and persuasion, but for several reasons it 
proved incapable of accomplishing this task. First, even aggressive Stalin-era methods of 
police repression had failed to crush the Witness organization. Certainly, the more limited 
coercive tactics under Khrushchev and Brezhnev could not possibly achieve better results in 
this regard. Second, the state repeatedly underestimated the tenacity of religious belief, 
particularly among unregistered religious groups. ―Divide and conquer‖ strategies certainly 
weakened the Witness organization, but the state did not account for the ability of Witnesses 
to adapt to and overcome such challenges. Third, the continued use of coercion strengthened 
the Witnesses‘ beliefs, affirming that they had been singled out as true Christians by an 
ungodly and demonic state.  With each passing year, the survival and even growth of 
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Witnesses confirmed for members that Jehovah had not deserted his people and that they 
would outlast the Soviet state. 
 Further, the remarkable achievements of the Witnesses in creating a well-structured 
underground organization demonstrate the limits of the Soviet state‘s ability to quash dissent 
and create a unified citizenry. The Witness organization was unparalleled in the scope of its 
illegal activities, its active membership base, and its hierarchical structure, not only among 
other religious groups, but in Soviet society as a whole. Yet because it did not have the 
strong international presence and media attention that the dissident movement and mainline 
Christian and Jewish religious organizations gained, its history has been overlooked in 
scholarship. Watch Tower publications have publicized the organization‘s history of Soviet 
repression, but this literature is not widely read by non-Witnesses.
694
 Certainly, the Witnesses 
never represented more than a small fraction of Soviet religious believers, but they were 
tried, exiled, and harassed in numbers well out of proportion to their size. The Soviet state 
consistently referred to them as the most hostile and fanatic religious group, and responded 
accordingly to this perceived threat.
695
 Historians Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin 
have referred to the ―Jehovist obsession‖ among KGB officers as a ―supreme example of 
their lack of any sense of proportion when dealing with even the most insignificant forms of 
dissent.‖ I suggest, in contrast, that the Witnesses represented a very real danger to the Soviet 
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Union by undermining state control and showing that if they were willing to face the 
consequences, Soviet citizens could construct communities outside of the law and the official 
ideology.
696
 
 Recent debates on the overall influence of the dissident movement on Soviet society 
and on later reform efforts under Gorbachev shed further light on this matter. Some scholars 
have argued that the role of the dissidents has been overemphasized, while more conformist 
forces for reform have been overlooked or downplayed. As historian Mark Sandle notes, 
neither the experiences of the dissidents nor of the shestidesiatniki (1960s-ers) can ―be 
assumed to be representative of Soviet society as a whole.‖697 In reality, both, like the 
Witnesses, encompassed only a small percentage of the population. Historians might 
consider this fact when addressing the impact of religious minorities. Their importance is not 
necessarily in their numbers, but in how their actions and ideas challenged state and society. 
 In short, the Witnesses‘ history demonstrates that religious believers, particularly 
those in unregistered organizations, formed a major component of Soviet society that did not 
conform to official ideology or state laws. They ordered their lives according to religious 
principles and broke the law when obeying it would violate their faith. Well after the 
dismantlement of the Gulag and special exile systems, Witnesses and other religious 
dissenters continued to be tried and convicted, forming a large part of the remaining political 
prisoner population in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. Their stalwart resistance hindered efforts 
to create a cohesive society advancing toward communism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WITNESS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
 
“Watch your life and doctrine closely. Persevere in them, because if you do, you will save 
both yourself and your hearers.” 1 Timothy 4:16. 
 
“We are therefore Christ‟s ambassadors, as though God were making his appeal through 
us.” 2 Corinthians 5:20. 
 
 Soviet Witnesses struggled to maintain their basic beliefs and practices despite 
changing conditions. They had lived under multiple regimes, changed citizenships, resettled 
in new regions, and seen their communities scattered throughout the Soviet interior. By the 
1950s, some Witnesses had served time under two or three different states. As one Witness 
declared in court, answering charges of treason: ―I was born in Ukraine under the 
Czechoslovakian government and later lived under the rule of Hungary; now the Soviet 
Union has come into our territory, and I am a Romanian by nationality. Which motherland 
did I betray?‖698 This sustained persecution reinforced Witnesses‘ belief that true Christians 
could expect no favors from secular authorities hostile to Jehovah and Christ‘s millennial 
kingdom. Holding true to their faith offered a contrast to the instability surrounding them.  
  Arrests and special exile had transformed the western borderland communities of 
Witnesses into a disparate network of congregations spread throughout the Soviet interior 
and peripheries. Yet even in these new territories Witnesses continued to gather in small 
groups to read the Bible and talk about their faith. They found new converts, raised their 
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children in the religion, and held baptisms to welcome members into the faith. They kept 
themselves separate from secular society and local government as much as possible.   
 The Witnesses‘ ―neutrality‖ on political matters did not mean, however, that they 
lived without regard for the world around them. Even if they had desired to do so, this was 
not a viable option. Their children attended state-run schools, while the adults worked on 
collective farms and in Soviet industry. They lived side by side with their largely secular 
comrades, shopping at the same stores, riding the same buses, and walking the same streets. 
Their call to spread their faith required them to engage with their neighbors, to speak to them 
about their beliefs, and to endeavor to win them over to their religion. In turn, the state, along 
with Party activists, felt compelled to reach out to these communities, attempting their own 
brand of proselytism for the cause of scientific atheism and communist ideology.  
 Thus the Witnesses interacted and collided with the Party-state and Soviet society. 
The Witnesses‘ understanding of Soviet power and modern society came from biblical 
interpretation and prophecy as described in official Watch Tower literature. Their views and 
actions, in turn, shaped the prevailing Soviet discourse about their religion. Neither side 
recognized compromise or coexistence as a long term solution, since each saw the total 
destruction of the other as a necessary precursor to the triumph of its ideology, either through 
the achievement of communism or the establishment of Christ‘s kingdom. This chapter will 
explore both the daily lived experiences of Witnesses after 1953 and the Witnesses‘ evolving 
views on communism, world peace, persecution, and Soviet power.  
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The Geography of Witness Life 
Massive dislocations of Witnesses since World War II created communities of 
believers well beyond the western borderlands. Significant numbers of Witnesses now lived 
in special settlements in Kurgan, Tomsk, and Irkutsk oblasts. Even after exile conditions 
ended, some chose to stay in their adopted homelands, making them major centers of Witness 
life through the end of the Soviet Union. Forced labor camps in Siberia and Central Asia also 
held many Witnesses, who often settled close to their former places of imprisonment upon 
release. In Kazakhstan, for example, Witnesses settled in Karaganda and Dzhezkazgan after 
being released from nearby labor camps.
699
 Still others moved to new regions of Ukraine and 
Moldavia, establishing small groups in Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs‘k, Crimea, 
Kirovohrad, Donets‘k, and Cherkasy oblasts.700 These communities, once created, attracted 
additional Witness settlers who felt assured that they would have access to literature and 
Bible studies.
701
  
The conditions of the 1965 release from special exile further encouraged the 
dispersion of Witnesses throughout the Soviet Union. While the decree restored freedom of 
movement to Witnesses, it did not guarantee them the right of return to the western 
borderlands. Even those who did obtain state approval to return to their native villages found 
it nearly impossible to convince local authorities to register them. Officials in other regions 
refused to register Witnesses as well, leaving some with no choice but to lead a fairly 
                                                 
699
 Artem‘ev, Svideteli Iegovy, 42. The KGB in Kazakhstan noted a growth in Witnesses in Karaganda oblast as 
early as 1956 when many recently released Witnesses began preaching among the local population. RGANI, f. 
5, op. 33, d. 190, ll. 15-18, 37-46. 
 
700
 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 4704, ark. 10-12. 
 
701
 Alexandru Guriţă, for example, settled in a village in Kazakhstan near the Uzbekistan border in part because 
there were already other Witnesses there who had established a congregation and had a steady supply of 
literature. Guriţă, interview. 
 
 225 
itinerant existence. For instance, one Moldavian family, exiled in 1949 to Kurgan oblast, 
moved several times before finally establishing a permanent home in Kazakhstan among the 
growing community in Chimkent oblast.
702
 Another Witness couple lived in nine different 
locations after leaving the Tomsk special settlement, unable to acquire permanent 
possessions because they were always on the move.
703
 Similar obstacles awaited Witnesses 
returning home from labor camps. One man lodged a complaint with the CRA alleging that 
local authorities refused to allow him to return to his home village in Moldavia upon his 
release from a camp in Kazakhstan.
704
  
Further, because the Witnesses saw the 1965 decree as an opportunity to preach their 
faith in new lands and among new peoples, many families and individuals relocated in order 
to bring the faith to Soviet citizens who had never heard its message. The 1967 Yearbook 
report proclaimed that ―the name Siberia, in fact, has lost its terror for our brothers and to 
many it has become a cherished territory assignment.‖705 Kazakhstan CRA officials noted the 
arrival of a formerly imprisoned Witness leader in the city of Leninogorsk in 1978 who 
quickly began gathering a small group of believers to meet in his apartment. When 
questioned by the authorities as to why he moved to the region, he said that the cost of living 
was lower and life calmer in Kazakhstan, while nonetheless admitting he had already 
converted several local residents.
706
 Another man and his wife, denied the right to return 
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home, used this chance to serve as full-time ―pioneers,‖ or missionaries, preaching the faith 
in Central Asia until the late 1980s.
707
 
In short, by the late 1960s, there were hundreds of Witnesses in southern Russia 
(Krasnodar and Stavropol‘ regions and North Ossetia), northern Russia (Komi republic), and 
in Siberia and the Urals (Tomsk, Irkutsk, Kurgan, and Altai regions). Sizeable communities 
had also sprung up in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. A KGB report from 1964 detailed the 
Witnesses‘ growth in Central Asia, including more than 300 Witnesses in Kirgizia. The other 
Central Asian republics had a much more limited Witness presence, restricted to a few 
families or individuals.
708
 All of this new growth was in addition to the longstanding and 
expanding Moldavian and Ukrainian communities. 
 Witness migration throughout the Soviet Union took place around the same time that 
the Soviet government began a concerted effort to identify religious associations and 
believers. In March 1961, by joint decree of the TsK and the Council of Ministers, the CRCA 
and CROCA began the complex process of quantifying religious belief in the Soviet 
Union.
709
 The government charged the two councils with cataloguing all religious 
associations, both registered and unregistered, by region and republic. Each religious 
association (defined as having at least twenty members) and religious group (having less than 
twenty members) was entered as a distinct unit. When possible, commissioners also 
identified the exact number of members and any known leaders.
710
 Oblast council 
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commissioners collected this information using their own records and data supplied by police 
and local soviets. The state made it clear that the councils should keep the public and 
religious communities entirely unaware of these efforts. It instructed commissioners to 
restrict the circle of persons informed about this task to a bare minimum. In a 1966 interview 
with the Soviet press, CRA chairman Vladimir Kuroedov publicly denied that the USSR kept 
track of the number of believers, citing the state‘s respect for freedom of conscience.711 The 
secretive nature of the effort presented a challenge to commissioners, who could not appeal 
to the pastors and priests of registered churches for accurate estimates of membership.
712
 
 In its inaugural year, the two councils identified 10,910 religious associations or 
groups in the Soviet Union, of which only 4,424 were registered with the state. The data 
shows that ―Jehovists‖ existed in 47 oblasts and krais, with 607 associations and groups, 
15,214 members, and 454 leaders. The breakdown of members by republic included 6,149 in 
the RSFSR, 6,957 in Ukraine, 1,425 in Moldavia, 286 in Kazakhstan, and 377 in Kirgizia, 
with small groups scattered throughout the remaining union republics. The statistics also 
reflected the continued concentration of leadership in the western borderlands, with 288 of 
the 454 leaders in Ukraine and Moldavia alone.
713
  
 In the following years, the database charted the slow, but steady growth in the 
Witness organization through the mid-1980s. By 1965, it had a reported 16,700 members.
714
 
Five years later, that figure had risen to 18,906 members, with 4,919 in the RSFSR; 10,500 in 
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Ukraine; 2,212 in Moldavia; 643 in Kazakhstan; and 360 in Kirgizia.
715
 This included 
increases both in and outside of the western borderlands. For example, Krasnoiar krai had 
248 members in 1965, and 370 in 1975. Stavropol‘ krai, which listed almost no Witnesses in 
1965, had 1,200 members ten years later. In Ukraine, with the highest density of Witnesses, 
the religion grew in Zakarpattia oblast from 3,045 to 3,914 members, and in Ivano-
Frankivs‘k oblast from 1,679 to 1,812.716 By 1977, the CRA reported over 22,000 Witnesses, 
with an estimated 3,349 in Moldavia and 12,449 in Ukraine.
717
 In 1985, the last year that 
comprehensive statistics are available from the archives, the CRA reported a total of roughly 
27,000 Witnesses, with 1,381 members in Kazakhstan, 690 in Kirgizia, 4,100 in Moldavia, 
13,271 in Ukraine, and 6,695 in the RSFSR. It also identified small groups in Lithuania, 
Estonia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Georgia. In Ukraine alone, there were 3,381 Witnesses 
in Zakarpattia oblast, 2,152 in L‘viv oblast, 1,506 in Chernivtsi oblast, and 1,910 in Ivano-
Frankivs'k oblast.
718
  
The data on religious membership laid bare the problem posed by relatively minor 
groups such as the Witnesses. While Witnesses made up a small fraction of total Soviet 
believers, they were one of the largest unregistered religious organizations. In western 
Ukraine, they dwarfed all other unregistered groups and were second only to Pentecostals for 
Ukraine as a whole.
719
 For example, Zakarpattia oblast in 1974 had 146 unregistered 
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religious associations with 5,334 total members. Of these, 90 associations and 3,892 persons 
were Witnesses. The next biggest group was the Pentecostals with 32 associations and 707 
members.
720
 The situation was similar in L‘viv oblast.721 By 1980, the region had more than 
2,000 Witnesses, with only 600 unregistered Pentecostals and 250 unregistered Baptists in 
comparison.
722
 In general, the inclusion of unregistered groups in the data highlighted the 
high percentage of religious activity occurring outside of state norms and control. It also 
demonstrated the diversity of religious belief across the Soviet Union and identified hot spots 
of religious activity. The percentage of Moldavians belonging to religious sects was roughly 
five times the Soviet Union‘s average.723 More broadly, religious life, and unregistered 
religious groups in particular, existed disproportionately on the periphery of Soviet power in 
regions far from the metropoles of Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
The post-Stalin push to show concrete results from antireligious agitation and 
propaganda led some CRCA officials to underreport religious membership even prior to the 
1961 all-union database. A 1957 CRCA memo criticized the L‘viv CRCA for listing only a 
handful of ―Jehovists‖ in its report. The CRCA commissioner noted that these figures ―raise 
serious doubts as to the accuracy of such assertions,‖ calling the numbers ―unlikely.‖ 724 This 
problem persisted throughout the late Soviet era. In 1980, the Moldavian CRA commissioner 
admitted to having trouble tabulating exact counts of Witnesses, with figures ranging from 
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four to six thousand members. He found that some districts had provided inaccurate data, 
hoping not to ―spoil their statistics.‖725 With an increased drive to eliminate unregistered 
groups by the late 1970s and early 1980s, oblast CRA personnel often combed their rolls for 
groups of Witnesses they could argue no longer functioned and did not need to appear in the 
official data collection. As a result, CRA commissioners regularly requested that an 
unregistered group of Witnesses be removed from the official charts, claiming it was no 
longer active.
726
 
 Even beyond willful tampering with the statistics, surveys of unregistered religious 
associations such as the Witnesses suffered from poor and inaccurate reporting. The 1961 
instructions to commissioners acknowledged the inherent difficulty of identifying 
communities and members who make a concerted effort to remain hidden from state 
authorities.
727
 Indeed, while commissioners had relatively easy access to basic information 
on registered churches, including baptism records, they had no such window into Witness 
life. The mobility of Witnesses made this task even more demanding. Responding to the poor 
quality of reporting in 1975, the Kazakhstan CRA complained that some regions did not 
accurately describe the level of religiosity in their areas, primarily in regard to unregistered 
groups. It criticized several regions in particular for poor reporting on ―Jehovists.‖728 This 
memo points to another basic problem: the lack of distinction between Witnesses and the 
Orthodox sect of Il‘inists. Only a few regional and republic-level CRCA branch offices 
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distinguished between the two religions in their reports. Even then, both types of ―Jehovist‖ 
data were often grouped into one category at the all-union level. The 1973 CRA report did 
include separate lists for both groups, suggesting that Il‘inists did not make up a significant 
portion of ―Jehovist‖ believers. It identified only 500 Il‘inists, compared with an estimated 
20,000 to 22,000 Witnesses.
729
  
CRCA and CRA data sometimes contradicted reports from the security organs. A 
1963 letter to all oblast CRCA commissioners in Ukraine noted with frustration that the data 
supplied by these branch offices bore little resemblance to information given by the KGB. It 
cited substantial discrepancies in accounting for the ―Jehovists,‖ which cast doubt on the 
accuracy of CRCA information on this organization. The memo asked commissioners to 
work more closely with their regional KGB offices to clarify statistical data and provide 
more accurate reports.
730
 On a similar note, while the CRA counted 2,796 members in 1974 
for Zakarpattia oblast, the KGB estimated roughly 6,500 members, a huge discrepancy in 
numbers.
731
  
The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society kept its own tallies of its members in the 
Soviet Union using smuggled-out reports from the country committee. The 1962 Yearbook, 
for example, highlighted a ―marked decrease‖ in active members for the prior year, but 
suggested that the reason for the lower figure might be that not all reports made it to 
Brooklyn.
732
 To shield Soviet bloc members from state persecution, the organization did not 
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publish individual country statistics in its yearbooks. Instead, it printed the sum total of all 
members in countries where Witnesses had no legal status as a single statistic.
733
 As a result, 
it is impossible to tally data specific to the Soviet Union for this period. However, post-
Soviet publications have estimated the Soviet membership of the Witnesses at roughly 
45,000 members by 1991.
734
 This figure is much higher than the 25,000 members identified 
by the state five years earlier. 
A final reason for official underreporting of Witnesses stems from the difference in 
how the organization and the religious councils defined ―members.‖ For the CROCA and 
CRA, membership denoted an adult who had presumably undergone baptism, and thus their 
definition did not include children and youth. In fact, Witnesses do not have an age 
requirement for baptism into the faith, allowing minors with sufficient maturity to make this 
commitment. Since children and youth were a substantial portion of Witness communities, 
this distinction was of major importance in tallying members. For example, the Zakarpattia 
oblast CRA estimated in 1975 that there were 720 children under the age of 3; 3,998 children 
ages 3 to 7; and 2,256 school-age children in Witness families.
735
 The youth factor may have 
been the biggest reason for the gap in actual membership and official statistics. The official 
tallies also did not include unbaptized members who nonetheless adhered to the religion‘s 
beliefs and practices. 
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 The Khrushchev era also gave rise to a second form of cataloguing religious belief, 
shedding light on the demographics of religious communities such as the Witnesses. William 
C. Fletcher has noted that heightened scholarly attention to religion beginning in the 
Khrushchev era led to the steady growth of studies on the ―the sociology of religion,‖ which 
encouraged field research on religious believers.
736
 This trend resulted in numerous opinion 
polls among Witnesses to gauge not only their beliefs, but also their attitudes toward the 
Soviet state. Equally important, the data provided a snapshot of the social makeup of Witness 
communities. The bulk of this research was conducted in Moldavia and Ukraine with the 
oldest Witness communities in the Soviet Union. The relatively high concentration of 
Witnesses in rural areas in these regions made them especially attractive to researchers. The 
overall strength of Christian sectarianism in the western republics also allowed scholars to 
survey several religious communities in a single area and to compare the various groups.  
Although the studies focused heavily on quantifying beliefs and practices, the data are 
perhaps most useful in providing basic demographic information on the Witnesses. Unlike 
subjective matters of faith and worship, questions regarding educational level, age, gender, 
and class were less vulnerable to survey bias. That said, this type of data also served an 
ideological purpose by supporting the official depiction of believers as generally poorly 
educated, elderly, and female. 
On the most basic level, many surveys attempted to prove quantitatively the Soviet 
trope that religious belief and ignorance went hand in hand. A 1965 monograph cited data 
that more than 80 percent of sectarians were barely literate or illiterate, while a 1969 work 
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quoted a Moldavian study that found low levels of literacy among 78 percent of Witnesses.
737
 
A subsequent study of Moldavian Witnesses by the Moldavian Academy of Sciences 
concluded that a majority of the organization‘s leaders had only a basic education (four 
years), while just 4 percent had a secondary or technical education.
738
  
Given the low education levels of Witnesses surveyed, it is not surprising that 
research revealed a concentration of Witnesses in unskilled farm and industrial labor. The 
aging population of Witnesses in Ukraine meant that many members were pensioners who no 
longer worked. A 1971 study of 1,510 Witnesses in Ivano-Frankivs‘k oblast found that 
among male members, roughly 75 percent worked at unskilled jobs in industry or on 
collective farms, while the rest were pensioners or unemployed. For women, roughly 40 
percent worked in these fields, with the rest classified as housewives, pensioners, or 
unemployed. Sixty-six percent of members were 40 to 60 years old. The study highlighted 
these data as evidence of the aging membership of Witnesses in this community.
739
 
The CRA also collected demographic information on religious believers. A detailed 
report from the Irkutsk oblast CRA in 1969 described the Witnesses upon their arrival to the 
region in 1951. Largely illiterate or semi-literate, few had any specialized skills, with most 
working in unskilled, low-paying jobs given to special settlers. The report noted that the 
Witnesses‘ generally low levels of education limited their job opportunities. It also observed 
some change over time, with increasing numbers of Witnesses completing an eight-year 
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secondary education in the two decades after their initial settlement in the region.
740
 Still, 
even CRA studies done in the 1980s documented low education and employment skill levels. 
A 1982 CRA report from L‘viv oblast found that less than 1 percent of Witnesses had a 
higher education, and only 15 percent had completed secondary school. Another 30 percent 
had an incomplete secondary education, while 45 percent had only a basic education. Ten 
percent had no formal education at all. In regard to social class, the report listed 30.5 percent 
as laborers, 9.5 percent as collective farm workers, 47 percent as pensioners or unemployed, 
and 2 percent as serving time. The rest were youth and students (10 percent) or white-collar 
workers (1 percent).
741
  
Both CRA and academic sociological studies identified a Witness membership that 
was disproportionately female and rural. In the Ivano-Frankivs‘k study, approximately 34 
percent of members were men.
742
 In a 1982 CRA report on L‘viv oblast, only 39 percent of 
members were men. In general, nearly every study found an imbalance in the gender 
breakdown of members. CRA reports from Ternopil‘ and Chernivtsi oblasts in 1979 stated 
that only 18 percent and 4 percent of surveyed Witnesses lived in urban areas, 
respectively.
743
 Studies revealed that most Witnesses lived in towns and villages, where it 
was easier for them to find employment and support their family with less government 
interference. 
Data from areas with more recent Witness migration sometimes showed a more 
youthful membership. For example, according to a 1976 CRA study done in Krasnoiar krai, 
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11 percent of the 84 members in the city of Abakan were under 20; 29 percent were between 
21 and 31 years of age; 25 percent were between 41 and 50; 14 percent between 51 and 60, 
and 21 percent older than 60.
744
  Similarly, the Odessa community in 1981 had 572 members, 
of which 20 percent were under 20; 12 percent were 30 to 40; 21 percent were 41 to 50; 21 
percent were 51 to 60; and 26 percent were over 60. However, as with statistics for the older 
communities, only 38 percent were men and 58 percent had four years of education or less. 
Still, this data did not include the 119 school-age children or 57 preschool-age children.
745
 
Lastly, CRA statistics reveal the heavy burden of criminal convictions of Witness 
leaders for actions related to their religious activity. Of thirty-one Witness leaders surveyed 
in Odessa oblast in 1979, for example, twenty had criminal records. In comparison, the 
Pentecostals had only two of thirty-nine leaders with prior convictions, and the Baptists only 
two of nineteen leaders.
746
 Similarly, four out of six group leaders in Donets‘k oblast, three 
out of four leaders in Zaporizhzhia oblast, and twenty-one out of forty-four leaders in Ivano-
Frankivs‘k oblast in 1982 had criminal records.747  
Overall, sociological statistics provided a mostly accurate portrait of the demographic 
composition of Witness communities. Indeed, members tended to have a low level of 
education and to work in unskilled industrial or farm labor, or to be of pension age. A 
majority of members were female.  
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Coming Together as a Community 
More so than for other religions in the Soviet Union, the Witnesses‘ beliefs and 
practices required that they gather as a community to maintain their faith. Perhaps no religion 
took the Biblical injunction ―faith without works is dead‖ as seriously as the Witnesses.748 
This passage formed the framework for everything the Witnesses did, from finding new 
converts to coming together for Bible study. While other believers may have found spiritual 
comfort or satisfaction through the Bible and prayer alone, for Witnesses, faith required them 
to share their beliefs with others within and outside of their own community. This led to 
frequent clashes with Soviet authorities, but it also impelled Witnesses to create viable, 
cohesive communities that functioned outside of secular society. 
 Regular meetings formed a central part of how Soviet Witnesses created a sense of 
kinship. In democratic countries during this period, Witnesses gathered as a congregation 
three times a week for five basic functions: theocratic ministry school, service meeting, 
public meeting, study of The Watchtower, and book study. The public meeting and 
Watchtower study were held in tandem, typically on Sunday. The theocratic ministry school 
and service meeting occurred together on a weekday evening. The book study took place on a 
third evening.
749
 The Soviet organization preserved much of this standard format. The 
theocratic ministry school, instituted by President Knorr in 1943 in all congregations 
worldwide, taught members how to preach effectively. Ukrainian Witnesses created their 
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first theocratic ministry schools by the late 1940s, a fact uncovered during a 1951 criminal 
investigation of several members who led these classes in L‘viv oblast.750 This practice 
followed the Witnesses into exile.
751
 Witnesses also implemented the service meeting, which 
used interactive elements, such as short talks or skits, to help members learn to speak about 
their faith to others. A 1969 CRA report noted that Witness children in Stavropol‘ krai gave 
short talks at gatherings and participated in plays on Bible themes, likely in conjunction with 
service meetings.
752
 
Similarly, Soviet Witnesses, like their fellow believers worldwide, used the weekly 
meetings to study Bible-based literature, most importantly The Watchtower. To facilitate this 
practice, book-length publications and The Watchtower contain questions at the bottom of the 
text to guide members. At meetings, the questions are then read aloud, giving members the 
chance to provide answers and elders the opportunity to reinforce the main points of the 
reading. Soviet Witnesses had to grapple with a much more limited supply of literature, 
which likely led to slower, more intensive study of what publications were available in the 
community. This made meetings all the more valuable, as sometimes an entire circle of 
members may have had only a single issue of The Watchtower.
753
  
Some elements of Witness meetings took a different form due to the unique 
conditions of life under Soviet rule. In democratic societies, the public meeting consists of a 
short prepared speech given by an elder. This presented a particular challenge since inviting 
the public to meetings was simply not an option for Soviet Witnesses. It appears that such 
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talks did take place, but without non-member involvement. To help circulate prepared 
speeches among several communities, some elders recorded their talks onto cassette tapes 
that could be played at meetings.
754
  
Worldwide Witness gatherings traditionally include a musical component, limited to 
religious songs from the organization‘s standard songbook, usually sung by the entire 
congregation to open and close meetings. Live orchestras provided instrumental music at 
Witness assemblies until the late 1970s, when the organization largely replaced them with 
tape recordings.
755
 Soviet Witnesses had a strong interest in music and many communities 
developed a more organized repertoire, creating choirs and orchestras to perform at 
weddings, funerals, and other large gatherings.
756
 Fedor Zhitnikov, who later became the first 
head of the Kazakh Witness organization after independence, played drums in his local 
orchestra. His community also had a choir, and both groups played at major events.
757
 Even 
the Mordovian camp had its own Witness choir. One man recalls that the camp officers and 
their wives at times requested songs from them.
758
 
In order to avoid police detection, Witnesses developed multiple strategies to gather 
without provoking undo attention. While most congregations worldwide contain one to two 
hundred members, Soviet Witnesses broke up their congregations into small circles. This 
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allowed them to meet in small groups of less than a dozen members, often all family 
members or neighbors, making it more difficult for police, who could have trouble sorting 
out meetings from familial gatherings.
759
 To further protect members, Witnesses generally 
arrived before dawn or late at night at the designated homes. At a 1975 trial in Stavropol‘ 
krai, former Witnesses testified that meetings generally occurred after dark on short notice, 
and that attendees showed up in intervals in small groups of two to three people. They also 
stated that the organization advised members that, if authorities or unknown people appeared 
at the meeting location, they were to immediately hide, flee, and, if necessary, destroy all 
literature. No one attended meetings until having received clearance from local elders.
760
 
In addition to the weekly meetings, conventions and assemblies offer Witnesses 
worldwide a chance to come together on a larger scale. Since Rutherford‘s tenure, these mass 
events have given the organization a platform to announce the publication of new literature 
and to address changes in doctrine or the administrative structure. Equally important, the 
gatherings provide a specific time and space for the baptism of new members into the 
faith.
761
 In democratic countries during the Soviet era, circuit assemblies (roughly 20 
congregations) met once or twice a year, along with an annual district convention (roughly 
200 congregations). Once every several years, the organization hosted an international 
convention, bringing together hundreds of thousands of members from across the world. It 
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generally held such gatherings at sports stadiums or other large venues.
762
 For example, at the 
Divine Will International Assembly in 1958, more than 250,000 people gathered in and 
around Yankee Stadium and the nearby Polo Grounds.
763
 
Because Soviet Witnesses did not have the luxury of renting out auditoriums and 
stadiums for their members, district conventions, international conventions, and mass 
baptisms were out of the question. Instead, they found ways to skirt the law and official 
notice, hosting smaller-scale assemblies for members. The rural locations of most 
communities proved beneficial in this regard. As they had in the Stalin era, members 
continued to hold meetings in unpopulated, wooded areas outside of their villages. One 1970 
meeting in the forest between two villages in Zakarpattia oblast, for example, drew over 300 
participants. The organization hosted at least a dozen other mass gatherings that year in 
various locations, according to official reports.
764
 In Central Asian communities, Witnesses 
met in mountainous areas or in the steppe.
765
 One woman remembered walking several 
kilometers into the empty Kazakh steppe early in the morning so that she and other believers 
could meet as a community in secret.
766
  
This tactic worked best in isolated areas with low population density, but officials still 
managed to identify and break up many of these gatherings. Witnesses thus relied heavily on 
                                                 
762
 For an overview of these gatherings, see You Can Live Forever, 199-200. For a history of these gatherings, 
see Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Proclaimers, 254-82. 
 
763
 ―The Perfect Ruler for Man‘s Government,‖ The Watchtower Announcing Jehovah‟s Kingdom, February 15, 
1959, 122. 
 
764
 RGANI, f. 5, op. 63, d. 89, l. 275. For another forest meeting incident, see DALO, f. 3, op. 59, spr. 196, ark. 
1-7. 
 
765
 Guriţă, interview. 
 
766
 Artem‘ev, Svideteli Iegovy, 44-45. 
 
 242 
weddings and funerals as a more widespread and reliable method to disguise assemblies. 
These occasions provided cover for Witnesses to convene en masse in plain view of the 
authorities. Some events involved as many as 500 people.
767
 One Witness referred to them as 
―one-day conventions.‖768 A 1960 funeral in Ukraine had over 250 attendees who read 
poems, sang songs, and gave speeches on religious themes. This particular funeral provoked 
the ire of authorities for several reasons: the deceased had not been a known believer, a 
teenager gave one of the speeches, and Party members‘ wives were among the 
participants.
769
  
 Given the large crowds at such celebrations and the overtly religious content of the 
ceremonies, authorities quickly grew wise to the secondary function of these events. One 
woman recalls how, when her father died, the police and local officials came to the home 
seeking information on the funeral and warned the family against singing songs and reciting 
prayers at the event. On the morning of the service, the police arrived just as prayer had 
begun and followed the mourners from the home to the cemetery, where the police then 
attempted to detain the man leading the prayer. The women in attendance created a 
distraction that allowed him to slip away undetected.
770
 Local Moldavian press coverage of a 
1973 Witness wedding remarked that no one drank wine or gave toasts and that the service 
consisted primarily of endless speeches on religious themes.
771
 
                                                 
767
 TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 81, ark. 33-34. 
 
768
 Măcuţă, interview. 
 
769
 TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 4, spr. 283, ark. 174-76. 
 
770
 2002 Yearbook, 208-09. 
 
771
 E. Nani, ―Svad‘ba bez vesel‘ia,‖ Novaia zhizn‟, February 3, 1973, 4. 
 243 
A 1978 report from the Ukrainian CRA advised local officials to be on the alert for 
upcoming weddings in order to prevent such events from turning into religious rallies. The 
memo also suggested that Party organizations send a representative to the gathering to watch 
for possible violations of the law.
772
 A report from Ivano-Frankivs‘k oblast the same year 
demonstrates how this advice worked in practice. The CRA oblast commissioner had 
received information regarding an upcoming wedding between two young Witnesses. To 
strategize a response to the event, local police, the district Party executive committee and the 
prosecutor held a special meeting to work out appropriate measures, setting up voluntary 
patrols and traffic stops along all roads leading to the village on the wedding day. To further 
keep tabs on the celebration, they instructed the chair of the Party committee at the factory 
where the bride worked and one of the groom‘s co-workers to attend the event guised as 
well-wishers. Undoubtedly, the uninvited presence of two Party members did not escape the 
notice of the Witnesses.  
The report from the two wedding crashers provides a detailed portrait of a typical 
Witness wedding. According to Soviet custom and law, the special day began with a trip by 
the bride and groom to the local civil registry office to formally register their marriage. The 
monitors made note of the fact that the couple failed to drink the customary champagne. The 
couple then traveled home to greet the roughly ninety people in attendance. A choir began 
the festivities with a few religious songs, followed by an elder member who opened the 
ceremony with a prayer. He then explained the biblical significance of a Christian wedding to 
those gathered. A second speaker addressed the proper behavior of a husband and his need to 
remain firm in his beliefs, true to his wife, moral, and faithful to Jehovah. The newlyweds 
spoke next, pledging to stay committed to their faith and thanking Jehovah for strengthening 
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their lives. The parents followed, echoing previous sentiments, before the choir resumed, 
followed by four more speeches. After a final prayer, food was served. For several hours, the 
wedding had given this congregation a means to gather and listen to religious speeches 
without interruption, all under the gaze of Party members, who stood by, unable to do 
anything at that time other than document the event.
773
  
Certainly, the state could, and sometimes did, prosecute believers for the illegal use of 
weddings and funerals as religious events. Most frequently, local soviets issued warnings and 
fines to organizers and speakers if officials managed to determine the identities of these 
individuals. This happened in all locales with sizeable Witness communities.
774
 In a few 
instances, Witnesses faced criminal charges on this basis, although typically such incidents 
served as only one element in a larger criminal case for illegal religious activity. The content 
of speeches mattered greatly in determining the state‘s reaction. In one 1986 trial, for 
example, two men from Donets‘k oblast received lengthy sentences after holding multiple 
assemblies of Witnesses in various locations and allegedly giving talks about Armageddon 
and against military service.
775
  
 Unlike many other Soviet citizens, Witnesses did not celebrate birthdays nor religious 
and state holidays, seeing them as pagan traditions incompatible with true Christian worship. 
Indeed, at the trial of one Witness, a neighbor testified that the woman had spotted her 
buying a Christmas tree and told her that this practice was against God‘s wishes.776 This 
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belief extended to state holidays and demonstrations, which Witnesses avoided in order not 
to get involved in any political activity.
777
 The Witnesses‘ only celebration, the Memorial of 
Christ‘s Death, takes place during the Easter season. The event, open to the public in 
democratic countries, consists of religious talks, along with a reenactment of the Last Supper. 
Only members of the 144,00 ―anointed‖ class, the earliest converts to the faith whom the 
Witnesses believe will ascend to heaven, partake of the wine and bread. Since by the postwar 
era, most of these individuals were elderly, and many had died, local Memorial celebrations 
worldwide often did not, and do not include a single person from this select and dwindling 
group. 
Soviet Witnesses made a concerted effort to celebrate this event, albeit on a much 
smaller scale and in secret. One former Witness described a Memorial service he had 
attended where participants gathered after sunset in the locked apartment of one of the 
members. They sang songs, praised God and Christ, and displayed the bread and wine, but 
did not eat or drink them as they had no individuals present from among the 144,000.
778
 At a 
1981 Memorial service in Kirovohrad oblast held late in the evening, Witnesses barred the 
apartment door, preventing police who arrived on the scene from immediately entering the 
home.
779
 Even imprisoned Witnesses struggled to observe this special day. While one 
Witness imprisoned in the Mordovia camp recalled never missing a single Memorial during 
the several years he spent there, others were not so fortunate. One woman, who served time 
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in a camp in Kemerovo oblast, managed to celebrate Memorial only twice during her ten-
year sentence, including one service that was disrupted by camp officials.
780
   
 Owing to lack of information on Witness beliefs and practices, Soviet officials did not 
immediately recognize Memorial as a religious holiday nor take consistent measures to 
combat its celebration. As a result, Memorial services played only a minor role in most 
Soviet antireligious propaganda. A 1964 newspaper article in Zakarpattia oblast by former 
oppositionist leader Potashov explained the ritual, but the event merited little other coverage 
in the press.
781
 Similarly, a 1974 CRA report circulated among commissioners referred to it 
as the Witnesses‘ version of Easter, giving a short description of the practice for its 
personnel.
782
 Only in 1978 did the CRA begin taking serious note of Memorial celebrations. 
Two years later, they began collecting systematic data on its observance.
783
 That year, CRA 
provided local Party, soviet, and police officials advance notice of the event so that they 
could hold meetings with known Witness elders in their areas to warn them against violations 
of the law. As a result, the CRA and local authorities documented dozens of Memorial 
services, resulting in fines and warnings for some elders and organizers.
784
 
 Symbolizing a covenant between God and the individual, baptisms represented an 
additional way for Witnesses to come together as a community and practice their faith. 
Soviet Witnesses continued to perform baptisms in secret as they had in Stalin era. Some 
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took place during the day, hidden among crowds of swimmers in nearby lakes and rivers.
785
 
More commonly, small groups gathered at night for this ritual. Baptism signified an 
individual‘s sincere commitment to the organization. For Soviet Witnesses, this had 
particular resonance as it meant that the individual could be trusted not to betray others to the 
police. Prior to baptism, potential converts often had no access to any religious literature 
other than the Bible. They studied it and learned about the faith through individual meetings 
with another member or an elder. This limited neophytes‘ sphere of contacts within the 
organization and prevented them from giving out information to the police, making 
infiltration more difficult. One Witness, Gheorghe Gorobeţ, recalled that people sometimes 
waited two or three years to be baptized so that the local members could be certain they were 
not KGB infiltrators. He noted that the practice of using only the Bible to teach the faith to 
interested people allowed elders to test a person‘s loyalty to the faith before introducing the 
individual into the broader community.
786
  
Indeed, Witnesses had good reason to be wary of baptizing new members, as elders 
who performed these rituals could suffer fines or criminal prosecution. For example, three 
South Ossetian elders received lengthy sentences in 1961, in part for conducting a nighttime 
baptism of members in a local canal.
787
 Despite the precautionary measures, many trials of 
elders included testimony from former believers about baptisms. A case in point, the 1973 
trial of Witness elders in Crimea included statements from former members about how 
thedefendants had helped to prepare them for their baptisms, which were performed in a local  
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river.
788
  
Former members sometimes shared this sensitive information in the press and atheist 
publications, a common challenge to maintaining secrecy within the organization. One man, 
Vladimir, retold his baptism horror story in a 1963 volume of testimonials from former 
believers. He described how, having passed а two-year ―trial period‖ with the Witnesses, he 
was finally invited to be baptized after midnight one night in a local river in Tomsk oblast. 
After the baptism, Vladimir came home with a serious fever and the chills and spent days 
hallucinating that Jehovah and local leaders were stalking him outside his window. He 
quickly grew disillusioned with the local leaders who ignored his sickness, and decided to 
leave the organization. His wife took him to a psychiatric hospital and then divorced him 
after he renounced his faith.
789
 His story, though undoubtedly embellished, highlights the fact 
that, after baptism, some individuals renounced their faith and denounced the organization. 
While the Witnesses took care to prevent such incidents, it was impossible to eliminate them 
entirely.  
 
Staying “No Part of This World” 
Although some tactics changed, the Witnesses‘ position against involvement in 
government or state affairs remained largely consistent throughout the late Soviet era. In the 
Witnesses‘ view, the constancy of their faith provided a stark contrast to the actions of other 
Christian organizations and the Soviet state itself. As a 1969 Watchtower article stated:  
Jehovah‘s witnesses today cannot compromise. In some countries they must preach 
the Kingdom good news underground. In others they meet secretly in order to be 
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strengthened for the work ahead. Though they are law-abiding Christians when faced 
squarely with an issue involving integrity to Jehovah, they cannot bow to the whim or 
dictates of nationalistic rulers.
790
 
 
In the Soviet context, the politicization of daily life required Witnesses to adopt more rigid 
practices in order not to compromise their ―Christian neutrality.‖ They did join trade unions 
to gain employment, but they did not participate in any union activities.
791
 More broadly, 
they generally avoided movies and plays and did not read fiction, magazines, or newspapers, 
which they correctly assumed contained political content. While atheist propaganda on the 
Witnesses routinely depicted these actions as the result of prohibitions from the organization, 
in fact, they reflected the adaptability of Witnesses to the conditions of Soviet rule. Similarly, 
atheist propaganda portrayed Witnesses who participated in these activities as violating their 
beliefs. This ignored how members made personal choices as to how to best remain true to 
their faith. For instance, one Witness told the press, ―I believe in Jehovah God. I am a 
member of a trade union. I listen to the radio and watch television.‖ While the state may have 
seen this statement as a contradiction in terms, Witnesses worldwide would not have seen 
any inherent problem with this behavior.
792
  
The Witnesses‘ neutral stance toward politics led nearly all members to abstain from 
state-sponsored petition campaigns against nuclear war. In 1955, local Party organs 
acknowledged the resistance of local Witnesses in collecting signatures for an antinuclear 
petition. Across Moldavia, officials identified hundreds of Witnesses who refused to sign due 
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to their religious convictions.
793
 In Irkutsk oblast, the region with the highest number of 
Witnesses in exile, 1,035 members refused to add their names to the petition.
794
 Officials in 
Tomsk oblast reported similar problems with their local Witness communities. The district 
Party committees sent their most experienced agitators to handle the situation, but they failed 
to convince 514 Witnesses to sign.
795
 Given that the petition drives aimed at 100 percent 
participation, the Witnesses‘ stance represented a distinct obstacle to local officials intent on 
fulfilling this goal. Although the Witnesses saw their actions as politically neutral, the state 
read them as a political statement against world peace and Soviet foreign policy. 
More important, Witnesses adopted new strategies to avoid involvement in electoral 
campaigns. With the approval of the organization, many members began to participate in 
elections, at least on a performative level. Potashov, for example, advised members that, if 
they chose to vote, they should cross off all the candidates and write in, ―I vote for Jehovah 
God.‖796 A 1964 Watchtower article instructed Witnesses that they may write ―For God‘s 
Kingdom‖ on the ballot or mark it void, but should not vote for specific candidates.797 Others 
told election monitors that they could not vote, as they had ―already cast their votes for 
Jehovah God.‖798 A 1969 CRA report cited over 3,000 individuals who refused to participate 
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in elections as they ―had already voted for Jehovah God.‖799 Since many Witnesses worked 
as seasonal laborers, they sometimes skirted elections by gaining permission to vote in 
another location, but then not voting at all.
800
 Some members left home on the day of 
elections so that electoral commissions could not stop by and pressure them to vote.
801
  
The voting issue remained a thorn in the side of Soviet authorities, who kept close 
track of individuals who did not cast ballots. By performing the act of going to the polls, 
some Witnesses avoided unnecessary social pressure from activists eager to increase 
participation in elections. It also gave officials proof that atheist campaigns were having a 
positive effect. Reports on atheist work frequently cited the fact that more and more 
Witnesses voted in elections. Whom they were voting for was rarely mentioned. In general, 
the percentage of Witnesses voting in elections varied greatly by district and region, 
reflecting the decisions of local elders and members whether to cast invalid ballots or to 
avoid the polls entirely.
802
  
 Military service forced another major confrontation between Witnesses and the state. 
Throughout the postwar Soviet era, neither the state nor the Witness organization had any 
inclination to budge on this issue. Statistics from Ukraine show the growing number of 
religious-based refusals in the late 1970s, from 271 cases in 1976 to 540 in 1979. While these 
figures do not differentiate between religions, a strong majority were certainly Witnesses, the 
rest coming from unregistered Protestant denominations. This is evidenced by the fact that 
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the highest number of violations came from the region with the highest concentration of 
Witnesses, Zakarpattia oblast.
803
  
Throughout the postwar era, most Witnesses followed the guidelines given in the Ten 
Points memo, which instructed members to register for the draft, but not to serve. A 
Khrushchev-era CRA report from L‘viv states that the Witness organization advised 
believers not to join the military, but told them to register in order to avoid police 
detection.
804
 Typically, the young men reported for the initial medical exam, hoping for a 
possible medical exemption in order to avoid a court trial. A few men cited medical 
conditions, whether real or invented, to skirt service, a method that was not always 
successful.
805
 Others left home and moved to other regions after receiving their draft notice 
in order to dodge the local authorities.
806
  Those who failed to avoid a criminal trial used it as 
a means to publicly declare their faith. In some trials, family members, usually parents, spoke 
on behalf of their son‘s religious convictions.807 Most received a three-year labor camp 
sentence, but at least a few served more time as a result of prior convictions. Upon release, 
some men found themselves again under investigation, as they were still of eligible draft age. 
No law prevented multiple convictions.
808
 One man, for example, was convicted in 1978 to 
three years, and then called up to serve again immediately upon release in 1981, where he 
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received another three years.
809
 In general, young men faced a test of their faith as they 
reached adulthood, and most, but not all, chose to serve time rather than go against their 
religious beliefs.  
 
Soviet Witnesses and the Ban on Blood Transfusions 
In the Soviet Union, much of the conflict between Witnesses and the state stemmed 
from the Witnesses‘ doctrine of political neutrality. In comparison, the Witnesses‘ refusal to 
accept blood transfusions, a highly contentious issue in many countries, had little effect on 
the Witnesses‘ relationship with the state. Since 1945, Witnesses have viewed transfusions as 
a violation of biblical commandments not to ―eat blood.‖810 Watch Tower publications 
frequently highlight the procedure‘s medical risks, suggesting that avoiding transfusions is 
not simply a religiously wise decision, but also a medically safer option.
811
 A 1961 
Watchtower article on the issue, for example, included the subheading, ―Transfusions cause 
death and disease.‖812 The organization instructs members to reject a transfusion even in 
cases where it could lead to death. Witnesses typically carry cards in their wallets that read 
―no blood‖ to inform medical personnel of their wishes in an emergency situation.813 Since 
1990, the organization has organized hospital liaison committees to explain the Witnesses‘ 
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religious beliefs on blood transfusions to hospital staff and medical professionals and to 
advocate bloodless alternatives for patients.
814
 
The Witnesses‘ stance on blood transfusion rarely arose as an issue either in the 
Soviet media or in internal documents from Party and governmental institutions. A 1969 
report from the Irkutsk CRA briefly mentioned a Watchtower article discussing the 
organization‘s position on blood transfusions, but made no comment on its application to 
Witnesses in Irkutsk.
 815
 Similarly, a 1966 Soviet publication on the Witnesses devoted a 
section to the topic, but its only examples involved foreign Witnesses.
816
 One 1979 
newspaper article told the story of a Witness woman who died as a result of refusing a 
transfusion. Yet it was the only time the paper mentioned the subject in over a hundred 
postwar articles it published on the Witnesses.
817
  
The lack of attention to this issue may have been due to the fact that in other 
countries, conflicts tend to arise as officials grapple with how to respect the religious wishes 
of patients and the responsibilities of doctors. In the Soviet Union, doctors had no such 
responsibility to temper their medical decisions to meet the religious demands of patients. If 
a Witness patient needed a blood transfusion, sources suggest that state hospitals saw no 
problem with administering one by force. One woman, Galina, almost died from 
complications after giving birth to her second son in 1980. The doctor told her she would die 
without a blood transfusion and asked, ―Where is your God now? Will he come down from 
heaven to save you?‖ The hospital staff tried to force Galina‘s husband to give blood for his 
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wife, but he refused. Meanwhile, Galina took what many thought might be her last moments 
alive to preach from her hospital bed. Luckily, Galina managed to gain access to hard-to-find 
medicine to treat a blood infection and survived the incident.
818
 Another Witness recalled an 
incident in which a fellow believer had a c-section without general anesthesia because she 
feared that the state would give her a blood transfusion if she were not conscious to resist.
819
 
Often the Soviet media made no distinction between blood transfusion refusals and a 
broader mistrust of medicine.
820
 The reticence of Witnesses to seek medical attention at state 
clinics and hospitals was real, but linked not to a rejection of science, but to fears that Soviet 
doctors would force them to accept transfusions in violation of their beliefs. One 1977 
newspaper article, for example, gave a detailed case of how a hospital performed a 
transfusion on a woman despite the family‘s objections. The journalist did not mention the 
Witnesses‘ objections to transfusions as a specific religious practice, making it seem as 
though the family simply did not want doctors to intervene at all.
821
  One 1979 CRA report 
did clarify the issue, noting specific abstention from blood transfusions and citing one case of 
death as a result of this refusal.
822
 Yet this information seems not to have widely circulated 
among lecturers and agitators. The transfusion issue rarely appeared in antireligious 
pamphlets and books on the Witnesses. Overall, the refusal to accept blood transfusions had a 
relatively minor impact on how the Soviet state viewed Witnesses, a notable fact in itself  
given how much controversy the issue has caused in other countries. 
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Preaching the Good News to Soviet Citizens 
Despite the risks of bringing new people into the fold, Soviet Witnesses understood 
evangelism as a duty and a privilege of all true Christians. Indeed, The Watch Tower Bible 
and Tract Society calculates its membership as the number of active ―publishers,‖ a term it 
uses to describe those who engage in preaching their beliefs to others. Each member is 
expected to go out into the community every month to ―publish‖ and submit a report on these 
efforts to the local congregation. Soviet Witnesses were no different in this regard, although 
they faced the real danger that someone would not merely refuse to listen or slam the door in 
their face, but would denounce them to the police.  
In countries where Witnesses legally practice their faith, most of the publishing work 
occurs through door-to-door preaching, a method inspired by the example of early Christian 
communities. The Bible recounts, ―Day after day, in the temple courts and from house to 
house, they never stopped teaching and proclaiming the good news that Jesus is the 
Christ.‖823 As a result, many Soviet Witnesses adhered to this practice. Iacob Gojan found 
inspiration for his door-to-door efforts from the story of Jesus and the woman at the well, in 
which Jesus asks a Samaritan women to draw him water and uses the moment to preach to 
her. Adopting this approach for the modern day, Iacob went to homes asking for a glass of 
water. Once allowed inside, he retold the ―woman at the well‖ story as a means to start 
discussions of faith.
824
 Similarly, Nikolai Kalibaba went to peoples‘ homes to ask if they 
were interested in selling any livestock, gradually turning the conversation to religious 
matters.
825
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In areas where Party and state officials neglected atheist work, Witnesses eagerly 
took advantage of the increased opportunity to practice their faith and find converts. One 
Moldavian Witness openly proselytized to others in the community and even picked up 
hitchhikers in the district as a way to preach to individuals. Local officials did nothing 
beyond issuing warnings to the man. His employer did even less, listing him as a shock 
worker on the honor board. In 1973, the Moldavian agitprop department cited this case as an 
instance of extreme negligence of scientific atheist education by Party officials. It noted that 
the KGB had finally gotten involved in the matter, but failed to state what measures the KGB 
had taken to resolve the situation.
826
 
Most Witnesses, however, avoided door-to-door preaching and other conspicuous 
activities in favor of safer methods. Indeed, the organization‘s annual reports on Soviet 
Witnesses highlighted this fact, stating that believers had found new ways to spread their 
faith. Funerals and weddings, for example, offered an opportunity for elders to give talks 
about their beliefs to guests who were not members of the faith.
827
 In general, Witnesses used 
any opportunity to preach, a practice the 1969 Yearbook called ―incidental witnessing.‖828 
Some spoke to passengers while riding trains and buses.
829
 One man, a bus driver himself, 
preached on his routes before he was reported to authorities and issued a fine.
830
 The 1970 
Yearbook gave a list of other tactics employed by Soviet members, including using vacation 
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time to travel and speak to people in new territories.
831
 One hospital discharged a Witness 
man early proselytized to other patients. Prior to this, he had developed a habit of going to 
the local house of culture on evenings and weekends to share his beliefs. Several of the 
hospital patients testified against him at his subsequent trial for illegal religious activity in 
1971.
832
 
While Witnesses found their career paths limited by low levels of education and 
employment discrimination, they also sought out jobs that would allow them the freedom to 
proselytize with less police scrutiny. Mykhailo Dasevych, the head of the Soviet country 
committee from 1972, worked as a self-employed carpenter in order to have the freedom to 
travel and meet with congregations.
833
 Local authorities in Chernivtsi oblast in 1968 
determined that the majority of the local Witness leaders worked as drivers, allowing them 
the opportunity to meet with members without arousing suspicion and to deliver literature 
and instructions.
834
  
Seasonal labor brigades posed a serious problem for officials, not solely because they 
provided Witnesses with the ability to travel and network with other Witness communities. 
Equally problematic, the brigades were sometimes staffed and led largely by Witnesses. The 
few non-Witness members were then subjected to constant proselytism and sometimes joined 
the organization as a result.
835
 Reports from Zakarpattia oblast in 1968 stated that officials 
had to strengthen passport control over Witnesses to prevent them from using seasonal labor 
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as a means to leave the area.
836
 The KGB also took note of this issue, citing an incident 
involving proselytism by members of a seasonal brigade in Krasnodar krai.
837
 Despite the 
efforts of authorities, seasonal labor continued to offer Witnesses opportunities to preach to 
others. One Moldavian Witness who organized a construction brigade to Omsk oblast in 
1974, read Bible passages to his fellow workers and provided commentary on Armageddon. 
When the brigade returned to the village, one of the workers denounced the man. The 
Witness, he claimed, had not let anyone listen to the radio, and tried to convince them not to 
go to movies or concerts.
838
 The Komsomol intervened in one situation, in which a young 
man had joined the Witnesses after learning about the faith on a construction brigade.
839
 
Similar incidents appeared in the Soviet press through the late 1980s.
840
  A schoolteacher in 
Zakarpattia oblast in 1985 reported that she and her fellow teachers warned parents about the 
dangers of Witness proselytism on construction brigades and tried to convince graduates to 
take jobs in local factories or at the kolkhoz instead.
841
  
Because so many Witnesses served time in prisons and labor camps, many of the 
proselytism efforts took place among prisoners. The 1957 Yearbook report on the Soviet 
Union claimed that ―of all that are known to be in the truth today in Russia it is concluded 
that forty percent have received the truth in prison and in camps.‖842 One Soviet publication 
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depicted a Witness elder watching a train convoy of prisoners pass through his town. An 
onlooker tells the elder that the train is full of traitors. The elder, inspired by this information, 
decides to commit a crime in order to get sent to prison, where he can preach among the 
traitors—the perfect soil for Witness teachings, the book noted.843 This fantastical story 
highlights the state‘s concern about the fact that Witnesses did have success in converting 
prisoners, in part because they offered redemption for those condemned by society. A 1963 
procuracy report stated that, in labor camps in L‘viv oblast, many ―Jehovists‖ proselytized to 
other prisoners. The Witnesses had taught prisoners not to read newspapers or books or to 
watch Soviet films shown in the camps, but the camp administration had done little to 
address this problem.
844
  
Soviet publications exploited the fact that some Witnesses had served time for treason 
and other serious crimes related to activities during World War II. In 1960, atheist activists in 
Irkutsk oblast held a meeting to denounce two Witnesses who had allegedly collaborated 
with the Nazis. During the event, another Witness defended one of the accused men: ―He 
tortured and killed people, it is true. But he was not a Jehovist then. Now he does not kill. 
God has forgiven him. Now he is a servant of Jehovah God.‖ Though refracted through the 
lens of an atheist agitator, the incident is likely a fairly accurate reflection of what happened. 
Witnesses‘ evangelism extended to everyone, including those with criminal records, due to 
their belief that only God could judge the sincerity of a person‘s repentance. One Witness, at 
an atheist talk in 1967, admitted to the crowd that he had personally committed many bad 
deeds before joining the faith, but that, having become a Witness, he had chosen to sin no 
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more.
845
 For the Soviet state, however, the Witnesses harbored traitors and war criminals, a 
fact that played a major role in their depictions of Witness leaders.
846
  
 Witnesses also preached to camp officials and atheist agitators. One imprisoned 
Witness spoke about his faith to a woman who ran the food kiosk in the camp. Only when 
sent to install windows in the camp commander‘s home did he realize that the kiosk operator 
was the commander‘s wife. Yet he continued to proselytize to her, trusting her enough to 
give her literature to read in secret.
847
 In another instance, when agitators raided a late night 
Bible study in 1984, the elder in charge began to preach to the men, telling them that 
Witnesses have nothing to hide.
848
 Similarly, one man openly proselytized to the witnesses 
(poniatye), who monitored a police search of his home.
849
 Two Witnesses, ordered to appear 
at a court trial to give testimony against a fellow member, used the train trip there to spread 
their beliefs to fellow passengers.
850
 In one case, a KGB agent assigned to infiltrate the 
Witnesses embraced the faith and became a member. He recalled that when the Witnesses 
learned of his KGB background, they showed him kindness and attention, impressing him 
with their fearlessness.
851
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The refusal of Witnesses to cease their preaching efforts represented a constant thorn 
in the side of local Party and state officials. One Moldavian Komsomol secretary from a 
district with a large number of Witnesses declared at a Komsomol plenum in 1957 that at his 
kolkhoz, ―We have people belonging to the Jehovist sect. Those of you who do not know this 
sect, God help you never to know.‖852 The Witnesses‘ ability to attract new youth converts 
outside of existing Witness families particularly troubled Soviet authorities.
853
 In one village 
in Moldavia in 1954, Witnesses convinced a young man to join the faith. Formerly a 
Komsomol member, he publicly turned in his Komsomol membership card, announcing that 
―Jehovah God forbid him to remain in this ‗satanic‘ organization.‖854 The Komsomol 
reported on another incident in which one of its members, a student at a pedagogical institute, 
joined the Witnesses after they visited his home while he recovered from a serious illness. 
Although the same report noted that most young ―sectarians‖ join these religions due to 
parental influence, incidents such as the one with the student indicated that some youth 
members came from among the allegedly secular Soviet population.
855
 
Overall, the insular nature of Witness communities created a spirit of closeness and 
mutual aid, which won them some converts. Witnesses often sought out potential new 
members from among those alienated from Soviet society or those experiencing personal 
hardships or tragedy. They pointed to the Bible‘s message of redemption and the promise of 
eternal life in an earthly paradise as a way to bring comfort to these individuals. One woman, 
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whose husband had died at the front in World War II, found consolation in the Witnesses, 
who told her that her husband would return to her after Armageddon.
856
 One young man, 
born with impaired vision, discovered a welcoming community and an outlet for his musical 
talents in the Witnesses‘ local orchestra. His new beliefs taught him that God would make his 
disability disappear in the millennial kingdom.
857
 Where the Witnesses saw themselves as 
offering hope and support to those in need, the Soviet state viewed their efforts as exploiting 
individuals in times of crisis and vulnerability.  
Witnesses reached out to those estranged from society. One man joined after the loss 
of his job left him and his wife struggling to make ends meet.
858
 Another man converted after 
his collective farm unfairly allotted him a smaller plot of land than he felt he deserved.
859
 
One woman struggled to care for her two small children alone after she lost her husband in a 
work accident. Her work collective ignored her, offering no help, while the Witnesses 
showered her with attention.
860
 Instances of injustice in the Soviet system bolstered the 
Witnesses‘ message that secular governments could never create a perfect society and a fair 
system of rule. 
Some who joined the Witnesses found themselves attracted to its strong moral values. 
Atheist propaganda attempted to deflect this by publicizing the moral indiscretions of 
believers. Yet even some agitators recognized the common public perception that Christians 
had higher morals than the rest of Soviet society. Witnesses do not allow their members to 
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smoke or engage in premarital sex, and they advise moderation in alcohol consumption. In 
the Soviet Union, almost all members abstained from alcohol, a practice shared with many 
Protestant communities. At a 1963 Komsomol plenum in Moldavia, one attendee described 
his own difficulties in working with Baptists at the factories, as they did not smoke, did not 
drink, and worked hard. He complained that the Komsomol lacked compelling examples 
from within their own ranks to counteract this upstanding image of young Baptists.
861
 
Similarly, a 1957 CRCA memo to the Party agitprop department noted that ―sects‖ that 
promote moral family life and do not drink alcohol, smoke, or curse, draw in new members 
attracted to this cleaner lifestyle.
862
 A 1969 CRA memo contained a nearly identical 
statement, suggesting that atheist work had succeeded little in addressing this issue. It quoted 
one Witness who said he used to be a hopeless drunk before he joined the Witnesses. Now he 
lives a sober life.
863
  
The higher moral standards could provide an inviting contrast to difficult home lives. 
Women who were married to abusive or alcoholic husbands found a special appeal in the 
Witnesses‘ sober lifestyle. When one family joined the Witnesses, the father, a heavy drinker 
with a prior conviction for hooliganism and a habit of getting into fights, abandoned these 
pursuits in favor of his new religion.
864
 Another woman, who had already joined the 
Witnesses, encouraged her husband to join after alcoholism cost him his job and driver‘s  
license.
865
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Witnesses, like other evangelizing communities, also frequently sought out potential 
converts among believers of different faiths, primarily other Christians. These individuals 
already had a demonstrated interest in the Bible that made them more open to discussions 
about God. One 1956 CRCA report from L‘viv oblast mentions that some of the local 
Baptists had joined the Witnesses, but that eight of these individuals had already returned to 
the Baptists. The report provides no information as to the reasons for the conversions.
866
 
Soviet publications recounted numerous incidents where citizens had joined and left several 
different Christian religious organizations.
867
 One man, for example, had been baptized into 
the Orthodox Church and then joined the Baptists with his wife. When his wife died at a 
young age despite his prayers, he joined the Pentecostals, but left after bandits attacked and 
killed his son in western Ukraine. Finally, he joined the Witnesses, only to renounce that 
faith as well, and religion in general.
868
  
 Given that many Protestant communities had public houses of worship in the Soviet 
Union, Witnesses had a relatively easy time locating these believers and preaching directly to 
them. A 1971 CRA report stated that Witnesses in Vinnytsia oblast had begun attending 
Adventist and Baptist services in order to speak with these congregations.
869
 Other CRA 
memos cite similar instances from other regions. One such report noted that Witnesses 
visited the homes of local Baptists to proselytize to them, but with no apparent success.
870
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Witnesses in Volyn‘ oblast attended Seventh Day Adventist meetings in 1974 and spoke with 
one Adventist leader at his home. The two groups discussed biblical interpretations of 
Armageddon, with neither side apparently winning the other over to their views.
871
 Police 
confiscated cassette tapes from one man that contained recordings geared at converting 
Baptists to the faith.
872
  
 For the Soviet authorities, Witnesses represented a greater danger to the social order 
than registered religious organizations whose members practiced their faith within the 
parameters of Soviet law. Officials did not look kindly on conversions from legal into illegal 
religious communities. One 1958 report from L‘viv oblast cited an incident involving the 
local assistant pastor of a registered Baptist congregation. After the man‘s daughter had 
joined the Witnesses, the pastor allowed her and her husband to live in his home. A regional 
newspaper reported on this matter, condemning the man for letting this happen, while the 
CRCA met with the head pastor to discuss the man‘s possible dismissal.873 Such incidents 
reflect the clear hierarchy of religious organizations in the late Soviet era, in which Witnesses 
were viewed as the least desirable.
874
 A member of a registered Baptist congregation 
appealed to the CRCA after a Witness spoke with her nephew. In response, the CRCA 
commissioner met with both parties, warning the Witness that if she continued to proselytize 
to the young man, the government would take appropriate measures. An atheist agitator was 
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also assigned to work with the nephew.
875
 One Moldavian Komsomol official complained in 
1957 that some Komsomol activists had decided that ―the Orthodox Church is good, the 
Jehovists are bad.‖876 
Witnesses‘ preaching efforts among other religious communities highlight the tense 
relations between Witnesses and believers of other faiths. Registered congregations had little 
more tolerance for Witness proselytism among their members than did the state authorities. 
In some instances, clergy took it upon themselves to report illegal actions of the Witnesses.
877
 
The Ukrainian CRCA even noted in a 1964 report that, in Rivne oblast, courts had allowed 
Russian Orthodox priests to serve as expert witnesses in the trials of illegal sectarians. It cited 
the trial of one Witness, which included testimony from a local priest who claimed that the 
Witness organization cooperated with foreign security agencies. The CRA stated clearly that 
such use of priests was unacceptable, recommending a local agitator or former believer give 
this information in court instead.
878
 This incident was likely an anomaly since it won 
immediate condemnation when brought to the attention of CRA officials. Nonetheless, it 
demonstrates the preferential treatment accorded to registered religious leaders in comparison 
to Witness elders. The Witnesses‘ harsh critiques of other religions similarly ruled out any 
ecumenical spirit across faiths. In 1983, after Witnesses attempted to convert Baptists in 
Odessa oblast, accusing their leaders of ―collaborating in the crimes and deeds of Caesar‖ 
and ―deviation from the gospel truths,‖ the local minister complained to the CRA  
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commissioner.
879
 
 Overall, Soviet Witnesses proved steadfast in their efforts to spread their faith to 
others, adapting the organization‘s worldwide preaching methods to meet the challenges of a 
largely secular Soviet society. They offered potential converts a close-knit community based 
on principles of strict biblical morality and mutual support. For those dissatisfied with the 
current order or their personal lives, Witnesses provided a critique of Soviet power and a 
promise of a better life under Christ‘s kingdom. The small, but steady growth in members 
suggests that some Soviet citizens found comfort in this message.    
 
Witness Family Life 
 Although conversion played a major role in Witness beliefs and practices, much, if 
not most of the Soviet-era membership growth came through existing family networks. By 
raising their children in the faith, Witnesses ensured a new generation of believers. The 
Soviet state, fully aware of this dynamic, devoted a great deal of attention to children and 
youth in an effort to cut off the Witnesses‘ primary source of expansion. For them, youth 
represented the next generation of Soviet leaders. In the western borderlands, this was the 
first generation born and raised under Soviet power. As such, the existence of religious youth 
represented a far more disturbing phenomenon to Soviet officials than the older generation of 
prewar Witnesses.    
Not surprisingly, Witnesses faced a major battle with the state over the hearts and 
minds of their children, a confrontation waged mostly through the school system. Having no 
choice but to send their children to state-run institutions, parents could only hope that they 
had trained their children well enough to resist pressures from secular classmates, teachers, 
                                                 
879
 TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 274, ark. 171-72. 
 269 
and principals. For the Witnesses, the Soviet situation did not present an entirely unique 
dilemma. The Watch Tower organization teaches members to view the outside world as 
corrupt and to guard against ―bad associations,‖ which can lead believers away from their 
faith. In keeping with this view, Witnesses restrict their friends (and marital partners) to 
within their faith communities, and expect their children to do the same. Schools make this 
especially challenging for children with a still developing sense of identity and values.  
The Watch Tower organization advises members worldwide to take caution and 
prepare their children before sending them out into society. A 1954 Watchtower article 
provides a good summation of the official stance on the outside world and schools in 
particular: 
This old world is sunk! It has sunk itself. It sows filth, it reaps filth. It mocks God, but 
not with impunity. (Gal. 6: 7-8) Yet it is amid these sullied seas of delinquent 
humanity that we must navigate a course of morality and integrity, and one of the 
most anxious concerns of faithful parents is that their children will not sink in these 
seas when they venture from the home port. 
 
The article further advises parents not to delay instilling religious values in their children, 
noting, ―The fresher clay is the easier it is to mold. The longer it sets the harder it gets.‖ The 
organization urged parents to begin at infancy, making the child prepared to defend the faith 
once he or she enters school.
880
  
In order to raise steadfast believers, Witness communities treat their children as 
unbaptized members of the faith, involving them in gatherings and other activities. As in 
other countries, Soviet Witness children attended the weekly meetings and Bible studies, 
contributing along with their parents.
881
 Some Witness groups ran youth meetings, giving 
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children a chance to make friends within their own community.
882
 А 1971 CRA report noted 
that Stavropol‘ krai ran a youth orchestra and a youth theater troupe, which performed short 
skits on religious themes at weddings.
883
 In some families, even young children helped with 
the literature production, hand-copying issues of The Watchtower.
884
 In the trial of a Witness 
elder in 1961, the school notebooks of the defendant‘s son, filled with hand-copied religious 
texts, were entered as evidence.
885
 One young girl acted as a courier for her grandfather, a 
local elder, because she attracted less suspicion.
886
  
Some parents preferred to limit the risk posed by Soviet schools by restricting their 
children‘s exposure to them. In the Stalin era, most Witness parents enrolled their children 
only in the four-year village schools. Rural areas in the western borderlands and exile 
locations often lacked schools beyond this basic level, making it necessary for students to 
travel to town and live in dormitories to continue their studies. Local officials in one village 
tried in vain to convince one father to let his son live in a dormitory rather than have to walk 
several kilometers each day to school in the nearby town.
887
 One young Witness recalled 
how, after eight years of primary school in his village, he had to travel to the district center to 
continue his education. That lasted only two weeks. Shocked by the drinking, smoking, and 
vulgarity of his fellow students, he quickly concluded that, if he remained there, he would 
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soon compromise his faith. Indeed, two other Witness youth who remained at the school left 
the religion.
888
 By the Khrushchev era, the expansion of educational institutions in these 
more peripheral regions allowed most Witness children to attend school longer in their own 
communities. Most completed at least seven to eight years of schooling, with some finishing 
their secondary education. 
Even while at school, Witness children tried to keep apart from their secular peers. 
Like their parents, Witness children operated in the Soviet world, but they worked hard not to 
be ―of the world.‖ This meant adhering to the principle of ―Christian neutrality‖ in all 
political matters. In Soviet schools, this proved extremely difficult given the politicization of 
everyday life and the education system. Students sang patriotic songs glorifying the state in 
their choirs. They participated in training exercises meant to prepare them for military 
service. They joined the Party‘s youth organizations, the Octobrists, Young Pioneers, and 
Komsomol. They read stories and watched films about the heroic deeds of the Red Army. 
Witness children did none of these activities. They tried to get along with their classmates, 
but they did not befriend them.  
Beyond abstaining from what they saw as political matters, Witness children 
attempted to steer clear of most extracurricular activities, which could bring them into greater 
contact with ―bad associations.‖ Witnesses teach that these activities can distract children 
from their proper focus on spiritual growth and preaching work. As such, their children 
generally do not play competitive sports, join school clubs, or participate in amateur art or   
                                                 
888
 Măcuţă, interview. 
 
 272 
theater circles.
889
 The Soviet Union was no exception. A Zakarpattia school principal noted 
 that one Witness child sat with her eyes closed the whole time the class watched movies.
890
  
Some Witness children felt compelled to speak about their faith in the classroom, 
perhaps viewing it as a chance to fulfill the biblical injunction to preach the word of God. 
One seventh-grader wrote an essay about how he had missed something in life before he read 
the Bible.
891
 Another student told his class:  
All sciences claiming that God did not create the earth and the universe are wrong. 
They are not able to disprove what is written in the Bible. There is God and there is 
Satan. They rule the world. Satan seduces people and leads them from God. In order 
not to be influenced by Satan, I read only the Bible. I do not read any other books, I 
do not go to the movies, I do not watch television, and I sing only Christian songs. 
 
A seventh-grader declared that even if her father told her to abandon the Bible and her faith, 
she would not do so. Her convictions were her own, not something borrowed from her 
parents.
 892
 Expressing these convictions required young Witnesses to take ownership of their 
religion. 
Making a stand in schools put Witnesses in direct confrontation with teachers and 
principals. Children generally knew enough not to involve their parents, since doing so could 
result in a criminal investigation for illegal religious activity. Parents in turn taught children 
to fight their own battles.
893
 The organization itself had already dealt with similar situations 
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elsewhere, including in the United States where Witness children refused to say the pledge of 
allegiance. A 1940 Watchtower article described the organization‘s view of such matters: 
When a child reaches the age of understanding and intelligence, and intelligently 
takes his stand on the side of Jehovah and his kingdom, that child must prove his 
integrity toward Jehovah if he gains life everlasting. Therefore the child must be 
subjected to reproach and persecution and the parents also must likewise be subjected 
to reproach and persecution, because Satan will see to it that they get it, and the Lord 
permits it in order to afford an opportunity for such consecrated persons to prove their 
integrity toward him and thus prove Satan a liar.‖894 
 
Children, like their parents, needed to learn to defend their faith and appreciate the 
opportunity to serve as witnesses for the biblical truth in the face of persecution. One 
thirteen-year-old boy, detained by the police for proselytizing in his village, came home and 
told his parents how he ―had been persecuted for Jehovah‘s name.‖ Both parents and child 
considered the incident a ―proud‖ moment, as the boy had remained firm in his faith under 
pressure.
895
  
 The refusal to join youth organizations provoked the greatest tests of children‘s‘ 
commitment to this principle. The Soviet press invariably blamed the parents when children 
would not join, portraying the children as victims of adults‘ fanatical beliefs. In one case, a 
principal called a third-grade child, Ionel, into his office to ask him if he would like to join 
the Young Pioneers. Ionel responded no. The man then pulled out a Pioneer scarf and tried to 
tie it around Ionel‘s neck, saying, ―Hold on, let‘s see if it at least looks good on you.‖ The 
boy backed into a corner, crying and putting up his hands to protect himself until the 
principal relented and put the scarf away. The Soviet press, which covered the incident in 
detail, portrayed the affair as an example of parental fanaticism, but the description makes it 
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hard to ignore the clear use of coercion applied to the young child.
896
 In a similar situation, 
after a fifth-grader took off the Pioneer scarf and refused to wear it, the principal grabbed a 
child, putting the scarf back on him. The child took it off again despite the principal‘s 
threats.
897
   
In this regard, schools frequently reinforced, rather than undermined, Witness 
children‘s convictions. A 1979 CRA report acknowledged this fact, noting that Witnesses 
often quit school rather than face further conflict with teachers over membership in youth 
organizations.
898
 Some Witness children expressed to their teachers their belief that the 
Pioneers and true Christianity were incompatible. One girl told the school that she could not 
join the Pioneers because ―the Pioneers do not recognize God.‖899 Another girl expressed her 
desire to live in the next world and her belief that joining the Pioneers would lead to her 
destruction at Armageddon.
900
 The two young sons of one Witness couple told the school 
principal that their father had read them the Bible, teaching them that only faith in Jehovah 
could bring happiness in life.
901
  
Even if Witness children had wanted to make friends and fit in, schools often made 
this difficult if not impossible. Many children experienced harsh teasing as a result of their 
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beliefs. Teachers singled them out for ridicule and scorn. Iacob Gojan received lower marks 
in school because of his faith, and his teacher forced him to stand in front of the class so that 
other students could mock him and his faith.
902
 One young man who did ultimately leave the 
faith recalled how, in school, students treated him meanly, but this made him happy because 
his parents had taught him that to be friends with the world is to be enemies with God. Only 
when the class leader began to be nice to him did he reconsider his beliefs.
903
 
Having been raised to view persecution as a sign of true faith, Witness children thus 
had a chance to experience this early on in life and many found it deeply meaningful and 
spiritually significant. On the whole, Witness children learned hard lessons about how the 
state treated members of their faith. They saw their homes searched, their parents harassed, 
even arrested, and their Bible studies broken up by police. Such experiences taught Witness 
children that secular authority would persecute true Christians. These convictions could 
withstand even serious trials. One Ukrainian woman lost custody of her seven-year-old twins 
and was only able to visit them on yearly vacations. Seven years later, both children chose to 
return to their mother, becoming Witnesses as well.
904
 In a similar vein, the state sent Fedor 
Zhitnikov to a children‘s home after his father‘s arrest in 1959. The experience only 
strengthened Fedor‘s faith, motivating him to undergo baptism. A traveling elder performed 
the ritual in secret while Victor was still living at that home.
905
  
Undoubtedly, some children felt caught between conflicting desires to fit in with their 
peers, remain true to their beliefs, and please their parents. An example from one school in 
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L‘viv oblast in 1961 illustrates how even very young children became trapped in those 
battles. At the school, a third-grader from a Witness family voiced a desire to join the 
Octobrist and wear the signature red star badge. When her parents refused to allow it, the 
district Knowledge Society got involved, holding a public meeting to discuss the matter. 
After the young girl repeated her request at this gathering, the parents relented and let her 
join.
906
 One young man fell in love with a girl outside of the religion, marrying her and 
leaving the faith.
907
  
 As the above examples illustrate, not all Witness children and youth choose to follow 
the path laid out by their parents and elders. For many, school was an exciting time of 
exposure to new people, new ideas, and new possibilities. In one family, all three daughters 
left home after renouncing the faith of their parents. The youngest appealed to the village 
soviet to be placed in a dormitory where she could complete her schooling away from 
home.
908
 Instances of Witness youth who ran away from home or moved in with other 
relatives appeared regularly in the Soviet press, often written by the young people 
themselves.
909
 One young Witness, for example, wanted nothing to do with his father or his 
religion as a child, living with his grandmother until he joined the Red Army.
910
 A CRA 
report from Chernivtsi oblast in 1981 gave an example from the village of Cherlenivka. The 
principal there estimated that of the 224 Witness children who had graduated from his school  
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during his tenure, 125 became baptized members and the rest became non-believers.
911
   
 Peer pressure is a powerful force and it had a definite influence on Witness children 
both in the Soviet Union and worldwide. For example, former Witnesses have published 
numerous accounts of growing up in and leaving the faith in the United States.
912
 For Soviet 
Witnesses, children faced additional pressure from school and local authorities to renounce 
the faith of their parents. In a 1982 trial, the prosecution called the ten-year-old daughter of 
one Witness to the stand to testify about how her mother had forced her to abstain from 
school activities, even tearing off the Octobrist badge from her dress in front of the entire 
school. The court deprived the mother of custody rights, sending the child to live with her 
non-Witness father.
913
 This case was not unique.
914
 Soviet press and courts repeatedly 
involved children in attacks on Witnesses, claiming to protect these young ―victims‖ from the 
fanaticism of their parents. 
  
Former Believers 
 Tensions in Witness families over religious matters bring to light the broader, mostly 
unexplored issue of former believers in scholarship on religion in the postwar Soviet Union. 
Previous research on Soviet Witnesses has not given this issue its due, focusing instead on  
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those Witnesses who remained within the faith. This ignores the fact that every religion 
produces not only converts, but also ―apostates,‖ who often have a highly critical view of the 
faith they abandoned and are frequently the most vocal opponents of the religion.
915
 This is 
especially true of the Witnesses, who have a high turnover in membership worldwide.
916
 In 
this sense, the Soviet experience is not entirely unique. Former Soviet Witnesses cited feeling 
isolated from their peers at school and work, left out of holiday celebrations, and pressured to 
devote more energy to proselytism than to career or educational aspirations as reasons for 
why they reconsidered their faith. Similarly, former Witnesses often voiced their doubts in 
the organization‘s interpretation of the Bible. Of course, former Soviet Witnesses also had 
complaints unique to the Soviet system—such as disgust with the Watch Tower 
organization‘s alleged political motivations, anti-Soviet activities, and criminal leadership. 
Some Soviet Witnesses certainly left the organization because doing so offered a 
reprieve from intense public scrutiny and from discriminatory practices in workplaces and 
higher education. Vasilii Kalin, the first head of the Russian Witness organization after 1991, 
has stated that Witnesses could not find good work or get a higher education in the post-
Stalin era. When he applied twice to attend university, officials told him to bring in a 
Komsomol membership card, knowing that this would not be possible for him.
917
 Yet by 
renouncing their faith Witnesses could get an advanced degree or a job promotion and no 
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longer face the scorn of their coworkers and neighbors. Renunciations could also protect 
Witnesses from ongoing criminal investigations and trials for their religious activities. One 
former Witness claimed that some opportunistic Witnesses gave fake renunciations of their 
faith to avoid punishment for their crimes. Ironically, this man had himself left the Witnesses 
while on trial for illegal religious activity.
918
 Indeed, it was a fairly common occurrence for 
courts to dismiss all charges or give a suspended sentence to Witnesses who publicly 
admitted guilt and promised to forsake all further involvement with the religion.
919
  
 Many, perhaps most, who left the Witnesses were young people, some of whom had 
never formally joined the faith, but had been raised in Witness families. The pressures at 
school, combined with the realization that, as long as they stayed with the faith, their career 
and educational paths would be very limited, drove many young people to opt out of their 
parents‘ belief system. Some young men did not want to serve several years in labor camps 
for refusing to join the military along with their peers.
920
 In short, Witness youth reached a 
crossroads as they entered adulthood. They, among their fellow believers, had the most to 
gain materially by leaving the faith. For some, Soviet society was, for all its faults, a much 
more appealing option that offered greater opportunities than a life lived within an oppressed, 
insular religious community.  
The experience of leaving the faith could be both exhilarating and terrifying. Former  
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believers found that the society that had previously denounced them now welcomed them 
with open arms. One young woman, Ivanna, moved into a dormitory, made new friends, and 
joined the Komsomol. She even took lessons to become a parachutist. Nikolai, a young man 
raised in the faith, skipped Witness meetings with another friend from the religion, secretly 
watching Soviet movies until caught by the friend‘s father. He finally left home so that he 
could join the Komsomol and serve in the Red Army. Recounting his decision to reject the 
Witness faith in the Soviet media, he entitled his story, ―From sectarian darkness into the 
light and joy of life.‖921  
At the same time, losing one‘s faith often meant losing one‘s family as well. In all 
countries, Witnesses generally do not communicate with individuals who are expelled from, 
or who voluntarily leave, the organization. This includes relatives and family members, with 
exceptions made as dictated by necessity.
922
 The practice was more pronounced in the Soviet 
Union, given that, in many instances, these individuals now actively cooperated with the state 
against the religion. One young woman had to leave home upon renouncing the Witnesses. 
Her mother told her she would rather see her dead than an unbeliever.
923
 Another young 
Witness, whose father disowned him after he left the faith, addressed his father in a 
newspaper article: ―Am I not your son? Where is your fatherly love, your love of the people, 
which you speak about so often in your preaching?‖924 Two years later, then in the army, he 
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continued to try to convince his Witness wife to leave the faith, without success.
925
 For many 
youth, their entrance into secular society meant starting a new life outside of the religion. 
 
Witness Views of the Soviet State 
Sustained persecution of believers strengthened the Witnesses‘ long-held conviction 
that true Christians would suffer for their faith in the final days before Armageddon. A 1958 
Watch Tower publication describing the mistreatment of Soviet members affirmed: 
The God of salvation has been permitting all this persecution of his witnesses in order 
to test those who profess to seek him and to love him.  By the fiery trials from the 
persecutors and oppressors Jehovah smelts those claiming to be his people in order to 
expose and skim away those who are mere scummy dross and to manifest, purify, and 
retain those who are pure, precious, metal.
926
  
 
Even encounters with police could be sources of inspiration. After Gheorghe Gorobeţ joined 
the Witnesses in the mid-1950s, the local police called him in for questioning, showing him a 
printed copy of The Watchtower. He had never seen it before in its original form and did not 
recognize it at first. While the police had hoped to show him the political content of the 
magazine, all he noticed were the ―words of everlasting life‖ printed on its pages.927 
For Witnesses, changes to Soviet religious policy represented no more than a 
temporary shift that did not alter the government‘s anti-Christian foundation. A 1956 
Watchtower article written after the Secret Speech declared, ―Today the predatory, 
bloodstained, intolerant totalitarian leopard of communism claims to have changed his 
spots.‖ The continued imprisonment of Witnesses, however, signaled to the organization that 
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this move was nothing more than ―sheer hypocrisy.‖928 In the organization‘s view, it might 
win concessions from such a state, but it could not secure real justice for believers. Similarly, 
Witnesses took the lack of registration and ongoing persecution as a confirmation of their 
faith. Unlike other Christian organizations that had registered with the atheist Soviet state, 
the Witnesses felt they alone had refused to compromise their faith for political expediency. 
A 1958 Awake! article declared, ―Popular organized religion has suffered the defeat in that it 
has agreed to mouth the Communist peace-propaganda line for the crumbs of freedom to 
practice a strictly ritualistic religion.‖929 For the Witnesses, registration had made other 
religions, namely the Russian Orthodox Church, into a ―tool of the Godless Communist 
Soviet regime.‖930 Other articles blamed the Orthodox Church for ignoring the spiritual needs 
of the Russian people and thus fostering the growth of communism.
931
 A 1973 Awake! article 
stated:  
One needs to understand that the churches, especially the Orthodox Church, were key 
elements in the oppression of the people by the czars. For their own selfish advantage, 
the clergy for centuries had catered to the rulers, ignored the needs of the people and 
kept them in ignorance. The majority of the people were held in virtual slavery to the 
rulers and wealthy classes. The clergy worked to keep it that way.
932
 
 
While Watch Tower publications proclaimed their own survival and even growth in the face 
of Soviet repression, they also believed that the rest of the Soviet Union‘s religious tradition 
would not last much longer. A 1973 article ended with the statement: ―the conclusion is 
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inescapable. Slowly but surely the religions of Christendom and heathendom are being 
strangled to death in the Soviet Union.‖933 Rather than contextualize their persecution within 
a larger antireligious policy, the Witnesses understood their persecution as unique and 
spiritually meaningful, marking them as the only true Christians. 
The content of Watch Tower publications put them not only at odds with other 
religions, but, more problematically, with the Soviet state and the official ideology. Witness 
literature, perhaps as much as Witness actions, fueled suspicions that the organization had 
political, rather than religious aims. Both Awake! and The Watchtower constantly reported 
and commented on a wide range of human interest stories and world news presented from a 
biblical perspective. They published detailed coverage of both major and minor events in the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. For example, in 1957, Awake! printed news briefs on 
Khrushchev‘s ―We will bury you‖ speech, a UN resolution against Soviet intervention in 
Hungary, Soviet troops in Poland, Khrushchev‘s comments on Stalin, Soviet-American 
missile disputes, nuclear test bans, May Day peace parades, the international youth festival in 
Moscow, Soviet spies, Sputnik, and Marshal Georgii Zhukov‘s fall from power, among other 
topics.
934
 For the state, these types of articles and blurbs had no place in religious literature 
and could only be explained by the organization‘s underlying political ideology. Coverage of 
Soviet affairs in Watch Tower publications provided easy fodder against the organization in 
the Soviet press. 
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 The Witnesses understood their publications as reflecting the organization‘s strictly 
neutral position regarding politics. A 1961 Awake! article told readers that ―true Christians 
today therefore can no more take sides in the cold war between East and West than Jesus and 
his disciples took sides in the political strife between the Romans and the Jews.‖935 While the 
Soviet media focused only on Witness condemnations of communism, the Witnesses equally 
dismissed capitalism and all other economic and political systems as incapable of bringing 
about lasting world peace, security, and prosperity. A 1981 Awake! article that described the 
failings of capitalism, communism, and socialism in turn, said of capitalism:  
Capitalism undoubtedly provided an improvement over the feudal system, if only for 
the greater freedom it brought to the working classes. But it also brought many 
injustices. The gap between the rich and the poor tended to widen. At its worst, it 
brought about exploitation and class warfare. At its best, it produced an affluent 
consumer society in some lands, with material fullness. But it has also produced 
spiritual emptiness, and has failed to bring true and lasting happiness.
936
 
 
For the Witnesses, no man-made government, regardless of its ideology, could provide a 
permanent solution to the world‘s problems. Humans needed to wait on God and not take 
matters into their own hands. Unfortunately for Soviet Witnesses, the Soviet media easily 
cherry picked those passages that related directly to communism in order to portray the 
organization as distinctly anti-Soviet, while ignoring those that related to capitalism.  
That said, although Witnesses did not see their publications as political, Witness 
coverage of Soviet affairs cannot be described as neutral. First, likely as a result of being 
written in the United States, Watch Tower literature adopted much of the style and rhetoric of 
American publications on the Cold War. It used the moniker ―totalitarian‖ to describe the 
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Soviet government and ―iron curtain‖ to refer to the East-West division of Europe.937 A 1965 
Awake! article commented that ―the people under Communist rule in East Germany are 
unhappy captives. They want to be united with the rest of Germany.‖938 Witness coverage of 
the 1956 Hungarian revolution provides perhaps the best illustration of this point. The 
organization described the events in Hungary as follows: 
Following the deglorification of Stalin the Russian bear had smiled. . . . Then an 
oppressed people rose in unison to throw off the oppressive yoke of a hated rule. 
Russia‘s ―peaceful coexistence‖ exploded. The bear‘s smile became a snarl, the 
gloved hand showed an iron fist and the streets of Hungary were bathed in blood.
939
 
 
Soviet publications took particular issue with this reporting, even claiming that Witnesses 
were somehow involved in supporting anti-Soviet forces.
940
 Certainly, they did not read an 
article such as this as politically neutral. 
More important though, the coverage was not neutral in that Witnesses did not, and 
do not, understand current events to be unrelated to biblical teachings. In fact, for them, 
current events underscore the veracity of the organization‘s prophetic teachings regarding 
Armageddon and the establishment of the millennial kingdom. Where the Soviet Union saw a 
political message, the Witnesses found clear evidence that biblical prophecies were being 
fulfilled. Indeed, the extensive reporting on political affairs, begun under Rutherford‘s 
tenure, served a clear religious purpose: to demonstrate to members the failure of secular 
states and societies to achieve peace, justice, and prosperity for humankind. This 
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understanding of world history clashed directly with Soviet policy. The Watch Tower 
organization seemed to understand this fact perfectly when it wrote in 1960: 
Why are Soviet leaders bothered by Jehovah‘s witnesses? Because they uphold 
Jehovah as the One to worship, not the State; because they seek peace and pursue it, 
even now beating their swords into plowshares; because they increase in number 
despite Communist attacks against them; because they preach the kingdom of God as 
man‘s only hope; because they foretell the doom of worldly nations, including world 
communism, at God‘s war of Armageddon.941 
 
Both the Witnesses and the Soviet Union recognized that this view was  not compatible with 
Soviet ideology, nor was it a peripheral issue within Witness beliefs. In fact, it stood at the 
core of Witness doctrine, which promised that Jehovah would sweep away the corrupt 
current system and establish righteous rule for his followers.  
 Since the 1920s, Watch Tower publications have denounced communism both in 
theory and practice, a view expressed in their literature throughout the Soviet era. A 1955 
Awake! article described communism as a ―false religion‖ that ―receives its power and 
authority from none other than the Dragon, Satan the devil.‖942 Coverage of the repression of 
Witnesses in the Soviet bloc offered evidence for this viewpoint. A 1957 article entitled 
―Exposing the Red Paradise,‖ focusing on recent events in Hungary, declared, ―Here is 
firsthand evidence that communism is not a modern materialistic messiah.‖943 Such language 
reflects the Witnesses‘ ongoing view that communism is itself a religion.944 
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The Witness organization combined its general critique of communism and the Soviet 
state with more specific positions on issues unique to the postwar context. With the arms race 
and the looming threat of nuclear war, the Witnesses rejected fears that a nuclear holocaust 
could destroy the earth. For them, this directly contradicted God‘s promise that his followers 
would live forever in a paradise on earth.
945
 This theme recurred in dozens of articles in the 
postwar era. A 1982 Awake! article stated, ―One reason Jehovah‘s Witnesses publish this 
journal is to assure its readers that the world is not going to end in a nuclear holocaust.‖946 If 
Watch Tower publications rejected widespread anxiety about the planet‘s destruction, it was 
not on the basis of optimism about progress toward peace. In fact, Witnesses regarded both 
the Khrushchev-era concept of ―peaceful coexistence‖ and Brezhnev-era détente negotiations 
with the United States as biblically unsound.
947
 A 1963 article on a test-ban treaty between 
the US and the Soviet Union declared, ―Peace will come soon, in our very generation, but in 
God‘s way, not by any test-ban treaty.‖948 Similarly, a 1954 Awake! proclaimed that ―the 
Bible shows that coexistence is not the hope of the world, for only one kingdom is destined 
to control the world, and that is God‘s kingdom.‖949 In fact, both the Witnesses and the 
Soviet state agreed that ultimately either God or communism would have to win out.  
Perhaps most important in explaining the Witnesses‘ view of the Soviet Union, the 
organization taught its members that the postwar rise of two new superpowers fulfilled 
biblical prophecy. In 1958, the organization released a new book entitled Your Will be Done 
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on Earth!, which included a new interpretation of the Book of Daniel. In chapter eleven, the 
Bible describes Daniel‘s powerful vision of an epic struggle between two mighty kings, the 
―King of the South‖ and the ―King of the North.‖ According to Your Will be Done on Earth!, 
these kings represented real-life figures. In each historical time period, the kings took on new 
incarnations, always fighting among themselves for world domination. For example, the 
King of the North appeared in history from ―the Seleucid dynasty of the hellenic kings‖ to 
―the Nazi imperial ruler.‖ The 1958 book declared that the King of the North had resurfaced 
and taken on a new embodiment: the Soviet Union. The ―Anglo-American dual world 
power‖ of the United States and Great Britain, meanwhile, assumed the adversarial role of 
the King of the South.
950
  
Daniel‘s description of the King of the North, the organization felt, fit in perfectly 
with the actions of the Soviet state. Daniel predicted that the king would ―exalt and magnify 
himself above every god‖ and would blaspheme against the true God (Daniel 11:36). The 
organization noted how the Soviet Union had persecuted true Christianity and had promoted 
communism as a false idol. Daniel foretold that the king would ―honor a god of fortresses‖ 
and would have a great military strength (Daniel 11:38). Witnesses saw the arms race as 
proof of this attribute. Daniel stated that the king would invade other lands and act 
aggressively toward other countries (Daniel 11:24). Watch Tower publications cited the 
Soviet Union‘s control over Eastern Europe and its involvement in third world politics as 
evidence of this intent.
951
 A 1981 publication quotes Daniel prophesying how the King of the 
North would gain gold, silver, and other precious metals, commenting that the Soviet Union 
―is one of the very few industrialized nations that does not need to import oil. The Soviet 
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Union also controls vast deposits of the very strategic minerals that the ‗king of the south‘ 
needs desperately. No wonder world politics in recent years have been characterized by a 
‗pushing match‘ between the superpowers!‖952 
The organization believed that the Daniel prophecy not only helped believers to 
understand current and past Soviet actions, but to predict future outcomes. A 1960 Awake! 
proclaimed, ―God‘s prophetic Word, according to the Book of Daniel, shows that the present-
day prophetic ‗king of the north‘ is the ruling actor of world communism and that this 
Communist ‗king‘ will eventually launch a full-scale attack against Jehovah‘s witnesses.‖953 
The Daniel prophecy also foretells defeat for both kings, evidence that God would destroy 
worldwide communism along with all other earthly governments. This view gave further 
weight to the position that there could be no lasting agreement between the US and the Soviet 
Union. A CRA official who spoke with one Witness elder in 1984 noted that the man openly 
expressed his opinion that the world was in a state of tension, with the forces of North and 
South opposed to one another, as the Bible predicted.
954
 
Overall, the Witnesses‘ beliefs placed them in direct confrontation with Soviet 
ideology, as they soundly rejected the notion of human progress and prophesied the 
destruction of the Soviet system. They understood and expected that the state would 
persecute them for these views, which in turn reinforced their conviction that true Christians 
must suffer at the hands of ungodly authorities. A 1966 Watchtower article compared the 
standoff to the events of Exodus, in which the Israelites‘ righteous actions only hardened the 
Pharaoh‘s heart against God and led to his defeat. Referring to people learning God‘s truth in 
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communist lands, the article declared, ―This fact that people are learning this greatly plagues 
the Communist leaders but they are unable to stop the plague and they continue to harden 
themselves, making their destruction sure.‖ Both Witnesses and the Soviet state agreed on 
one thing: both of them could not survive; one would have to defeat the other.
955
 
 
1975: Countdown to Armageddon 
 Beginning in 1966, the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society began to publish 
information on a new milestone in human history.
956
 1975, it proclaimed, would mark 6,000 
years of human existence since Creation. Would this date also usher in the millennial 
kingdom? Witness doctrine and biblical interpretation suggested this might be the case.
957
 
The Watchtower and Awake! tended toward more nuanced views of 1975, cautioning readers 
not to view the year as the definite date for Armageddon, although assembly speeches and 
the monthly newsletter, Our Kingdom Service, used more exclamatory language, exhorting 
Witnesses to engage in publishing work while there was still time before Armageddon.
958
 In 
remarks republished in The Watchtower, Vice President Franz, for example, told a crowd at 
the district assembly in Baltimore: 
What about the year 1975? What is it going to mean, dear friends? Does it mean that 
Armageddon is going to be finished, with Satan bound, by 1975? It could! It could! All 
things are possible with God. Does it mean that Babylon the Great is going to go down 
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by 1975? It could. . . . All things are possible with God. But we are not saying. And 
don‘t any of you be specific in saying anything that is going to happen between now 
and 1975. But the big point of it all is this, dear friends: Time is short. Time is running 
out, no question about that.
959
 
 
Given Soviet Witnesses‘ more limited access to literature, it is impossible to know how much 
of this information filtered into the Soviet Union. However, Soviet Witnesses did pick up on 
the potential significance of 1975, increasing their own proselytism efforts among the local 
population. 
 The surge in Soviet Witness activity was noticeable enough to come to the attention of 
local officials by the early 1970s. For example, a 1974 report from the Zakarpattia oblast 
Party committee observed that local members had been preaching the coming of 
Armageddon in 1975 on trains and buses. The year before, one of the leaders had given a 
speech at a funeral stating that 5998 years had passed since the creation of the world and that 
this meant only two years remained until Armageddon. After this speech, the village soviet 
and regional CRA issued the man an official warning.
960
 A 1974 KGB report from 
Zakarpattia oblast recommended that atheist agitators use the 1975 prediction to compromise 
the religion and its leaders. It suggested that it covertly support such propaganda until the end 
of 1975. When Armageddon did not occur as widely predicted, the state could then exploit 
this fact in its antireligious propaganda. The KGB advised planning talks on TV, radio, and 
in the press to highlight the false prophecy after 1975.
961
 Indeed, the KGB put this plan into 
action in the area, promoting the 1975 prediction and then hosting lectures along with local 
soviet and Party organs afterward.  
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 Soviet publications similarly used the prediction as evidence of the leadership‘s 
hypocrisy, hoping it would create a rift between members and elders. It cited examples of 
how Witnesses had sincerely waited for Armageddon to happen, even selling off their 
possessions and giving the money to the organization, while elders used these donations to 
build additions on their homes.
962
 Crimean officials published several articles in the two 
years after 1975, hoping to compromise the belief in Armageddon among Witnesses.
963
 Yet 
other sources suggest that at least some members approached the 1975 date with caution. For 
instance, a 1976 article entitled ―Report from Armageddon‖ cites this fact as evidence of 
greater skepticism among believers.
964
 When agitators brought up the 1975 prediction at an 
atheist evening the following year, one Witness stood up and declared, ―Only Jehovah knows 
the hour‖ of Armageddon.965 Similarly, the L‘viv CRA, alerted to the 1975 date in advance, 
reported that it had not identified any instances of Witnesses actively preparing for 
Armageddon by selling off goods or spreading rumors.
966
 These incidents illustrate the fact 
that some Soviet Witnesses, like others worldwide, saw the 1975 date as a possibility or 
likelihood, but not as an absolute certainty.  
 Still, the 1975 prediction had a serious impact on the worldwide Witness membership, 
slowing down the growth in baptisms and the average time spent in monthly proselytism in 
the immediate years that followed.
967
 In 1979, the Governing Body apologized for the 
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organization‘s role in over-stressing the potential significance of the date among members.968 
However, the 1975 prediction had led to a major increase in worldwide membership, from 
roughly 1,200,000 members in 1968 to roughly 2,400,000 members, or double, by 1976.
969
 
Likewise in the Soviet Union, the 1975 prediction helped, more than it hurt, Witnesses. 
Soviet membership spiked dramatically in the lead-up to 1975. In 1973, roughly 400 people 
joined the religion in Zakarpattia oblast alone, followed by 800 people in 1974, and 1,474 
people in 1975. Even though the press and internal reports noted that some members did 
leave after 1975, having grown disillusioned by the false prediction, most did not.
970
   
 
Conclusion 
 Soviet Witnesses proved remarkably skillful at adapting to changing circumstances. 
They found ways to modify their practices while following, as closely as possible, the actions 
of their brethren worldwide. They also maintained their core beliefs, which they used to 
make sense of the outside world and the Soviet state in particular. The close ties between the 
Brooklyn headquarters and the Soviet communities, combined with more regular access to 
literature, made it possible for these communities to achieve a high degree of conformity to 
the central model, while still allowing members the freedom and flexibility to make choices 
on the ground level about how best to remain faithful to their values in the unique Soviet 
context. Because the organization itself had a long history of state opposition to its activities 
                                                                                                                                                       
967
 Chris Bader, ―When Prophecy Passes Unnoticed: New Perspectives on Failed Prophecy,‖ Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 38, no. 1 (1999): 122-23. 
 
968
 1980 Yearbook of Jehovah‟s Witnesses (Brooklyn: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 
1980), 30-31. 
 
969
 Penton has charted this surge based on yearly statistics provided by the organization in its yearbooks. Penton, 
Apocalypse Delayed, 96. 
 
970
 DAZO, f. 1 op. 9, spr. 59, ark. 60-62. 
 294 
in other countries, it was able to address many of these issues in its publications, for instance 
on matters of voting and trade union membership. When in doubt, the Witnesses tended to 
follow the motto of ―better safe than sorry,‖ avoiding films, social organizations, and other 
aspects of Soviet culture and society that might compromise their beliefs. This position put 
them at further odds with the surrounding world, bringing both adults and children into 
conflict with local authorities and atheist agitators. Ironically, this only reinforced the 
Witnesses‘ longstanding views on state persecution of true Christians.  
 The organization‘s ―neutral‖ stance on political matters cannot be understood without 
a critical reading of how this concept worked in practice and an appreciation of the fact that 
―neutrality‖ itself is a deeply political position. The Witnesses‘ rejection of secular 
government, combined with their specific denunciations of communist ideology and Soviet 
governance, offered a clear critique of the state‘s official promises that it could achieve peace 
and prosperity for all of its citizens. While these statements constituted biblical prophecy for 
the Witnesses, Soviet officials, not surprisingly, saw them as a political rejection of its 
policies and achievements. This fact reinforces the reality that Soviet persecution of 
Witnesses was not entirely irrational, but rather based, at least in part, on the real threat posed 
by the Witnesses to the existing social and political order.  
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PREACHING ATHEISM IN THE LATE SOVIET ERA 
“I am sending you out like sheep among wolves. Therefore be as shrewd as snakes and as 
innocent as doves.”  Matthew 10:16 
 
 
 While Witnesses labored to construct viable religious communities, the Soviet state 
implemented an agitation and propaganda campaign against believers. During the Hundred 
Days Campaign in 1954, the Party asserted that previous atheist propaganda had failed 
because it was far too limited, abstract, and divorced from real life. The post-Stalin state 
made it its duty to correct these perceived mistakes and to know about every facet of 
religious life within its borders. In order to reliminate religious belief, it also recognized the 
need for local efforts by trained agitators armed with detailed knowledge of individual 
religious communities. Post-Stalin official discourse on religion divided believers into two 
camps: ordinary or rank-and-file (riadovye) believers, and dangerous fanatics and leaders. 
The state emphasized that most believers fell into the former category and had to be 
encouraged to rejoin society using only persuasive, non-coercive methods. Authorities saw 
the latter category, however, as a distinct threat to Soviet society that had to be eliminated, by 
force if necessary. A 1964 article in the newspaper Pravda Ukrainy (Ukraine Truth) vividly 
illustrates this view:  
It is said that rabid dogs must be destroyed, but those whom the dog bites must be 
treated. We must wage a decisive battle against those who consciously harm our great 
work of building communism, but also ―treat,‖ patiently, intelligently, humanely, all 
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of those for whom life obstacles led them off the true path and threw them into 
Jehovism‘s embrace.‖971 
 
If rank-and-file members were to be ―treated‖ of their religious disease, leaders were to be 
―destroyed.‖ As a result, Soviet publications frequently referred to ordinary members as 
victims and atheist work as necessary to ―free‖ them from the chains of religious dogmatism. 
One 1965 work declared that the struggle against religion ―is against religious ideology, not 
against the people whom it has infected.‖ It called for the ―liberation‖ of believers so that 
they could become ―conscious builders of communism.‖972 
The Soviet state‘s revitalization of antireligious agitprop represented an unwelcome 
intrusion into the private lives of Witnesses perhaps equal to the Stalin-era exiles and arrests. 
Witnesses faced intensive pressure to conform to societal norms in all aspects of their daily 
lives. Their coworkers used meetings at work to discuss and condemn Witnesses‘ private 
lives and religious activities. Their local papers ran steady news coverage scrutinizing the 
most mundane of believers‘ activities. Local Party agitators hosted lectures, film screenings, 
and talks to denounce religious practices and beliefs. Witnesses‘ fellow villagers and 
townspeople came to their homes to convince them to abandon their beliefs and embrace 
communist ideology. And their former fellow believers, who had since renounced the faith, 
attempted to convert them to patriotic, loyal Soviet citizens and atheists.  
 The Watch Tower organization noticed the sea change in antireligious propaganda. Its 
1960 report on the USSR noted: 
Previous to this the Communists in Russia have tried to deal with the Witnesses in a 
quiet manner. Obviously they felt that such a course was the best one for them to 
follow in their efforts to keep the message of Jehovah‘s kingdom suppressed. Now 
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they have resorted to dealing with this problem in public. They seem to have realized 
that they have lost the battle to keep the message from being spread throughout all of 
Russia.
973
 
 
The battle between Soviet ideology and Witness beliefs had entered the public arena, with 
both sides eager to win converts so that their vision of utopia—be it communism or the 
millennial kingdom—could be fulfilled. This chapter will examine how the Soviet state 
hoped to turn believers into active builders of communism. It will also describe how the 
Soviet state constructed a standard, official discourse about the Witnesses. 
Witnesses had their own strategy to deal with the state‘s public attacks on religious 
belief. A 1956 Watchtower article bore the title, ―Cautious as Serpents Among Wolves,‖ a 
reference to Matthew 10:16, in which Jesus advises his disciples, ―I am sending you out like 
sheep among wolves. Therefore be as shrewd as snakes and as innocent as doves.‖974 The 
Soviet media quickly picked up on the new organizational motto and intentionally 
mistranslated it to read ―poisonous as snakes.‖ A 1960 issue of the antireligious magazine, 
Voyovnychyi ateist, printed a full-page editorial cartoon against the Witnesses with the 
caption informing readers that the Witnesses‘ motto is: ―Be quiet like doves, and poisonous 
as snakes.‖975 True to their slogan, Witnesses exercised both caution and resourcefulness in 
responding to atheist agitprop. Their actions show that some believers actively contested 
attempts by atheist agitators to distort and defame religious beliefs and practices. 
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Framing Official Discourse 
The state‘s proclamation that most believers were loyal Soviet citizens required 
atheist agitators to take a more tactful and patient approach to their work. A 1958 booklet on 
Witnesses and state religious policy informed readers, ―The Communist Party, to achieve the 
real liberation of all workers from religious prejudices, is waging an ideological battle against 
religious ideology and organizing the broadest possible scientific-educational and anti-
religious propaganda, without offending the religious sentiments of believers and religious 
servants.‖976 This message, at least in theory, applied to all religious communities, regardless 
of registration status.  
The press tried to reflect this new attitude toward religious believers, but much of its 
coverage remained offensive to believers. It still contained factual errors, exaggerations, and 
false accusations, and it did little to further the acceptance of Witnesses as loyal citizens in 
the minds of Soviet citizens. A 1967 CRA report on atheist press in the Komi republic 
illustrates this problem. The CRA criticized local papers in the region for not printing enough 
materials on ―Jehovists,‖ but also rebuked the author of an article calling for criminal charges 
against all Jehovist parents as too harsh. The press found itself caught between a rock and a 
hard place, needing to take a firm stance against religion, without antagonizing believers. Not 
surprisingly, many newspapers found it easier to publish more abstract materials against 
religious belief without adapting it to reflect local conditions. In Komi, local papers printed 
articles on Baptists in districts where there were no actual Baptists.
977
 Similarly in Ivano-
Frankivs‘k oblast, newspapers ran articles on Islam despite the lack of any Muslim 
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community in the area.
978
 Yet these actions, too, garnered criticism from CRA officials for 
incorrect attitudes toward atheist work. 
The post-Stalin Soviet state felt that lack of information on the Witnesses in the press 
had hindered atheist work and left citizens vulnerable to proselytism. Indeed, while the 
religious councils, police, and security organs had extensive information about local leaders, 
organizational structure, rituals, and beliefs, they did not generally share this data with the 
public. The public in the Stalin era had known virtually nothing about the Witnesses outside 
of what it had learned directly from Witnesses themselves or from local gossip. The 
Witnesses and other small religious communities had almost never appeared in any atheist 
materials. Seeking to correct this perceived problem, the Soviet media dramatically increased 
its attention to unregistered minority religious communities after 1953. In fact, a 
disproportionate amount of atheist publications after 1953 focused on efforts among these 
groups. For example, a survey of all Soviet atheist literature from 1955 to 1966 showed that 
17 percent was dedicated to Witnesses, 12 percent to Baptists, 9 percent to Pentecostals, 7 
percent to Seventh Day Adventists, and about 50 percent to ―sectarianism‖ in general.979   
In response to the state‘s call to make atheist work specific to local conditions, 
agitators and newspapers in regions with Witnesses began publicizing the existence of these 
communities in atheist lectures and articles. In areas with high concentrations of Witnesses, 
press coverage of the religion could be quite intense, often dwarfing that of all other 
religions. Zakarpatskaia pravda (Transcarpathian Truth), an oblast-level newspaper, printed 
almost 200 articles solely on the Witnesses during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. Other 
western Ukrainian oblast newspapers, such as Lvovskaia pravda (L‘viv Truth, in L‘viv 
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oblast) and Prykarpats‟ka pravda (Carpathian Truth, in Ivano-Frankivs‘k oblast), covered the 
Witnesses extensively. District papers in northern Moldavia devoted a remarkable amount of 
space to the religion, with articles on Witnesses in many northern districts appearing far more 
often than those on any other religious community.
980
 As Moldavian district papers typically 
consisted of only four pages and ran only two to four times a week, Witness articles took up 
a substantial portion of a single edition, at times filling an entire page with articles and 
photos.
981
 In Edineţ district, home to several hundred Witnesses, local papers printed more 
than 150 articles during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.  
Republic-level papers, particularly Pravda Ukrainy, Radians‟ka Ukraina (Soviet 
Ukraine), Sovetskaia Moldavia (Soviet Moldavia), Sovetskaia Kirgiziia (Soviet Kirgizia), and 
Kazakhstanskaia pravda (Kazakhstan Truth), supplemented more extensive local and 
regional coverage with additional articles on the Witnesses. District and regional papers 
reprinted some of these articles. Further, the two national anti-religious magazines, 
Voyovnychyi ateist and Nauka i religiia, published more than fifty articles each on the 
Witnesses from the 1950s through the mid-1980s. In sum, Soviet citizens who lived in one of 
the regions or republics with a significant Witness presence would have found it almost 
impossible to avoid reading about the Witnesses on a weekly, if not monthly basis.  
Moreover, state publishing houses printed numerous book-length studies of the 
Witnesses beginning in the 1960s. These books served primarily as practical guides for 
agitators. The Knowledge Society‘s union-level and regional publishing houses, along with 
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other regional presses, distributed books, tracts, and booklets on the Witnesses, their beliefs 
and practices, and how to conduct atheist work among them.
982
 Other publishers produced 
lengthier, academic works by Soviet scholars, who delved into the Witnesses‘ history in the 
United States and the Soviet Union, sometimes incorporating sociological research and 
theological analysis.
983
 
State film industries released several fictionalized and documentary films for use in 
atheist agitation, such as Reportazh z t‟my (Report from the Darkness) on the Witnesses‘ 
underground printing bunkers in Irkutsk oblast.
984
 Another film, Armageddon, revolved 
around a love story between two youths. The young female protagonist joins the Witnesses 
while her love interest has gone off to serve in the army. With the help of the local collective, 
the young man returns home and wins back his woman from the sect.
985
 These films relied 
heavily on information from the religious councils in scripting the narrative. A 1959 letter 
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from a Leningrad movie studio to the CRCA shows how this process worked. The studio 
wanted to make a propaganda film about the Witnesses and had a list of questions it needed 
answered. It asked whether Witnesses conduct water baptism, use icons, have formal choirs, 
allow children to participate at their meetings, and what their prayer houses look like and 
how they dress. The CRCA sent the studio a detailed response.
986
  
Official propaganda on the Witnesses had much in common with Soviet discourse on 
other Western Christian religious communities, which portrayed these believers as victims of 
unscrupulous leaders who took advantage of individuals‘ ignorance, naïveté, or personal 
hardships to convert them.
987
 Having joined a religion, they struggled with the inherent 
contradictions in religious beliefs, particularly in regard to science and biblical literalism, and 
grew suspicious of their leaders‘ hidden motives, either for personal enrichment or political 
power. The Soviet media presented believers as being trapped by fear or indecision, lacking 
the tools to renounce religion, yet envious of their secular neighbors, who enjoyed happy, 
fulfilling lives. Intent to emphasize the positive, this discourse focused on those believers 
who had made the leap out of faith to rejoin Soviet society. It permeated atheist lectures and 
talks, newspaper and journal articles, atheist booklets and pamphlets, and academic works on 
Christian believers. It also pervaded both the external and internal languages of the state. 
Indeed, religious council reports often showed little difference in content from published 
antireligious tracts. Similarly, at a closed Moldavian TsK meeting in 1960, Party members 
discussed the organization‘s need to distinguish between ―honest Soviet people‖ who had 
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joined sects due to ―political immaturity‖ and those ―dishonest people‖ who exploited 
ignorant individuals for their own aims.
988
  
While Soviet discourse on Witnesses incorporated fundamentals from the broader 
official image of believers as ignorant, naive, and vulnerable victims of manipulative, greedy, 
and power-hungry leaders and fanatics, it also included unique elements. Since the Witnesses 
did not have any legal standing in the Soviet Union, unlike many Baptist, Adventist, and 
other Western Christian organizations, Soviet discourse emphasized the illegality of the 
religion and its subversive underground political activities. This fact made it difficult to 
depict the majority of Witnesses as loyal Soviet citizens, hindering Soviet efforts to fit the 
Witnesses into the broader narrative about religious believers. Similarly, the continued arrest 
of many Witnesses, and their refusal to conform to social norms and state laws, meant that 
state and Party officials could not easily avoid offensive or politically-charged language that 
portrayed Witnesses as dangerous criminals.
989
 Soviet discourse thus settled into an uneasy 
balance of painting most Witnesses as ordinary citizens duped into joining a religious faith, 
while also characterizing the Watch Tower organization as the most fanatical and anti-Soviet 
of all Soviet religious organizations.  
Perhaps more than any other factor, the organization‘s American roots made the 
Witnesses an object of deep suspicion during the Cold War. Soviet sources often referred to 
the Witnesses‘ American leadership simply as ―Brooklyn,‖ an allusion to the location of the 
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organization‘s central offices.990 The author of one antireligious work noted that for 
Witnesses, ―Their ‗god‘ is not in heaven, but on earth, in Brooklyn.‖991 Another referred to 
Watch Towe literature as ―literature from Brooklyn, that same Brooklyn that is near New 
York, that same New York that is in the USA.‖992 According to Soviet accounts, the 
Witnesses‘ American connections demonstrated their political support for capitalism and 
bourgeois democracy.
993
 In this view, the reactionary capitalist West used the Witnesses as a 
tool to undermine Soviet attempts to build world peace and achieve communism.  
Soviet accounts disputed the organization‘s claims that it constituted a religion, 
arguing that for the Witnesses, religion served solely as a ―mask‖ to hide their true political 
goals.
994
 One editorial cartoon depicted a worker asking a Witness, ―What is it that you, 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses, do?‖ The Witness replies, ―[We conduct] anti-Soviet agitation. And if 
there‘s time left over, we pray.‖995 A former Witness, in a 1961 series of articles for 
Molodezh‟ Moldavii (Moldovan Youth), concluded, ―The Jehovah‘s Witness organization 
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has no faith in God and is subservient to dirty politics against the people.‖996 A 1958 book, 
Dvoinoe Dno (Double Bottom), used the metaphor of a double-bottomed suitcase, which 
Witnesses employed to transport illegal literature, to describe how the organization hid its 
political message beneath religious beliefs.
997
 
Almost all Soviet publications described the organization‘s doctrine on Armageddon 
as misanthropic, violent, and politically motivated. They depicted this belief as tantamount to 
support for war and the annihilation of the majority of the population. The press portrayed 
the organization as teaching its members to rejoice at the prospects of a violent extermination 
of humankind.
998
 Some articles suggested that Witnesses themselves would take part in the 
mass slaughter.
999
 One former Witness described his misgivings with Armageddon, which he 
interpreted as meaning that his salvation depended on the destruction of everyone else.
1000
 
Belief in an inevitable battle that would destroy all worldly governments contradicted the 
state‘s promise of an eventual triumph of communism over capitalism. Press reports 
suggested that talk of the annihilation of secular authority referred solely to the Soviet Union 
and Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe.
1001
 This transformed a belief in the destruction 
of Satan‘s followers into a call for the murder of all communists and citizens of socialist 
states.
1002
 Indeed, one academic work notes that, according to the Witnesses, Satan ―has an  
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exact address—the USSR and the countries of socialist cooperation.‖1003 
Within the context of the Cold War, talk of a ―holy war‖ often assumed a specifically 
nuclear tone by the 1960s.
1004
 Soviet sources depicted the Witnesses praising the invention of 
the atomic bomb as God‘s weapon against Satan in Armageddon.1005 A 1961 work claimed 
that the Witnesses advocated a third world war between the Soviet Union and the West to be 
fought with nuclear and hydrogen weapons. The author noted that the doctrine of 
Armageddon buttressed the ―atomic psychosis‖ promoted by the Pentagon, West Germany, 
and NATO.
1006
 One former Witness declared that Armageddon was a code word for the 
destruction of socialism by thermonuclear rockets and bombs.
1007
  
In general, the Witnesses faced accusations that their apocalyptic religious language 
masked a political agenda of promoting the political and military interests of the capitalist 
West. Their refusal to complete obligatory military service made them vulnerable to 
accusations of disloyalty. In the eyes of the Soviet press, such acts amounted to sedition. One 
newspaper article told the story of a Witness, a trained medic, who attempted to avoid service 
altogether, but eventually enlisted under fear of criminal prosecution. He then skillfully 
avoided getting sent to the front during World War II by faking a heart condition. After 
demobilization, he freely took advantage of his status as a veteran to get perks at his job.
1008
 
One former Witness, who fought in the Red Army during World War II prior to joining the 
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faith, recalled his outrage when he discovered that some of his fellow believers had not 
served their country and even bragged about it. Announcing in the local paper his break with 
the Witnesses, he declared that he would take up arms to defend the homeland again if 
necessary.
1009
 
Numerous Soviet publications accused the organization of promoting 
―cosmopolitanism,‖ best defined as a refusal to recognize national borders or loyalties, under 
the guise of religious doctrine. Witnesses allegedly instructed members to reject national 
identity and patriotism, and to view themselves instead as world citizens, or alternately, as 
citizens of Christ‘s future kingdom on earth.1010 One man, when brought before a court in the 
Komi republic, described his nationality as ―former Ukrainian, current Jehovah‘s 
Witness.‖1011 At the same time, many authors suggested that the organization misrepresented 
its so-called cosmopolitanism, which had little to do with religious beliefs and everything to 
do with political expedience. They asserted that the Watch Tower leadership encouraged 
members in socialist countries to disobey the state, while advocating submission to state 
authority in capitalist countries.
1012
  
Espionage charges appeared sporadically in the press and served as evidence that 
while the Witnesses publicly preached cosmopolitanism, they secretly pledged loyalty to the 
United States. A 1964 work claimed that American intelligence recommended that their spies 
                                                 
1009
 L. Boiko, ―Pochemu ia porval s sektoi,‖ Sotsialisticheskii Donbass, August 2, 1958, 2. 
 
1010
 A. Z. Shysh, Armageddon? Pro politychniy kharakter egovists‟kogo dogmatu „viyna Armageddon‟ (L‘viv: 
Kameniar, 1975), 34-36; and A.  Shamaro, ―Torgovtsy strakhom i nadezhdoi,‖ Nauki i religiia, no. 5 (1963): 
30. 
 
1011
 Rekemchuk, Dvoinoe dno, 47. 
 
1012
 Bartoshevich and Borisoglebskii, Imenem boga Iegovy, 90-91.  
 308 
make contact with Witnesses as ―loyal and trustworthy allies.‖1013 The fact that the Witnesses 
kept detailed records of their membership and their missionary activities played an important 
role in these accusations. Press reports accused the Witnesses of sending sensitive 
information on the Soviet Union to American intelligence.
1014
 Several publications alleged 
that Witnesses were gathering data on the prices of basic goods in the Soviet Union.
1015
 
Publications cited the seizure of goods, printing equipment, and currency from high-level 
elders as further evidence of illegal foreign connections.
1016
 Again, Witness beliefs were seen 
as a religious smoke screen that clouded the real, political aims of the organization.   
Heightened Western scrutiny of Soviet religious persecution starting in the 1970s led 
to a greater emphasis on Soviet guarantees of freedom of conscience in atheist 
propaganda.
1017
 Feeling an increased need to justify state actions against religious 
organizations, some Soviet works claimed that the capitalist West employed religion as 
―psychological warfare‖ to turn citizens against the Soviet state.1018 A 1984 book 
acknowledged foreign allegations that the Soviet Union persecuted religious believers. Yet it 
asserted that the state needed to take harsh measures against religious communities that 
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contained a ―few bad apples‖ (v sem‟e ne bez uroda), namely the Witnesses, Reform 
Adventists, and unregistered Pentecostals and Baptists.
1019
  
Soviet publications covered criminal trials of Witnesses, not as examples of state 
persecution, but as fair and necessary court decisions based on the defendant‘s illegal actions. 
Accusations of criminal activities provided a strong justification for the organization‘s 
continued illegality. They also allowed the press to argue that Witnesses did not suffer 
persecution for their beliefs, but rather for their underground political activities, anti-Soviet 
behavior, and violation of Soviet laws. As a 1962 article stated, ―Every citizen of the Soviet 
Union is free to practice any religion and no one will condemn him for this. But, if under the 
guise of religious activity someone violates Soviet laws, infringing on that which is sacred to 
us, our people will deal with him according to the law.‖1020  
In keeping with its denial of religious persecution, the Soviet state never 
acknowledged the mass exiles of Witnesses. Books that did include background on the 
organization‘s Soviet history simply skipped from the 1940s into the late 1950s, or referred 
to Witnesses as relocating or resettling in Siberia of their own volition. In a 1957 newspaper 
article by a former Witness in Moldavia, for example, the author indicated without 
explanation that he and his family ―ended up in Kurgan oblast.‖1021 One 1960 work, which 
perhaps came the closest to discussing the exile, retold an incident in which a Witness child 
recited a poem entitled ―How demons took us to Siberia.‖ The author, however, notes simply 
that the poem was anti-Soviet.
1022
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Official discourse on Witnesses never fully adhered to the guidelines outlined in the 
Khrushchev antireligious campaigns because the state entrusted its conveyance to atheist 
agitators and the press, and then did little to ensure that these groups properly transmitted its 
message. As a result, the press and atheist publications repeated wild rumors and stories that 
depicted all Witnesses, leaders and ordinary believers alike, as amoral, dangerous, anti-
Soviet villains. One 1962 newspaper article alleged that Witness elders require female 
members to lose their virginity in group orgies and even claimed that this explained the 
pregnancy of several local women, whom the author named.
1023
 According to a 1979 book on 
sects in North Ossetia, the Witnesses avoid wearing metal because they believe that God 
intends to send an electrical current to earth to burn non-believers.
1024
 Bizarre accusations 
may have kept the public leery of getting involved with the Witnesses, but they could not 
have convinced current believers. During a question and answer session with the CRA in 
1983, local Witnesses in Crimea asked the speaker why the state demanded a certain level of 
expertise from those who write books on economics, but apparently anyone who wants to can 
write a book on atheism.
1025
  
Many scholars and agitators recognized the shortcomings of atheist literature on the 
Witnesses, modifying or rejecting specific tenets of this broad general discourse and 
criticizing baseless accusations like the ones cited above. For example, some works gave 
serious attention to Witness theology as a religion, and not just a political mask.
1026
 Nauka i 
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religiia printed an article in 1972 critiquing several aspects of the official discourse, 
including the notion that the Witnesses were purely a political organization and that 
Armageddon was a code word for a third world war.
1027
 In a 1978 scholarly work on the 
Witnesses, the author rejected the ―assertion that appears in our literature that this religious 
movement is ‗not so much a religious as a political organization.‘ For the majority of 
believers, it is first and foremost a religion.‖1028 Yet even works that acknowledged the 
religious aspects of the organization connected it to reactionary political ideas.  
Propaganda repeatedly highlighted the negative effect that religion had on believers, 
citing multiple examples of women victimized by predatory religious sects, including the 
Witnesses. A sociological study of the Witnesses published in 1981 described the inhumane 
treatment of women in the organization, claiming that the Watch Tower organization taught 
woman that their role was as a ―loyal slave‖ to man.1029 This fit in with the state‘s assertion 
that most believers were elderly women, whom religious organizations, especially Western 
Christian denominations, treated as inferior to men.
1030
 The Soviet media depicted male 
Witnesses as chauvinists who justified beating their wives into submission by citing their 
biblical right to rule their households.
1031
 The local Moldavian press accused one man of 
forcing his wife to attend Bible studies, telling her he would kill her if she refused. The 
man‘s local elders had allegedly instructed him to bring her ―dead or alive.‖ She left him 
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instead.
1032
 Knowledge Society publications advised agitators to discuss the inequality of 
women in religious sects, and to show women how only Soviet power offered them an equal 
role in society.
1033
 
Beyond ignorance and female oppression, atheist propaganda made heavy use of fear 
as a reason why Soviet citizens chose to remain in the Witnesses even when they had doubts 
about the religion‘s beliefs or realized its anti-Soviet or criminal undertones. For example, 
one article related the story of a woman who wanted to leave the Witnesses. Local leaders 
frightened her into remaining in the organization by appearing at her windows at night and 
conjuring up a fake ―spirit‖ who made prophecies about the dire consequences of renouncing 
the faith. The woman became so scared that she fell ill and had to be hospitalized.
1034
 A 1959 
article claimed that a local leader had decapitated a stray cat in front of members with an axe, 
telling them that this would happen to them too if they disobeyed him.
1035
  
Numerous publications recounted the deleterious effects of Witness beliefs on 
members‘ physical and mental health.1036 A 1961 book retold the story of a Siberian Witness 
who went insane after working in an underground printing bunker for two years. He ended up 
in a mental hospital in Irkutsk, incapable of speaking until six months into his treatment, 
when he uttered the words: ―All-powerful Jehovah God, help!‖1037 Some books contained 
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stories of Witnesses drowning or becoming deathly ill as a result of baptisms.
1038
 One doctor 
testified at a public trial of a Witness that believers suffered a disproportionate amount of 
ailments, including epilepsy, due to the harmful effects of constant fear-mongering by leaders 
about the coming Armageddon.
1039
 Many works cited incidents in which Witnesses died after 
their leaders told them not to seek medical treatment and instead to pray for healing. One 
woman allegedly died from cancer after she waited too long to seek treatment. Her local 
leader told her that God gave her the disease as punishment for going to the doctor. 
1040
  
Since Witnesses allegedly spent all their time in fearful anticipation of the imminent 
arrival of Armageddon, Soviet sources depicted them as indifferent to labor and hard work. 
This interest returned to believers only after they had rejected their faith and embraced Soviet 
society. One man, who left the Witnesses while serving time for anti-Soviet activity, voiced 
regrets that he had wasted so much of his life without anything to show for it: ―Why did I rob 
myself of the best years of my life? Why am I not an agronomist, a doctor, or an 
engineer?‖1041 Another former Witness noted how he had found all work pointless with 
Armageddon just around the corner. Since leaving the organization, however, he became a 
shock worker and his portrait hung on the honor board at his workplace.
1042
 The fact that 
some Witnesses had originally avoided joining collective farms was also mentioned as 
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evidence of a weak work ethic among believers.
1043
 One man, renouncing his faith at a public 
hearing, asked the court for forgiveness and the opportunity to prove his change of heart by 
working at the collective farm.
1044
 
 
Ordinary Believers vs. Fanatics and Leaders 
By framing Witnesses as victims of their own organization, official discourse 
reinforced the state‘s distinction between so-called ordinary believers and leaders/fanatics. 
Almost all accounts about ordinary believers focused on those individuals who had already 
chosen to renounce their faith. This made it easier for the Soviet press to portray them in a 
sympathetic, if patronizing, light, as gullible individuals, often uneducated and rural, who 
joined the Witnesses as a result of trickery and manipulation. In this view, believers had little 
to no knowledge of the illegal, political activities of their leaders and trusted that they had 
joined a religion that could solve all their problems. The Soviet media used images of spider 
webs to portray how religious organizations trapped unwitting citizens and poisoned their 
minds.
1045
 One newspaper reporter commented, ―Just as the spider sets out its net and drinks 
the blood of those insects caught in it, so too does the sectarian weave a web of lies and 
deceit around trusting children‘s souls.‖1046 Similarly, at a 1956 Moldavian Knowledge 
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Society seminar on how to give atheist lectures, one speaker commented that ―sectarian 
propagandists try to recruit weak-willed people and those who have experienced or are 
experiencing misfortune or dissatisfaction with their personal life.‖1047 A lecturer on 
scientific atheism stated that religious sects had grown more active due to the hardships of 
World War II and the immediate postwar period, exploiting instances of personal tragedy or 
inattention from the collective to win over vulnerable citizens.
1048
  
The Soviet media described how believers gradually underwent a process of 
enlightenment as they slowly realized the organization‘s illegal political activities and the 
falsity of its doctrines. The amazing technological achievements of the Soviet Union also 
swayed believers to embrace communism. In one instance, a newspaper printed a statement 
from Witnesses who described how the launch of Sputnik and Khrushchev‘s trip to America 
helped convince them to embrace atheism.
1049
 Sputnik convinced another Witness that there 
was no God in the heavens, only Soviet rockets.
1050
 The press used these stories to 
demonstrate the superiority of communist ideology over religious belief. 
The fact that many Witnesses had joined the organization in the western borderlands 
prior to or shortly after the arrival of Soviet power allowed the state to characterize some of 
its own citizenry as backward and foolish, while shifting the blame for this situation to the 
capitalist Polish and Romanian interwar governments. This created the impression that time 
would naturally solve this problem, since individuals raised under Soviet power would be 
less susceptible to such tactics. A 1963 work told the story of a Moldavian Witness, born to a 
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poor peasant family under Romanian rule in 1919. With no formal education, he was lured 
into the Witnesses by a traveling proselytizer in 1946, who told him that, at Armageddon, 
everyone would die except the Witnesses. In this earthly paradise, the blind would see, the 
lame would walk, and all the women would be beautiful. Years later, he began to realize the 
massive corruption among his local leaders and found troubling contradictions in the biblical 
teachings. He eventually left the organization in the early 1960s.
1051
 The example of Mariia 
Kuziv from Stanislav oblast provides another illustration of the typical former believer as 
represented in Soviet publications. Under Polish rule, she received only three years of 
education in a village school. When her husband, father, and two brothers died at the front 
during World War II, she was left to raise their three young children on her own. A Witness 
who wanted to use Mariia‘s house as a potential hideout offered her money, telling her it 
came from ―Jehovah himself.‖ After a few more meetings and payments, he convinced 
Mariia to let him dig a hole under her stove to hide literature, making her an unwitting 
accomplice to the organization‘s illegal deeds. The author cited this story to make his point 
that primarily ―weak, unstable, ignorant people‖ join the Witnesses.1052 
If ordinary believers represented the most backward, vulnerable elements in Soviet 
society, official discourse portrayed religious leaders and so-called fanatics as a motley 
assortment of evildoers: former kulaks, rapists, murderers, child abusers, drunkards, 
deadbeats, Nazi collaborators, thieves, and speculators. A 1965 newspaper article provided a 
broad definition of a religious fanatic: ―It is someone who has so absorbed religious illusions, 
so tortured his mind with God‘s cloying false promises, that his mind has become 
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impenetrable to surrounding reality.‖1053 Soviet publications depicted leaders as having little 
investment in the actual religious faith—if they believed it at all—and exploiting religion as a 
means to their advance their political agenda or to get rich. As one 1974 Knowledge Society 
publication put it, most Witness leaders ―do not believe in God or Satan, nor in biblical 
texts.‖1054 Accounts of leaders invariably portrayed them greedily collecting donations from 
members to spend on lavish goods for themselves. A 1975 book painted a detailed portrait of 
one man who lived in a two-storied estate with servants. The author described how, over 
glasses of cognac, the leader doled out money to his underlings, who then deposited the 
funds into their secret Swiss bank accounts.
1055
 A 1960 Moldavian newspaper article listed 
the supposedly luxury items owned by a local Witness leader, including two electrical 
heaters, kitchen appliances, a gas stove, and a phone, with information on the exact cost of 
each item.
1056
  
As the above article demonstrates, the press frequently cited preaching about 
Armageddon as evidence of the insincerity of leaders‘ beliefs. Many press accounts 
characterized leaders as hypocrites who privately focused on acquiring wealth, but publicly 
advised believers against the accumulation of goods in preparation for the millennial 
kingdom. The 1977 work, Armageddona ne Budet (There Will Be No Armageddon), related 
an anecdote about one leader who bought a new Zhiguli automobile, noting, ―Where is he 
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going to get gasoline after Armageddon?‖1057 Similarly, publications exploited the 
organization‘s ongoing schism as evidence that leaders only cared about their hold on power. 
One article referred to Pavlo Ziatek as an ―old rooster,‖ and the battle between him and the 
oppositionists as a ―cock fight‖ over who would rule the roost.1058 Accounts of the schism 
within the organization by former leaders involved in the events described it as a struggle for 
control and access to funds.
1059
  
The Soviet media did not merely suggest that leaders were crooked, but that they 
represented a serious threat to their members and society at large. Repeated accounts of 
Witnesses raping, assaulting, and murdering Soviet citizens enforced the idea that these were 
extremely dangerous individuals who could not be allowed to remain free in Soviet society. 
The story of one Witness, who allegedly impregnated and then attempted to kill a thirteen-
year-old girl, appeared in several publications. The media also frequently mentioned the story 
of a man who burned his wife and aunt alive when they left the Witnesses.
1060
 One piece 
suggested the man had gotten inspiration for his violent act from the Bible, in particular 
God‘s command to Abraham that he sacrifice his only son.1061 In a 1979 article, a reporter 
told the story of one woman who had joined the Witnesses. When her husband, in part due to 
the stress of his wife‘s newfound religious faith, became an alcoholic and cheated on her, she 
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attempted to set the house on fire, hoping to kill him and his lover. The village soviet 
chairman intervened before this could happen.
1062
  
Violent narratives like these served to undermine the Witnesses‘ self-proclaimed 
superior morality by suggesting that, in reality, members did not uphold such high standards. 
A 1958 work on sectarianism drew a sharp distinction on this basis between communist and 
sectarian morality. The author, noting that sects teach people to love their enemies, asked 
how a Soviet citizen could love fascists who had killed so many innocent people, or love the 
American imperialists who had executed peaceful Korean citizens. Real love for humanity, 
he concluded, means hating the enemies of humanity and of the working class.
1063
 Similarly, 
Soviet discourse depicted the idea of repentance as insincere and self-serving. One 1963 
work recounted how a Witness impregnated a young milkmaid at the local collective farm, 
resulting in him being expelled from the religion. Six months later, after praying day and 
night for forgiveness, he began attending meetings again with the elders‘ approval.1064 
Overall, the Witnesses‘ belief in redemption translated in Soviet texts into a cynical 
justification for all manner of illegal actions, not just war crimes.  
World War II imagery played a critical role in Soviet depictions of Witness elders and 
so-called ―fanatics.‖ Publications generally remained silent on the Witnesses‘ persecution in 
Nazi Germany or suggested that the Nazis had favored the Witnesses during occupation.
1065
 
The press described the Watch Tower organization as providing a postwar cover for former 
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Nazis, who converted to the Witnesses either during the war in Nazi concentration or POW 
camps, or after the war in Soviet prison camps, where they were sent for alleged 
collaboration.
1066
 Several publications detailed the wartime deeds of one Witness who 
allegedly worked as a translator for the Germans under occupation. A 1962 work said that, 
while serving time for treason, this woman ―did not change her views regarding Soviet power 
and the Soviet people, but simply changed the form of her struggle‖ by converting to the 
Witnesses.
1067
 The ―Nazi-turned-Witness‖ became one of the most common tropes in 
literature about the Watch Tower organization. These accusations suggested a fundamental 
similarity between Nazi and Witness ideology.
1068
 At least one academic work alleged that 
the Nazis sought out Witnesses as potential collaborators and spies in the occupied 
territories.
1069
 Other accounts conflated both Witness beliefs and Nazism with Ukrainian 
nationalism.
1070
 In this version, former Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists joined the Witnesses 
because they found the organization‘s anti-Soviet and anticommunist political rhetoric 
familiar and appealing. It also offered them a new underground structure through which to 
continue their subversive political activity.
1071
  
Not all Witnesses had lived in the occupied territories during the war, however, and  
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the Soviet media could not tar all believers with the charge of Nazism or Ukrainian 
nationalism. Still, most press reports applied the broad themes of fanaticism and violence to 
depictions of the Witnesses. Most commonly, they portrayed the family life of ―fanatical‖ 
Witnesses as dysfunctional and abusive, with parents instilling religious values in their 
children through brute force.
1072
 A 1963 article recounted an incident in which such harsh 
treatment by parents led to the death of their young son.
1073
 Soviet accounts alleged that 
Witness parents isolated their children from society, denying them the happy childhood that 
other Soviet children enjoyed.
1074
 In one such incident, a father told his son, ―Do not even 
think of wearing that satanic collar! I‘ll kill you!‖ The son left home and turned into a 
hooligan. He later fatally wounded his father during a brawl.
1075
 Stories like this served as 
―proof‖ both of the psychological damage caused by a religious upbringing and of the desire 
of children to participate in Soviet life. They also demonstrated the dangers that fanatical 
members represented not only to society and state, but also to their own families.  
The press used such accusations to justify the state‘s decisions to revoke the child 
custody rights of some so-called Witness fanatics. A 1960 study of the organization included 
the story of Vladimir Derkach, the father of a Witness, who appealed to the courts to grant 
him custody rights of his grandchildren. He testified that his son and daughter-in-law, since 
joining the Witnesses, had mistreated their children and barred him from visiting, as a result 
of which he had to sneak food to them through an open window. After the parents discovered 
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this activity, they kept the shutters closed and the lights off.
1076
 A 1959 article recounted how 
one woman entrusted her young daughter to the care of her older sister. When she returned 
home a year later, the daughter and her Witness husband had brainwashed the girl, who no 
longer recognized her mother.
1077
 The distraught woman appealed to the courts for redress. 
Similar stories of neglect and abuse featured prominently in articles on depriving Witness 
parents of custody rights.
1078
  
Although many accounts characterized women as victims of a sexist religious sect, 
some narratives reinforced traditional gender roles in attacking fanatical female Witnesses. 
The Soviet press depicted these women as devoting all their time to the religion while 
disregarding their duties as wives and mothers. Newspapers printed complaints from 
husbands about their Witness wives, whom they said did not cook, clean, or do laundry. 
Reporters from the village of Briceni, Moldavia, traveled to investigate one such complaint 
letter in 1964. The woman, accused of not speaking to her husband, cooking for him, or 
keeping their home heated, told the reporters that she did not need a husband who did not 
believe in God.
1079
 In one case detailed in Zakarpatskaia pravda, a young man falsely 
accused his wife of being a Witness so that he could divorce her, claiming she did not do any 
housework and that she beat him. The court threw out the claim, declaring it fraudulent 
because his wife, in fact, was not a Witness or religious at all, and the man wanted a divorce 
so that he could marry his cousin.
1080
 The fact that the man thought this defense would win  
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him a divorce suggests that such allegations had a wide reach. 
The Soviet state pitted ordinary believers against leaders and fanatics to show that 
most believers were loyal Soviet citizens who could be taught to embrace communism, while 
leaders and fanatics constituted a real threat to the social order. In reality, however, anti-
Witness publications did not always draw a clear distinction and instead painted a picture of 
the Witnesses as so politically corrupt and nefarious that it was difficult, if not impossible, 
for any sensible reader to believe that ordinary members could have been unaware of these 
illegal actions. One 1960 work portrayed nearly all Witnesses as drunks, murderers, and 
rapists, even while repeating the standard rhetoric about ordinary believers and 
leaders/fanatics.
1081
 A 1962 Komsomol report criticized atheist propaganda for being 
primitive in nature and lumping all believers together as ―western collaborators‖ and 
―parasites.‖ It stressed that the lack of well-defined distinctions between leaders and ordinary 
members had detracted from atheist efforts.
1082
 
In addition, while atheist discourse on other Western Christian sects contained many 
of the same tropes about ordinary believers and leaders/fanatics, it categorized Witnesses as 
the most extreme and dangerous, with little sincere religious belief except among rank-and-
file members. This mirrored the fact that Witnesses, unlike Baptists, Adventists and other 
more mainstream organizations, had no access to registration. One 1975 work even recounted 
how Baptists rebuked Witnesses for their hostility to Soviet power.
1083
 A former believer 
recalled her involvement with three religions: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Baptists, 
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and the Witnesses. ―Jehovism,‖ she noted, was the most reactionary.1084 Thus, official 
discourse reinforced the state‘s assessment of the relative threat posed by various religious 
organizations, justifying the heightened use of repressive measures against Witnesses in 
comparison to other faiths. 
 
Cadres, Cadres, Cadres 
 Atheist work required not only information, but also individuals to disseminate this 
standard discourse to the broader population. The demand for more attention to local 
conditions and a personalized approach to agitation created a major need for trained 
personnel, one that the Party-state never managed to fill. Simply put, there were always too 
few cadres and most had insufficient knowledge to be effective.
1085
 The concentration of 
Witnesses in small towns and villages, which disproportionately suffered from a lack of 
qualified cadres, compounded this problem.
1086
 A 1959 report by the head of the Knowledge 
Society‘s scientific atheism department in Zakarpattia oblast to the Ukrainian agitprop 
department identified the number one weakness among cadres as a lack of information. Many 
cadres, it stated, mistakenly thought it was enough to acquire superficial familiarity with 
religion, natural science, and dialectical materialism, often giving lectures on topics they 
knew nothing about. In fact, the report asserted, an atheist must have ―encyclopedic  
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knowledge.‖1087 Few agitators lived up to this high standard. 
In some areas, the state did assign its most experienced activists for work with the 
Witnesses, viewing it as a challenging assignment appropriate only for the most skilled 
cadres.
1088
 Indeed, atheist agitators sometimes spent a disproportionate amount of their time 
addressing this religion in part because official discourse portrayed Witnesses as the most 
dangerous and anti-Soviet religion. A 1965 work on Christian sects, while acknowledging the 
Witnesses‘ small size relative to other religious organizations, called on agitators to pay 
―special attention‖ to them because their reactionary politics hindered progress toward 
communism and world peace.
1089
 Similarly, a 1974 report on atheist work in Moldavia 
observed that ―all attention from the Party, soviets, and social organizations is directed 
precisely at work with Jehovists.‖1090 Activists in other locales, however, often took an 
opposite approach—ignoring the Witness issue precisely because it was so challenging. A 
1962 article criticized one collective farm for stopping all individual work with believers 
because its members ―do not have time.‖1091  
Teachers and principals from primary and high schools made up the greatest number 
of atheist lecturers and agitators. A 1961 article on atheist work in Irkutsk oblast argued that 
atheist efforts would have greater success if university-level instructors could be persuaded to 
get involved.
1092
 However, despite continual efforts to secure their participation, individuals 
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working with Witnesses and giving lectures on the Witness faith were rarely professional 
scholars. Further, few universities or institutes existed in the rural areas where most 
Witnesses lived, limiting available cadres to local Party and Komsomol members and school 
staff. Statistical data from districts in L‘viv oblast for 1971 provide a representative 
breakdown of these cadres. In Sokal‘ district, of the 102 atheist lecturers, 67 percent were 
Party members and another 15 percent belonged to the Komsomol. Of the 423 atheist 
agitators in the district, 31 percent were Party members and 47 percent belonged to the 
Komsomol. The majority of the cadres (58 percent) were educators, another 17 percent in 
government jobs, and the rest in an assortment of fields.
1093
  
Language barriers remained a constant problem for cadres, since most atheist 
literature was printed in Russian and some Witnesses from the western borderlands could not 
read it. While publishing houses printed literature on the Witnesses in the Ukrainian 
language, language remained a major issue in Moldavian communities. Local agitators 
complained in 1959 that they lacked any materials in Romanian when, at the same time, 
Witnesses had plentiful literature in this language.
1094
 Since atheist lecturers relied heavily on 
prepared remarks, the lack of resources in non-Russian languages was another major hurdle 
to atheist work. In 1964, thirteen years after the exile of Moldavian Witnesses to Tomsk 
oblast, the Asino city Party secretary reported that plans to hold a Romanian-language atheist 
event suffered from a basic dilemma. The region apparently did not have a single capable 
lecturer in that language and had to ask the Moldavian Party organization to send  
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someone.
1095
  
The specific traits of Christian religions created another stumbling block even for 
trained cadres. Atheist propaganda instructed agitators to gain a more detailed knowledge of 
the Bible because of the central role this text played in Western Christian religious 
organizations.
1096
 Yet one report from the Knowledge Society in Zakarpattia oblast 
complained that, while many Soviet atheists did not have access to a single serious book on 
Christian theology, the Witnesses illegally distributed Bible commentary throughout the 
Soviet Union.
1097
 Despite this fact, official propaganda frequently touted stories in which 
agitators stumped Witnesses on biblical questions. Some publications claimed that even 
unskilled workers could beat the Witnesses at Bible trivia. A 1986 work, for example, 
recounted how coworkers challenged a Witness to explain whom Cain married, since the 
only other humans at that time were his parents, Adam and Eve. The Witness decided to 
leave the religion as a result of this encounter. In reality, most believers, Witnesses included, 
could have told the workers that Adam and Eve also had female children for Cain to marry. 
The same man was stumped by how God could resurrect the dead, since by then their bodies 
would have decomposed.
1098
 Such primitive ―gotcha questions‖ reveal the reliance by 
agitators on limited training and primitive antireligious tracts. 
The propaganda notwithstanding, atheist agitators had a difficult time distinguishing 
between the various strains of Christianity. For example, Witnesses do not believe in the 
immortality of the soul. They preach that the Biblical term ―soul‖ refers to a living human 
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being, not to a separate entity that can survive death. In Christ‘s millennial kingdom, 
righteous individuals who have died will be given new bodies and will be allowed to live 
forever. In the interim between death and this resurrection, however, they do not exist in a 
spirit form as a soul. One agitator, unaware of this doctrine, brought scientific data to a 
meeting with a local Witness proving that life cannot exist after death. The man eagerly 
responded, ―You see, even science confirms our teachings.‖1099 In another embarrassing 
example, a well-meaning activist devoted an entire year to convincing a local believer to 
renounce the Baptist faith. The woman proved very receptive to his critique of the Baptists 
and eventually announced, ―You‘ve convinced me. I don‘t believe in Baptism.‖ The man‘s 
enthusiasm over his success soon soured, however, when he learned that she was, in fact, not 
a Baptist, but a Witness.
1100
 A 1967 brochure on atheist work noted that many agitators use 
the same Bible criticism for all Christian religions, ignoring the major differences in 
beliefs.
1101
 Overall, unprepared and ill-qualified cadres bore significant responsibility for the 
huge gap between the state‘s proclaimed agitation standards and reality. 
The state did attempt to improve the quality of its cadres, and most locales offered at 
least some training for atheist agitators in the form of seminars or classes.
1102
 This included 
Knowledge Society and Komsomol-facilitated courses, as well as classes within secondary 
and higher educational institutions in scientific atheism.
1103
 Despite the additional training 
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and re-training of cadres, reports on atheist work throughout the late Soviet era continually 
cited poor quality personnel as a major problem. A 1965 conference on sects hosted by the 
CRCA brought together personnel from the CRCA, editors of antireligious journals, 
members of the Knowledge Society, and various antireligious agitators and scholars to 
discuss how to strengthen scientific atheist propaganda. Prominent religious scholar A. I. 
Klibanov expressed alarm at abusive practices on the part of some agitators, who, he 
observed, had turned atheist work into its own sort of ―sect.‖ He cited instances where 
agitators forced vodka down the throat of an Adventist believer and other incidents where the 
state had compelled believers to undergo psychiatric treatment. He concluded that agitators 
needed not only to educate believers, but also to improve the quality of their own work.
1104
  
A 1979 CRA report likewise complained that many teachers and Komsomol members could 
not distinguish between various sects and, as a result, sometimes hurt or offended youth with 
their atheist efforts, only making the situation worse.
1105
  
 Given the dearth of qualified personnel to facilitate agitation, the state tapped into the 
sizeable community of former religious believers to supplement its ranks. These individuals 
were in theory ideally suited for this work, having personally experienced life within a 
religious community. Particularly for smaller and more obscure religions such as the 
Witnesses, former believers offered a vital source of information on beliefs and practices.
1106
 
Equally important, the state hoped that believers would be more likely to listen to such 
individuals than they would to Party activists. As a result, former believers became a 
ubiquitous part of antireligious work in the late Soviet era, serving as public speakers, expert 
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witnesses at trials, and authors of antireligious articles, books, lectures, and pamphlets. Thus, 
in dealing with atheist agitation, Witnesses often faced their own former fellow believers. 
 The fact that many former Witnesses still had family members in the religion gave 
their involvement in antireligious work a personal motivation that other cadres lacked. 
Statements by former believers almost always included a call to friends and family members 
to follow their example and join Soviet society. One former Witness, retelling his story in 
Sovetskaia Moldaviia, declared, ―I call on everyone who has not yet broken free of the spider 
web of religious superstition: Look around yourself, open your heart and eyes to those people 
building a new life.‖ He then addressed his mother and sister, asking them to believe him, 
lose their fear, and abandon their faith.
1107
 Renunciation of religion provided a way for these 
families to reconcile, now as fellow atheists. Yet not all former Witnesses wanted to 
participate in atheist agitation, as it could further damage their relationship with religious 
family members. One 1976 article noted that some people lacked the willpower to make their 
renunciation of religion public because they worried about what their former fellow believers 
would think of them.
1108
 The press also alleged that religious leaders frightened members 
from publicly turning against the organization even after they no longer belonged to it.
1109
 
The former believers brought not only passion to their appeals, but also a tone and 
style that resembled the religious imagery and language of their previous faith. One former 
Witness, for example, stated that her future now lay with people who, like her, shared a belief 
in ―the greatest faith—communism.‖1110 Another referred to life after the Witnesses as a 
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―spiritual resurrection.‖1111 One former believer told readers that, after hearing about Iurii 
Gagarin‘s flight into space, he realized, ―Now that‘s where heaven is! People are building it 
on earth without Armageddon and other nonsense.‖1112 Many individuals described their 
embrace of communism and atheism as akin to having to being ―born again.‖1113 One former 
Witness declared, ―I once was blind, but now I see.‖1114  
Ironically, many of those former believers most willing to contribute to atheist work 
had been leaders and ―fanatics,‖ who, according to the state, were supposed to be a band of 
devious criminals and traitors. Yet, with so few qualified cadres, agitators could hardly afford 
to be picky, especially since these individuals possessed unique information on the 
organization‘s structure and activities. For the former believers themselves, the striking 
contrast in treatment between ordinary members and leaders/fanatics made it imperative that 
they demonstrate that they belonged to the former category. Even though the hierarchical 
nature of the Witness organization made it relatively easy to identify leaders, these former 
Witnesses emphasized both their own victimization and their attempts to internally reform 
the organization as a means of reframing their life stories. 
In particular, high-ranking former members aligned themselves with the neutralist or 
oppositionist splinter organizations founded as a result of the schism, claiming to have 
pushed for severing ties with the Brooklyn headquarters. Former oppositionist Konstiantyn 
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Polychuk took this approach in his 1958 open letter to Sovetskaia Moldaviia. He described 
numerous attempts on his part to convince the organization‘s leadership to stop their 
underground activities and seek legal registration. The failure of these efforts caused him to 
realize the subversive political aims of the Witnesses and to quit the organization.
1115
 
Gheorghe Dobuliac, a former local Witness leader in Moldavia, recounted an incident in 
which oppositionists threw stones at him one night after he returned home from a meeting 
with fellow neutralists.
1116
  
Fanatics, meanwhile, proved more elusive to define, making it easier to reinvent 
themselves as ordinary members. In many instances, the only difference between a fanatic 
and an ordinary member was that the former still belonged to the Witnesses while the latter 
no longer did. Indeed, at a trial in Moldavia in 1959, the defendant had already confessed to 
illegal religious activity and abandoned the organization. Despite being charged with 
activities that the press associated with fanatics, media coverage portrayed her as a victim of 
a manipulative organization that converted her in the immediate aftermath of her husband‘s 
tragic death. The court, noting the sincerity of her change of heart, handed down a suspended 
sentence and released her back into the community.
1117
 
Former Witnesses invariably depicted their own conversion through the lens of 
victimization, even when they held positions of considerable rank within the Witness 
organization. For example, Polychuk, the oppositionist leader, not only claimed to have been 
a voice of moderation in the leadership, but also described his conversion to the Witnesses as 
a result of wartime instability in western Ukraine. He explained how the Witnesses‘ message 
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appealed to him in a time of desperation and uncertainty.
1118
 Regardless of which approach 
they chose, former Witness leaders and ―fanatics‖ framed their involvement with the 
organization within the standard narrative about religious believers. In particular, they 
confirmed the state‘s official position that most believers represented loyal Soviet citizens 
who had simply gone astray.  
 
Reaching Out to Believers 
Former believers and atheist activists took on the work of individualized and mass 
forms of agitation. Both methods aimed to inoculate Soviet citizens against the false 
promises of religious belief and to convert those who had already joined a religious faith into 
engaged, atheist builders of communism. Mass events such as lectures, film showings, 
meetings, and other evening events, allowed agitators to reach the largest possible number of 
citizens. Thus, as the antireligious campaign returned to the fore in the late 1950s, the 
number of antireligious lectures and other events grew rapidly. For instance, a 1961 article in 
Nauka i religiia surveyed atheist work in Irkutsk oblast, focusing on lectures as the biggest 
component of these efforts. It cited the fact that over 10,000 atheist or natural science 
lectures had been given in the region in the past year.
1119
 L‘viv oblast reported 4,517 atheist 
lectures in 1956, 13,094 in 1958, and 26,250 in 1960, a huge increase over just four years.
1120
 
Moldavian Party cadres held roughly 5,000 such lectures in 1956, and 9,000 a year later. 
They also hosted 25 seminars to train atheist lecturers in 1958.
1121
 Atheist lectures by the 
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Moldavian Knowledge Society grew many times over during this period as well; it gave 
10,089 lectures in 1965.
1122
 
 Lectures served a purpose beyond propaganda, allowing agitators and local 
authorities to identify believers and potential leaders. Acknowledging this point at a 1959 
Knowledge Society conference, one speaker noted that he had stopped keeping lists of those 
who spoke at or attended these events because it put believers on guard.
1123
 One Witness 
confirmed this view, recalling that those Witnesses who asked questions were assigned closer 
police surveillance.
1124
 In fact, some believers chose not to participate in these events for this 
reason. As a result, mass forms of atheist agitation frequently suffered from ―preaching to the 
choir‖ syndrome. Yet some believers came to these events precisely to engage in debates 
with the lecturers, exploiting the ignorance of speakers by asking tricky questions or making 
provocative statements.
1125
 An all-union Party conference on work among believers in the 
western borderlands acknowledged that interactive formats sometimes ran into these 
problems when cadres lacked proper training.
1126
 To give an example, a Witness at one 
lecture asked the speaker why Witnesses could not study at institutions of higher education. 
The man placed the blame on Witness parents, whom he alleged barred their children from 
enrolling at such institutions.
1127
 He could not admit the obvious truth that the Soviet state 
violated its own constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience by denying believers 
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access to higher education. At a different talk on Christian sects in 1969, a Baptist challenged 
the speaker‘s comments on the reactionary nature of religious organizations. He said, ―But 
did sectarians create the atomic bomb? Did they drop it on Hiroshima?‖ The speaker 
awkwardly responded by declaring that Truman, who dropped the bomb, was a Baptist.
1128
 
This answer was unlikely to satisfy most believers. 
The Watch Tower organization promoted these efforts by providing Soviet members 
with lists of suggested questions to stump atheist lecturers.
1129
 It cited the example of Christ, 
who, when answering questions posed by priests and Pharisees, would often avoid falling 
into a trap by not giving a direct answer.
1130
 Sample questions in one list included: ―What is a 
law of nature?‖ ―Can there be a law without a lawgiver?‖ ―Who taught birds to build nests?‖ 
―What came first—wisdom or matter?‖ These sorts of questions played on the poor 
preparation of many lecturers, who did not typically have a strong scientific or religious 
background. The Watch Tower organization also circulated prepared answers to common 
questions from agitators and authorities.
1131
 They also cited quotes from Lenin and 
Khrushchev defending the rights of citizens to freedom of conscience.
1132
  
 As a result, some atheist agitators felt uncomfortable hosting such events. At a 1959 
RSFSR Knowledge Society conference, the chairman of the organization‘s atheism 
department criticized those who suggested that agitators back off from interactive formats for 
atheist evenings. He expressed his belief that question and answer sessions where both 
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believers and presenters speak can be productive as long as organizers control the event. He 
advised them not to let believers speak more than the atheists, as had happened on some 
occasions. When done well, he remarked from his own experience, such evenings could draw 
large crowds of as many as 700 to 1,500 people.
1133
  
Community and work collective meetings represented a more intense form of mass 
work than lectures and other atheist events, and typically focused on the actions of specific 
local individuals. The primary goal was not to provide information on the religious 
organization‘s beliefs and practices, but rather to ostracize allegedly fanatical members or 
leaders, applying social pressure to force them to renounce their faith. To this end, agitators 
encouraged audience members to participate in condemning the individual. Particularly in the 
Khrushchev era, these events often went well beyond mere pressure and could include direct 
threats of criminal prosecution or other coercive measures. In August 1961, the Rakhiv 
district Komsomol in Zakarpattia oblast, citing the success of its public meetings in 
converting believers to atheism, observed that participants demanded that all remaining 
Witnesses be brought to court on criminal charges.
1134
  
The call for strong measures against believers stemmed in part from the Khrushchev-
era campaign against ―parasites.‖ Under the decree on parasites, communities could exile 
such individuals or compel them to perform labor for the state. Some believers, primarily 
clergymen and ministers, were subject to exile under this law. For example, at meetings held 
in several Transcarpathian villages in December 1959, village residents clamored for the 
exile of local Witnesses, whom they labeled parasites and accused of stealing from the 
collective farm. Under pressure from the community and authorities to abandon their faith or 
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face exile, nineteen Witnesses wrote a letter to the district newspaper announcing they had 
quit the religion. The local leader, unwilling to renounce his faith, moved to Crimea to escape 
possible criminal charges.
1135
 
Well after the Khrushchev era, communities used these meetings to apply social 
pressure on believers. At a 1983 meeting of workers at a timber industry plant in Tomsk 
oblast, members castigated two Witness coworkers for their religious activities. One worker 
stated, ―Fedor, we not only work, but live as neighbors. And now it turns out that, every day 
after greeting me, you pray for my destruction.‖ He went on to compare Hitler and Reagan‘s 
militarism to Fedor‘s belief in Armageddon. In closing, he asked Fedor where in the Bible it 
says he cannot defend his homeland, questioning Fedor what he would do if he punched him 
right now. Fedor responded: ―Just try.‖ The attendees denounced the two men‘s allegedly 
antisocial actions, issuing a warning that, if their religious activities did not cease, the matter 
would be brought before a court of law.
1136
 These events, meant to condemn local Witnesses, 
could undermine the antireligious campaign‘s stated goal of convincing believers to renounce 
religion without resorting to threats. Often vitriolic in tone, press coverage of the meetings 
failed to distinguish between leaders and other members, calling for harsh measures against 
all believers. A 1960 report from the Zakarpattia oblast Party committee, for example, 
criticized local newspapers for printing articles denouncing ordinary Witnesses as speculators 
and parasites when, the report pointed out, many ordinary members are in fact honest Soviet 
citizens.
1137
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In forced labor camps, authorities also used meetings to convince Witness prisoners 
to embrace atheism. In the Ozernyi camp in 1960, officials discovered that Witnesses had 
conducted meetings to preach and convert new members. To deal with the situation, camp 
supervisors held a meeting of all prisoners to voice their criticism of the ―Jehovists‖ among 
them. The collective recommended that the men publicly renounce their faith and that 
officials transfer the most active members to a stricter security camp where they would have 
less ability to proselytize to others, a move approved by the administration. In the same 
camp, officials assigned several atheist prisoner-activists to work with a known Witness 
prisoner. The men persuaded the Witness to attend films and participate in other group 
activities. When his family came to visit him, he told them to stop mentioning Jehovah in 
their letters as he had lost his faith in God.
1138
 Such conversions to atheism, done under the 
duress of camp life, reflect the combination of persuasion and coercion employed in atheist 
agitation.  
By the late 1950s, numerous publications and reports began to urge agitators to take 
the message directly to believers, declaring ―individual work‖ the most effective method of 
atheist agitation.
1139
 At a 1960 Party conference on scientific atheism, the speakers endorsed 
this tactic above all others.
1140
 As envisioned, ―individual work‖ meant that atheist agitators 
would establish contact with a local believer in their community, perhaps by visiting the 
individual‘s home or workplace. The goal was to create a sense of trust, showing the believer 
that the agitator had a genuine interest in his life. Many publications advised agitators not to 
immediately bring up religion in conversation, as this could put the believer on guard. The 
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literature recommended that only once the two individuals were well-acquainted should the 
agitator slowly bring the conversation around to religious matters and tactfully make the case 
for atheism. Ideally, the believer would see the agitator as his friend and be convinced to 
renounce his faith. As described by atheist literature, a successful conversion to atheism 
through individual work took considerable time. Agitators were advised to exercise patience 
and dedication.
1141
  
A 1964 report from the village of Zniatsevo in Zakarpattia oblast provides an 
example of what high quality individual work looked like in practice. The village had forty-
nine Witnesses in 1963. At first, the district party committee studied the Witnesses‘ beliefs. 
Next they organized lectures on scientific progress at the village club and showed an anti-
Witness propaganda film. Then they assigned agitators to each Witness family. The report 
indicated that the Witnesses were initially suspicious, but the agitators persisted and 
eventually managed to speak directly to their assigned families, offering critiques of the 
Bible. As a result of these efforts, at least a few Witnesses renounced their faith. Some of the 
younger former believers joined the Komsomol.
1142
 In a similar case in 1976, a local agitator 
in Crimea visited one Witness family on multiple occasions, brought them periodicals to 
read, showed interest in their lives, and even took their son to the movies. Only after the 
agitator became a welcome guest in their home did he successfully turn the conversations to 
questions of faith.
1143
 Because so many atheist agitators worked as schoolteachers and 
principals, much of the individual work occurred in the school system with Witness children 
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and youth.
1144
 Publications gave examples of how the care and concern of a dedicated teacher 
turned a child away from religion and toward active involvement in school activities.
1145
 
Whether for adults or children, individual work relied on an interpersonal emotional 
appeal to believers on a face-to-face basis. A former believer who spoke at a 1966 conference 
hosted by the Moscow Institute of Scientific Atheism compared individual work to his own 
previous proselytism. He remarked that, when he was still a ―fanatic,‖ he believed God 
would reward him for every person he saved. When he went to one woman‘s home to preach, 
she warned him that her husband would kill him if he came again. Because he was so 
committed to saving this woman, even this threat did not deter him. He visited the home once 
more, spoke directly to the husband, and the two developed respect for one another. The man 
concluded that agitators had to put the same amount of time and effort into their work as 
believers devoted to proselytism.
1146
 A memo from the CRCA to the secretary of the 
Moldavian TsK in 1956 likewise advised the Party to borrow from sectarian methods by 
using an individual approach to believers to persuade them to renounce their beliefs.
1147
 A 
1967 work advocated a strategy nearly identical to the one employed by Witnesses 
worldwide, recommending that agitators leave an article or book with the believer to read,  
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using the literature as a means to return to the home for further discussion.
1148
 
The difference between Witnesses and atheists, however, was that while Witnesses 
were prepared and willing to spend hundreds of hours to win over a single convert, atheist 
cadres had no such dedication. They had their own careers and families, making atheist 
agitation a part-time responsibility of secondary importance in their lives. Soviet publications 
repeatedly reminded agitators to be patient and to understand that individual work was a 
―complex process‖ that could not happen as a result of a single meeting or lecture.1149 A 1987 
newspaper editorial in Zakarpattia oblast criticized agitators who had unrealistic expectations 
about how quickly they could win over believers to atheism.
1150
 A 1966 book on the 
Witnesses gave the example of a local believer, Semen, to illustrate this problem. It noted 
that atheist agitators had held four individual conversations with Semen over the preceding 
eight years. Yet in that same period, Semen had spent at least eighty hours a month attending 
Witness activities.
1151
 A 1989 article likewise estimated that it took sixty visits for 
―sectarians‖ to convert someone into their faith, but that atheists aimed to convince them to 
renounce these beliefs in only five to six visits.
1152
 With this imbalance of time, atheist 
individual work could not hope to eliminate religious belief. 
Even when the state succeeded in winning believers over to atheism, it often failed to 
capitalize on its gains. Indeed, believers sometimes returned to their faith once the state lost 
interest in them. In some of these cases, believers may have never sincerely wanted to 
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abandon their religion, doing so only under pressure. For example, the state granted a 
Witness elder convicted of anti-Soviet activity early release in 1974 after he claimed to have 
left the organization. Upon returning home, however, he remained involved with the 
religion.
1153
 Some former Witnesses came back to the organization in part because, while the 
state viewed its task as done, Witness members did not lose hope that their former fellow 
believers could be convinced to return to the faith.
1154 
Several former Witnesses complained 
that current members and elders repeatedly attempted to woo them back into the 
organization.
1155
 A 1974 sociological study of the Ukrainian Witnesses instructed agitators to 
continue meeting with believers even after they rejected religion, noting that some 
individuals later rejoined the organization or joined a different faith community.
1156
  
 
Private Life on Public Display 
 While official discourse told inspirational stories of how atheist activists had 
befriended believers and convinced them to renounce their faith, it also reflected the 
consequences for those who rejected these overtures. Their lives were put on display for 
ridicule, scorn, and condemnation. Post-Stalin antireligious work relied heavily on public 
shaming, citing individuals by name and exposing their private lives to public scrutiny. One 
lecture, for example, singled out a young Witness woman as a hypocrite for preaching ―do 
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not kill,‖ even after she had an abortion.1157 A district Party organization set up voluntary 
patrols (druzhiniki) to catch believers stealing from the collective farms, taking their pictures 
at the site of the crimes and using these in propaganda work among believers.
1158
 Published 
accounts by former believers almost always listed Witnesses whom the author called upon to 
renounce the faith. While done in the name of encouraging people to break the chains of 
religion, such publications isolated and ostracized believers from their neighbors. 
Newspapers in particular practiced this form of social pressure, defaming individual 
Witnesses for a variety of immoral or unethical actions. One district newspaper in Moldavia 
singled out a man for owning more than the legally permissible number of sheep, which he 
sold on the black market at a high price.
1159
 The same paper printed an article against 
Witnesses who apparently failed to give up their seats on a local bus to a woman with an 
infant. The article used this incident to show how Witnesses treated nonbelievers.
1160
 The 
paper also criticized one Witness woman for cursing at her workplace.
1161
 Another paper 
published pictures of Witness women drinking liquor and named several Witnesses who had 
stolen fruit during a recent harvest at the collective farm.
1162
 
Agitators often applied equal pressure to the families of believers as they did to the 
believers themselves. Agitators expected family members to take the lead in atheist work 
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with their religious relatives and condemned them when they did not. In one incident, not 
publicized in the press, a Party member and city soviet deputy shot and killed two of his 
wife‘s relatives because they converted her to the Witnesses. The murder came after 
authorities subjected the man to relentless criticism for his poor control over his family. 
Getting drunk after one such Party meeting, he decided to commit the crime. Outside the 
court building, where he was tried and sentenced to ten years, people threw snowballs at his 
wife, shouting, ―He should have killed you too.‖1163 The incident reflects the awkward 
position of individuals who came from Witness families but did not belong to the religion. 
Local officials often held them responsible for family members‘ actions.1164 In 1976, the 
Moldavian village of Grimancăuţi held meetings of the local trade union, Party, and 
Komsomol to condemn several villagers who had not tried to convince their relatives to leave 
the Witnesses.
1165
  
Internal memos from the religious councils and the Ministry of Justice reveal that 
officials and agitators used a variety of methods that fell outside the approved guidelines to 
pressure believers to abandon religion. One Witness filed a complaint in 1980, alleging that 
the city soviet refused to give him an apartment unless he publicly renounced his faith in the 
press.
1166
 A 1960 report that praised how 500 Witnesses had left the faith identified several 
instances of improper conduct. Some unnamed individuals hurled insults at Witnesses. One 
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man fired shots at the home of a Witness family, while others tried to force local Witnesses 
to drink vodka. One believer lost his driver‘s license, and officials refused to reinstate the 
license until he embraced atheism.
1167
 At a 1960 conference on scientific atheism, several 
speakers criticized officials who turned to coercive methods, such as illegal dismissals from 
work, instead of using persuasive methods. Some officials treated believers as second-class 
citizens, conflating religious organizations and leaders with rank-and-file members.
1168
 
Similarly, the Komsomol cited instances in which believers lost their jobs despite having 
good work ethics or were excluded from higher education, only further isolating these 
individuals from society and making it harder to reach them.
1169
  
For those few qualified cadres, the poor quality and crude tactics of their fellow 
agitators were a source of continual frustration. Speakers at a 1963 plenum of the Moldavian 
Komsomol pointed to cases in which flawed atheist work had hindered attempts to reach out 
to believers. In one factory in Tiraspol, for example, rather than befriend a young Baptist 
worker, agitators created ―an atmosphere of hatred and persecution‖ around her, resulting in 
the girl trusting no one. The plenum also discussed the widespread showing of the anti-
Witness film Armageddon at atheist evening events, which included scenes of believers 
committing murder, an occurrence the plenum felt was ―very rare‖ and not helpful.1170 Party 
agitators admitted that such forms of atheist work only hindered progress toward creating 
trust among believers and molding them into atheist Soviet citizens. In general, the 
discriminatory treatment of ordinary Witnesses and leaders alike detracted from atheist 
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efforts and made most Witnesses even more hostile to the thought of embracing Soviet 
society and ideology.  
 
Trials as Propaganda 
At the same time that some activists criticized atheist agitation for its inappropriate 
coercive elements, many also wanted to soften the state‘s hard-line measures against the 
Witnesses by infusing them with a persuasive, propagandistic motive, thereby muting their 
underlying punitive function. They recognized that repressive measures could make it more 
difficult for agitators to win the trust of believers and could undermine the state‘s message 
that it wanted to help, not punish, ordinary believers. With this in mind, post-Stalin trials 
gave Witness defendants the chance to admit guilt, repent, and avoid a criminal conviction. 
So that the trials served a broader educational function, they were generally open to the 
public and reported on widely in the press. For example, all RSFSR cases involving anti-
Soviet agitation under the guise of religious propaganda for the first quarter of 1960 were 
held in open court and included a community accuser (obshchestvennyi obvinitel‟), often a 
former member of the religion.
1171
 These trials frequently attracted large crowds and 
newspaper reporters. At one trial in 1964, 250 people attended, with the district and regional 
papers and local radio providing detailed information, along with testimonials from former 
believers.
1172
   
 Comrade and social courts epitomized the educational aspect of trials. Instituted in 
1919 to enforce work discipline, these courts were revived under Khrushchev, becoming a 
major feature of antireligious work and part of a larger populist impulse in the Khrushchev 
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era.
1173
 By 1964, approximately 197,000 such courts existed in the USSR.
1174
 The courts, 
staffed by citizens, were organized primarily around workplaces and housing units, and 
exerted pressure over individuals in their community in cases where direct state intervention 
and criminal proceedings had been deemed unnecessary. Radio stations broadcast some of 
these hearings and atheist film producers used court footage in documentary films against the 
Witnesses.
1175
 The 1962 Yearbook noted that: 
Fiendish means have been employed to break the integrity of Jehovah‘s servants. 
Publishers [Witnesses] are brought before so-called fellow-workers courts, made up 
of factory of farm workers, managers and party functionaries. They are threatened 
with the loss of their jobs, allotments, homes, pensions, and so forth, if they do not 
publicly denounce the organization and withdraw.
1176
 
 
A 1960 comrade court hearing against two Witness fathers provides a glimpse of how 
these trials ran. The court accused both men of raising their children in a religious spirit and 
of refusing to allow the children to participate in official youth organizations or other 
extracurricular activities. Several speakers made accusatory remarks against the men. For 
example, a doctor provided testimony on how one of the men had come to his office to 
secure medical treatment for his terminally ill wife. The doctor asked him why he had 
appealed to a medical professional, and not God, for help. The man responded: ―Who else 
would I call?‖ The audience shouted: ―Jehovah!‖ The doctor continued to berate the man, 
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asking him if he had ever actually seen or spoken to Jehovah. The doctor then demanded to 
know where the man obtained his Watch Tower literature. The audience shouted in response: 
―Nathan Knorr! Rutherford! Brooklyn! Bourgeoisie! America!‖ When the presiding judge 
allowed one of the men to speak, he was shouted down by calls from audience members, 
including former Witnesses, to let the man‘s child join the Pioneers, sing in the school choir, 
and get involved in gymnastics. The court recommended the revocation of custody rights, 
sending its decision to the local People‘s Court.1177  
Criminal trials often employed a similar framework and style, even though the 
proceedings were more serious and could result in long sentences. A 1959 trial in Mykolaїv 
oblast took place over three days in the city of Pervomais‘k‘s Palace of Culture. Prior to the 
event, local residents attended public talks by former Witnesses, a KGB official, and others, 
all decrying the actions of local believers. Area newspapers and the regional radio covered 
these events and the well-attended trial in detail, while a crew filmed the proceedings for use 
in anti-Witness propaganda. The oblast Party secretary reported that, as one of the defendants 
spoke, the crowd shouted, ―Death to American spies and traitors of the homeland,‖ and 
called out, ―Exile them!‖ The prosecution paraded a host of former and current Witnesses 
onto the stand. After the current Witnesses refused to testify against the organization, the 
crowd called out, ―Shame!‖ ―Try him!‖ and, ―He is no better than the defendants!‖ The 
defendants received terms of five to ten years of forced labor for anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda, while the court indicted those individuals who had not testified against their 
fellow believers for refusal to cooperate with the court. The crowd called out for harsher 
sentences and had to be reminded by the prosecutor that the terms were consistent with  
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government sentencing guidelines.
1178
  
Atheist agitprop used materials gathered at public trials to convince ordinary 
believers that their leaders were crooks and fanatics. After the 1962 trial against the country 
committee, agitators put together a traveling exhibition of trial photographs and 
documents.
1179
 Similarly, newspapers reprinted photographs of confiscated literature and 
printing equipment found during the arrest of country servant Dubovyns‘kyi.1180 Evidence 
from the Stalin-era trials of Witness leaders resurfaced in some publications.
1181
 Agitators 
even organized group tours of uncovered printing bunkers so that community members and 
believers could see the illegal activities of the Witness leadership.
1182
  
Witnesses saw trials as opportunities to explain and preach their faith, just as they had 
in the Stalin era. A 1962 Komsomol report cautioned that open court trials had sometimes 
proven counterproductive in this regard, giving sectarians a venue for religious 
propaganda.
1183
 At a 1983 trial of a Witness husband and wife in Kirgizia, neither defendant 
admitted to any leadership position in the Witnesses, but told the court that they had raised 
their children in the faith and that the family read Watch Tower publications together.
1184
 At 
another trial, the defendant told the court, ―There are two roads—the wide one, leading to 
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death, and the narrow one, leading to eternal life. And I am glad that I am taking the narrow 
path.‖ Accused of refusing to allow her daughter to join the Octobrists, she declared, ―I am a 
true Christian and I believe in Jehovah God and worship only God, and not a star. Therefore, 
I want my daughter also to be a true Christian and not to wear a star.‖ She ended by telling 
those gathered in the courtroom that God would soon eliminate all suffering and evil on earth 
and establish a paradise for the Witnesses.
1185
 
 While most Witnesses defended their beliefs in court, trial propaganda focused 
instead on those Witnesses who abandoned their beliefs during the hearing or investigation. 
In such instances, the court usually abstained from delivering a prison sentence, releasing the 
reformed believer back into society as a testament to the great humanity of the Soviet justice 
system. The believer, in turn, was expected to make good on his pledge by publicly 
renouncing his former faith, typically in the local or regional newspapers. Ion, a Moldavian 
Witness tried in 1963, used his courtroom testimony to admit guilt and ask for mercy. He 
clarified that no one had forced him into making this statement. The court granted his request 
and freed him.
1186
 At a 1960 comrade court hearing in Stavropol‘ krai, a former Witness 
begged his fellow collective farmers not to deprive him of custody rights and vowed to raise 
his children in a Soviet manner. The court decided to grant him a second chance to show the 
collective that he could lead an honest life.
1187
  
 
Perpetual Crisis 
To demonstrate concrete results in their struggle against religious belief, atheist  
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activists and CRA officials cited the numbers of believers converted into atheists. Nearly 
every community could point to someone who had been convinced to abandon religious 
beliefs. In this sense, former believers served a useful purpose beyond their involvement in 
atheist work. Their sheer existence proved that religion was indeed losing support among the 
population. As a result, both Soviet publications and internal reports continually cited 
examples of former believers, providing lists of Witnesses who had abandoned their faith.
1188
 
Similarly, most reports on the state of antireligious work referred to ―former believers‖ and 
quantified how many believers had left religious organizations in a given time period. A 
1962 Ternopil‘ oblast report, for example, noted that as a result of Party measures over the 
previous two years, 282 Jehovists had announced their withdrawal from the organization.
1189
 
A 1959 Volyn‘ oblast report claimed that the Witnesses were no longer active in the area.1190 
Despite these positive assessments, both Ternopil‘ and Volyn‘ continued to have sizeable 
Witness populations through the 1980s.
1191
 Similarly, reports from the northern Moldavian 
district of Edineţ declared that, thanks to atheist work, the local Witness community was on 
the brink of collapse in 1956.
1192
 Yet a 1973 CRA report on the district listed 514 
Witnesses.
1193
  
Even though atheist propaganda maintained that religion would not die out on its 
own, antireligious propaganda promoted the view that it would decline in influence as Soviet 
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society progressed toward communism. Atheist propaganda proclaimed that religion had 
entered a general ―crisis‖ as it struggled to adapt to modern conditions. This view 
acknowledged the fact that religions had modified their beliefs and practices to remain 
relevant in Soviet society. A 1971 booklet, for example, was entitled ―Jehovism Adapts.‖1194 
Soviet publications argued that religious organizations were desperate to fill in their depleted 
ranks.
1195
 Overall, atheist propaganda declared that religions would eventually collapse under 
the weight of modern reality. As a 1968 work put it in discussing ordinary believers: ―They 
cannot be deceived forever. The time will come when people will see the light.‖1196 A 1962 
article in a Moldavian district newspaper, noting how it had received letters from more than 
twenty former Witnesses, was appropriately entitled ―On the verge of collapse.‖1197 
What these publications often failed to take into account, of course, were the 
individuals who continued to join the Witnesses, a number that could more than equal those 
leaving the organization. A 1974 report from Zakarpattia oblast stated that, although in one 
district 120 people had left the Witnesses, another 152 had joined during the same time 
period.
1198
 On the national level, the agitprop department of the TsK acknowledged that, 
although more than 500 Witnesses had left the religion in 1959, many others had converted 
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to the faith. More than forty people had become members from one Irkutsk district alone. 
Children of Witness parents also tended to join the organization upon reaching adulthood.
1199
 
The Zakarpattia oblast Party committee in January 1969 reported that many districts 
experienced a decline in members of unregistered sects and a halt to further growth, but 
admitted that there had been no net decrease in the number of Witnesses and some growth in 
specific districts. The committee explained this discrepancy as the result not of actual 
growth, but of better accounting and more accurate information on Witness communities.
1200
  
 Even if the data did not substantiate this point, Soviet media, scholars, atheist agitators, 
and the CRA all comforted themselves with the belief that religion had reached a state of 
crisis from which it could not recover.
1201
 A 1978 work stated that ―the religious crisis cannot 
be evaluated solely by the number of believers.‖1202 A 1966 CRA report proclaimed that 
more and more Witnesses wanted to move out of the underground and reject ties to the 
Brooklyn headquarters.
1203
 In 1979, the CRA described the religion situation in Moldavia as 
―extremely complex.‖ It cited the alleged ―crisis‖ to help explain the increase in youth 
membership in Christian groups, including the Witnesses.
1204
 At a 1980 All-Union CRA 
conference at the Moscow Academy of Science, speakers explained the apparent stability of 
religious life and even some recent growth in the number of believers by claiming that 
religious organizations were doing everything in their power to overcome the ―crisis‖ within  
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their ranks.
1205
  
 Sociological studies offered a means to give scientific weight to this argument. One 
1980 booklet put out by the Ukraine Knowledge Society declared that ―empirical data from 
concrete sociological research‖ had proven that believers are in the midst of a ―process of 
emancipation‖ from religious belief.1206 Much of the sociological research on religion 
focused on finding proof for the existence of the alleged ―crisis‖ in religious communities.  
Sociological survey data on qualitative religious belief should be used with caution. Many 
studies do not indicate how they identified Witnesses, nor how they managed to get them to 
answer probing and potentially incriminating questions regarding their faith. It is possible 
that researchers relied on police records or CRA databases to locate believers and that 
Witnesses felt forced to cooperate in such surveys. Given the continued arrest and 
harassment of Witnesses into the 1980s, members would have had ample reason to provide 
false information and little incentive to speak freely about their beliefs and practices. Not 
surprisingly, survey results show relatively high percentages of participants who responded 
to all questions with either ―I don‘t know‖ or ―I cannot say.‖1207 Indeed, at a 1975 trial of 
Witnesses in Stavropol‘, a former member testified that his local leaders had instructed 
believers to answer ―I don‘t know‖ to all questions by authorities.1208 The wording of 
questions could also heavily bias the results. A survey in Moldavia asked Witnesses: ―Are 
you aware of the political orientation of Brooklyn literature?‖ The majority respondents in 
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each village answered, ―I don‘t know.‖ The study concluded from this response that the 
majority of ordinary believers were unaware of the political machinations of the 
organization‘s leaders.1209  
Accurate or not, Soviet publications used sociological data as evidence of an internal 
crisis among the Witnesses. The study of Ukrainian Witnesses in 1976 offered a great deal of 
data to back up this claim, observing that more than 47 percent of Witnesses did not intend to 
raise their children in a ―religious spirit.‖ Fifty-seven percent allowed their children to read 
fiction and roughly 27 percent let their children join the Pioneers. Only a third stated that 
they had total confidence in the truth of the organization‘s doctrines. Just over 8 percent of 
respondents believed that Armageddon would occur in their lifetime.
1210
 According to 
another study conducted in Ukraine, 28 percent of Witnesses had married outside of their 
faith, ―evidence‖ that members did not always follow the religion‘s guidelines.1211 Other 
research found that 15 percent of Witnesses believed families should instill love of one‘s 
homeland and people (narod) in their children. The author used this data to argue that the 
vast majority of Witnesses were either neutral or positively inclined toward socialist 
progress.
1212
 
Sociological data also attempted to prove that not all Witnesses shared the assumed 
anti-Soviet political ideology of their leaders. For example, a Ukrainian study asked 
Witnesses to define Armageddon. The most popular definition was ―God‘s judgment‖ or the 
―Last Judgment,‖ followed by ―God‘s secret‖ or ―I don‘t know.‖ Only 5 percent of 
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respondents described it as a ―holy war‖ and another 5 percent as the destruction of the 
world. This stood in contrast to the authors‘ depiction of Armageddon as war propaganda. 
Ordinary believers, they argued, did not share the organization‘s allegedly misanthropic 
views.
1213
 Ukrainian surveys found that 53 percent of members actively opposed the 
organization‘s attitude toward the Soviet state and society, while 29 percent passively 
rejected some or all of the organization‘s political views.1214 A similar study concluded that 
only 39 percent of Witnesses were ―fanatics,‖ although the researchers did not state exactly 
how they came to such a conclusion.
1215
  
 The crisis began to ring hollow as decades passed with little or no success in liquidating 
Witness communities. Even as the state trumpeted its achievements in converting believers 
into atheists, its own statistics from the CRA showed no evidence of a reduction in religious 
belief. Religious propaganda declared that religious communities could not adapt to the 
changing conditions of Soviet life forever, but just how long it would take for this alleged 
crisis to have a real impact on reducing religious belief was never articulated. In fact, 
Witnesses had faced far more adverse circumstances and overcame them. They were 
prepared to weather this crisis of modern times until Armageddon. 
  
Conclusion 
After Stalin‘s death, the state generated a standard discourse on religious belief in 
general, and Witnesses in particular, that sharply distinguished between ordinary believers 
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and leaders/fanatics. The distinction between ordinary believers and leaders allowed the state 
to view most believers as loyal Soviet citizens who had been misled by manipulative 
fanatics. Equally critical, it shielded the state from having to confront the more dangerous 
possibility that some of its citizens actually found the Witnesses‘ message more appealing 
than socialism or communism. Instead, official rhetoric explained the tenacity of religious 
beliefs as mere ―survivals‖ from the capitalist past that would completely disappear only with 
the achievement of communism.
1216
  
Yet, while the post-Stalin press asserted that more and more Soviet citizens 
abandoned their faith each year, official rhetoric on the alleged ―sectarian crisis‖ remained 
profoundly static throughout the late Soviet era. This situation presented the state with a 
rather serious dilemma. On the one hand, exposing what the authorities saw as the severe 
drawbacks of membership in religious organizations to public scrutiny created a more 
informed public that in theory would be less susceptible to religious solicitations. On the 
other hand, continued media attention betrayed the staunch resilience of religious 
communities in Soviet society. The Soviet media and atheist agitators thus awkwardly 
oscillated between highlighting the threat of sects and proclaiming their gradual and 
inevitable dissolution. This discourse revealed the state‘s failure to eliminate religion, while 
providing marginal religious organizations with free publicity for their beliefs and practices 
refracted through the lens of official propaganda. 
At the same time that the state extended legal registration to many religious 
organizations, it faced increasing scrutiny from foreign observers, including the Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society, regarding its persecution of religious believers. Official 
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rhetoric maintained that the state prosecuted believers not for their religious convictions, but 
for their illegal, subversive political actions.
1217
 It proclaimed that the state was doing all it 
could to reach out to ordinary believers and to integrate them into Soviet society. 
Testimonials from former Witnesses affirmed these claims, while exposés of criminal 
activity by leaders and fanatics validated the alleged threat posed by certain members.  
Cadres from Party and public organizations used lectures, atheist events, individual 
work, comrade courts, and work meetings to pressure Witnesses to embrace atheism and 
abandon religion. They hoped to beat the Witnesses at their own game by converting 
believers into godless builders of communism. Yet the Witnesses actively contested these 
attempts, protecting their members from atheist rhetoric by challenging agitators and winning 
new converts, even bringing former believers back into the fold. Ultimately, the state could 
not compete with the dedication and skills of trained Witness proselytizers who believed they 
were saving citizens from destruction in Armageddon. Atheist cadres, meanwhile, lacked this 
same level of motivation and Bible knowledge. While the state pointed to former believers as 
evidence of its success, religious belief showed little indication of fading away. As a result, 
promises of a secular communist paradise began to appear about as likely as Witness 
predictions of a coming Armageddon. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PATH TO LEGALIZATION FROM LATE BREZHNEV THROUGH GORBACHEV 
“When the Lord restored the fortunes of Zion, we were like those who dreamed. Our mouths 
were filled with laughter, our tongues with songs of joy. Then it was said among the 
nations, ‟The Lord has done great things for them.‟” Psalm 126: 1-2. 
 
The Soviet state and the Jehovah‘s Witnesses found themselves in a stalemate by the 
late 1970s. Despite continued efforts to control or eliminate unregistered religious 
communities, the state had failed to convert most Witnesses to atheist communism and to 
liquidate the Witnesses‘ leadership and underground organization.  Yet the Witnesses 
remained a fringe religious group with a small membership in comparison to other faiths in 
the Soviet Union. Both the Witnesses and the Soviet state won individual converts to their 
point of view, but neither communism nor Armageddon seemed close on the horizon. Under 
Brezhnev, the state shifted focus toward controlling, rather than eliminating, religious life. It 
hoped that a ―softer‖ approach of extending limited benefits to religious organizations 
previously barred from registration would bring them under closer state scrutiny. It would 
also help prevent illegal activities and undermine independent religious authorities.  
With this goal in mind, the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) in the late 1970s 
began to cautiously broach the possibility of legalizing the Witnesses if they agreed to 
conform to state laws on religious organizations. While both the CRA and Witnesses seemed 
open to discussing the matter in the abstract, neither party proved willing to compromise its 
vision of what registration should entail. The CRA intended to register the Witnesses on the 
basis of the existing registration laws, while Witnesses wanted a ―no strings attached‖ 
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legalization that would allow them to practice their faith as they did in Western democratic 
countries. The death of Brezhnev in November 1982 did not cause a shift in this standoff by 
either the state or the Witnesses. Under the short-lived successive leaderships of Iurii 
Vladimirovich Andropov (November 1982 to February 1984) and Konstantin Ustinovich 
Chernenko (February 1984 to March 1985), dialogue over registration persisted with little 
tangible results. 
 Ultimately, it took new, more youthful leadership under Mikhail Sergeevich 
Gorbachev (1985-1991) to transform church-state relations. Under Gorbachev‘s twin policies 
of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost‟ (openness), the state signaled a willingness to 
rethink official policy toward registration with greater input from Soviet citizens. Yet even as 
the state moved toward democratic reforms and more liberal definitions of freedom of 
conscience, the Witnesses remained one of the last illegal religious organizations in the 
Soviet Union. Not until the final months of the Soviet state were the Witnesses officially 
registered. 
   
Revisiting Registration 
Adjustments to religious policy in the twilight years of the Brezhnev era made it 
possible to revisit the question of registration. In 1977, the state replaced the 1936 ―Stalin 
Constitution‖ with the so-called ―Brezhnev Constitution,‖ which reaffirmed freedom of 
conscience for all Soviet citizens, while introducing two relatively minor changes in church-
state relations. First, it modified Article 52 to ―guarantee‖ freedom of conscience, where the 
earlier constitution had merely ―recognized‖ this right. This semantic distinction reflected the 
state‘s desire to voice a commitment to basic human rights in response to growing 
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international condemnation. Article 29 declared that the USSR, in its relations with other 
states, ―respects human rights and fundamental freedoms‖ and upholds the rules of 
international law. Second, the constitution further altered the original language of Article 52 
by substituting the right to conduct ―antireligious propaganda‖ to the right to conduct ―atheist 
propaganda.‖1218 This less antagonistic approach framed atheism as a positive worldview 
based on science and materialism rather than a reaction against religious belief. The 
Brezhnev Constitution, however, did not ensure basic rights for citizens any more than had 
the previous Stalin constitution. Even if the state had enforced the freedoms outlined in the 
document, the constitution did not address serious obstacles to freedom of conscience for 
organizations such as the Witnesses. In particular, it did not allow for religious abstention 
from civic duties such as voting and military service. 
In general, the Brezhnev Constitution was as much a public relations campaign as it 
was an official statement of Soviet governance. In the lead up to its passage, the state 
solicited input from citizens to demonstrate the democratic nature of Soviet rule as enshrined 
in the document. Citizens had a chance to suggest changes and to comment on the draft 
constitution between June and October 1977, when the state adopted the final version as 
law.
1219
 In keeping with this policy, the CRA gathered feedback from religious believers and 
clergy on their reactions to the new constitution. CRA officials noted that, while most 
religions had a positive attitude and favorable response to the draft version, some ―extremist 
elements‖ and ―religious fanatics,‖ including the Witnesses, responded with skepticism and 
denounced continued state support for atheist propaganda. One 1977 CRA report quoted 
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Witnesses in Odessa oblast who criticized the constitution‘s provision requiring military 
service and rejected the Brezhnev doctrine of a worldwide ―struggle for peace.‖1220 A 
Witness cited in the report said in regard to the latter point, ―We [Soviet Witnesses] do not 
take up arms. In the US, 500,000 Jehovists do not take up arms either. That‘s how you really 
prevent war.‖1221 Witnesses in Krasnoiarsk krai criticized the new constitution for not 
granting believers the right to proselytize.
1222
 Witness criticisms of the constitution, not 
surprisingly, found little favor among Soviet officials, who disregarded these opinions as the 
voices of a few extremists and fanatics. 
More important for religious organizations, the Soviet state in the summer of 1975 
announced revisions to the 1929 Law on Religious Associations. As with the Brezhnev 
Constitution, the state intended the modifications to address growing international criticism 
of its human rights record in regard to religious believers. The Ukrainian agitprop department 
director, for example, in a memo to the Ukrainian Politburo in October 1976, expressed the 
hope that the law would counteract foreign propaganda on alleged religious repression in the 
USSR.
1223
 A 1975 memo from the Ukrainian CRA commissioner called on state institutions 
to show greater adherence to the principles of freedom of conscience due to foreign 
propaganda on religious repression. The commissioner advised the CRA officials to put more 
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effort into explaining these principles to Soviet citizens in order to avoid conflicts with 
believers.
1224
 
In fact, the statute contained little that was new. Rather, it made public what had 
already been practiced, but never acknowledged, since the secret 1961 instructions.
1225
 By 
exposing internal religious policy to public scrutiny, the state intended to acquaint Soviet 
citizens, and believers in particular, with Soviet laws on freedom of conscience.
1226
 Greater 
knowledge of the law, it believed, would result in better compliance with state regulations by 
believers. The 1975 regulation had one notable difference from the 1961 instructions, 
however, of relevance for Witnesses and other unregistered religious organizations: Article 
23, which barred specific organizations from registration, did not appear in the new 
published regulation. This change apparently caused some confusion within the CRA as to 
whether this aspect of the 1961 instructions remained in force, or had been superseded by the 
new law. To clarify the matter, CRA commissioner Kuroedov wrote to the TsK in 1978 that 
he understood Article 23 to no longer apply to registration. Unfortunately, available 
documentation does not include the TsK‘s response to this query.1227 Yet the subsequent 
actions of the CRA to promote registration strongly suggest that Kuroedov‘s view 
represented the majority opinion of CRA officials, at least in some areas, primarily Ukraine, 
with the most concentrated Witness communities. 
The renewed interest in registration reflected the long-standing focus on control over 
religious life in the Brezhnev era. At a Ukrainian Politburo session in October 1976, 
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members acknowledged that, by not offering registration to certain groups, the state had 
created dissatisfaction among believers, fueling religious fanaticism and conflict between 
believers and local authorities.
1228
 In a 1979 report on religious sectarianism, the Ukrainian 
CRA commissioner underlined the following text: ―The second major problem remains the 
actions of groups of unregistered believers.‖ The report maintained that these groups 
harbored extremists, traitors, fascist collaborators, and criminals. The best strategy, it 
asserted, was to bring such groups out of the underground and into the legal system.
1229
 The 
Witnesses, as one of the largest unregistered religious communities, were of major 
importance in this regard. In Zakarpattia oblast, for example, with the highest concentration 
of Witnesses in the Soviet Union, 1978 CRA statistics identified 46 unregistered Witness 
groups with 4,287 members. The next largest unregistered religion in the oblast, Pentecostals, 
had only 14 groups and 599 members.
1230
 In order to extend control over unofficial religious 
life, the state realized it needed to take measures to bring the Witnesses under its authority. 
In May 1980, the registration issue received further attention from the all-union CRA 
as a result of a national conference and a related CRA resolution on work with Jehovists.  
The conference stressed the need for all CRA commissioners and local officials to do more to 
bring religious life under the control and oversight of the state. It focused on registration and 
compliance with the law and discussed the need for propaganda to counteract Western 
charges of Soviet religious repression.
1231 
That same year, the CRA passed a resolution 
calling for improving work with ―Jehovists,‖ including the goal of registration. In response, 
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the Ukrainian CRA held oblast-level seminars for the MVD, police, and justice officials to 
discuss its implementation and notified oblast-level Party committees about the resolution 
and the measures to be taken.
1232
  
The 1980 resolution sent a mixed message to CRA commissioners, requiring them to 
broach the issue of local registration with Witness communities, while simultaneously 
working to eliminate organized Witness activities. Question and answer sessions between the 
officials and agitators and local Witnesses in Volyn‘ oblast demonstrate this two-pronged 
strategy toward Witnesses. While ostensibly held to explain the law and registration to 
Witnesses, the talks also included denunciations of the allegedly anti-Soviet ideology of 
Witness leaders and the anti-communist nature of the Witness religion. Authorities used the 
meetings to help identify Witnesses for targeted atheist agitation.  
In addition, the CRA hoped that registration would weaken the religion‘s 
underground organization. In this sense, the 1980 resolution evidenced the state‘s intent to 
implement what KGB director Semichastnyi had advised over a decade earlier: to divide and 
conquer the Witnesses through registration. This idea won support from CRA officials and 
advisors in the early and mid-1980s. Shortly after the conference, the Krasnoiarsk CRA 
commissioner stressed the need to pursue legalization as part of other measures to reduce the 
influence of extremist leaders in the Witness organization.
1233
 A few years later, with little 
progress made on registration, P. L. Iarotskii, a religious scholar and advisor to the CRA on 
the Witnesses, instructed the CRA that, if the state extended registration to the Witnesses, 
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they would fight among themselves to meet the terms necessary for registration, leading to 
division and schism within the religion, a positive outcome for the state.
1234
  
The state struggled to find the right balance between registration and repression 
during this period. Some officials still hoped that the state could eliminate the Witnesses 
without extending them any legal standing. For example, the Kurgan oblast Party committee 
in 1981 called for registration of unregistered religious organizations within eighteen months. 
Yet in the copy of the action plan sent to the CRA, an official had penciled in the margins 
next to the stated registration goal, ―or prevent their illegal actions.‖ The official also 
underlined the text stating that, in cases where groups refuse to register, it would move to 
prevent any unauthorized religious activities.
1235
 An August 1982 memo from the Zakarpattia 
oblast Party committee called for registering Jehovists and Reform Adventists, but also for 
taking measures against those who refuse to register.
1236
  
Probably as a result of the higher concentration of religious believers in Ukraine, 
officials there devoted the most time and effort into resolving the registration issue. From the 
late 1970s through the mid-1980s, several Ukrainian oblasts worked to extend registration to 
underground Western Christian groups. In most locales, these measures took the form of 
talks between CRA and Party officials and believers to explain the existing law and need for 
compliance. For example, the Ukrainian CRA sent out inspectors in 1978 to explain the new 
statute on religious organizations to believers and to assess their willingness to comply.
1237
 
Outside of Ukraine, where Witnesses and believers in general were less concentrated, CRA 
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commissioners and local soviets showed less initiative. In one exception to this rule, some 
districts in Irkutsk oblast sought to register the Witnesses. In December 1979, the Usol‘e-
Sibirskoe city soviet passed a plan for work with ―Jehovists‖ that included broaching the 
question of registration for Witnesses in Chunskii district. Though unsuccessful, this example 
demonstrates that interest in registering the Witnesses by local officials extended beyond 
Ukraine.
1238
 
A 1979 memo to city and district Party executive committees from the Donets‘k CRA 
commissioner advised officials how to conduct these meetings with believers. It suggested 
that speakers explain the nature and practical guarantees of freedom of conscience in the 
USSR, including the right to practice or not practice a religion, the right to conduct atheist 
propaganda, the separation of church and state and church and schools, and the equality of all 
citizens before the law. The memo instructed officials to make clear that these rights were 
limited to the extent necessary to ensure social order and security and the health and well-
being of its citizens. It also recommended that officials encourage believers to take part in 
Soviet life by going to the movies, watching television, and reading modern Soviet literature, 
newspapers, and magazines. The memo cautioned that some ―extremists‖ might cite the 
Helsinki Accords and other international legal documents concerning freedom of religion. It 
advised officials to clarify that these documents do not provide unlimited freedom, but rather 
confirm both the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and as such, conform to Soviet 
laws.
1239
 Agitators, local soviets, and their control commissions similarly stepped up efforts 
during this time to explain the current laws and registration policies to religious communities, 
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especially unregistered groups.
1240
 To aid in these efforts, the CRA circulated information to 
lecturers on the laws governing religious organizations.
1241
 
Forums between believers and authorities and agitators revealed the seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles to registration. In Ivano-Frankivs‘k oblast from 1980 to 1981, the 
CRA held thirty-nine conversations with Witnesses to explain the laws governing religious 
organizations, along with individual conversations with sixty-six known Witness elders.
1242
 
Yet, after three years of such talks, the Odessa CRA commissioner concluded in 1981 that 
these communities were unready for registration.
1243
 Many Witnesses pointed out that 
registration would make it impossible for them to practice their faith as they saw fit. They 
wanted the state to guarantee their right to preach door to door and to provide meeting spaces 
for Witnesses to gather.
1244
 A CRA inspector to Chernivtsi oblast in 1981 described 
Witnesses‘ attitude toward registration as ―negative,‖ noting one Witness‘s comment to him 
that ―the Bible and the USSR‘s laws are incompatible.‖ At a 1984 meeting in Zakarpattia 
oblast, believers questioned how they could register when Soviet laws deny the existence of 
God and wondered if registration would interfere with access to literature, or, more 
troublingly, if it would deprive them of salvation.
1245
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Many Witnesses felt registration would, in fact, make it more difficult for them to 
practice their faith. Since the state had failed to cut off literature supply or prevent illegal 
activities, the Witnesses saw little benefit in compromising. They had already learned how to 
adapt to life under Soviet rule without having to abandon their beliefs or practices. One elder 
in Zakarpattia oblast worried that registration would entail a loss of access to Brooklyn 
literature. He observed this would be far worse than the current situation, in which Soviet 
Witnesses received literature once a month from Ukrainians in Canada and from Europe. He 
did not elaborate on the logistics of these literature deliveries, but presumably some of it was 
mailed to the Soviet Union and eluded customs officials.
1246
 A 1982 report from Donets‘k 
oblast acknowledged that, because the state had been unable to prevent Witnesses from 
holding illegal meetings, it had failed to demonstrate to the Witnesses the need for 
registration.
1247
 An informational report prepared for a 1983 CRA conference in Kiev 
emphasized: ―Without Brooklyn literature, without its constant incitement of fanaticism and 
the fomenting of a campaign of fear around a given situation . . . Jehovism as an ideological 
phenomenon and organizational system cannot exist.‖1248 Yet although the state understood 
the critical role of Watch Tower literature in the religion, it could not effectively cut off its 
supply into the Soviet Union and force the Witnesses to accept its terms of registration. 
State efforts to control access to the international organization and literature became 
even more difficult in this period due to developments in Poland. Watch Tower President 
Frederick W. Franz and Governing Body member Theodore Jaracz received official sanction 
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from the Polish government in the fall of 1977 to visit the country and meet with Polish 
believers. The following year, Jaracz returned to Poland with another Governing Body 
member, Milton Henschel, for a meeting with the Polish version of the CRA, the Office of 
Religious Affairs. While this visit did not result in registration for the organization, Polish 
Witnesses subsequently enjoyed a freer atmosphere with less state interference even after the 
imposition of martial law in 1981 in response to social and labor unrest. The Polish 
government also consented to the Witnesses‘ establishing greater contact with its 
international organization and its fellow believers worldwide. In 1983, Witnesses from 
Western European countries received visas to take part in religious conventions in Poland. 
The next year, the organization imported 60,000 copies of the publication, My Book of Bible 
Stories, followed by other religious literature in mass quantities.
1249
  The freer environment 
in Poland undoubtedly made it easier for Soviet Witnesses to network with the Polish 
Witness organization and to smuggle in instructions and literature from this neighboring 
country. 
As the Polish example suggests, both Witnesses and the international Governing 
Body understood registration in Soviet bloc countries as an act of negotiation not between 
local believers and local officials, but as an agreement between the Governing Body and the 
state. Many CRA officials acknowledged this obstacle in their reports on talks with Soviet 
Witnesses. At a 1984 meeting in Dnipropetrovs‘k oblast, an elder told officials, ―We have a 
theocratic organization and, therefore, the question of registration is not decided by us, but by 
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Brooklyn.‖1250 At a meeting in Chernivtsi oblast, one Witness told a CRA official that he 
would need to travel to Brooklyn to resolve the matter of registration.
1251
 The talks between 
the CRA and Witnesses yielded no results because CRA officials did not speak to those with 
the power to make decisions for the organizations. 
Further exacerbating this problem was the fact that the state hoped to drive a wedge 
between ordinary believers and elders within the Witness community. This strategy led CRA 
officials to hold talks not only with local elders, but with the entire Witness population. Yet 
reports acknowledged that believers deferred to their elders in making key decisions and 
showed little inclination to operate independently of the organization‘s leadership. When the 
CRA sent inspectors to Zakarpattia oblast in 1984, for example, all of the local elders and 
many other Witnesses were out of the region working as seasonal laborers. The Witnesses 
left in the area were primarily children, homemakers, and the elderly. One man, a pensioner, 
advised the inspector to wait for the elders to return from the seasonal labor brigades, since 
he could not make decisions himself on registration.
1252
 The trip proved fruitless. 
Similarly, CRA officials hoped that they could exploit lingering divisions from the 
schism among the Witnesses and appeal to splinter groups outside of Brooklyn‘s authority. 
Although officials assumed these communities would be more eager to register and have 
fewer concerns about literature access and communicating with the Governing Body than 
mainline Witnesses, this proved not to be the case. The Chernivtsi commissioner claimed in 
1983 that the CRA and local officials had a better relationship with neutralists than with 
other Witnesses. However, he lamented that even the neutralists had not completely rejected 
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Brooklyn‘s authority, noting that some members continued to read old Watchtower issues or 
to receive new issues from other Witnesses. More problematically, neutralists refused to 
compromise on the issue of military service and were lukewarm about registration in general. 
In the end, the commissioner concluded that the CRA could not depend on legalization of the 
neutralists in the near future.
1253
  
A few oblasts had greater initial success in advancing registration among these 
schismatic groups due to interest from individual Witnesses, but also failed to achieve real 
results because they could not convince the entire community of the benefits of registration. 
The Ternopil‘ CRA worked with one breakaway Witness community that seemed open to 
registration.
1254
 The oblast CRA commissioner reported in 1981 that the village elder in 
Malyi Khodachkiv, Volodymyr Turok, had presented a written declaration seeking 
registration of his group of nine Witnesses. On closer examination, however, the CRA 
discovered that only Volodymyr had signed the letter and therefore instructed him to acquire 
the signatures and consent of all members. A follow-up meeting with Volodymyr a month 
later found that not only had he made no progress in convincing other members to sign, but 
that his wife was the major holdout. Volodymyr told the commissioner, ―The main thing is 
that I need to convince my wife, Marta. For some reason, she is wary about this idea and 
definitely influences others. I will try to convince her.‖1255 Two years later, Volodymyr had 
made no progress in convincing Marta and the other members to sign the registration 
documents. By that time, even he had changed his mind and begun to avoid contact with the  
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CRA.
1256
 
 The Zakarpattia CRA focused on registering the so-called Tyvodarists, named after a 
local Witness leader whose members had split from the main organization in the 1960s, 
rejected Watch Tower literature, and renounced ties to Brooklyn.
1257
 Although the KGB had 
suggested as early as the late 1970s that the state consider registering this group, this had 
never come to fruition.
1258
 In the 1980s, local Witness leader M. I. Turda, a pensioner, led the 
group in the village of Bila Tserkva. In 1981, the CRA reported that Turda did not feel the 
time had come for registration.
1259
  Reports in 1983 and 1984 described the group as not very 
active, meeting only once a week in small groups to study the Bible, with an estimated 
seventy-three members, fifty-three of whom were women, mostly elderly pensioners.
1260
 
When the CRA held a meeting with the Tyvodarists and other Witnesses in the spring of 
1984 to discuss registration, it was met with a positive attitude from Tyvodar supporters, and 
a more muted response from mainline Witnesses.
1261
 Yet the CRA failed to convince either 
group to register. In general, the CRA erred in assuming that splinter groups within the 
Witnesses would agree to register. Multiple attempts to win cooperation from these 
communities yielded no better results than with groups loyal to the Governing Body.  
Because dialogue with Witnesses produced no tangible results, the state struggled to 
maintain any momentum toward registering the Witnesses. In fact, the Ukrainian agitprop 
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department was not entirely oblivious to the major obstacles facing registration. Its 
instructions to CRA commissioners in 1984 identified legitimate barriers to capitalizing on 
the purported division between rank-and-file members and leaders and acknowledged that 
Witnesses intended to wait on Brooklyn for permission to register.
1262
 The state, however, 
failed to see the fundamental contradiction between its official discourse and the real-life 
situation as reported by its own personnel and CRA officials. The state also refused to admit 
that its methods of agitation work had failed to make progress toward a uniformly atheist 
society.  
As a result, action plans for work with Witnesses showed little difference from 
previous decades. The agitprop department, for example, continued to endorse the use of 
public meetings to condemn believers for illegal religious activity. It advocated the same 
basic measures it had employed since the Khrushchev era: specialized groups of atheist 
agitators to be created solely for work with Jehovists, improved statistics on Witnesses, 
further individual work with members, preventative measures against proselytism by 
members on seasonal work brigades, and more propaganda on the religion‘s allegedly anti-
Soviet and reactionary teachings. It instructed officials in Ukraine to initiate group 
conversations with members to explain the existing laws on religious associations and 
cautioned officials not to let these measures be perceived as an ―anti-Jehovist campaign.‖1263 
The plan enacted by Zakarpattia oblast called for studying the local situation, allocating the 
best ideological workers to areas with high concentrations of Witnesses, holding oblast 
seminars for lecturers and agitators, using the mass media and law enforcement to expose the 
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antisocial activities of extremists and fanatics, and highlighting examples of effective atheist 
education among Witnesses.
1264
  
Ultimately, efforts to register Witnesses in the late 1970s and early 1980s failed 
because the state, despite its new rhetoric about legalization, would not modify registration to 
make it acceptable to Witnesses. While the state saw registration as a process that would 
begin on the local level with individual groups of Witnesses, the Witnesses viewed it as an 
act that could occur only on a national level with approval of the international 
organization.
1265
 The chief CRA inspector in Ukraine, in a 1985 report, also noted that the 
new policy had not been uniformly implemented. Some oblasts had abandoned their efforts 
when they did not produce results, while other oblasts did not understand the new policy and 
thus never made any real attempt to implement it.
1266
 In short, registration required a 
coordinated effort and centralized talks between the Soviet state and the Governing Body, 
conditions the state was not prepared to meet.  
 
No End in Sight to State Repression 
As the Soviet state pursued a dual strategy of regulation and repression, Witnesses 
faced continued arrests and convictions through the early Gorbachev era for illegal religious 
activity. Criminal cases focused on alleged leaders and fanatics, whom the state increasingly 
referred to as ―extremists.‖ According to a 1984 Krasnoiarsk CRA memorandum, 
―Characteristic of religious extremism are attempts to use religion for political purposes, to 
consciously refuse to recognize the law on religious cults, and to falsify the position of 
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religion, church, and believers in the USSR.‖ This definition reflected the heightened 
sensitivity of the Soviet state in the 1980s to foreign accusations of state religious 
persecution. The document urged the state to struggle against religion and fight for the rights 
and interests of believers.
1267
 The state‘s proclaimed support for freedom of conscience 
notwithstanding, Witnesses accounted for a disproportionate number of the criminal 
convictions for illegal religious activity. For example, in Ukraine in 1978-79, the state 
recorded 78 criminal violations of laws by Witnesses. The significantly larger organization of 
unregistered Baptists had 124. In comparison, the Russian Orthodox Church had 15, and 
Pentecostals had only 11 violations.
1268
 
To shield itself from foreign accusations that it criminalized religious activity, the 
Soviet state sometimes opted to revoke custody rights of unregistered religious believers, 
including Witnesses, on the basis of child neglect or abuse, rather than prosecute them for 
religious activity.
1269
 In one notable instance, the Dobuliac family in the village of 
Grimăncăuți, Moldavia, lost custody of its four youngest children after a court convicted the 
eldest son of shirking military service in 1976. A year later, the state placed the children in 
state-run homes, where it hoped to reeducate them in a Soviet spirit. Instead, the children 
continually ran away to their parents. Thirteen-year old Petru showed little interest in school, 
ten-year old Liudmila did not join the Young Pioneers, and even seven-year old Galina 
refused to join the Octobrists. After several years of state involvement with no progress, 
officials finally got tired of hauling the children back to orphanages and returned custody to 
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the parents.
1270
  In other cases, however, the state opted both for criminal prosecution and 
revocation of custody rights. One woman, Mariia, lost custody of her young daughter in late 
1982 after being tried for illegal religious proselytism. Prosecution witnesses at the trial 
testified that Mariia had ripped off the Octobrist pin from her daughter‘s dress in front of 
students and teachers at the local school.
1271
 While these cases were not common, Witness 
parents lived with the knowledge that their religious beliefs could cost them custody of their 
children. 
The appointment of former KGB chief Iu. V. Andropov as General Secretary in late 
1982 resulted in a brief rise in religious repression and arrests of human rights activists, but it 
did little to eliminate underground religious activity or intellectual dissent.
1272
 The Witness 
organization itself remarked on a ―wave of persecution‖ from 1982 to 1984, and archival 
evidence confirms this impression.
1273
 During this period, regional courts convicted dozens 
of Witnesses of illegal religious activity, often based on flimsy evidence, and handed down 
relatively long prison sentences. For example, in 1984 a Moldavian Witness received three 
years in a labor camp for printing and storing a large quantity of religious literature in his 
home.
1274
 The same year, a female Witness also received three years in a camp on the basis 
of evidence that she regularly attended religious meetings in private homes and proselytized  
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to local citizens about her beliefs.
1275
  
A 1983 trial in the city of Osh, Kirgizia, illustrates the typical format of trials during 
this period. The two defendants, a married Russian couple, had moved to the region in the 
late 1960s with their two school-age children. Both had prior convictions related to their 
involvement with the Witnesses. The husband served time for resisting the military draft in 
1973, and the wife spent six years in a camp for a 1959 conviction on anti-Soviet activity. 
The court presented evidence that the couple converted several individuals in the city of 
Dzhalal-Abad and held meetings in their home to read The Watchtower and Awake!. The 
prosecution noted that, because of the couple‘s actions, some of these converts had refused to 
vote or to serve in the military. The couple‘s children had not joined the Komsomol or 
participated in other school activities. A search of the home uncovered hundreds of Watch 
Tower publications, along with cassette recordings of Witness sermons and choir music. In 
court, the couple claimed that they were simply ordinary Witnesses and did not lead any 
group or give any literature to others. The wife admitted to raising her children as religious 
believers, but said she let them make their own decisions. The son testified that his parents 
helped him study the Bible. Other Witnesses took the stand to confirm that the family 
belonged to the Witnesses, but they refused to denounce the couple. Perhaps sensing the 
weak evidence linking the couple to specific illegal actions, the prosecution emphasized that 
the Witnesses were not registered under the law and that the confiscated literature contained 
slander against the government and social order. The court sentenced both defendants to 
three years in a labor camp, with partial confiscation of property, but suspended the 
husband‘s sentence with a promise from his employer that the work collective would  
reeducate him.
1276
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The Kirgizia trial demonstrates the state‘s willingness to prosecute believers for 
simply owning religious literature and studying it in small groups. In the absence of clear 
evidence of illegal activity, the court used ―expert‖ analysis of literature to demonstrate the 
inherently slanderous and reactionary nature of Watch Tower publications. For Witnesses, 
the latest wave of criminal trials only confirmed the insincerity of state overtures regarding 
legalization and showed the state‘s fundamental unwillingness to alter its policy toward the 
religion. The new round of court sentences did not deter most Witnesses from practicing their 
faith. 
A 1984 resolution from the Ukrainian CRA on counteracting illegal activities by 
Witnesses highlighted the state‘s lack of progress in eliminating underground religious 
organizations.
1277
 A 1984 report from Zakarpattia oblast remarked that even though 
Witnesses held meetings two to three times a week, local authorities rarely bothered to fine 
them.
1278
 Indeed, the oblast CRA commissioner stated that in Rakhiv district, home to more 
than a thousand Witnesses, officials had fined only nine members the previous year.
1279
 A 
report from the Ukrainian agitprop department recommended that the CRA work more 
seriously with Witness communities to explain the need to conform to the laws governing 
religious organizations. The department circulated instructions to the CRA and other officials 
on the 1984 resolution, noting that the state would continue to issue fines and warnings and 
would initiate criminal investigations against Witnesses for violating the law.  The 1984 
resolution repeated worn-out, decades old tropes about the Witnesses that showed little 
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understanding of the organization‘s capacity to adapt and respond to its members‘ needs in 
the face of state repression.
1280
 In the end, Andropov‘s shortlived attempt to clamp down on 
underground religious activity had little impact on most Witnesses and no influence on their 
willingness to compromise over the issue of registration. 
 
A New Era in Church-State Relations? 
 After the brief tenures of Andropov and Chernenko, the Communist Party choose a 
leader who offered a chance to infuse new ideas and relative youth into the increasingly 
elderly Politburo. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary in March 1985. 
The appointment of Gorbachev as General Secretary did not immediately usher in a 
transformation of Soviet governance. Political scientist George Breslauer accurately 
describes Gorbachev‘s domestic policies during the first eighteen months as ―noteworthy 
more for their traditionalism than for their reformism.‖1281 During this early period, 
Gorbachev gave little indication that he intended to overhaul religious policy.
1282
 Political 
Scientist Nathaniel Davis notes only modest improvements in church-state relations during 
Gorbachev‘s first year and half in power, when the state eased restrictions on contact with 
Western religious organizations, allowing foreign aid in the form of Bibles, religious 
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literature, building supplies, and financial support for Orthodox churches.
1283
 Despite the 
slow pace of progress, Gorbachev‘s rhetoric of glasnost‘ and perestroika represented a clear 
discursive break with the past and laid the framework for more radical reforms later in his 
tenure.
1284
  
The first signal of a shift in the state‘s attitude toward acceptable dissent came in the 
fall of 1986 when the state released imprisoned human rights activist Anatolii Shcharanskii 
and dissident poet Irina Ratushinskaia. In December, the state allowed Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Andrei Sakharov to return to Moscow after years spent in internal exile.
1285
 More 
broadly in early 1987, Gorbachev instituted a sweeping plan for gradual democratization of 
the Party-state over the next few years.
1286
 Yet progress in registration of religious 
communities remained extremely slow through 1987. For example, in 1985, the RSFSR 
granted registration to twenty-three new religious associations. In 1987, the figure rose 
slightly, to forty-four new associations, still only a tiny fraction of the total unregistered 
religious communities.
1287
  
The Soviet state began implementing sweeping reforms in church-state relations by 
1988, beginning a period of increased registration, official acknowledgement of the 
repression of religious believers and the need for new laws, public discussion of religious 
matters, and a gradual rejection of the basic tenets of previous antireligious propaganda. The 
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reversal of religious policy was nowhere more evident than in the state‘s attitude toward the 
dominant religious faith in the Soviet Union.
1288
 In April 1988, Gorbachev met in the 
Kremlin with Patriarch Pimen I (1971-1990) and other church leaders to hear their demands 
for changes in state policy and to apologize for the mistreatment of believers and church 
hierarchs under previous Party leadership.
1289
 Of equal importance, 1988 marked the 
thousand-year anniversary of the Christianization of Rus‘ by Prince Vladimir of Kiev. The 
state granted the Russian Orthodox Church broad leeway to host several days of festivities to 
mark the historic occasion, while Gorbachev and other officials showed their support by 
attending some of the events.
1290
  
 Gorbachev demonstrated his commitment to the new state position by visiting 
churches of various denominations and speaking with religious leaders during his trips 
abroad. Most notably, in December 1989 he met with Pope John Paul II to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
1291
 The new all-union CRA commissioner, Iu. N. 
Khristoradnov, in a 1989 interview with Nauka i religiia, stressed that the new course in 
religious policy was based on Leninist principles. He promised Soviet citizens that ―there 
will be no return to the past‖ regarding Soviet religious policy.1292 Gorbachev‘s actions 
regarding religious policy in this respect mirror his larger ―New Thinking‖ platform of a 
socialist democracy with respect for ―universal human values‖ and in collaboration with the 
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capitalist world. In line with this view, Gorbachev traveled not only to the Vatican but across 
Europe and to the United States, creating a strikingly different, more cooperative and open 
image of Soviet leadership.
1293
  
The Soviet media adopted a starkly different tone in keeping with the changing 
religious climate, as glasnost‘ allowed for greater public discussion of previously taboo 
subjects. By 1987, Soviet citizens could read frank accounts of the Stalin-era purges and the 
Gulag in their newspapers and magazines.
1294
 In the religious sphere, increased press 
freedoms led to an almost uniformly positive view of Orthodoxy in Soviet newspapers and in 
previously atheist journals, sometimes bordering on an endorsement of Orthodoxy. In some 
instances, journals provided calendars of church holidays and other information for readers 
about how to practice the Orthodox faith. By 1991, the last year of its publication in the 
USSR, Nauka i religiia featured a series on Buddhism in Russia, ―conversations on the 
Bible,‖ and theological debates in Christianity. The former science section contained a wide 
range of articles on matters as disparate as astrology, ghosts, UFOs, the hole in the ozone 
layer, and the origins of human life.
1295
  In February 1991, Nauka i religiia launched a series 
of articles called ―The ‗Small‘ Churches in the USSR‖ to introduce readers to the various 
Christian, largely Protestant, denominations active in the Soviet Union.
1296
 Before the 
USSR‘s collapse, the journal printed articles in this series on Seventh Day Adventism and the 
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).
1297
 Liudyna i svit adopted a similar 
tone from 1988 through the Soviet Union‘s collapse, printing photographs of church services, 
interviews with religious leaders, discussions of the Bible, and articles on psychic power and 
other eclectic topics. Not surprisingly given its size comparative to other faiths in the Soviet 
Union, Russian Orthodoxy dominated the coverage.  
The liberalization shift in religious policy occurred primarily through unofficial 
signals given by the Party leadership and Gorbachev, and not through changes to legislation. 
Arrests of believers for religious activity came to a halt. Religious literature flowed into the 
country without state interference. International religious leaders received visas to visit the 
Soviet Union and speak to their faith communities. Religious communities applied for and 
received registration with little resistance from local officials. In 1988, 231 new religious 
groups gained registration, followed by 686 in 1989 and 834 in the first half of 1990.
1298
 
While the Soviet state recognized the clear need for new legislation to make these reforms 
permanent and standard throughout the country, it took considerable time for the Supreme 
Soviet to develop a law to meet the demands of the public, church leaders, and the Party-
state.
1299
 In 1987, the TsK ordered the CRA to draft a new law on freedom of conscience.
1300
 
Three years later, the Supreme Soviet finally passed the law.  
 In the interim, a vibrant discussion of the draft law took place in public, most 
prominently in the journal Nauka i religiia, which published regular reports on the law‘s 
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progress. In an interview conducted with A. E. Sebentsov, the chair of the legislative 
committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the official told the journal that the draft law had 
been made public to allow for greater input from citizens. He said that all mainstream faith 
communities, including Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists, had a chance to 
review the law and to recommend changes. The Supreme Soviet had reached out to the new 
Patriarch, Aleksii II (1990-2008), to ensure his support for the legislation. However, the state 
did not include Witnesses and other unregistered religious organizations in the discussion. In 
addition, as Sebentsov pointed out, elections to the Supreme Soviet allowed a significant 
number of religious personnel to win seats as people‘s deputies, including 192 Russian 
Orthodox believers, 55 Muslims, 12 Baptists and Adventists, 5 Buddhists, 4 Greek Catholics, 
2 Methodists, and 1 Armenian Apostolic Church member. This ensured these communities a 
voice in the political process.
1301
 At the same time, this avenue to political empowerment was 
not available for Witnesses, who do not vote or run for office due to their religious beliefs. 
 The new Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, passed by the 
Supreme Soviet on October 1, 1990, guaranteed broad religious freedoms.
1302
 Article 3 
guaranteed the right of all citizens to practice a faith either as an individual or within an 
organization. It gave parents the right to raise their children in a religious manner and to 
enroll their children in religious education courses (Article 6). The state could no longer 
deprive parents of custody or harass them for instilling religious values in their children. Of 
major importance for members of evangelical faiths, the article granted believers the freedom 
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to preach to others. The law also created a streamlined process for registering religious 
organizations with equal protection under the law. Any group of ten or more adults could 
seek registration of a religious organization through its local city or district soviet. The law 
mandated that soviets make a decision on registration within a month (Article 10). Any 
organization rejected for registration had the right to appeal the decision in court (Article 15). 
Once registered, religious organizations could purchase or rent buildings for services and 
rituals without state interference (Article 21). They could import and export religious 
literature (Article 22) and conduct charitable and philanthropic activities (Article 23).  
 The new legislation radically altered the postwar relationship between church and 
state, and the Soviet state and international law. It denied the Soviet state the right to finance 
atheist agitation and propaganda (Article 5). Equally critical, it removed all regulatory power 
from the CRA. Under the new law, the CRA functioned solely as a center for ―information, 
consultation, and expert review,‖ making it little more than an advisory body to the state on 
religious matters. Lastly, the final article of the law gave precedence to international treaties 
signed by the USSR (Article 31). In response to the all-union law, several Soviet republics 
enacted similar legislation. The RSFSR passed its version of the law on October 25, 1990. 
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet enacted its own law on April 23, 1991.
1303
 As a result, even 
after the Soviet Union‘s collapse only a year later, republic-level laws modeled after the 
USSR legislation continued to govern church-state relations into the 1990s in Soviet 
successor states. 
The new laws did not address all legal matters of importance to believers. For 
Witnesses, military service remained an unresolved issue. Article 4 of the all-union law 
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stated, ―No one can evade the performance of duties established by law for reasons of his 
religious convictions. Substituting the performance of one duty for another for reasons of 
convictions is permitted only in instances stipulated by USSR legislation.‖ The law‘s RSFSR 
counterpart similarly stated that religion itself was not a basis for refusal to fulfill civic duties 
unless provided for by other legislation (Article 7). However, USSR or RSFSR legislation on 
alternative service or religious exemption did not exist, which made it impossible for 
Witnesses to choose this option. A 1991 article in Nauka i religiia estimated that hundreds of 
believers refused to complete military service each year.
1304
 Thus, even as the Gorbachev era 
transformed religious life in the country, allowing for more free, open practice of faith, 
Witnesses continued to receive prison sentences through 1991 for refusing to serve in the 
military.
1305
 
 
Making Soviet Witnesses Legal 
 
By the time Gorbachev took over the Party leadership, the state had spent nearly a 
decade in fruitless attempts to negotiate registration with the Witnesses. As the Watch Tower 
organization noted, ―The perestroika announced in 1985 did not immediately bring about the 
results anticipated. In some regions, the Witnesses were still convicted and sent to prisons as 
before.‖1306 Moreover, the state continued to use fines and warnings to penalize minor 
violations of the law. In 1986, the Ukrainian TsK praised the Party-state for improved control 
over religious groups and for curtailing illegal activities, but criticized local officials for 
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overuse of fines and warnings instead of explanatory work among believers.
1307
 The CRA 
noted that some officials wrongly thought that approving any request for registration was 
akin to retreat from the struggle against religion. This, it observed, had caused dissatisfaction 
among believers and a growth in fanaticism and extremism.
1308
 Yet the TsK and CRA 
statements apparently did little to immediately change the situation. In Zakarpattia oblast the 
next year, for example, city and district soviets issued 21 fines, 9 warnings, and facilitated 
165 public meetings or other group forums to condemn the illegal actions of local Witnesses. 
Courts sentenced five individuals to labor camps for refusal to serve in the military.
1309
  
At least a few Witnesses faced criminal trials for illegal religious activity during the 
early Gorbachev era. Soviet courts found Witnesses guilty of slandering the Soviet state by 
spreading false information about the government and its social system. In some cases, these 
charges were in addition to convictions under Article 209, the statute most commonly used to 
prosecute believers who illegally preached their beliefs to others.
1310
 In January 1987, the 
Snizhne city court in Donets‘k oblast convicted five individuals under Article 209, finding 
the men, all local city leaders of the Witnesses, had organized meetings and incited members 
not to fulfill their civic duties. The men received four- to five-year sentences along with three 
years exile and confiscation of property.
1311
 In the spring and fall of that same year, a broader 
amnesty of over a hundred ―prisoners of conscience,‖ including several prominent religious 
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dissidents such as Father Gleb Iakunin, resulted in the early release of some Witnesses.
1312
 
Other Witnesses, mostly those convicted of refusal to serve in the military, remained in 
prison through early 1991. 
Gorbachev-era coverage of Witnesses in the Soviet mass media differed little in 
content and tone from that of previous decades until 1989. Liudyna i svit, for example, 
printed two articles on the Witnesses in 1986, both of which were identical in style to earlier 
pieces in the journal during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The first article described an 
interview with an elderly Witness who expressed regrets at having wasted his life in the faith; 
the second article praised the success of individual work with Witnesses in Chernivtsi 
oblast.
1313
 An article in the journal from the summer of 1988 gave no indication that official 
attitudes toward the Witnesses had changed. The author told a far-fetched tale of a young 
Witness who fought with the Allied Forces in World War II only to return home to his 
Ukrainian village after the war and have his father shun him for serving in the military. The 
man eventually left the Witnesses.
1314
  
Newspaper coverage through 1988 similarly maintained a strikingly unchanged tone 
toward Witnesses, although the number of articles on Witnesses decreased to only a handful 
of pieces. A February 1988 article in Zakarpatskaia pravda, for example, told the story of a 
young Witness who had served time for refusing to complete military service. Repeating 
worn-out tropes about ordinary believers, the author recounted how the man had lost his 
father at age three and had a difficult childhood, facts used to explain why the man joined the 
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Witnesses. The author related how the man, having since left the faith, wanted to make up for 
his mistakes by serving in the army.
1315
 The same year this article appeared, Zakarpatskaia 
pravda praised former oppositionist leader Konstantin Potashov‘s decades-long atheist work 
among Witnesses in the oblast.
1316
 
While newspapers and atheist journals printed articles on improved church-state 
relations, the tone did not imply that expanded religious freedoms necessarily encompassed 
the Witnesses. In a 1988 interview in Liudyna i svit, the Ukrainian CRA commissioner 
informed Soviet readers that groups who still had not registered did not want to do so. He 
remarked that groups such as the Baptist-Schismatics, Pentecostals, and Witnesses seemed to 
prefer to wait for the new law on freedom of conscience, rather than register in conformity 
with the existing law. The commissioner expressed his belief that this viewpoint 
demonstrated these believers‘ low level of political consciousness.1317 As late as December 
1989, the commissioner publicly criticized these religious groups for continuing to violate 
the law and refusing to register. He blamed religious leaders for the lack of cooperation with 
the state.
1318
  
Naturally, it took time to implement the state‘s new course in religious affairs and to 
dismantle the previous system of atheist agitprop. A November 1987 article in a Moldavian 
district newspaper stated that perestroika did not mean an end to atheist work with the 
Witnesses. The reporter, speaking about the situation in the village of Criva, told readers that 
whether or not they believed in God ―is a matter of your conscience. But your conscience 
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ought to be clean not only before God, but before your homeland, before your neighbors, and 
before those you love. Is this not so?‖1319 By 1989, however, the tone of publications on 
atheist agitation took a much less politicized view of religious life and beliefs, including 
those of Witnesses. For example, a pamphlet printed that year by the Ukrainian Knowledge 
Society for use by atheist agitators did not claim that the Witnesses were a political 
organization, had a political agenda, or committed criminal acts by violating the law. Instead, 
the publication focused on teaching agitators the basic facts about the Witnesses‘ religious 
worldview. The pamphlet advised agitators to develop a new program for work with 
Witnesses devoid of even a hint of coercion.
1320
 
 While the Soviet state grappled with how to respond to Witnesses in light of its 
evolving religious policy, Soviet bloc countries changed course in their treatment of the 
Witnesses. Growing religious freedom in the near abroad reflected the lack of control by the 
Soviet Union over its satellite states and put pressure on the Soviet state to resolve its own 
registration issues with the Watch Tower organization. In all Soviet bloc countries, de facto 
persecution ended first, followed later by official registration. In Hungary, steps toward 
legalization began in the fall of 1984 when members of the Hungarian country committee 
met with state officials. As a result, Hungarian Witnesses began to hold meetings with less 
government interference. In 1987, Henschel and Jaracz, along with German Governing Body 
member Willi Pohl, met with Religious Affairs officials. They achieved registration of the 
Hungarian Witness organization in June 1989.
1321
 In Czechoslovakia, state persecution 
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largely ceased in the late 1980s.
1322
 East German Witnesses had to wait until the Berlin Wall 
fell to win legal recognition, granted by the German Democratic Republic on March 14, 
1990.
1323
 Romania legalized the Witnesses a month after the GDR.
1324
  
The developments in Poland had the greatest impact on Soviet Witnesses. Most 
notably, the Polish Witness organization appealed for and received a permit to host an 
international convention in the summer of 1989. The permit allowed four conventions in the 
cities of Chorzów, Warsaw, Wrocław, and Poznán. Finally, in May 1989, after years of 
negotiation between the state and the Governing Body, the organization received official 
registration.
1325
 Soviet Witnesses, sensing a new attitude toward religion on the part of the 
state, hoped to take part in Polish conventions across the border.
1326
 In December 1987, a 
Ukrainian CRA inspector reported from Volyn‘ oblast that several local Witnesses had 
attended conventions held in Poland under the pretense of visiting relatives. The Witnesses 
told the inspector that both KGB and CRA officials had been aware of the real purpose of the 
trip and had not attempted to prevent them from traveling.
1327
 Similarly, some Ukrainian 
members took part in a 1988 district convention in Poland under the guise of visiting friends 
and relatives. Customs officials allowed these individuals to bring back Bibles and other 
religious literature.
1328
 The lack of state interference in these travel plans signaled to  
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Witnesses the potential for further progress in church-state relations. 
The climate of greater freedom for Witnesses in the near abroad indicated to the 
Governing Body that a regional shift in religious policy was taking place and that the time 
had come to reopen serious negotiations with the Soviet state. Soviet Witnesses conveyed to 
the European branch offices and the international organization the positive shift in state 
policy. The German branch office relayed to the Governing Body in 1988 that Soviet 
Witnesses ―feel that the attitude toward them has drastically changed.‖ That year, Witnesses 
celebrated the yearly Memorial services without interference. Watch Tower publications in 
1989 acknowledged the progress toward greater religious freedom.
1329
 To test the extent to 
which the Soviet state had shifted its position on the Witnesses, the German branch office 
compiled a list of home addresses for Soviet Witnesses and shipped small packets of 
literature to them.
1330
 By early 1990, the branch had mailed roughly 1,600 shipments into the 
Soviet Union without interference.
1331
  
While Witnesses waited for the state to resolve the registration issue, they continued 
to find new members. This growth accelerated under Gorbachev, in part due to the more 
relaxed climate under glasnost‘, which made it easier for Witnesses to proselytize. While 
comprehensive CRA statistics were temporarily unavailable from the Russian state archive 
for the Gorbachev period at the time of my research, other sources identify several areas of 
growth. For example, the 1985 statistics listed just under 7,000 Witnesses in the RSFSR, 
while a 1989 CRA memo estimated that 10,000 Witnesses now lived in the territory, 
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primarily in the Northern Caucasus, Krasnodar and Krasnoiarsk regions, and Irkutsk 
oblast.
1332
 Similarly, Ukraine identified 13,271 members in 1985, but a 1989 CRA chart 
included 14,860 Witnesses.
1333
 A document prepared later that year showed a remarkable 
jump in the statistics, with 19,518 Witnesses, an increase mostly accounted for by an 
additional 3,000 reported members in Zakarpattia oblast.
1334
 Indeed, by January 1991, 
Zakarpattia oblast reported 9,540 Witnesses, by far the largest Witness community in the 
Soviet Union.
1335
 For its part, the Watch Tower organization estimated that in 1991, there 
were 25,448 active members in Ukraine and another 20,000 in the rest of the USSR. Of this 
20,000, the organization estimated that 15,987 lived in the RSFSR.
1336
  
The state‘s rapid registration of religious communities between 1988 and 1990 made 
this growth all the more apparent by isolating the Witnesses from other religious 
communities who now enjoyed legal standing. As of January 1, 1989, Witnesses represented 
the largest category of unregistered religious groups in Ukraine, followed by Pentecostals 
and Baptists.
1337
 At a meeting between officials, agitators, and religious believers in February 
1988 in the village of Velyki Luchky in Zakarpattia oblast, a Russian Orthodox believer 
criticized Witnesses for keeping their children out of the army when other believers‘ children 
fulfilled their military service obligations. At a similar meeting in the village of Rakoshyno, 
an Adventist told Witnesses to follow the Adventist example and begin registration. The 
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Witnesses were open to such meetings, but wanted to wait on permission from Brooklyn to 
register.
1338
  
The Gorbachev-era state realized that, if it wanted to achieve the legalization of the 
Witness organization, it would need to do so on the conditions set by the Witnesses through 
the Governing Body. By 1988, the state recognized that it had to make the first move and 
establish direct contact with the Brooklyn headquarters. The first attempted high-level 
meeting, which took place on the initiative of the Ukrainian CRA commissioner, proved 
somewhat of a disaster. When Ukrainian CRA commissioner, N. A. Kolesnik, traveled to 
Brooklyn in November 1988 to meet with the Governing Body, he did so with little warning 
to the organization, whose leaders were, it turned out, not in the country at the time.
1339
 
Watch Tower representatives apologized to Kolesnik for the confusion and provided a tour of 
the organization‘s printing presses and facilities. They promised to convey his desire for 
dialogue to the leadership. Despite the setback, Kolesnik took the opportunity to speak to 
lower-level representatives of the organization about the democratization process in the 
Soviet Union and improvements in freedom of conscience. He claimed that many Witnesses, 
including those in Ukraine, had expressed a desire to normalize relations between their 
organization and the state, and to register in accordance with the law. Witnesses, he 
acknowledged, would register only with approval from the Governing Body. Thus, he asked 
that the Governing Body review its position on registration, stressing that resolution would 
be in the interests of the several thousand Soviet ―Jehovists.‖ Upon his return to Ukraine, 
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Kolesnik recommended that the CRA send an official request for registration to the 
Governing Body.
1340
  
The Brooklyn leadership seemed to appreciate the olive branch extended by Kolesnik. 
The following year, the Governing Body advised the Soviet country committee to ―start 
negotiations with authorities to register our public ministry.‖1341 In turn, the CRA gained 
encouragement from the example of improved church-state relations across the Soviet bloc. 
A 1989 CRA report noted the recent registration of Witnesses in Poland and elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe, and hypothesized correctly that this shift reflected new instructions from the 
Governing Body.
1342
 These external developments put pressure on the CRA to resolve its 
own Witness question, since they demonstrated that an appeal to the Governing Body could 
produce positive results. The CRA and Governing Body made a second attempt at 
negotiations at the end of the year. With permission from the Soviet state, Governing Body 
members Milton Henschel and Theodore Jaracz traveled to Ukraine to meet with the Soviet 
country committee.
1343
 At the same time, in the fall of 1989, Ukrainian elders traveled to 
Moscow to discuss legalization with the CRA.
1344
  
Even with the progress in 1989 toward legalization, it is important to recognize the 
gradual and sometimes inconsistent character of the new course in religious policy. Without 
the new religious law in place, events proceeded in a haphazard manner and the long-term 
objectives of the top Party leadership were not always clear to officials or Witnesses. A 
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October 1989 resolution passed by the Russian CRA on improving work with unregistered 
Protestant associations reflects this confusion. The report acknowledged that approximately 
half of all Western Christian religious groups remained unregistered, including 220 Baptist 
groups, 200 Pentecostal groups, 86 Witness groups, and 20 Adventist-Reformist groups, 
among others. It blamed the situation on the state‘s misguided decision to categorically deny 
these groups registration under previous regimes. As a result, it argued, these communities 
went deeper underground and developed a hostile attitude toward state institutions. The 
resolution instructed all regional CRA commissioners to speak with religious leaders, active 
members, and ordinary believers and to answer their questions regarding registration, 
explaining the current laws and the constitutional guarantees on freedom of conscience.
1345
 
On the other hand, the resolution mixed old tropes with the new ideas of perestroika. For 
example, it cited the internal ―crisis‖ within religious communities as a partial explanation 
for the unwillingness of leaders to register their communities. The report also drew a clear 
distinction between these supposedly recalcitrant leaders and ordinary believers who, it 
alleged, favored registration.
1346
 In short, even as the state sought registration, some officials 
continued to view the Watch Tower organization and its leaders as extremists, and believers 
as naive, but loyal citizens. 
A further illustration of the confusion among officials, Witnesses, and the Party 
leadership over the course of church-state relations came when local Ukrainian elders 
requested the right to attend the four international conventions held in Poland in the summer 
of 1989. L‘viv Witnesses appealed directly to the CRA to help arrange group transportation 
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for about 1,000 members. Although the CRA rejected this request, directing them to travel as 
tourists, it wavered on how to respond to the convention. The CRA felt that it could be useful 
for Soviet Witnesses to take part and advance the call for Soviet registration.  Thus, after 
telling the Witnesses it could not help them with transportation, the L‘viv CRA nonetheless 
sent a memo to the Ukrainian CRA to ask whether it could offer a bus for local Witness 
elders to participate in talks on registration. The Ukrainian CRA chairman, reading this 
report, underlined the last remark and put a question mark in the margin.
1347
 The documents 
do not indicate how the transportation question was resolved, but they do show how officials 
struggled to apply the new course in religious policy to concrete local and regional decisions. 
The state ultimately allowed Witnesses to attend the Polish conventions, marking the 
first time the two Witness communities had been able to communicate openly after decades 
of clandestine contacts. According to Watch Tower statistics, several thousand Soviet 
members traveled from Moldavia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and other Soviet 
regions, joining a total of 165,518 Witnesses in attendance for several days of religious talks 
and fellowship.
1348
 Ukrainian Witness Sofiia Vovchuk, who attended the 1989 Polish 
conventions, recalled afterward that ―we never imagined that there would be freedom. When 
we read in The Watchtower about the conventions taking place in other countries, we prayed 
to Jehovah that just once in our lives, we might have the opportunity to attend a convention 
such as they have in other countries. Sure enough, Jehovah blessed us.‖1349 Soviet delegates 
had a chance to speak about their experiences as part of the convention program, spreading  
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information about their repression and Soviet history to members worldwide.
1350
 
The conventions show how, despite lingering mutual mistrust, both officials and 
Witness elders proved willing to work together for legalization. The following winter, in 
February 1990, an official Watch Tower delegation, which included Henschel, Jaracz, eleven 
Soviet Witnesses, and Willi Pohl and Nikita Karlstroem from the German branch office 
traveled for direct talks with CRA officials in Moscow. Although the organization wished to 
register, representatives made clear their intent to maintain a ―theocratic‖ structure, and 
stipulated that the state had to grant registration first to the central organization, and then to 
its lower rungs. The meeting also discussed the finer points of Witness beliefs, which CRA 
officials struggled to understand. Pohl, for example, clarified that the belief in the destruction 
of earthly governments stems from the organization‘s interpretation of biblical prophecy, and 
did not indicate an endorsement of violence by Witnesses. At the close of the session, the 
CRA officials promised to expedite the registration process.
1351
 
In the wake of these talks, Ukrainian Witnesses told local CRA officials in early 1990 
that they considered the matter of registration ―resolved.‖ They voiced their intent to wait for 
the passage of the new religious law and achieve registration under its more liberal 
guidelines. Echoing the hopeful remarks of the Ukrainian Witnesses, the Russian CRA 
commissioner reported in April 1990 that he had made clear progress in registering the 
Witnesses. He remarked that ―the Jehovists are in talks with Brooklyn and have received its 
permission to register.‖1352 Russian CRA commissioner L. F. Kolesnikov, in Nauka i religiia 
in 1990, expressed certainty that although some groups had not yet ―established official 
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relations with the state,‖ citing Reform Adventists, True Orthodox Christians, and Witnesses, 
the situation would gradually resolve itself.
1353
 Sensing a clear change in conditions, 
Witnesses spoke freely to officials about how they received literature in packages from 
Poland and other countries. For example, on the day they met with CRA representatives, 
Witnesses mentioned that they had received copies of The Watchtower published just two 
weeks earlier. More surprisingly, local Witnesses invited the CRA inspector to attend one of 
their weekly meetings. He accepted the invitation. The inspector reported that the meeting 
opened and closed with prayer and song. Much of the service, he observed, was similar to 
that of the Adventists. He stressed the positive reaction he received by the twenty-four 
Witnesses gathered at the private home.
1354
  
The Soviet state affirmed its new attitude toward the Watch Tower organization by 
making it even easier for believers to attend Polish conventions in 1990, allowing 17,454 
members, or nearly half of all Witnesses, to travel to Warsaw that summer.
1355
 The state‘s 
position reflected the more open borders within the Soviet bloc countries and the growing 
ability of Soviet and Eastern bloc citizens to travel without state interference. For Soviet 
Witnesses, the convention offered a chance not only to meet with international believers, but 
also to reunite with fellow Soviet members from across the vast USSR. More than 100 
prisoners who had served time in the Mordovia camp reunited at the event.
1356
 One attendee, 
who had spent fifteen years in Siberian exile, commented, ―We are now expecting better 
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times to come along.‖ Another man declared, ―Better times are already here. I can now take 
our message freely from house to house, whereas in the past this was not possible.‖1357   
 In February 1991, a follow-up delegation of Witnesses, including Pohl, met with the 
Ukrainian CRA commissioner in Kiev to review final negotiations for registration. Pohl 
voiced concerns about the need for foreign Witnesses to receive multi-entry visas to help 
advise the Soviet Witness organization on the importation of literature, the establishment of 
legal printing presses within the USSR, and the construction of meeting spaces or ―Kingdom 
Halls‖ where members could gather.1358 This meeting led shortly thereafter to the first legal 
Witness organization established in the USSR through the Ukrainian CRA. The legal charter, 
signed on February 28, 1991, by the inaugural country committee, mirrored the basic 
administrative structure of Witness country branches worldwide. The charter recognized the 
creation of a governing committee (kerivnyi komitet) and a central office (or ―Bethel,‖ as it is 
known by Witnesses) staffed by full-time volunteers to oversee the national organization. 
The governing committee comprised a small body of elders (from three to nine members) 
chosen by the Governing Body. The first committee included seven elders and, though 
registered in Ukraine, included one representative from Kazakhstan, two from Irkutsk oblast, 
and four from western Ukraine. Mykhailo Dasevych, then head of the Soviet country 
committee, joined the new committee as its ―coordinator.‖ Now allowed to gather openly as 
they did elsewhere in the world, the Witnesses regrouped their members into congregations 
that met as a single community, instead of in small circles and groups. The charter 
proclaimed the Witnesses‘ core beliefs and commitment to door-to-door proselytism, free 
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Bible studies with interested individuals, and distribution of literature. Registration accorded 
the Ukrainian Witnesses the previously unimaginable right to rent or purchase 
accommodations for its Kingdom Halls, Congress Halls, and other building needs. The 
document did not address military service or other civic responsibilities of Witnesses.
1359
 
This would have to be resolved through separate legislation by the state, as happened in 
Ukraine the next year. Russian Witnesses followed suit with their own registration and 
charter through the Russian CRA a month later on March 27, 1991.  
While the Witnesses lacked an all-union registration of their organization, in effect, 
both charters together created a single, unified Witness organization whose administrative 
authority stretched across the entire Soviet Union. Moldavia provides an illustrative example 
of how other Witness communities achieved de facto legal status prior to the Soviet Union‘s 
collapse. In December 1989, Moldavian elders had already received permission to travel to 
L‘viv to meet with the country committee for religious training. In early 1990, local officials 
in the district of Feteşti allowed Witnesses to use a member‘s house as a Kingdom Hall for 
185 local believers. When construction work to convert the house into a hall revealed deep 
structural problems, the Witnesses appealed for and received permission to construct a new 
Kingdom Hall on the site instead. By 1991, they held circuit assemblies without police or 
state interference.
1360
  
Registration made possible centralized communications and coordinated efforts 
between the Governing Body, its European branch offices, and the newly legalized Soviet 
country committee. In early spring of 1991, the first legal mass shipments of literature from 
Germany arrived in L‘viv, where Witnesses then transported them to congregations in 
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Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.
1361
 For the first time, Soviet Witnesses 
received illustrated color copies of The Watchtower and Awake! in regular shipments, no 
longer needing to hoard literature or to share a single issue among friends and family. Two 
Witness couples from Germany arrived in L‘viv later in the year to help establish the first 
branch office facilities.
1362
 Witnesses held their first-ever district conventions in public 
spaces with government approval that summer and fall, attending one of seven conventions 
held in Estonia, Ukraine, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Some likely attended more than one event 
or brought non-Witness friends and relatives, since the total attendance at the events (more 
than 70,000 individuals) exceeded the organization‘s active membership that year. Polish 
members helped provide logistical support for the Ukrainian conventions.
1363
  
The Witnesses‘ new legal status finally began to overturn some of the negative, 
politicized discourse about their religion in the Soviet media. A few publications even 
directly acknowledged the previously secret exile of the Witnesses from the western 
borderlands.
1364
 An October 1991 issue of Liudyna i svit printed perhaps the first press 
attempt at an objective history of the Witness organization, its beliefs and practices, and its 
view of the Soviet state.  The piece admitted that the Soviet press and other publications had 
misrepresented the Witnesses and their activities as subversive.
1365
 The April 1991 issue of 
the Moldavian district newspaper, Krai rodnoi, contained a lengthy article on the Witnesses 
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that began: ―Pairs of people are going in the darkness to the prayer house, discussing 
something in a whisper. They return from the prayer house with a lightness and ease in their 
souls, hope, and faith in tomorrow.‖ The article retold the life story of one Witness couple 
who had spent years in a forced labor camp in the 1950s, separated from their young child. 
Even after the state released the couple from the camps, they faced steady discrimination and 
were denied equal access to work and housing. Students bullied their son at school and 
teachers gave him poor grades because of the family‘s faith. Despite these obstacles, the 
family remained firmly committed to the Witness faith, a fact that in earlier coverage would 
have won them scorn, but here resulted in praise for their determination. The article ended, 
―Whether Jehovists, Orthodox, Subbotniki, or Baptists, we are all, first and foremost, 
people.‖1366 
 
Conclusion 
The Soviet state in the late 1970s and early 1980s fundamentally misread the 
Witnesses in thinking that it could convince them to abandon their provocative beliefs and 
practices in exchange for registration. Official rhetoric championed the mistaken notion that 
Soviet reality had pushed religions into a state of ―crisis‖ that left them weak and desperate to 
remain relevant in the modern world. In fact, no such crisis existed and many religions 
maintained firm communities of believers and found new converts. Further, the Witnesses‘ 
attempts to legalize their activities under the previous Stalin and Khrushchev regimes clearly 
showed that the organization expected the state to compromise its policies to meet the needs 
of the Witnesses, and that the Witnesses had no intention of adapting their faith to suit 
secular authorities. As decades passed without progress on registration, the Witnesses 
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developed a viable underground network of believers that functioned remarkably well 
without state sanction. Having learned how to survive under these conditions, the 
organization had less incentive to modify its practices and accept restrictions on its activities.  
Thus, both the Witnesses and the state expected the other side to give ground, but 
neither proved willing to do so. It took new Party leadership under Gorbachev in the late 
1980s for real advances in registration to take place. In the end, the Witnesses‘ version of 
legalization won out, as the Gorbachev-era state agreed to register the Witnesses on the terms 
of the Governing Body. In a summer 1991 article in The Watchtower, the organization 
referred to its Soviet registration as ―a joyful climax to one hundred years of witnessing.‖1367 
After decades of repression and harassment, Soviet Witnesses could now openly profess their 
faith without fear of state reprisals. A new era of church-state relations had begun. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FREEDOM AND OPPOSITION IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
―A great door for effective work has opened to me, and there are many who oppose me.‖  
1 Corinthians 16:9 
 
No sooner had the Watch Tower organization and the Soviet state finally come to an 
agreement on registration than the Soviet system entered a period of crisis and collapse that 
culminated in the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. The man who had engineered 
the advent of religious freedom, Gorbachev, was out of power, and fifteen newly independent 
republics emerged, each with the power to determine the boundaries of freedom of 
conscience within its borders. The Witness question, therefore, was solved in the USSR only 
to become an issue for the successor states.
1368
 The final two chapters explore Witness life 
and the Witnesses‘ interactions with state and society in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. 
While this chapter focuses on Russia, many of the problems faced by Russian 
Witnesses affected Witness communities across the states of the former Soviet Union. First, 
although official attitudes changed toward the Witnesses, public perceptions did not shift as 
rapidly. Decades of agitation work and sustained anti-Witness propaganda in Soviet 
publications left their mark. Negative press on the Witnesses ceased in the late 1980s, but it 
was not replaced with an equal amount of positive or neutral coverage. Only occasional 
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articles challenged Soviet conceptions of the Witnesses, leaving readers to assume that 
Soviet discourse on the religion had been largely accurate. By the mid-1990s, much of the 
reporting once again adopted a hostile tone. Witnesses remained ostracized from their fellow 
citizens, much as they had been for decades. 
Second, registration created massive work for the international organization, which 
had to adapt to its gradual legalization across the former Soviet bloc countries. Each of the 
newly independent states needed offices, full-time volunteer staff, translation services, rental 
space and land for its Kingdom Halls, and administrative oversight. Rapid growth in 
membership in the region made these tasks all the more challenging by creating a continual 
demand for literature, meeting spaces, and responsible elders. In turn, Soviet elders and 
believers had to learn how to conform to the worldwide standards of the organization and 
submit to closer administrative control from the international leadership. All of this took 
time, effort, and financial resources from the organization.  
Lastly, the resurgence of national and religious identities during this period created 
new tensions between the Witnesses, state, and society. As a religion that eschews the 
concepts of patriotism, nationalism, and ecumenicalism, the Witnesses won few admirers 
among the major political parties and churches in the post-1991 era. Moreover, the 
Witnesses‘ growth sparked tension within society and, in particular, among more mainstream 
religious organizations that resented the Witnesses‘ provocative beliefs and confrontational 
proselytism. By the late 1990s, the Witnesses faced an increasingly hostile climate, fueled in 
large part by the Russian Orthodox Church and its followers. In particular, the Church helped 
launch an ―anticult movement‖ that framed opposition to the Witnesses within a pan-
European discourse about the alleged dangers of ―cults‖ to a democratic society. The anticult 
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movement, in turn, fueled public mistrust of minority religions and pushed the Russian state 
to adopt stricter controls over them. As a result, Witnesses once again found themselves on 
the margins of acceptable belief and dissent. The newly elected governments of the western 
successor states struggled to set boundaries on freedom of conscience that fit within basic 
democratic standards and satisfied the demands of powerful political constituents, including 
the resurgent Russian Orthodox Church.  
 
The Religious Revival 
In the final years of the Soviet Union, Russian citizens already demonstrated a 
renewed interest in religion and spirituality buoyed by the state‘s more tolerant attitude 
toward faith in the late 1980s. Television healers, now allowed to broadcast on Soviet 
airwaves, captivated millions of viewers.
1369
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
booming market for religious ideas, as well as the relative lack of restrictions on missionary 
activities, attracted large numbers of foreign religious organizations to Russia in search of 
converts.  American preachers introduced Christian broadcasting programs on the Russian 
television and radio airwaves and held mass rallies in major Russian cities. New religious 
movements (hereafter, NRMs) such as the Unification Church and the Church of Scientology 
also established a toehold in the religious marketplace.
1370
 Within the first three years of 
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independence, an estimated 1,000 foreign missionaries and 50 foreign religious organizations 
flocked to Russia.
1371
 Homegrown religious movements added to this boom. While most 
Russians remained either nonreligious, nondenominational, or nominally Russian Orthodox, 
a growing percentage identified themselves with NRMs and Western Christian organizations. 
Statistics on this growth vary widely, from the figure of three to five million Russian 
members of NRMs promoted by Russian critics of these groups, to an estimate of 250,000 to 
400,000 given in Western scholarship.
1372
 Whatever the reality behind the figures, by the late 
1990s, this initial surge had largely leveled out.  
Regardless, most Russians considered themselves Orthodox.  Few, however, had any 
interest in participating in church life or in adhering to a strict set of practices and beliefs. 
According to surveys carried out from 1991 through 1999 by a joint research project of the 
Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences, although a majority of the 
population identified as Russian Orthodox, only 7 percent attended services at least once a 
month. Orthodox self-identification seemed to indicate a cultural rather than religious 
affiliation. While 75 percent of all Russians in 1999 considered themselves Orthodox, so did 
42 percent of self-identified atheists and 50 percent of self-identified ―nonbelievers.‖ Further, 
                                                 
 
1371
 Serge Schmemann, ―Religion Returns to Russia, With a Vengeance,‖ New York Times, July 28, 1993, A1. 
 
1372
 The higher figure originated with the Ministries of Health and Internal Affairs in the 1990s. The 
discrepancy in the statistics is the result of four basic difficulties in establishing total NRM membership. First, 
many organizations do not keep track of membership, refuse to provide these figures to the public, or artificially 
inflate their rolls. Second, there is little agreement among scholars and NRMs themselves as to what 
membership entails; some organizations have clear initiation rituals, such as baptisms. Other organizations 
consider anyone who attends a meeting a member. Third, NRMs tend to have high membership turnover. 
Lastly, many organizations exist only briefly, sometimes reemerging under a different name. Stephen J. Hunt, 
Alternative Religions: A Sociological Introduction (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 31. For 
the three to five million figure, see, for example, A. I. Khvylia-Olinter and S. A. Luk‘ianov, Opasnye 
totalitarnye formy religioznykh sekt (Moscow: Sviato-Vladimirskoe Bratstvo, 1996), 5, 40. For Western 
estimates, see Marat Shterin and James T. Richardson, ―Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Precursors 
of Russia‘s New National Law,‖ in Religious Liberty, 154, and Marat Shterin, ―New Religious Movements in 
Russia in the 1990s,‖ in Religious Transition, 185. 
 410 
among those who expressd belief in some Orthodox dogma, adherence to specific tenets 
varied greatly. In 1991, a mere 34 percent of Russians believed in God, a figure that 
increased to 59 percent by 1999. Only 17 percent of those polled in 1991 expressed belief in 
life after death, and 24 percent in 1999. The corresponding percentages for men and people 
under thirty were even lower.
1373
 
Thus, the first post-Soviet decade saw a ―return‖ to Russian Orthodoxy for most 
Russians, as well as greater experimentation with other religious traditions and beliefs, and a 
lack of cohesion among the Orthodox faithful. This presented the Church with an opportunity 
to reestablish itself as the center of Russian religious life, but also created clear challenges. 
First, in contrast to many of the Western religious organizations setting up shop in newly 
democratic Russia, the Church was not well prepared to handle the free market competition 
in religious ideas that characterized the 1990s. It had little experience conducting the sort of 
modern missionary work practiced by Western Christian organizations. In fact, the 
missionary tactics of Westerners seemed brazen, alien and offensive to Russian Orthodox 
clergy and to many ordinary Russians. Some clergy characterized Western missionary work 
as ―buying members.‖1374 This accusation hints at the disparity of financial resources 
between the Church and large missionary organizations. Western missionaries offered not 
only free educational and religious materials, but also social services, sometimes as basic as a 
hot meal, to Russians at a time when neither the state nor the Church could provide for the 
social welfare of Russian citizens. Such activities blurred the line between religious 
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proselytism and charity work, and led the Church to view all foreign philanthropy with 
suspicion.  
 
Rapid Membership Growth 
The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society was one of the well-financed, well-trained 
missionary operations setting up shop in Russia in the 1990s. With its extensive experience 
in worldwide proselytism, the organization stood in a good position to expand its preaching 
work to new locales in Russia. Thus the 1990s saw rapid growth in the number of Witnesses 
in Eastern Europe in general, and in Russia in particular. The organization conducted 
baptisms of 7,820 individuals at the 1991 Soviet conventions alone.
1375
 However, it did not 
immediately adapt its annual reports on membership to reflect the breakup of the Soviet 
Union into independent states. The 1992 annual report grouped together all fifteen states of 
the former USSR, territories which contained a total of 58,823 ―publishers‖ (active members 
in the organization).
1376
 The next year‘s report listed the Baltic states separately and reported 
the remaining twelve countries‘ membership at 75,726.1377 The 1994 report gave Ukraine its 
own entry, followed by a separate listing for Moldova in 1995, and finally for Russia in 
1996.
1378
 At this point, it becomes possible to chart the Witnesses‘ growth in Russia 
separately from that of the other former Soviet republics. 
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These statistics reveal a sharp increase in Russian membership in the organization. 
The 1996 annual report listed 61,483 publishers in Russia, a number that nearly doubled by 
2000, when Russia had a total of 114,284 publishers.
1379
 By 2005, this figure had risen to 
136,726, and by 2010, 157,365 Russians belonged to the organization.
 1380
 To put this growth 
into a global perspective, in 1996, the Witnesses had nearly five million members worldwide, 
and 7,224,930 members by 2010.
1381
 As these data make clear, Witnesses in Russia grew at a 
faster rate than the worldwide organization. This gap had closed by 2010, when Russia 
reported a 2 percent growth, compared to a 2.5 percent worldwide growth.
1382
  
 In the early to mid-1990s, Witnesses capitalized on the rising interest in their religion 
and learned to adapt their proselytism methods to attract the greatest number of converts. For 
example, Witnesses typically arrange Bible studies in private homes for individuals or single 
families, but in Ivanovo oblast, local Witnesses faced such a demand for these studies that 
one man held studies with as many as fifty people in a rented hall in order to preach to more 
people simultaneously. Eventually, a large number of the participants wanted to become 
―unbaptized publishers,‖ the term used by the organization to refer to those who engage in 
preaching work, but have not yet undergone baptism. The unbaptized publisher usually 
accompanies a more experienced, baptized member to learn how to preach door-to-door. In 
Ivanovo, the local Witness allowed as many as ten unbaptized publishers at a time to join 
him as he preached in the community.
1383
 The Ivanovo example demonstrates the challenges 
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posed by the organization‘s rapid expansion. The injunction to preach led to a major influx in 
new members and potential members, but it also created a pressing need for experienced 
believers to instruct recent converts in the tenets and practices of the faith. The organization 
met this commitment in part by encouraging its more spiritually mature members to serve as 
―pioneers,‖ the name for individuals who devote extra time to preaching. In particular, 
―special pioneers‖ preach full-time, sometimes in distant locations that lack congregations. 
To train personnel for this work, the organization set up the Pioneer Service School in Russia 
in the 1990s, which offered instruction for pioneers in local Russian congregations..
1384
  
In the two decades since the demise of Soviet power, the makeup of the Witnesses in 
Russia changed dramatically. A 2000 study of roughly 1,000 Witnesses in Moscow by the 
Sociology Department of Moscow State University offers some insights into this 
phenomenon. It found that Witnesses had a higher level of education (67.5 percent) than the 
rest of the city population (54.7 percent).
1385
 Roughly 80 percent of Moscow Witnesses were 
women, compared with 56 percent of the general Moscow population. The average age of a 
Witness women was 45 years, and 34 for men. As with the broader Russian population, 
Witness families had a low birth rate, with an average of one child per family. Most 
Witnesses had joined the organization between 1995 and 2000; only 4 percent had been 
baptized before 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, almost 60 percent of married respondents had 
partners who did not belong to the Witnesses.
1386
  
                                                 
1384
 Ibid., 240. 
 
1385
 Unfortunately, the study does not include information on employment or income for the Moscow Witnesses.  
 
1386
 ―Family and the Bible: Scientific Report on the Results of Sociological Research of the Moscow Society of 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses,‖ Family Sociology and Demography Faculty, Sociology Department, Moscow State 
University (Moscow, 2001). Available online at the Jehovah‟s Witnesses in Russia Official Informational Site, 
http://www.jw-russia.org/expert-analysis/expert-analysis.htm (accessed January 15, 2011). 
 414 
These results should be viewed with caution, since they come from Moscow, an area 
in which virtually no Witnesses lived prior to 1991 and since Moscow‘s population is more 
urban and educated than that of Russia as a whole. Still, the study offers a portrait of one of 
many newly-formed Witness communities in Russia since the advent of religious freedom. 
Overall, women made up the majority of new converts, as they had in the Soviet era. Most 
members had no experience with Soviet repression of religious belief, having joined the faith 
after the collapse. Major urban centers like Moscow and Petersburg now boasted thousands 
of Witnesses, where previously only a handful had existed. In general, new congregations 
throughout the Russian Federation increased the religion‘s ethnic and geographic diversity. 
No longer subject to official discrimination at institutions of higher education and jobs, more 
Witnesses found gainful employment, earned a college degree, and lived in urban centers 
with greater career opportunities.  
 
Creating a Russian Witness Organization 
With such massive membership growth, the Governing Body faced a monumental 
task in establishing its administrative system over Russian territory. On the national level, it 
granted the Soviet country committee initial responsibility for all work within the fifteen 
former union republics. By the early 1990s, however, the Governing Body began to 
subdivide the former Soviet territories, creating a separate Ukrainian branch and shifting 
oversight for Moldova to Romania, and supervision of the Baltic states to Finland. Armenia, 
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan received separate branch offices somewhat later, while a newly 
created Kazakhstan office took over responsibility for the remaining Central Asian republics. 
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The Russian country committee and branch office maintained responsibility for Belarus 
through 2010.
1387
  
On the eve of the Soviet Union‘s collapse, the Governing Body launched a ―spiritual 
rehabilitation program‖ in Soviet bloc countries to help previously underground 
congregations conform to the organization‘s administrative structure. Translation of Watch 
Tower literature played a critical role in this project. In the Soviet era, members smuggled in 
various language editions of The Watchtower from abroad and then translated them into the 
languages spoken by Soviet members. For most of this period, the international organization 
also printed its own Russian edition of the magazine, which appeared on a monthly basis and 
was periodically smuggled into the Soviet Union. In 1985, the Russian version first appeared 
twice a month, in line with the English version, and in June 1990, the two versions were 
published simultaneously. By the 1990s, Witnesses could read The Watchtower semimonthly 
in color in nine East European languages. With standardized translations of the magazine 
now in use, Witnesses studied the same articles at the same time as other believers 
worldwide. As the Russian branch administered many ethnically non-Russian territories, the 
organization also financed translation work of The Watchtower and other publications into 
more than forty regional languages of the Russian Federation, from Buryat to Ossetian.
1388
 In 
addition, the Governing Body launched a major effort to create versions of its New World 
Translation of the Bible in all the major Eastern European and Slavic languages. Previously, 
Eastern European Witnesses had relied on translations produced by other religious 
organizations and publishers, which created some confusion when discussing biblical texts 
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that appeared in Watch Tower publications. Shortly before 1991, the Governing Body began 
translation of the Bible into Russian. In 2001, it released its Russian-language New 
Testament, followed by the Old Testament in 2007.
1389
 The organization‘s large-scale 
printing facilities in Germany supplied all of the literature for Russia through 2010, while a 
team of volunteers at the Russian branch office created the official translations of 
publications.
1390
 
Prior to legalization, Soviet Witnesses had communicated with the Governing Body 
and European offices solely through smuggled reports written in code and clandestine 
meetings with middlemen. It is remarkable how well this system worked, given its 
limitations, but the post-Soviet era now allowed direct contact between the branch office and 
the Brooklyn headquarters. In short, it became both possible and imperative that the 
organization establish much closer control and oversight over its Russian operations. The 
nearby branch office in Finland provided initial guidance for some of the early administrative 
work, helping to organize conventions and sending fifteen special pioneers to Russia in 1992. 
The Polish branch made an additional contribution of more than 170 volunteers, including 
many special pioneers.
1391
 Personnel from these offices, combined with other foreign 
volunteers, allowed the organization to retrain Soviet-era elders, giving them the new skills 
they needed to work within a legally operating organization. The Watch Tower organization 
also doubled the 1992 class size at Gilead, its American school for training foreign 
missionaries, and offered Gilead Extension classes in Germany and India to train additional  
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full-time missionaries specifically for Eastern Europe.
1392
 
The Watch Tower organization functions through national branch offices run by full-
time volunteers in countries where it has legal standing, and it moved quickly to extend this 
system to Russia. The administration of such a massive territory required the construction of 
a sizeable branch complex. In 1992, the organization purchased land in the St. Petersburg 
suburb of Solnechnoe and began construction with the aid of Finnish and other international 
volunteers. By 1993, the new country committee relocated to the area and a new branch 
committee, headed by Vasilii Kalin, assumed the responsibilities of the previous Soviet-era 
committee.
1393
 The organization officially opened its Solnechnoe center with a public 
dedication in June 1997.
1394
 The 1998 Yearbook related the feelings of long-standing Russian 
members in attendance at the dedication ceremony: ―What a joy it was to be present when 
brothers and sisters in the large courtyard spontaneously began singing in four-part harmony 
Kingdom songs that they had sung when they were exiles in Siberia decades earlier!‖1395 
 Even with volunteer assistance, expanded translation of literature, and the recently 
opened administrative center, establishing a unified ―theocratic‖ organization proved 
difficult. First, the territorial administrative divisions from the Soviet era had to be reworked 
to fit into the worldwide model. This included the appointment of circuit and district 
overseers who travel within a given territory and provide guidance to congregations. One 
circuit comprises roughly twenty congregations, and about ten circuits constitute a district. In 
the Soviet era, elders had periodically traveled to visit small groups, but it had not been 
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possible to function with the level of regularity or uniformity of branch organizations in 
democratic countries. One of the first post-Soviet circuit overseers recalled how the new 
system created some initial confusion:  
I sent a letter about the upcoming visit to one congregation in Petrozavodsk, Karelia. 
The letter outlined how the meetings should be conducted during that week. When 
my wife and I arrived for the visit, an elder met us at the railway station, and we went 
to his home. He showed me the letter and said, ―We received this letter from you, but 
since we did not understand what it meant, we decided to do nothing and wait until 
you came and explained everything.‖1396 
 
As this encounter suggests, direct oversight of congregations represented a fundamentally 
new phenomenon for Witnesses and elders, and required an adjustment period. 
 The establishment of an overseer system, combined with the rapid growth in Witness 
membership, created a serious shortage of qualified elders. In more established Witness 
communities in democratic states, a typical congregation will include a body of elders, as 
well as ministerial servants who assist them. In comparison, a single elder sometimes 
supervised as many as five congregations in Russia in the mid-1990s.
1397
 The problem was 
especially acute in areas without well-established Witness communities, as nearly all the 
members had only recently joined the faith and did not have the experience necessary to 
assume leadership roles in their congregations. A 1992 Watchtower article reported that in St. 
Petersburg, for example, more than half of the members of one congregation had been 
baptized in the last year.
1398
 Some congregations remained several times larger than usual 
because they lacked sufficient elders to allow for new congregations to be formed.
1399
 The 
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shortage of elders began to resolve itself only as membership gradually stabilized in the 
2000s.  
 Witnesses took advantage of their newfound religious freedom and membership 
growth to hold district conventions in major Russian cities in the 1990s. Until the Gorbachev 
era, Soviet Witnesses had never gathered en masse. Now, the Russian branch office could 
rent sports facilities from local governments. In 1992, Russian Witnesses hosted their first 
international convention, held in St. Petersburg at Kirov Stadium. One long-time member, 
who came to the event, recalled, ―What happiness, what freedom! We never even dreamed 
we would see such freedom in this system of things. But Jehovah made it possible.‖1400 More 
than 46,000 people attended, including 17,000 from countries outside the former Soviet 
Union. Before the gathering, the organization distributed a million flyers to the city‘s 
residents. Poster-size announcements appeared on the city streets and metro entrances.
1401
  
Mass conventions and assemblies became a regular, public feature of post-Soviet 
Witness communities, in line with the organization‘s worldwide practices. The year the 
Soviet Union collapsed, 74,252 members attended the seven conventions held in the USSR. 
Two years later, 112,326 gathered at eight conventions held in four of the former Soviet 
republics. In 1999, 282,333 were present at eighty district conventions across the region, at 
which more than 13,000 individuals were baptized.
1402
 In stark contrast to the secret meetings 
of past decades, the Witnesses now proclaimed their intentions to local residents and 
officials, no longer fearful of state reprisals.  
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Not Everyone Wants a Knock at the Door 
Yet the prominent public face of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, combined with steady 
door-to-door preaching work, did not sit well with all Russians. Even as some Russian 
citizens responded favorably to the Witnesses‘ message, most remained indifferent or hostile. 
They did not appreciate the appearance of Witnesses in their cities, at their doorsteps, and in 
their sports stadiums. These tensions worsened by the late 1990s, by which time many 
Russian citizens had settled on a new religious affiliation during the broad religious revival in 
the 1990s. For the most part, they did not convert to the Witnesses, but instead joined larger 
faith organizations such as the Russian Orthodox, Catholic, and Baptist Churches. 
Proselytism in itself was a new and not always pleasant experience for citizens, who were 
unaccustomed to sharing their personal religious beliefs with strangers and often resented 
intrusion into their homes. 
The Witnesses‘ condemnation of other Christian churches aggravated tensions over 
proselytism, as many citizens saw Witness beliefs as an attack on their own newly acquired 
faith traditions. Watch Tower publications regularly contain articles expressing the belief that 
all other organized religions are a tool of Satan. One 1996 brochure told readers: ―If a 
religion teaches lies about God, it really serves the purpose of Satan. People who are 
members of false religions may sincerely believe that they are worshipping the true God. But 
they are really serving Satan.‖1403 Some post-Soviet era Watch Tower publications printed 
articles that specifically targeted Orthodox religious traditions and the Church itself. A 1993 
news blurb in Awake! blamed the rise of paganism in central Russia on the failure of the 
Church‘s leadership.1404 In a similar vein, a 2000 article commented, ―The Russian Orthodox 
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Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, has kept people in ignorance of the Bible.‖1405 A 
2005 Watchtower article criticized the post-1991 revitalization of Christmas celebrations, 
claiming that a ―deep disappointment soon set in‖ among Russians due to the 
commercialization and excess associated with the holiday. The author reminded readers that 
Witnesses believe Christmas to be pagan and inappropriate for Christians.
1406
 Several articles 
denigrated the use of icons in Christianity, which the Witnesses consider unscriptural.
1407
 
While these views were not new to the Witnesses, most Russian citizens, including Orthodox 
clergy, had not previously encountered them. The literature also touched a raw nerve by 
portraying Soviet-era clergy as collaborators with the Soviet state while presenting Witnesses 
as the only true Christians who refused to compromise their beliefs.
1408
   
The Russian Orthodox Church, as the predominant religious institution in Russia, had 
the strongest reaction to the Witnesses. Like other religions, it experienced the early post-
Soviet period as a time of spiritual revival. Unlike the Witnesses, it had gained semi-legal 
status in the Soviet Union since World War II, with the state allowing it to retain a patriarch 
and an institutional structure (albeit skeletal). This position, however, cost the Church its 
ability to act as a moral opposition to the Soviet state, which kept close watch on Church 
activities. The party-controlled Council for Religious Affairs had approved or appointed most 
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Church hierarchs, making the Church into a quasi-state religion.
1409
 The Church thus came 
out of the Soviet period weakened and politically compromised, but nonetheless eager to 
regain its standing as the moral and spiritual center of Russian culture. In contrast, however, 
to many of the Western religious organizations setting up shop in newly democratic Russia, it 
was not well prepared to handle competition. While the Church had conducted missionary 
activities among national minorities in the tsarist period, it had less experience selling 
Russian Orthodoxy to an ethnically Russian audience. It had never done the sort of 
proselytism practiced by Western Christian organizations such as the Witnesses in the 1990s. 
The Church‘s initial reaction to the presence of what it deemed ―nontraditional‖ 
religions was immediate and visceral. The patriarch and other Church officials denounced the 
state for opening up Russia‘s borders to ―spiritual colonizers.‖1410 Many Orthodox believers 
saw Western religious organizations as exploiting the ―spiritual vacuum‖ created by seventy 
years of official atheism at a time when the Church was still weak, poor, and unorganized.
1411
 
Russian citizens, Orthodox clergy argued, needed to develop a better understanding of 
religion and spirituality before making a commitment to a specific faith. While they waited 
for this to happen, foreign missionaries cajoled naive Russians into making an uninformed 
and immature spiritual commitment. 
Yet beyond an appeal for cultural stability, between 1989 and 1992, the Russian 
Orthodox Church lacked a clear strategy for dealing with this sudden appearance of well-
funded religious competition. The man who ultimately provided new direction and leadership 
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to addressing this problem, Aleksandr Dvorkin, was uniquely positioned to contextualize the 
Church‘s desire for more restrictions on religious proselytism within an ostensibly Western, 
democratic framework. Dvorkin understood both the Russian Orthodox and the Western 
perspective on religious tolerance because he considered himself part of both societies. Born 
in Moscow in 1955, Dvorkin emigrated to the United States in 1977. His Soviet citizenship 
revoked, he received American citizenship while obtaining a higher education in New York. 
During the late 1980s he worked for Voice of America, and this led to Russian media 
speculation about his possible ties with the CIA.
1412
 Baptized Russian Orthodox in 1980, 
Dvorkin returned to Russia in 1992 to work at the newly opened Department of Religious 
Education at the Moscow Patriarchate.
1413
 
The conflict between Russian Orthodoxy and minority faiths, particularly more recent 
arrivals to Russian soil, did not strike Dvorkin as something altogether new. He had 
emigrated to the United States during the rise of the first modern Western anticult movement, 
developed in response to groups such as Children of God, the People‘s Temple, and the Hare 
Krishnas. In the 1970s and 1980s the American media reported on a ―cult crisis‖ that 
allegedly endangered America‘s youth. Newly formed anticult networks, supported by the 
works of prominent sociologists and psychologists, introduced a new vocabulary to describe 
the cult threat. The new language emphasized the psychological harm done to members; the 
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terms ―brainwashing,‖ ―mind control,‖ and ―deprogramming‖ entered the popular lexicon 
about religion. Arriving in New York one year before the mass suicide of Jim Jones‘ 
followers in Jonestown, Dvorkin began his major publication on sects with a recounting of 
this tragedy.
1414
 
Following the American model, the Russian anticult movement led by Dvorkin 
focused on marginal religious organizations, instead of more established faiths. It began 
partly in response to meetings between Dvorkin and parents concerned over their children‘s 
involvement in homegrown Russian sects. In 1993, after hosting a conference on these 
groups, Dvorkin founded the Saint Irenaeus of Leon Information-Consultation Center 
(SILIC) under the umbrella of the Moscow Patriarchate, which served as the organizing 
center for the anticult movement.
1415
 It gradually expanded to include over a dozen branch 
offices across Russia, united under the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of 
Religion and Sects.
1416
  
During a 1993 seminar on homegrown Russian NRMs, Dvorkin coined the term 
―totalitarian sect,‖ which thereafter served as the linchpin of the anticult message and would 
be applied frequently to the Witnesses.
1417
 If Dvorkin himself became synonymous with the 
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anticult movement, then his term ―totalitarian sect‖ occupied a similarly central position as 
the catch-all label for NRMs and for older, but still marginal faiths such as the Witnesses. 
Dvorkin defined a totalitarian sect, a term he occasionally alternated with ―destructive cult,‖ 
as an organization that ―violates the rights of [its] members and inflicts harm on them 
through the use of certain methods known as ‗mind control.‘‖1418 Under this definition, 
Dvorkin portrayed members of these religions as passive victims of greedy, power-hungry 
organizations that lured them in under false pretenses and then retained their loyalty through 
psychological manipulation and threats of violence. To explain why Russians allowed 
themselves to be victimized, the anticult movement referred frequently to the ―spiritual 
vacuum,‖ which allegedly made Russians ignorant and naive in religious matters, and thus 
easy prey for totalitarian sects.
1419
 
Through SILIC, Dvorkin adapted the Western anticult movement to the Russian 
situation, a move crucial to mobilizing support and gaining legitimacy with state and society. 
The anticult movement sponsored conferences to attract media attention and to network with 
Russian religious scholars and international representatives of the European anticult 
movement. Similarly, Russian anticultists attended conferences hosted by their European 
counterparts.
1420
 Dvorkin promoted his message throughout Russia, lecturing at universities 
and giving interviews with local and national newspapers and TV and radio stations. SILIC 
published brochures on the dangers of cults and created an informational website. Numerous 
other anticult publications appeared across Russia, with the various works of Dvorkin 
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dominating bookshelves on the subject.  
In addition to SILIC, Russian Orthodox students and priests formed organizations in 
other locales to provide anticult resources to the local population and to conduct media 
campaigns publicizing the threat of so-called totalitarian sects.
1421
 Most importantly for the 
Witnesses, Orthodox family members of Witnesses and other minority faiths formed groups 
independent of the Church. These groups later spearheaded legal challenges to the 
Witnesses‘ registration status. The Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Sects formed 
in Moscow, while the Committee to Protect the Family and the Individual established a 
similar group in St. Petersburg. Together, this loose network of organizations formed a 
Russian anticult movement, which, though lacking a formal structure, presented a fairly 
united front determined to prevent the further encroachment of minority faiths on Russian 
soil. 
Overall, SILIC moved the Russian Orthodox Church toward accepting new political 
realities by setting practical, achievable goals. The anticult movement focused the Church‘s 
concerns over religious pluralism on the most marginal and easily marginalized religious 
organizations, few of which had any significant presence in the Soviet era. In selecting its 
targets, the anticult movement chose enemies it thought it could defeat. The Western anticult 
movement and more mainstream religious organizations had already criticized the Witnesses, 
Scientology, the Unification Church, Hare Krishnas, and Aum Shinrikyo. These efforts 
provided a wellspring of information that proved useful for the Russian anticult movement. 
By narrowing in on these types of religious organization, the anticult movement sought 
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powerful allies in its fight against ―sects.‖1422 
 
The European Stamp of Approval 
In many respects, the Russian anticult movement is best seen as a variant of the 
European anticult movement. SILIC established a strong working relationship with the 
institutional center of Europe‘s anticult movement, the Dialog Center, based in Denmark, and 
Dvorkin served as one of its regional vice presidents.
1423
 Russian anticult materials referred 
to Western scholarship for historical background on marginal religions and for ―expert‖ 
opinions that these groups support violence and harm their members. For example, Russian 
and Western anticult works both stress the psychological damage of belonging to an insular 
community that strictly controls members‘ actions.1424 Dvorkin cited Dr. Jerry Bergman in 
particular, who suggests that Witnesses exhibit abnormally high rates of mental illness due to 
the damaging effects of their apocalyptic doctrine on the human psyche.
1425
 
For Dvorkin, while the United States provided the richest resource for anticult 
materials, the country‘s endorsement of broad religious freedoms with little government 
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oversight made it the prime example of how Russia should not respond to marginal religions. 
Dvorkin frequently invoked tragedies such as Jonestown as evidence of what happens when 
states do not take strong measures. In this view, the United States produced the most anticult 
literature because it had the most cults and therefore, the most victims of cults. Some Russian 
anticult publications accused the United States of deliberately exporting its cults abroad in an 
attempt to destabilize Russia and destroy its culture. Dvorkin went so far as to suggest that 
the U.S. government used Scientology members as CIA agents to spy on the Russian 
government.
1426
 Such sentiments fit in well with a growing distrust of American institutions 
and the American model of democratic capitalism. Anticult publications stressed the need for 
Russia to find an alternative route to religious pluralism that would both privilege the 
Russian Orthodox Church and provide for greater regulation of religious organizations. 
Thus, in translating the Church‘s demands into action, the anticult movement looked 
to Europe, not the United States as a model. In the 1990s anticultism reached new heights in 
Europe, just as Russians began to construct their own movement. Scholars James T. 
Richardson and Massimo Introvigne, in a survey of European parliamentary and 
administrative reports in the late 1990s, concluded that the earlier American anticult rhetoric 
of ―brainwashing and mind control is alive and well in Europe.‖ They noted that ―those ideas 
have helped to promote a moral panic in some European countries over cults and sects.‖1427 
In 1984, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for greater monitoring of NRMs 
by its member states, information sharing between countries, and the creation of crisis 
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centers for former members.
1428
 Many countries established parliamentary inquiry 
commissions to study the alleged dangers of NRMs and formulate a state policy to address 
this issue.
1429
 The Belgian commission recommended new laws that would criminalize the 
use of psychological or physical pressure by religious organizations, while the French 
commission issued a report listing 173 ―potentially harmful sects.‖ France funded cult-
awareness programs for the judiciary, law enforcement, and education system. In 1998 the 
French National Assembly established the Interministerial Mission to Combat Sects, as well 
as a separate commission to investigate the finances of major NRMs.
1430
 
European governments likewise took measures to warn the public about the alleged 
dangers of these groups. Both France and Austria set up crisis hot lines for believers and their 
relatives.
1431
 Austria printed and distributed pamphlets through the Federal Ministry of the 
Environment, Youth, and Family, warning of the dangers of sects.
1432
 Germany went further 
than most states, especially in its attacks on Scientology. Derek Davis notes that anticultism 
in Germany included ―police raids against independent Pentecostal churches, the denial of 
employment, political participation, and state licensure to Scientologists and Jehovah‘s 
Witnesses, the distribution of state-prepared pamphlets warning of contact with the Mormon 
‗sect,‘ and the expulsion from schools of children whose parents belong to the Unification 
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Church.‖1433 
Russian anticult literature consistently evoked the ―What Would Europe Do?‖ line of 
reasoning to justify its demands.
1434
 According to this logic, Russian anticultism simply had 
to frame its own goals within a European context to gain a democratic aura. The Russian 
anticult movement received direct positive reinforcement from France, whose 
Interministerial Mission chairman, Alain Vivien, aligned himself publicly with the European 
anticult movement. In 2001, Vivien delivered a talk entitled, ―The State and Sects: France‘s 
Experience,‖ at a conference on totalitarian sects sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church 
in Nizhnii Novgorod.
1435
 Although the Witnesses are not, technically speaking, a new 
religious movement, many European countries treated them as such. In the late 1990s, the 
French tax administration assessed the Watch Tower organization for taxes on individual 
donations amounting to fifty million dollars. The resulting court battle temporarily paralyzed 
the organization in France, constituting a serious encroachment on freedom of conscience for 
one of the Witnesses‘ largest international communities.1436 The right of Witnesses to 
practice has also been contested in Greece, providing the basis for a successful appeal to the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1993. In Germany, the state refused to register the 
Witnesses as a ―statutory corporation‖ until 2006, when it finally granted this status to 
Witnesses, first in Berlin on a federal level, and by 2009 to Witnesses in individual German 
states. The same basic pattern occurred in Austria, where Witnesses also received the status 
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of a statutory corporation in 2009.
1437
 
Russian newspapers frequently cited foreign examples when discussing domestic 
opposition to the Witnesses.
1438
 One 1999 article in Rossiiskaia gazeta, for example, noted 
that many European states also consider the Witnesses to be a totalitarian sect.
1439
 A 2001 
article in Moskovskaia pravda falsely claimed that a majority of European countries banned 
the Witnesses.
1440
 Some articles stated that the Witnesses did not even have official 
registration as a religious organization in the United States, failing to mention that this legal 
designation does not exist in the US.
1441
 A letter to the editor of Rossiiskaia gazeta in 1999 
from the mother of one Witness declared, ―What future awaits our children? Will the 
government help the victims of nontraditional religions again become free and whole 
individuals, as it does in democratic European countries?‖1442  
Examining Russia‘s anticult movement in the larger European context reinforces the 
fact that democracy requires a continual negotiating of boundaries. NRMs may not have 
gained a serious foothold in European society, but their significance, as James Richardson 
writes, ―is not in their numbers but in their demonstrations of the limits of tolerance in 
modern European society.‖1443 This is evident in the manner in which the anticult movement 
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addressed the boundaries of freedom of conscience. Almost every anticult publication began 
or ended with a declaration of support for religious freedom and toleration, while bemoaning 
the misuse of these freedoms to destabilize the fledgling Russian state. One such work 
commented, ―Democracy in and of itself is not guilty, but rather the negative aspects that 
accompanied its establishment—the weakness and underdevelopment of legislation and law 
enforcement, created under new conditions.‖1444 The back cover to a book compilation of 
media coverage on totalitarian sects proclaimed: 
We live in an amazing time, when everything is turned upside down. Religious guru-
criminals are labeled martyrs for their faith; those who attempt to protect the 
population from spiritual slavery are accused of ―inciting religious discord,‖ and 
called ―fighters against religious dissidents;‖ passivity and indifference are compared 
to ―religious tolerance,‖ while freedom of conscience transforms into freedom from 
conscience.
1445
 
 
Totalitarian sects, the argument went, took advantage of the unstable political situation in 
Russia to establish themselves. Once they gained members, they denied them freedom of 
conscience, manipulated them psychologically and emotionally in violation of their human 
rights, and endangered their health and well-being. 
 
Turning Witnesses into a “Totalitarian Sect” 
While the anticult movement did a good job of making anticultism relevant to 
ordinary Russians, it would not have reached much beyond the walls of the Church without 
the media to transmit its message to Russian society. National and regional newspapers 
willingly published frequent stories on the Witnesses and other targeted religious faiths, 
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including testimonials by distraught parents; accounts of violence, corruption, and 
psychological and physical manipulation of members; and countless interviews with 
Dvorkin. The media adopted the language of the anticult movement and made ―totalitarian 
sect‖ a household term. Few reports included interviews with the religious believers 
themselves and instead favored the accounts given by their relatives. Similarly, articles often 
amounted to little more than sensationalist or hysterical calls for alarm. For example, an 
article published in 2000 closed with a plea for members of religious sects to ―find protection 
and undergo a course of rehabilitation,‖ along with a listing of the SILIC website and phone 
number.
1446
 Several national newspapers in 2000 printed rumors that the Witnesses had 
brutally murdered one of their members as part of a religious ritual.
1447
 A sampling of article 
titles conveys the tone of Russian media coverage, which presented the Witnesses and NRMs 
as a clear and present danger to Russian society and the state: ―Spiritual Aggression,‖ 
―Where To Find Protection from Totalitarian Sects,‖ ―Professor Dvorkin‘s Cross,‖ ―Wolves 
in Sheep‘s Clothing,‖ ―Social Infection,‖ and ―Zombies from Jehovah.‖1448 The flood of 
media coverage made both the targeted minority religious organizations and the anticult 
movement appear much more pervasive than actual membership in either suggested. 
Much of the anticult rhetoric bore a strong resemblance to Soviet-era discourse. As in 
Soviet publications, the Russian media frequently portrayed ordinary Witnesses as victims of 
greedy, manipulative American leaders who exploit this gullibility and whose veiled political 
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rhetoric poses a threat to national security. One vocal opponent of the Witnesses, Father Oleg 
Steniаev, spelled out in his book on the Witnesses how the organization uses religious 
language to code its violent plans, interspersing the Witnesses‘ beliefs with his own 
commentary: ―This war will destroy all traces of Satan‘s earthly organization (in other words, 
all civilization – OS) and give surviving humanity (that is, the faithful remnant of Jehovah's 
Witnesses – OS) the opportunity to delight in unending blessings (on the corpses of more 
than six billion people! – OS).‖1449 Such statements echoed Soviet-era accusations that 
Witnesses supported a third world war or the nuclear annihilation of the Soviet Union due to 
their belief in Armageddon.  
Yet anticult rhetoric did not represent a simplistic carryover of Soviet-era tropes, but 
rather an amalgamation of this language, Western anticult rhetoric, and uniquely post-Soviet 
Russian elements. For example, anticult rhetoric combined Western scholarship on the 
psychological harm of cults with Soviet-era language that cast rank-and-file members as 
―victims‖ of manipulative leaders. The allegedly dangerous psychology of ―cults,‖ a major 
tenet of the Western anticult movement, entered into Russian anticultism. Anticult 
publications popularized the terms ―brainwashing‖ (promyvanie mozgov), ―deprogramming‖ 
(deprogramming), and ―mind control‖ (kontrolirovanie soznaniia), the ―victims‖ of such 
practices being described as ―slaves,‖ ―robots,‖ and ―zombies.‖ Newspapers referenced 
Western anticult sources in claiming that Witnesses were psychologically harmful to 
members. A 2003 article in Novaia gazeta, for example, cited a study claiming that the 
suicide rate for Witnesses was seven to ten times higher than for the general population.
1450
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Much of the focus on the psychological dangers of cults occurred because the West, 
particularly the United States, had paved the way for this analysis by supplying the experts to 
back it up in numerous publications.
1451
  
Western anticult psychology allowed Russian critics to argue that restricting the 
Witnesses, far from denying their freedom of conscience, would actually ensure this right. 
Indeed, the anticult movement expressed its sustained support for broad religious freedom. 
Dvorkin declared that no Russian citizen freely joins a totalitarian sect because he or she is 
never given a full account of what the organization believes and expects of members.
1452
 
Sociologist Eileen Barker, writing on the powerful role of language in framing anticult 
discourse in the Western arena, notes that: 
nouns such as ―cult,‖ ―pseudo-religion,‖ verbs such as ―brainwash,‖ ―manipulate,‖ 
―exploit,‖ adjectives such as ―bizarre,‖ ―fanatic,‖ ―violent,‖ and the use of the passive 
voice for ―victims‖ who have been duped and had to be rescued, effectively diminish 
the likelihood that members of NRMs could have made choices and/or be capable of 
leaving (although, in fact, most do, of their own free will).
1453
 
 
Russian media eagerly adopted the terminology that Barker criticizes. One publication 
referred to Witnesses as ―prisoners of the watchtower.‖1454 Dvorkin, offering advice for 
engaging with street proselytizers, reminded readers, ―Remember that the man standing 
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before you is first and foremost a victim, and that he deserves sympathy and 
consideration.‖1455 
Alleged cult violence reflected a broad insecurity over the process of democratization 
as the economy faltered, social safety nets evaporated, and Russians lost confidence that 
democracy offered an improvement over Soviet-style communism. The media and anticult 
publications drew links between the totalitarian sects and four prevalent concerns of Russians 
adjusting to life after the Soviet Union‘s collapse: fears of a return to state-sponsored 
violence and repression, uneasiness with the transition to a market economy, anxieties 
regarding the ongoing war in Chechnya and terrorism by ethnic and religious extremists, and 
anxiety over the alleged moral decay of Russian society and its youth in particular.  
First and foremost, the totalitarian imagery played on fears of a breakdown in 
Russia‘s fragile democracy and a return to Soviet-era repressions and state-sponsored 
violence. Anticult rhetoric claimed that, beyond destroying democratic choice through their 
psychological control over members, Witnesses and other totalitarian sects seek to replace 
the democratic political system with totalitarian, theocratic rule.
1456
 Publications drew on the 
imagery of the ―great terror‖ under Stalin, the Holocaust, and global terrorism. In his short 
work on the Witnesses, Dvorkin declared that the Witnesses ―have achieved that which the 
totalitarian communist regime could not: a new man, disposing of the ‗accursed past‘ once 
and for all. Homo jehovisticum has been created.‖1457 He further alleged that Witnesses 
intend to purge nonbelievers from their millennial kingdom.
1458
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The press repeated these concerns about repression and violence. A Komsomol‟skaia 
pravda (Komsomol Truth) article, for example, claimed that Witnesses teach their members 
that they will help Christ kill all non-believers during Armageddon.
1459
 According to this 
logic, totalitarian sects endorse violence over democracy and thus do not deserve the 
privileges afforded by a democratic state. By allowing totalitarian sects to exist, democracy 
was in effect sowing the seeds of its own destruction. The alleged violence of totalitarian 
sects reinforced Russian apprehension that society was disintegrating. The fact that Soviet-
era publications also accused the Witnesses of secret support for a third world war never 
earned mention in such works.  
Indeed, while anticult rhetoric employed the imagery of totalitarianism, purges and 
concentration camps, the Witnesses ironically had been the victims of repression by the two 
―totalitarian‖ regimes of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As Witnesses could not play 
the role of both victim and perpetrator of totalitarianism in the anticult drama, depicting 
Witnesses as totalitarian required erasing or manipulating the past. Anticult literature 
frequently used a ―blame the victim‖ line of reasoning, according to which the Witnesses 
―sacrificed‖ their members and urged them to provoke the state in an attempt to win 
international sympathy. Anticult publications accused the Watch Tower leadership of 
attempting to collaborate with Hitler, and, when this failed, of forcing members into a 
confrontation with the Nazi state. Another work claimed that the Soviet state exiled 
Witnesses in 1951 because they had collaborated with the Gestapo during World War II.
1460
 
One headline on the SILIC website asked, ―Who is guilty in the sufferings of the Jehovah‘s 
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Witnesses?‖1461 The answer was taken to be self-evident.  
 Anticult publications described the Soviet-era mass arrests, imprisonment, hard labor, 
exile, confinement in psychiatric hospitals, loss of child custody, and continual police 
harassment of Witnesses as merely one thread in the policy of state repression. This depiction 
denied the Witnesses‘ experiences any special recognition and made the Witnesses‘ 
victimization less about their religious beliefs and more about a totalitarian state repressing 
all members of society equally. The anticult movement also noted how the Bolshevik Party 
had initially sought out religious sectarians as potential allies against tsarist Russia and later 
granted believers considerable freedom. In the anticult movement‘s view, this served as 
damning proof of the collusion of sects with Bolsheviks for the purpose of destroying the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Just as in the 1990s, sects attacked the Church in a moment of 
weakness, using their newfound freedoms under Soviet power to lure Russians away from 
Orthodoxy.
1462
 
For many Russians, economic instability trumped political concerns about the alleged 
dangers of fringe religious movements. Free market reforms led to widespread 
disillusionment among Russians and introduced a new vocabulary to describe the rampant 
corruption and organized crime that characterized the privatization of the Russian economy. 
Anticult coverage borrowed heavily from this lexicon, referring frequently to the alleged 
―criminal character‖ of sects. Dvorkin compared NRMs to ―mafia networks.‖ His accusations 
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appeared not only in anticult publications, but in Russian newspapers as well. 
1463
 In his 
framework, the sect leader took on the role of a religious mob boss, raking in cash from 
needy and gullible Russians and then abandoning them when the money evaporated. Much 
like the oligarchs who bought up Russia‘s major industries for kopeks, ―rich‖ sects used their 
Western cash and goods to ―buy‖ members. A 2005 Komsomol‟skaia pravda article 
characterized sect leaders, including Witnesses, as opportunists and swindlers.
1464
 A local 
newspaper in Tiumen‘ oblast described the Witnesses as ―more like businessmen than 
proselytizers or missionaries.‖1465 
The ongoing war in Chechnya furthered heightened social anxiety in the 
post-Soviet period. The conflict exacerbated religious tension between Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians and fueled concerns that Russia could further disintegrate because of 
hostile ethnic and religious groups. Terrorist attacks in Russian cities in the late 1990s 
brought the war closer to home. When the media and anticult supporters made connections 
between sects and violence, they often mentioned global terrorism, transforming sectarians 
into crazed militants, brainwashed to fulfill the orders of their power-hungry leaders.
1466
 This 
painted sects as a time bomb waiting to explode in Russia‘s urban centers. A 2003 roundtable 
on NRMs in Moscow was entitled, ―Totalitarian Sects: Weapons of Mass Destruction.‖1467 
The supposed willingness of NRMs to resort to violence legitimated the Russian Orthodox 
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Church‘s demands for tougher laws and increased state involvement in religious affairs. 
Finally, anticult discourse played on fears that political, social, and economic 
instability had corrupted Russian society, leaving it without a moral compass and thus 
vulnerable to ―bad influences‖ such as totalitarian sects. A letter from the mother of a fifteen-
year-old Witness who committed suicide expresses her sense of helplessness: ―Who is 
protecting Russia‘s children? This is a cry from the soul! Help me!‖1468 According to anticult 
statistics, youth under the age of twenty-five made up as much as 70 percent of members, of 
whom the majority were students.
1469
 In an article on the presence of NRMs in higher 
education, one anticult supporter argued that totalitarian sects target students for their 
youthful zeal and infiltrate schools and universities to find Russia‘s best and brightest.1470 
The fight against sects in this context meant a battle for the hearts and minds of Russia‘s next 
generation. Similarly, media coverage drew on the high levels of drug and alcohol abuse 
among Russia‘s youth, equating membership in an NRM to an addiction. According to this 
analogy, totalitarian sects created a cycle of physical and psychological dependency, making 
members incapable of voluntarily withdrawing from NRMs. The inability of members to 
break the habit, or even to recognize their addiction, invoked the need for a third party to 
intervene. In this context, Dvorkin wrote that ―just as the alcoholic will deny his need for 
spirits,‖ sect members could not be taken at their word when they claim they are content and 
do not need help.
1471
 Only after members had been freed from the grip of the totalitarian sect 
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could they begin the process of recovery. 
Few sources cited interviews with current or former Witnesses, preferring to 
concentrate on the outrage of their relatives and family members. A 1996 article in Krasnaia 
zvezda (Red Star), for example, entitled, ―How My Son Ended Up in the Jehovah‘s 
Witnesses,‖ told the story of a young Witness through the critical eyes of his father. The 
father despaired that his son no longer greeted his mother on International Women‘s Day, no 
longer wanted to protect his homeland, and had no interest in his former career plans. The 
man referred to the Witnesses as a ―religious monster‖ that robbed Russians of their 
children.
1472
 The framework of such articles deprived the Witnesses of agency and left 
readers clueless as to why anyone would join the Witnesses, if not as a result of trickery and 
psychological pressure from manipulative sectarians. Focusing on youth who had joined the 
Witnesses also helped portrayed these individuals as victims, whose immaturity and 
inexperience made them especially vulnerable. The newspaper Argumenty i fakty (Arguments 
and Facts) advised readers in 2006 that the only way to protect themselves and their families 
was to keep close watch over what those close to them read to make sure it was not Watch 
Tower literature.
1473
 A 2001 newspaper article quoted one man as stating in regard to 
Witness proselytism, ―I am not afraid for myself, but for my children.‖1474  
Not all newspapers uniformly adopted the anticult language, instead attempting a 
more objective tone by covering controversy over the Witnesses and printing statements from 
both Witnesses and their critics.
1475
 This type of reporting featured primarily in newspapers 
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affiliated with or sympathetic to liberal political parties. Some newspapers praised the 
Witnesses or criticized the overheated rhetoric of Orthodox critics. Rossiiskaia gazeta 
(Russian Newspaper) allowed an official from the Russian branch office to write a guest 
editorial criticizing the paper‘s recent attacks on the Witnesses. The piece, ―Nostalgia for the 
Totalitarian Past,‖ addressed many of the media‘s misconceptions about the religion, its 
beliefs, and practices.
1476
 In 1997, Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper) published a 
strongly positive article about the Witnesses‘ resistance to Nazi Germany.1477 A handful of 
newspapers carried articles or comments from religious scholar Sergei Ivanenko, one of 
Russia‘s most vocal defenders of the Witnesses‘ and their right to practice.1478 A few 
journalists reported on violent attacks of Witnesses during their door-to-door preaching work, 
and they criticized local police for failing to punish those responsible.
1479
 Nevertheless, 
negative coverage dwarfed neutral or positive reporting, and even the latter often uncritically 
recycled anticult terminology, referring to Witnesses as a ―sect,‖ or using the derogatory term 
―Jehovists‖ for the organization and its members. 
Witnesses and other religious organizations singled out for criticism by the media did 
not passively endure these attacks. For example, the Witnesses took several steps to address 
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growing criticism in Russian newspapers of their refusal of blood transfusions.
1480
 To  
respond to the perception that this stance put members‘ lives in danger, the Witnesses 
extended methods they use in other countries to reduce societal tension over this issue and to 
allay public fears. In 1995, the Russian branch established the Hospital Information Desk and 
hospital liaison committees to provide information about Witness beliefs to medical 
personnel and to improve communication between doctors and Witness patients. In 2001, the 
Ministry of Health issued ―Instructions on the Use of Blood Components,‖ which advised 
medical personnel to respect a patient‘s religious objections to blood transfusions. Witnesses 
also circulated information on transfusion alternatives so that their members could receive 
viable medical care that conformed to their beliefs.
1481
 This did not have a significant impact 
on the press and the public, but it did address concerns by medical personnel treating Witness 
patients. 
More important, the Watch Tower organization demonstrated its intent to use the 
legal system to protect its members‘ right to freedom of conscience and to contest 
misinformation from the anticult movement and Russian media. Over the past century, the 
organization has carefully used courts in democratic states to construct ―a legal wall of 
protection‖ for believers, and they applied this body of knowledge to Russia.1482 In 1996, 
following the lead of Gleb Iakunin, the head of the nongovernmental organization Committee 
for the Protection of Freedom of Conscience, several Witnesses, along with religious 
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believers from other faiths, filed suit against Dvorkin for slander in his pamphlet, Ten 
Questions for the Intrusive Stranger: Or Advice for Those Who Don‟t Want to be Recruited. 
While the court dismissed the lawsuit, Iakunin v. Dvorkin, Witnesses proved their 
willingness to contest the ―totalitarian sect‖ label. Iakunin, himself a defrocked Orthodox 
priest and former Duma deputy, referred to the Russian Orthodox Church on occasion as the 
―largest totalitarian sect.‖1483 Similarly, when the newspaper Komsomol‟skaia pravda 
attacked the Witnesses in an August 1997 article, ―Sect Petersburg,‖ the organization brought 
a libel suit against the newspaper and the article‘s author. The Russian Federation 
Presidential Judicial Chamber for Media Disputes, which heard the case, ruled in favor of the 
Witnesses in 1998, finding the article to be in violation of the federal law regulating mass 
media. The court issued a written reprimand to the journalist and advised the paper to print 
an apology.
1484
 
Regarding public perceptions, Witnesses offered their own counternarrative to the 
prevailing negative characterization of their activities and beliefs, stressing their status as 
victims of Soviet repression. They also taught their members how to view challenges to their 
faith. A 1998 Watchtower article told readers that Witnesses ―are not surprised by such 
opposition. In fact, they expect it.‖1485 Beginning in the 1990s, Watch Tower publications 
featured numerous inspiring stories of Witnesses who overcame Soviet-era repression and 
spotlighted the Witnesses‘ history in the Soviet Union. For the fiftieth anniversary of the 
1951 exile, the organization released a documentary film, Faithful under Trials, with 
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interviews from scholars and Soviet Witnesses. Soviet stories were meant to demonstrate to 
Witnesses and to outside readers that believers have not and will not compromise their faith 
for any outside authority. A 2005 Watchtower article, for example, cited the 1951 exile, 
concluding, ―Jehovah's Witnesses around the world trust in God to help them remain faithful 
and obedient to him despite persecution. They rejoice in knowing that the reward for their 
faithfulness is great.‖1486 
 
New Legal Challenges 
Hysterical anticult coverage fueled the perception that the state needed to intervene to 
prevent Russia from falling under the totalitarian spell. The anticult movement‘s focus on the 
dangers these religious groups posed to citizens and the fledgling democratic state found an 
eager audience in Russia‘s parliamentary body, the Duma. Support for the movement 
allowed Duma deputies to align themselves with the interests of the Russian Orthodox 
Church and democracy simultaneously. In general, Russian politicians quickly learned to 
appeal to their electorate by invoking the Church, a symbol of stability, unity, and national 
culture. Russians, including atheists, almost unanimously viewed the Church as a positive 
institution.
1487
 In contrast, Russians had at best an ambiguous attitude toward NRMs and 
other marginal faiths. According to a 1997 opinion poll, only 40 percent of Russians 
supported full equality for all religions and churches.
1488
 A 1999 survey of Russians found 
that 38 percent of respondents had not heard of the Witnesses or had no opinion of them. But 
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only 14 percent of those surveyed had a positive attitude toward them and 47 percent had a 
negative attitude—the highest of any religious group.1489  
Public hostility toward the Witnesses meant that Russians were less willing to grant 
Witnesses the freedom to practice their religion. A survey conducted among urban Russians 
in 2003 to 2005 asked respondents how they felt about the following statement: 
Some people think Jehovah‘s Witnesses are a religious cult that presents a danger to 
Russian society and should be forbidden from distributing literature on the street. 
Other people think that, regardless of whether they present a danger to Russian 
society, Jehovah‘s Witnesses should have the right to distribute literature on the 
street. 
 
Only about 20 percent of those surveyed agreed that Witnesses should have the right to hand 
out their literature. A mere 10 percent of Russians had not heard of the Witnesses, itself a 
remarkable fact given that Witnesses had only recently appeared in most Russian cities. And, 
as most of what these respondents knew about the Witnesses came from the Russian media, it 
is not surprising that urban attitudes toward Witnesses were hostile.
1490
  
 The public‘s reticence to grant Witnesses religious freedom reflected a broader 
disillusionment with democratic reforms and a lack of strong popular support for civil 
liberties. A 2003 survey of Russians found that 78 percent considered democracy ―a facade 
for a government controlled by rich and powerful cliques.‖ Fifty-three percent stated that 
they disliked the idea of democracy. Such results reflected a populace increasingly alienated 
from power. For example, 82 percent of those polled in Moscow in the early 2000s felt they 
had no voice in national government; 72 percent felt the same way about local government. 
A poll in 2003 to 2004 found that 76 percent of those surveyed favored state censorship of 
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the mass media, Similarly, a study of residents in Voronezh oblast during the same period 
found only 11 percent of respondents would not trade their basic freedoms for stability; 29 
percent would forfeit these freedoms even without a promise of order.
1491
 
Overall, Russian politicians clamored to align themselves with the Russian Orthodox 
Church and few defended the rights of religious minorities protected by the 1990 law. The 
Church called for the state to tighten religious restrictions, with the patriarch suggesting a 
five-to-seven-year waiting period for questionable foreign religious organizations to register. 
Religious scholar Alexander Agadjanian has argued that ―the anti-Western and anti-cult state 
of mind dominated‖ the political landscape.1492 In response to pressure, the Duma amended 
the 1990 law in 1993. The modifications would have placed considerable obstacles in the 
way of foreign missionary activity, but President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin (1991-1999) 
vetoed the bill twice.
1493
 The Duma revisited the issue in 1995, seeking to replace the 1990 
law with a new law, ―On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.‖ Passed by 
an overwhelming majority in June 1997, the bill was also vetoed by Yeltsin, who criticized it 
for setting up unconstitutional barriers for foreign organizations.
1494
 The Duma adopted 
minor changes, and in September, Yeltsin reversed his initial opposition and signed the bill 
into law.
1495
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The law‘s passage included much that concerned the Witnesses. The preamble 
recognized the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity in 
general as part of Russia‘s cultural and historical heritage. It also set up a two-tiered system 
of religious registration based on the length of an organization‘s legal existence in Russia, a 
system that benefited the Church while seriously disadvantaging the Witnesses, who had not 
received legal recognition until 1991. Most disturbingly for Witnesses, the law introduced a 
list of vague reasons for revoking registration that, if loosely interpreted, would have caused 
most religious organizations to lose their legal status. The list included threatening public 
order and safety, extremist actions, undermining the family, infringing on citizens‘ rights and 
freedoms, endangering the health of citizens through denial of medical care, and inciting 
citizens not to fulfill their civic duties. Witnesses understood that their refusal to serve in the 
military or accept blood transfusions made them vulnerable to legal challenges. In practice, 
the law gave the anticult movement a means to contest the Witnesses‘ registration, but left 
the ultimate impact of the law up to the judiciary. Prior to the law‘s passage, thousands of 
Witnesses wrote letters to the Russian government protesting the proposed legislation.
1496
 
The law garnered international criticism from scholars and politicians who felt it 
encroached on Russian citizens‘ basic right to freedom of conscience. Yet initial indications 
suggested that the state had little interest in fully enforcing the most controversial aspects of 
the law. The law did not reintroduce a separate state agency for monitoring religious life or 
for identifying possible violations of the law, making it less likely that the state would revoke 
registration from religious organizations. In fact, almost all religious organizations, including 
the Witnesses, received federal registration under the new law. The Ministry of Justice re-
                                                 
1496
 Boris Lukichev and Andrei Protopopov, ―‗Svideteli Iegovy‘ v zerkale statistiki,‖ NG-Religii, September 8, 
1999. 
 449 
registered the Witness organization under the new law in April 1999.
1497
 More broadly, 
Russia's Constitutional Court ruled later that year that religions that had previously registered 
under the old law did not need to meet the fifteen-year minimum to retain their status as 
registered religious organizations.
1498
 By 2001, some 360 Witness communities had 
successfully registered under the new law.
1499
 
Further, while Yeltsin yielded under heavy internal pressure to sign the law, his 
governing strategy was largely one of decentralization, not of amassing new powers and 
responsibility for the federal government. In fact, many of the most egregious encroachments 
on religious toleration during the Yeltsin era occurred at the local level due to a lack of 
federal oversight. By 1999, for example, over one-third of Russia‘s regional governments 
had enacted laws limiting the rights of non-Orthodox religious organizations.
1500
 Some of 
these regulations included bans on all foreign religious organizations.
1501
 In certain instances, 
authorities consulted with the local Russian Orthodox Church on whether to grant 
registration to a particular organization.
1502
 All of this suggests that the major problem in the 
Yeltsin era was not central control, but rather the lack thereof, which led to numerous local 
violations of federal law.  
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The law itself reflected the decentralized power structure of Yeltsin‘s Russia by 
allowing both federal and local registration of religious organizations. In essence, it was 
possible for a local court to revoke a religious organization‘s registration within its 
jurisdiction, even if the federal government had registered the organization. This aspect of 
the law led to a major test case involving the Witnesses. Prior to the law‘s passage, anticult 
organizations in Moscow had tried and failed to bring criminal charges against the Witnesses. 
They saw the new law as a second chance to make their case.
1503
 In 1998, at the behest of the 
anticult group, the Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Sects, the Moscow prosecutor 
brought suit in the Golovino Intermunicipal Court against the Witness organization for 
violating the new law. 
In the trial, the defense and prosecution presented two starkly different views of 
freedom of conscience. The defense lawyers repeatedly referred to their client‘s Soviet-era 
repression and called on the judge not to let ―history repeat itself.‖1504 They argued that the 
outcome of the trial would determine whether or not Russia had moved beyond its repressive 
past by guaranteeing religious freedom for all its citizens. The defense cast refusal to 
recognize the Witnesses as an endorsement of the Soviet political order, asserting that the 
court‘s verdict would determine if Russian citizens could indeed now choose what God to 
worship, what faith to practice, and what literature to read.
1505
  
In turn, the prosecution dismissed the notion that the Soviet legacy had any bearing 
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on the case, while nonetheless branding the Witnesses as ―totalitarian.‖1506 It painted the 
Witnesses as intolerant of other religious organizations and opposed to democratic rule. 
Witnesses, the prosecution argued, refused to acknowledge the Orthodox victims of Soviet 
religious repression. When the defense asked Dvorkin, one of the prosecution‘s star 
witnesses, if he was familiar with the Soviet persecution of Witnesses, he responded, ―I am 
aware of the fact that millions of Orthodox believers were executed for maintaining their 
faith in, as the Jehovah‘s Witnesses so elegantly put it, a phallic symbol,‖ a reference to the 
fact that Witnesses believe Christ was crucified on a stake, not a cross.
1507
 In general, the 
prosecution downplayed the Witnesses‘ Soviet experience by placing it within the larger 
context of state suppression of all religions.  
More relevant to the 1997 law, the prosecution accused the Witnesses of illegally 
inciting religious discord through its criticism of other religions. It painted Witnesses as 
extremists who endangered the existing political and social order. Prosecution expert witness 
I. V. Metlik testified that the organization intended to set up ―work camps‖ after 
Armageddon and that Christ‘s millennial kingdom closely resembled the ―theory and practice 
of totalitarian governments.‖ Numerous family members also testified to the alleged 
psychological damage to their relatives by the Witnesses‘ belief in Armageddon. All of this 
provided the prosecution with evidence that the Witnesses had violated the new religious 
law, which made it illegal for religious organizations to undermine state security, divide 
families, and harm the physical and mental health of their members.
1508
   
The court proceedings more broadly reflected a society in transition, attempting to 
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construct a democratic system on Soviet foundations. References to European precedents and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) seemed to bewilder the judge, who had little 
practice in weighing decisions with a mind to international law. Religious matters proved 
even more confusing. Numerous incidents exposed the unfamiliarity of the judge with the 
religious issues under consideration. For example, when Metlik referred to the apocalypse as 
largely ―symbolic in character,‖ the judge interrupted, ―Then what is the Bible for?‖ As 
Metlik attempted to explain that the Bible is open to varying interpretations, the judge 
interjected, ―Well then, our Christian faith, for instance – does it speak about the end of the 
world?‖ Metlik replied that it did.1509 These remarks reflect the religious climate after 1991, 
in which most Russians considered themselves Russian Orthodox as a matter of birth, but 
often had a limited understanding of what this meant in terms of beliefs or practices. 
In part for this reason, the Watch Tower organization was pessimistic about the 
chances of a fair trial, writing in a September 1998 press release, ―The court is not expected 
to adhere to the Russian Constitution in trying this case.‖1510 The trial began in September 
1998, but immediately encountered numerous delays in the proceedings. The Witnesses‘ 
predictions notwithstanding, the judge in the case proved willing to consider both sides of the 
issue, frustrating and encouraging both the prosecution and the defense at different points 
during the trial. The longest delay came in March 1999, when the judge suspended the court 
case to allow an ―expert panel‖ to review Watch Tower literature, in part due to her own 
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ignorance of the religious questions under debate.
1511
 The trial resumed two years later, in 
February 2001, after four of the five expert panelists found in favor of the prosecution.
1512
 
Despite this finding, the court ruled against the prosecution on February 23, 2001. 
Unfortunately, the Witnesses had won only the first round in a series of court decisions 
regarding their registration. An immediate appeal of the verdict in the Moscow City Court 
had a less favorable outcome for the organization. The second trial largely retraced the first 
trial, assembling a new expert panel to investigate the Witnesses‘ publications. This time, 
however, the court found in favor of the prosecution in March 2004 and quickly rejected an 
appeal by the organization. Other local courts followed Moscow‘s example, delaying or 
obstructing the registration of the Witnesses under the 1997 law.
1513
  
Enforcement of the Moscow ban was arbitrary and inconsistent. During the trial, the 
organization lost leases on several properties they used for Kingdom Halls, resulting in 
overcrowding at the remaining available spaces.
1514
 A police raid abruptly ended the annual 
Memorial service in April 2006 in Moscow.
1515
 Yet in 2007 the organization rented Luzhniki 
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Stadium in Moscow for its district convention, attended by nearly 30,000 people.
1516
 Overall, 
the Witnesses continued to devise ways to practice their faith in Moscow, but found 
themselves on shaky legal footing. The lack of registration in the city did not apparently 
dampen the Witnesses‘ membership growth. At the start of the case, in 1998, the city had 
forty-three congregations; in 2006, there were ninety-three congregations.
1517
  
The Witnesses were one of only a handful of previously registered religious 
organizations to encounter such serious obstacles to registration under the new law. All told, 
by 2001, 12,000 religious organizations and groups had received registration. Only 200 had 
been refused, primarily due to having not filed complete paperwork as required by the law. 
The Salvation Army was the only other major organization to confront obstacles similar to 
those faced by the Witnesses. As with the Witnesses, the Moscow justice department denied 
the Salvation Army‘s application for registration in 1999, calling it an illegal paramilitary 
organization. The district court quickly decided against the Army; this judgment withstood 
an appeal in 2000. Yet soon after, in 2001, the federal government approved re-registration 
of the organization at the federal level. The local Moscow legal battle continued nonetheless, 
ending with a final court judgment against the Salvation Army in 2003.
1518
 As with the 
Witnesses, federal approval of the religious organization did not guarantee its right to operate 
at the local level. 
Moscow‘s actions fed into an increasingly hostile climate for Witnesses throughout 
Russia. By the late 1990s, members ran into growing difficulty in finding spaces to rent for 
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conventions due to local opposition, primarily from government officials and Russian 
Orthodox clergy. Some Orthodox communities held demonstrations outside of the 
conventions in protest.
1519
 A number of facilities canceled rental contracts with Witnesses, 
forcing the organization to scramble to find last-minute alternative accommodations. At least 
a few conventions received anonymous bomb threats, forcing evacuations and delays.
1520
 
Witnesses also confronted barriers to acquiring new property for Kingdom Halls and found 
many landlords and local officials hostile to attempts to rent property.
1521
 For example, 
authorities in Khabarovsk and Ekaterinburg cancelled rental agreements for facilities to be 
used for the yearly Memorial Service in 2004.
1522
 In 2002, the mayor of Velikie Luki in 
Pskov oblast cited local residents‘ opposition to justify why the city had denied Witnesses the 
right to buy land to build a Kingdom Hall.
1523
 The meeting space issue posed a major 
problem for Witnesses, as even with the rapid construction of Kingdom Halls in the 1990s, 
the organization struggled to keep pace with the demand generated by the massive increase in 
membership. The 1997 Yearbook noted that 85 percent of congregations in Russia lacked a 
permanent meeting space.
1524
 Opposition from property owners and officials only 
compounded the problem, which continued through 2010. In Murmansk, the head of the city 
administration told the press in 2007 that the city had chosen to reject the Witnesses‘ request 
for permission to build a Kingdom Hall, citing the organization‘s ―aggressive-intrusive 
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methods of proselytism‖ and a petition signed by more than 3,000 residents opposed to the 
construction.
1525
 Such incidents were more and more common by the late 2000s. 
If the early 1990s had represented a time of rapid membership growth and interest in 
the Witnesses‘ message, by the late 1990s Witnesses faced rising hostility from citizens and 
local police during their door-to-door preaching. Opposition could turn violent at times. In 
Volgograd in 2000, men identifying themselves as ―Cossacks of the Almighty Troops of the 
Don‖ attacked Witnesses at a religious gathering, striking one man with a whip and 
destroying religious literature at the site.
1526
 Witnesses also faced attacks on their local 
Kingdom Halls. In 2008, arson destroyed a Kingdom Hall in Chekhov, a town forty miles 
south of Moscow.
1527
 Given that police often dismissed complaints brought by Witnesses, 
proselytism became a potentially dangerous activity. For example, in 2005 a resident in a St. 
Petersburg apartment building attacked two female Witnesses while they preached. When the 
two women appealed to the police, an officer refused to bring charges, telling them that he 
supported the attacker.
1528
  
 The Witnesses encountered other legal problems unrelated to the 1997 law. Courts 
sometimes considered the Witnesses‘ religious affiliation when deciding custody disputes, 
finding in favor of non-Witness parents.
1529
 A number of these decisions cited the Moscow  
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court ruling to justify denying custody of children to Witness parents.
1530
 More commonly, 
Witnesses faced continued state pressure to enlist in the military. Although the Russian 
Constitution grants citizens the right to complete alternative civil service if they have 
religious objections, the lack of an alternative service law until 2004 made this right available 
to Witnesses only in theory.
1531
 As a result, the state forcibly conscripted some Witnesses and 
sent them to military units.
1532
 Even when it finally offered alternative service under the 2004 
law, the state nonetheless sporadically attempted to compel Witnesses to serve in the 
military, albeit in a civil capacity, an option that Witnesses refused to consider.
1533
 As of 
2005, the Witnesses reported over forty criminal cases against believers for refusal to 
complete alternative military service. The court handed down fines or assigned community 
service in many of these cases. At least a few local draft commissions ruled Witnesses 
ineligible for alternative military service.  
 
Witnesses as Extremists? 
The Moscow trials, which dragged on for several years, overlapped with Yeltsin‘s  
resignation and his replacement by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, whose leadership style 
shifted Russia toward a more centralized form of state control with greater restrictions on 
individual freedoms. During Putin‘s tenure, first as President (2000-08) and then as Prime 
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Minister (2008-), the central state firmly asserted its authority over Russia‘s regions, 
concentrating power within the office of the presidency.
1534
 The state also cultivated greater 
ties to the Russian Orthodox Church. For Russians who belonged to Western Christian 
religious organizations (roughly two million out of Russia‘s 142 million citizens), 
particularly more marginal faiths such as the Witnesses, the state proved less tolerant and less 
interested in church-state cooperation.
1535
 
 Putin‘s rise to power coincided with a series of domestic terrorism incidents linked to 
the ongoing war in Chechnya. Putin‘s ability to show strength, respond quickly to this 
violence, and reestablish Russian control over the breakaway region helped secure his 
popularity.
1536
 The war also gave the state more leeway to pass new laws that, under the 
guise of fighting terrorism, provided an avenue for it to restrict the activities of other groups 
it found threatening to public order and safety. With this in mind, the Duma passed the Law 
on Countermeasures against Extremist Activity in June 2002. The law barred organizations, 
including religious ones, from a host of ill-defined activities, including creating illegal armed 
formations and undermining state security. More troublingly for religious organizations, it 
prohibited propaganda on the exclusivity or superiority of citizens on the basis of religion, 
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social class, race, nationality, or language.
1537
 Under this law, Russian courts could declare 
certain religious publications extremist and add them to the Federal List of Extremist 
Materials. This would make it a crime to import or distribute them. The court could issue 
heavy fines or sentence violators to as many as five years in prison.
1538
  
 The law had no initial impact on the Witnesses, but amendments to the law in 2007 
suggested the state‘s intent to broaden the law‘s application to clamp down on free speech 
and silence political opponents.
1539
 Although Putin stepped down from the presidency in 
2008, he won election as prime minister, essentially retaining his previous powers under a 
different title. The new president, Dmitrii Anatol‘evich Medvedev, hand picked and endorsed 
by Putin, had limited independent power to set important policy. Immediately after his 
inauguration in spring 2008, Medvedev instructed the Federal Security Service (FSB) that 
―serious attention should be paid to counteracting manifestations of ethnic and religious 
intolerance.‖ He stressed the need for the FSB to demonstrate further progress in this area.1540 
In the wake of the 2007 amendments to the anti-extremism law, local prosecutors and 
officials began investigations into Witnesses for extremist activity, first in Rostov-on-Don 
oblast, and then in North Ossetia, Altai republic, Ekaterinburg oblast, Sverdlovsk oblast, and  
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elsewhere by 2009.
1541
  
To determine if the Witnesses publications qualified as extremist under the law, local 
officials ordered ―expert studies‖ of Watch Tower literature. Geraldine Fagan, an expert on 
religious freedom in Russia, has commented on these studies that, ―in some cases, it‘s quite 
farcical. If the texts say that their faith is the best or the truest, then that is understood as 
extremist. But that is an integral part of any religion.‖1542 Following this pattern, the study in 
Rostov-on-Don found that two Watch Tower publications ―contain statements humiliating a 
person‘s dignity on the principle of his or her attitude to religion,‖ and that this amounted to 
incitement of religious hatred.
1543
 Some of the expert conclusions bordered on the absurd. My 
Book of Bible Stories, for example, retells the story of how the Jewish high priests called for 
the execution of Jesus Christ. The expert found that this story made clergymen seem 
―hypocritical, mercenary, [and] cruel,‖ among other things.1544  
In the wake of the new wave of investigations into Witness activity in the late 2000s, 
local authorities blocked Witnesses from holding summer congresses in eight locations in 
2008; another roughly thirty congresses took place despite interference by local officials. 
Local government opposition went far beyond the sporadic and usually unsuccessful attempts 
of local officials in previous years to obstruct large scale Witness gatherings.
1545
 Some 
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human rights experts concluded that the sheer number of such instances suggested a 
coordinated campaign from the central government. This interpretation gained further 
credence in February 2009, when the state initiated investigations into Witness communities 
countrywide on the basis of the extremism law.  
The Witness organization interpreted the state‘s actions as the first step in a move to 
liquidate the administrative structure of the organization. While the federal government kept 
silent on its role in orchestrating the investigations, the human rights organization Forum 18 
obtained documents suggesting the First Assistant General Public Prosecutor Aleksandr 
Bastrykin in Moscow had ordered the investigations. According to Forum 18, ―Authorities 
are now ‗trawling‘ for information to shut down the Jehovah‘s Witnesses‘ Russian 
headquarters and over 400 dependent organizations.‖ Local authorities and education 
departments were asked to provide information on any problems they had with Witnesses, 
including in regard to blood transfusions and the involvement of minors in religious 
activities. Following this request, officials examined registration documents for possible 
errors that could establish a basis for revoking a congregation‘s registration.1546 Within a 
short period, more than 500 communities faced some form of government scrutiny.
1547
 In the 
spring and summer of 2009, the Russian government deported four foreign lawyers for the 
Witness organization, a move likely intended to undercut the organization‘s ability to defend 
itself in court.
1548
 In an equally worrying development for the Watch Tower organization, in 
February 2009 the Ministry of Justice strengthened the powers of its advisory board on 
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religious matters, the Expert Council for Conducting State Religious-Studies Expert 
Analysis, in order to permit it to make recommendations to the ministry about specific 
religious organizations. The chair of this newly reordered body was none other than Dvorkin, 
elected to the position by the council‘s members in May 2009.1549 Forum 18 has aptly dubbed 
the Council a new ―inquisition.‖1550  
 Under pressure from central authorities and bolstered by ―expert‖ studies, regional 
courts banned many Watch Tower publications as extremist. In September 2009, the Rostov-
on-Don oblast court declared thirty-four publications used by the Taganrog Witness 
community extremist, followed by a similar decision regarding eighteen publications in the 
Altai republic. In other areas, district and regional prosecutors‘ offices issued warnings to the 
local Witness congregations regarding their publications. The Taganrog verdict gained a new 
level of importance in December 2009, when the Russian Supreme Court upheld the decision 
and the liquidation of the community on the basis of the extremism law.
1551
  
The Supreme Court‘s action meant that local authorities could stop and question 
Witnesses for distributing extremist material.
1552
 Even prior to the ruling, FSB agents 
detained eighteen members at a local Kingdom Hall in Ekaterinburg in 2009 for eight hours 
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and seized the congregation‘s literature.1553 After the decision, large numbers of Witnesses 
were arrested when they engaged in door-to-door proselytism. The Russian human rights 
monitoring agency SOVA counted over 150 detentions and police searches in three months 
alone.
1554
 Police harassment of Witnesses reached such a high level in 2010 that the 
international Watch Tower organization created an interactive map on its official website to 
catalog all incidents under the categories ―arson/assault,‖ ―arrest,‖ ―actions by public,‖ and 
―actions by authorities.‖1555 
In the fall of 2010, for the first time since the Soviet era, trials of Witnesses for 
preaching activity began in seven areas. In the earliest trial in Gorno-Altaisk city court, the 
prosecution charged Aleksandr Kalistratov, a congregation elder, with inciting religious 
discord (Article 282 of the Russian criminal code) after he gave two Watch Tower magazines 
to a local resident who had requested them.
1556
 The actual incident predated the Supreme 
Court decision regarding the Taganrog community by over a year. The FSB involved itself in 
the case, intercepting the mail and tapping the phones of Kalistratov and other members of 
the congregation. The trial, which began in October 2010, focused on the confiscated 
religious literature seized from Kalistratov‘s home.1557 Two local Orthodox priests testified at 
the trial, neither of whom knew the defendant. Their knowledge of the Witnesses, the priests 
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admitted, was limited largely to the works of Dvorkin.
1558
 The court trial continues as of this 
writing, but the court‘s willingness to pursue the case based on a retroactive application of a 
court ruling and flimsy expert testimony strongly suggests a negative outcome for the 
Witnesses.  
In February 2010, the Witnesses began a media campaign throughout Russia to bring 
the public‘s attention to government harassment. Russian Witnesses distributed twelve 
million copies of the brochure Is History Repeating Itself? A Question for Russian Citizens. It 
highlighted the Soviet repression of Witnesses and recent actions against the Witnesses for 
extremism. The brochure concluded by stating, ―Repression will never succeed. We will not 
stop speaking tactfully and respectfully about Jehovah God and his Word, the Bible. (1 Peter 
3:15) We did not stop when subjected to the horrors of Nazi Germany, we did not stop in the 
darkest days of our country‘s repression, and we will not stop now.‖1559 Yet given Russian 
ambivalence toward democratic rule and the rights of minority religious organizations, most 
citizens may have greeted this brochure no more favorably than they did issues of The 
Watchtower. It certainly did not lead to any public outcry against state repression of the 
Watch Tower organization. 
 
Losing Freedoms at Home, Winning Freedoms Abroad 
Even as the Witnesses faced an uphill battle to retain their legal status in Russia, they 
won court decisions in their favor in the international arena. In 1996, Russia joined the 
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Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998.
1560
 
Article 9 of the convention recognizes the right of every citizen to exercise freedom of 
religion. This includes the ―freedom to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice, and observance,‖ and allows for restrictions of this right only as ―are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.‖1561 By ratifying the 
convention, the Russian state gave citizens the right to appeal domestic court decisions to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). For the Witnesses and other minority groups, the 
Convention granted them much needed protection from increasingly hostile Russian courts. 
These groups made frequent use of the ECHR and by 2008, more than a quarter of all 
applications pending in the court were against Russia.
1562
 
 The Witnesses already had a strong established presence in ECHR case law as the first 
religious organization to win a case in the court on the violation of Article 9. Kokkinakis v. 
Greece in 1993 granted Witnesses the right to proselytize in Europe and established them as 
a recognized religion. In fact, the majority of decisions by the ECHR regarding religious 
freedom have involved the Witnesses.
1563
 In Manoussakias and Others v. Greece in 1996, the 
Court overturned another Greek decision against Witnesses who had rented space for their 
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meetings without prior authorization from the state.
1564
 In 1993, the ECHR ruled in Hoffman 
v. Austria that courts could not discriminate on the basis of religion in making child custody 
decisions. Other decisions in 1997 ruled against Greek courts for convicting Witnesses who 
refused to complete military service while granting exemptions to Greek Orthodox clergy.
1565
 
Overall, Witnesses in Russia had the benefit of prior ECHR case law that established their 
religious organization as legitimate and protected by Article 9. 
 In the wake of the Moscow court decision against the organization, the Russian 
Witnesses filed a claim with the ECHR for violation of Article 9. The Witnesses also 
submitted an application, Kuznetsov and Others v. Russian Federation, in 2002 after police 
in Cheliabinsk forcibly shut down a meeting of deaf Witnesses in 2000.
1566
 The ECHR found 
in their favor in 2007.
1567
 Giving Witnesses additional confidence that the ECHR would 
support their Moscow appeal, a 2006 ruling by the ECHR found against the city for its 
refusal to register the Salvation Army.
1568
 In June 2010, the ECHR overturned the Moscow 
court‘s decision barring the Watch Tower organization and rejected an appeal by Russia in 
December 2010.
1569
 It remains to be seen if Russia will honor the ECHR‘s decision.1570 In the 
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meantime, the Witnesses have filed additional appeals of the recent court decisions regarding 
the extremist nature of Watch Tower literature. 
 The example of the ECHR points to the broader importance of the Witnesses in 
establishing legal precedent on the boundaries of freedom of conscience. In Europe, the 
ECHR has provided the Witnesses with an avenue to protect their religious freedoms. The 
case law created by the Witnesses also helps guarantee those same rights and protections for 
other minority faiths in Europe. In this regard, the Witnesses are more than a barometer of 
religious freedom. The Witnesses‘ advocacy pushes legal boundaries and ensures that states 
respect religious pluralism in the broadest sense allowed by the law. Ironically, given that an 
increasingly non-democratic Russia may choose to ignore the ECHR decisions, Russian 
Witnesses may have the greatest impact not on their own right to practice, but on the rights of 
Witnesses and minority faiths in other, more democratic European states, most of which do 
respect the court and its rulings. Thus, even as Witnesses are denied certain freedoms 
domestically, their legal challenges advance the cause of religious freedom beyond Russia‘s 
borders. 
Nor is the European example unique, as numerous scholars have noted how 
Witnesses have played an active role in securing broad civil liberties and religious freedom in 
other democratic countries, primarily in the United States, but also in Canada and 
elsewhere.
1571
 Indeed, it is often the unpopular religions and groups that set the legal 
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parameters of freedom of conscience and civil liberties because they, unlike more 
mainstream religions and groups, require the protection of the state against an often hostile 
public. The Witnesses have championed this notion that their actions benefit everyone. In a 
2000 pamphlet distributed in Russia entitled It Could Happen to You!, the organization 
advised Russian citizens that they should ―be concerned‖ about recent media slander against 
the Witnesses: ―Ultimately, it involves YOU and your rights. If slanderous accusations 
against the members of one religious group are allowed to stand unchallenged today, you and 
your beliefs could be targeted tomorrow!
1572
 
 
Conclusion 
 At the dawn of Russia‘s independence in 1991, Russian Witnesses had reason to 
celebrate. The 1990 law granted broad civil liberties and religious freedom to all Russian 
citizens, including those marginalized and persecuted throughout the Soviet era. One 
Witness, attending his first international convention, expressed a sense of disbelief that such 
a rapid transformation in religious policy had taken place: ―For many years we have been 
waiting for this day, and now we are here at this international convention. We find it difficult 
to grasp all of this and take it all in. It is like a dream.‖1573 In the years that followed, the 
Watch Tower organization grew rapidly, finding new members throughout the Russian 
Federation and establishing its administrative structure over hundreds of local congregations, 
most of them only recently created. 
 Yet continued social, economic, and political instability in Russia left citizens less 
optimistic about the country‘s long-term prospects as a democracy. The need for stability 
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overshadowed the desire to protect minority voices. The Russian Orthodox Church, itself 
struggling to adjust to changing realities, demanded stronger measures against marginal 
religious organizations that it felt threatened its position as Russia‘s traditional religion. The 
anticult movement painted the Church‘s religious competitors as predatory, psychologically 
manipulative, and largely foreign. It suggested that, to ensure social cohesion, public welfare, 
and state security, the Russian government needed to take strong measures to restrict freedom 
of religious expression.  
 A new religious law in 1997 triggered a major shift in church-state relations and a 
renewed tension between the state and Witnesses. Putin‘s rise to power aggravated the 
situation by applying further pressure on the Watch Tower organization through the selective 
application of the 2002 anti-extremism law. Less than two decades after Soviet Witnesses 
finally secured their freedom to practice their religion without state hindrance, this right was 
again under serious question. Russian Witnesses today are prepared for a return to Soviet-era 
repression, clandestine meetings and literature distribution, and the possibility of arrest and 
imprisonment for speaking about their beliefs to others. This scenario does not surprise them, 
but it does motivate them to apply every available legal tool to prevent it.  
Ultimately, Russia‘s actions will have implications not just for Witnesses themselves, 
but also for the future of Russian democracy and religious pluralism. Court rulings against 
the organization have set a clear precedent. They allow the state to liquidate any religious 
organization, ban their activities, and restrict the right of citizens to express their personal 
opinions when these views conflict with state interests. Yet even as Russian Witnesses 
prepare for the worst, they and other minority faiths in Europe benefit from the victories won 
in the ECHR by Russian believers. Ironically, although the European anticult movement may 
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have bolstered its Russian counterpart, Europe has proven uninterested in taking the 
extraordinary measures against Witness activity enacted by Russia in the last decade. The 
deterioration of religious pluralism in Russia, it seems, may have the opposite effect in 
Europe by establishing legal precedents for protecting Witnesses. The legal fate of the 
Russian Witness community remains in limbo. However, the history of Soviet Witnesses and 
of the organization worldwide make it clear that Russian Witnesses will continue to exist, to 
preach, and to meet together as a faith community, regardless of the circumstances. 
  
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
WITNESSES IN POST-SOVIET MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE 
―I tell you, open your eyes and look at the fields! They are ripe for harvest.‖ John 4:35 
Witnesses were a relatively new phenomenon for most Russians in the 1990s, as 
Soviet-era Witnesses had lived in a handful of provincial locations far from the political 
center. In contrast, Moldova and Ukraine had longstanding Witness communities in several 
major areas and high concentrations of members in northern Moldova and western Ukraine. 
By the end of the millennium, some of these communities included four or even five 
generations of Witness families.
1574
 While the former Soviet Union as a whole experienced a 
rapid increase in Witnesses, there continued to be far more Witnesses in Moldova and 
Ukraine than anywhere else in the region. In 2009, only 1 out of 903 citizens in Russia were 
Witnesses, compared to 1 in 312 in Ukraine, and 1 in 202 in Moldova.
1575
  
The Watch Tower organization pursued a similar strategy in Ukraine and Moldova as 
it had in Russia. In all three countries, it established a legal existence, implemented standard 
operating procedures for all congregations, and intensified its efforts to find new members. 
Like Russia, Ukraine and Moldova shared a post-Soviet religious climate dominated by 
various branches of the Orthodox Church that felt threatened by both homegrown new 
religious movements and foreign missionaries. Ukraine and Moldova also faced common 
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challenges with Russia after 1991 in establishing viable independent states and negotiating 
their new position in the European and global community.  
Freedom of conscience represented only one aspect of a broader regional transition 
from authoritarianism toward some form of democratic governance. In the mid-1990s, Russia 
began a gradual shift toward more exclusionary religious policies and exerted a serious 
influence over its neighbors, making it hard for them to ignore Russian trends. At the same 
time, many post-Soviet states set goals of greater integration with Europe. Admission into 
and cooperation with European institutions required conformity to certain democratic 
standards and limited the extent to which states could enact restrictive legislation against 
minority religions.
1576
 Russia and Europe offered Ukraine and Moldova slightly different 
models for religious policy, and both represented key economic and geopolitical partners. 
Each state had to negotiate between the two options with a mind to broader political and 
economic goals post-independence.  
By 2010, the post-Soviet transition had produced a significantly different outcome for 
religious freedom in Ukraine and Moldova than in Russia. Ukraine and Moldova established 
and maintained relatively broad religious freedoms, while the breakaway republic of 
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Transnistria within Moldova‘s borders pursued a strategy more in line with the Russian 
model. 
 
The Two States of Moldova 
 The 1991 collapse of the USSR brought Soviet Moldavia independence (now called 
the Republic of Moldova, hereafter shortened to Moldova), but not territorial integrity. In the 
fall of 1990, separatists proclaimed the creation of an independent state, the Transnistrian 
Moldovan Republic (abbreviated in Russian as PMR), over Moldovan territory east of the 
Dniester River.
1577
 This attempt at self-determination escalated into a more serious problem 
once Moldova itself received independence and international recognition in 1991. The PMR 
refused to accept Moldovan control over its territory, fueled in large part by fears of a 
Romanian annexation of the nascent republic. A small war broke out between the PMR and 
Moldova, resulting in a few hundred casualties and a ceasefire in July 1992.
1578
 Talks 
between the two parties and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe failed 
to produce any movement toward reunification. Instead, the PMR and Moldova both pursued 
separate courses of state-building, making reintegration increasingly problematic and 
undermining Moldova‘s strategy of greater integration with Europe.1579    
Making matters even more complex, each new state pursued a different course of 
action on religious affairs. Both states struggled to create some measure of religious freedom, 
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while also satisfying the demands of a resurgent Orthodox Church and community. Yet 
Moldova, as a small landlocked country with few natural resources, needed to take into 
account international and European standards if it hoped for vital economic and political ties. 
The PMR, in contrast, with similar needs but no hope of support from other states, had little 
reason to conform to their dictates. Its only erstwhile ally, Russia, had not recognized its 
sovereignty, but had supplied the military backing necessary to win the ceasefire and now 
had peacekeeping troops on its soil. As such, the PMR needed to find a religious policy that 
met its own internal interests without provoking hostility from Russia.  
Religious organizations in Moldova grappled not only with how to create a new legal 
entity in the newly independent state, but with how to conduct their work in the PMR, a 
quasi-independent state with no international standing. In setting up its operations, the 
Witness organization established a single unified organizational structure that included both 
the Republic of Moldova and the PMR. Given the lack of qualified personnel, the Governing 
Body initially assigned the Russian branch, and then in 1995, the Romanian branch, the task 
of exercising control over the Moldovan office until it could train staff and set up an 
operation in Chişinău capable of running the organization without intermediary oversight.1580 
Since 2006, the Moldovan office has reported directly to the international headquarters.
1581
 
This model proved to be a shrewd move as the relatively secure organization in Chişinău 
could then provide support to the communities in the PMR. The following two sections will 
explore the post-Soviet situation for Witnesses in the Republic of Moldova, and then 
examine the challenges faced by Witnesses in the PMR.  
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The Republic of Moldova 
 In Moldova, once early momentum toward unification with Romania lost steam, the 
state turned its energies to establishing a viable independent state with ties to its post-Soviet 
neighbor states and an eye to greater integration with Europe. The Moldovan economy 
struggled to adjust to independence, as the territory‘s industrial wealth was located primarily 
in the PMR. With few domestic economic resources, Moldovans faced a weak economy, an 
outdated infrastructure, and a minimal social safety net.
1582
 As of 2000, an estimated 65 to 75 
percent of citizens lived in poverty and as many as a third of adults worked abroad illegally 
to support themselves and their families.
1583
 Mounting frustration with the economic situation 
brought the Moldovan Communist Party back to the political stage, where it captured the 
presidency and a parliamentary majority in 2001. Civil unrest in spring 2009 challenged this 
status quo and eventually resulted in a new, non-communist coalition government at the end 
of that year. On the whole, throughout the post-Soviet period, Moldovans faced a difficult 
social and economic situation that politicians proved incapable or unwilling to adequately 
address.  
Moldova codified its commitment to freedom of conscience in its 1992 Law on Cults 
and its 1994 constitution.
1584
 The law offered a path to registration for religious organizations 
                                                 
1582
 ―EU-Moldova Relations: Internal political and economic situation,‖ Official Site of the European 
Commission External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu (accessed February 14, 2011), and John Löwenhardt, 
Ronald J. Hill, and Margot Light, ―A Wider Europe: The View from Minsk and Chisinau,‖ International Affairs 
77, No. 3 (2001): 614. 
 
1583
 Ibid., 606. 
 
1584
 ―Zakon Respubliki Moldova o kul‘takh,‖ Nezavisimaia Moldova, April 25, 1992, 2; and Schmidtke and 
Chira-Pascanut, ―The Promise of Europe.‖ Article 31 of the 1994 constitution guarantees freedom of conscience 
and the separation of church and state. Constituția Republicii Moldova (cu modificări și completări pîna la 20 
septembrie 2006) (Chișinău: Continental Grup SRL, 2008), 13-14. 
 476 
and provided for the creation of a governmental body to oversee the registration process.
1585
 
The law also reflected early discomfort with the recent arrival of foreign missionaries and 
included a ban on ―religious proselytism.‖1586 The state likely intended the statute to 
eliminate aggressive recruiting tactics by foreign religious organizations, but with no 
definition of proselytism provided, it was open to interpretation and impossible to enforce. In 
1999, the state modified this portion of the law to meet standards set by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The new version allowed proselytism except in cases of 
―abusive proselytism,‖ which it defined as proselytism through the use of force or abuse of 
authority.
1587
 In 2002, the new criminal code made the ―preaching [of] religious beliefs or 
fulfillment of religious rituals, which cause harm to the health of citizens, or other harm to 
their persons or rights, or instigate citizens not to participate in public life or of the 
fulfillment of their obligations as citizens‖ a punishable offence. Yet, as of 2009, the state 
had not used the statute against any religious organization.
1588
 
In 2007, this time partly under pressure from the Council of Europe, Moldova passed 
a new religious law intended to streamline the registration process for religious 
organizations. The law responded to domestic demands for more regulation by strengthening 
its ban on abusive proselytism to include ―psychological‖ pressure, a redefinition no doubt 
influenced by anticult rhetoric about how sects brainwash or ―zombify‖ members. As with 
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Russia‘s 1997 law, the new Moldovan law recognized the unique role played by the 
Orthodox Church in Moldovan history.
1589
 So far, the new legislation has not had a major 
effect on freedom of conscience, nor resulted in significantly greater hurdles for religions 
seeking registration. Unlike in Russia, Moldova showed little interest in using its laws to 
eliminate marginal religious organizations such as the Witnesses. 
The Moldovan state also resolved the military service issue much more quickly than 
Russia. In 1992, it enacted an alternative service law, thereby removing the last major Soviet-
era legal barrier to Witnesses. The law made it possible for Moldovan Witnesses to avoid 
active military duty and designated Witness elders and full-time volunteers at the branch 
office in Chişinău as members of the clergy. This status gave them an exemption from the 
alternative service as well.
1590
 The 1992 law eliminated a major source of potential conflict 
between the state and the organization. Young Witness men, who had seen their grandfathers, 
fathers, and even older brothers spend years imprisoned for their refusal to serve, could now 
enter adulthood and start families without fear of being marked as criminals.  
Under the 1992 Law on Cults, the Witnesses received official registration in July 
1994.
1591
 By 1999, the organization had 147 registered religious communities.
1592
 Without 
interference from the government and with steady access to literature and other resources, 
membership grew at a correspondingly fast pace. The Watch Tower organization does not 
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provide differentiated statistics for the PMR and the Republic of Moldova, but instead 
estimates its total membership at the time of independence at roughly 4,000.
1593
  By 1995, 
this figure grew to 9,320 active members.
1594
 In 2000, the organization listed 16,856 
members.
1595
 Growth then proceeded at a somewhat slower, but still steady pace, with 19,918 
members as of 2010.
1596
 
 Religious freedom and a surge in membership ushered in a new era for the national 
Witness organization, which now had unimpeded contact with the Brooklyn headquarters. As 
in Russia, the Governing Body worked with local Witnesses to reconfigure the underground 
structure of Witness communities to conform to its international standards. This involved a 
great deal of work for both parties. Local communities had to adjust to the new way of doing 
things, while the Brooklyn leadership needed to first determine the exact condition of these 
communities and then communicate and enforce rules and procedures. The local organization 
had many illiterate or functionally illiterate older members and almost no members with 
advanced degrees. Since the initial arrival of Witnesses into the territory under Romanian 
interwar rule, most members in Moldova lived in the northern districts and rural areas, with 
few members in Chişinău, the capital.1597 The organization had to establish an urban base for 
itself and train elders to run the country office. In 1989, sixty Moldovan members traveled to 
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L‘viv, Ukraine, for instruction in running the organization.1598 In addition, the Governing 
Body sent experienced foreign volunteers to Moldova in the early 1990s. In 1998, the 
organization began constructing a permanent administrative center in downtown Chişinău to 
provide office space and to house its full-time staff. The branch opened in early 2000.
1599
 
Religious freedom required a major monetary investment by the Witnesses to build 
Kingdom Halls so members could congregate outside of private homes. While Witnesses met 
primarily in groups of less than a dozen persons in the Soviet era, now they formed into 
congregations of roughly a hundred members each. Meeting times switched from the middle 
of the night or early morning to regular daytime and evening hours. Preliminary construction 
began on the first Kingdom Hall in 1990. Building projects proceeded at a rapid pace in the 
early 1990s in the northern districts, due to the great need for meeting places, massive 
volunteer labor donated by members, and a weak Moldovan currency that made such projects 
relatively inexpensive.
1600
 Even with this work, the rapid membership growth meant that 
space for congregations remained an issue and construction continued to occupy considerable 
time and resources into the 2000s.
1601
 
How Witnesses practiced their faith changed significantly after 1991. Meetings in the 
newly built Kingdom Halls conformed to a more uniform format, made possible in part by 
uninterrupted access to Watch Tower publications. While families may have previously 
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shared or hand-copied issues of The Watchtower or Awake!, all members now had their own 
copies to study at home before meetings. Massive investment in translation work made it 
possible for Moldovan Witnesses to read Romanian- and Russian-language versions of all 
major publications. Further, yearly conventions, held mostly in public stadiums, allowed for 
mass baptisms of new members in swimming pools rather than rivers and lakes. These 
changes allowed members to openly socialize with a wider community of fellow believers 
and for the Witnesses to present a public face to the broader community.  
By 2000, post-Soviet converts made up a strong majority of members. The greater 
geographic diversity of members and stronger urban presence attracted a diverse ethnic mix 
of Russian, Romanian, and Ukrainian converts. Many joined for the same reasons as those of 
past generations. The organization offered a close-knit community and provided spiritual 
guidance and hope during a difficult or traumatic period. One man, for example, found 
comfort and meaning in the Witnesses after a stranger brutally murdered his wife. While 
serving time for drug trafficking after her death, he studied the Bible with a Witness prisoner 
and was baptized while still in prison.
1602
 The Witnesses‘ strong support network had 
particular relevance in the post-Soviet era, a time of political and social instability and 
economic hardship. On a broader level, Witnesses have experienced the strongest growth in  
recent decades in third world and poor countries, and Moldova fit in with this larger trend.
1603
 
Some of those who joined came from Witness families or had Witness relatives, but 
Soviet repression had made the faith seem dangerous and unappealing. Lidia Sevastian‘s 
mother and grandmother both joined the Witnesses under Romanian rule, but not her father. 
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The family, including the father, went into exile in 1951, and Lidia was born nine years later 
in Tomsk oblast. While her father continued to support the family, he saw that Lidia received 
a secular education and did not get involved with the faith. She eventually married a man 
opposed to the Witnesses. Only in 1993, while recovering from back surgery, did she renew 
her contact with the Witnesses after learning that her son had been baptized at that year‘s 
international convention in Kiev. Following his example, she began a Bible study with the 
Witnesses and was baptized in 1995. In an odd twist, even her father joined the Witnesses a 
few years later before his death.
1604
  
As in the Soviet era, many people joined the Witnesses not as individuals, but as 
family units. As Lidia‘s story demonstrates, the conversion of one person could spark a chain 
reaction of parents, spouses, children, and relatives following them into the organization.
1605
 
Inna Țmokno began a home Bible study with the Witnesses in 1998. Her mother did not 
approve and chased the Witnesses out of her home. Inna persisted and eventually the mother 
expressed interest in learning more about the religion her daughter found so appealing. The 
mother joined Inna in her Bible study and both were baptized in 2002.
1606
 In general, the 
religion spread in large part through family and friend networks, as people responded more 
favorably and seriously to proselytism from someone they knew and respected.  
The new converts differed from Soviet-era Witnesses in their demographic makeup. 
One scholarly article in 2004 cited data indicating some interesting trends. Similar to the 
2000 study of Moscow Witnesses, it found that most Moldovan Witnesses were younger than 
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thirty and a significant percentage had university degrees.
1607
 Anecdotal evidence based on 
my own interactions with Witnesses confirms both of these observations in regard to post-
Soviet converts.
1608
 Tatiana Daniliuc, for example, came from a family of college professors 
and earned a teaching decree from the State Pedagogical University in 2010. She was 
baptized in 2007.
1609
 At least a few converts held positions of prominence or power. Prior to 
joining, Valeriu Mârza served as the vice mayor of Soroca, a mid-sized town, and was a 
member of the Communist Party.
1610
  
The Witnesses also took greater advantage of the religious revival during this period 
than the Orthodox churches, which did not invest the same amount of time and resources into 
missionary work. As in Russia, foreign missionary organizations arrived en masse after 1991 
with the goal of winning new followers to their faiths. One man, baptized in 2000, recalled 
how, in the early 1990s, all sorts of religious organizations flooded Chişinău. He attended 
events held by the Hare Krishnas and the Word of Truth before ultimately joining the 
Witnesses.
1611
 While Moldovan Witnesses engaged in the traditional door-to-door preaching 
conducted by members worldwide, they also proselytized in parks and on the streets. One 
woman joined the Witnesses after a member approached her in a park and set up a home 
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Bible study with her.
1612
 In short, Witnesses and other missionaries made proselytism a 
regular feature of post-Soviet life for Moldovan citizens. 
Given the relatively high concentration of Witnesses in Moldova compared to most of 
Russia, and the long legacy of anti-Witness campaigns under Soviet rule, it is surprising how 
quickly and smoothly Witnesses managed to establish free practice of their faith. Yet while 
the Witnesses confronted few serious state or legal challenges in post-Soviet Moldova, they 
did encounter public hostility and negative media coverage. As in Russia, much of the 
opposition to the Witnesses came from Russian Orthodox clergy and believers. In the advent 
of religious pluralism, roughly 90 percent of Moldovans adopted some form of Orthodoxy, 
either under the Moldovan Orthodox Church (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate) or the 
Bessarabian Orthodox Church (subordinate to the Bucharest Patriarchate).
1613
 Orthodoxy 
increasingly became a feature of Moldovan national identity, placing other religions by 
definition outside of the national narrative. At the same time, divisions over allegiance to 
Romania versus Russia created a less cohesive Orthodox community and reflected the 
relatively weak and unstable state of national identity among Moldovans. For them, the post-
Soviet identity crisis revolved primarily around a choice over Romanian, Russian, or a third, 
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‗Moldovan‘ identity. Unlike in Russia, therefore, foreign missionaries and Western religious 
influence were of secondary importance in post-Soviet Moldova. 
1614
  
Most of the hostility to foreign missionaries came from the Orthodox churches and 
was fueled by the successful importation of the Russian-based anticult movement to other 
post-Soviet states by the mid- to late 1990s. Anticult rhetoric granted newly independent 
states the ability to sharply criticize marginal religious organizations while still voicing 
support for democracy and European standards of religious freedom. It also provided an 
outlet for lingering Soviet-era suspicions about Western Christian minorities. As in Russia, 
Witnesses became a frequent target of these attacks, in part because Russia supplied a steady 
stream of critical information on the organization. If Russia borrowed heavily from 1970s-era 
American anticult literature, other post-Soviet states, such as Moldova, equally relied on 
Russian media sources in transmitting the anticult message in their national presses.  
Russian anticult terminology and materials appeared in the Moldovan press beginning 
in the late 1990s.
1615
 The Russian-language daily, Kishinevskie novosti (Chișinău Daily), 
printed stories of citizens allegedly victimized by the Witnesses and described the 
psychological pressure employed by Witnesses on potential converts.
1616
 The Romanian-
language paper Ţară (Country) published a nine-part series on the Witnesses in 1997 under 
the title ―The Sectarian Phenomenon.‖1617 Its author described the Witnesses as having a 
―totalitarian mentality‖ and sects in general as ―maladaptive‖ and ―parasitic.‖1618 The 
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language borrowed from Soviet-era depictions as well, comparing the Witness organization 
to a ―spider web.‖1619 At the same time, it portrayed the Witnesses, not religious intolerance, 
as the real threat to democracy. The Witnesses, it alleged, continued communist practices 
through their totalitarian-esque hierarchy. It claimed that the organization instructs members 
to obey the leader, whether he is ―the führer or the president.‖1620 The Orthodox press also 
readily published materials borrowed from the Russian anticult movement, and from Dvorkin 
in particular.
1621
 A 2004 paper listed Dvorkin‘s classification model for different types of 
members of totalitarian sects.
1622
 Other papers cited Dvorkin‘s published works as 
reference.
1623
  
Resentment over the financial resources of Western religious organizations spilled 
over into attacks on the Witnesses. In a climate of relative poverty in Moldova, the rapid 
growth of the Witnesses, their distribution of free literature, and their construction of 
Kingdom Halls fueled allegations that conversions to the faith amounted to little more than 
bribery. Kishinevskie novosti sent one of its reporters to a Witness meeting in 1998 to 
investigate the situation. Giving little attention to the content of the service itself, he instead 
focused on the more than eighty lei (Moldovan currency) collected from members. 
Afterward, he visited the congregational elder‘s office and described its computers, fax 
machine, copy machine, printer, and new furniture, all of which he saw as evidence of aid 
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from the West.
1624
 In fact, although the organization did invest major funds into development 
in Moldova, it relied heavily on local donations and almost entirely on local volunteers to 
build its Kingdom Halls.
1625
  
In contrast to Russia, public distrust of Western religious organizations did not 
translate into sweeping changes to the existing religious legislation, nor did it usher in major 
violations of freedom of conscience that had to then be resolved through the national and 
international court systems. Instead, it fed into a climate of public hostility and recurrent 
clashes between Witnesses and local government, clergy, and citizens. Equally important, it 
continued lingering distrust of the Witnesses that had survived well after the collapse of the 
Soviet system. For many Moldovans, Witnesses remained the dangerous and secretive sect 
described in the official Soviet press. Changes in attitude toward the religion did not come 
quickly, as neither the late Soviet nor the early post-Soviet press seriously attempted to 
debunk earlier notions and to present an objective view of the organization.  
Thus, while more Moldovans than ever before responded positively to the Witnesses‘ 
message, most remained wary, if not suspicious. Ironically, the same proselytism that 
brought the organization converts became the primary source of local friction. In the 1990s, 
the Witnesses‘ door-to-door proselytism put them in more frequent direct contact with their 
neighbors than under Soviet rule. Not everyone liked the idea of having religion pitched to 
them in their homes, particularly since the majority religion, Orthodoxy, did not endorse or 
practice this method. Witnesses reported numerous confrontations during their preaching 
work, some of them violent. Some members clashed with local Orthodox clergy who 
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attempted to prevent them from preaching in what they saw as Orthodox communities. In 
December 2008, an Orthodox priest assaulted a Witness woman.
1626
 A handful of local 
mayors took measures to block Witnesses from entering their villages, sometimes at the 
behest of Orthodox clergy. One mayor told two Witnesses that he and the local priest did not 
want them in the village and warned them not to preach there again.
1627
 These incidents have 
not kept Witnesses from continuing their door-to-door work. Instead, they reinforce their 
belief that true Christians will face persecution from the outside world until Christ establishes 
his millennial kingdom. 
Overall, Moldovan Witnesses enjoyed strong growth and relatively few hurdles in the 
two decades after independence. They faced their greatest challenges in transforming their 
underground organization into a legally operating structure and in counteracting continued 
distrust and hostility from the press, clergy, and some local citizenry. The central government 
affirmed their right to practice and Witnesses encountered little state resistance to their 
organization. This relative freedom contrasted sharply with the experiences of fellow 
believers in Russia. 
 
Witnesses in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR) 
Following the 1992 ceasefire, the Transnistria Moldovan Republic joined the list of 
so-called ―frozen conflict zones‖ in the former Soviet Union. With no thaw in sight, it 
increasingly came to resemble a full-fledged independent state. Yet even Russia did not 
recognize its independence. Its citizenry faced a difficult situation as members of a country 
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with no legal standing. The territory‘s political leadership, in turn, had little outside pressure 
to conform to international standards on human rights. The result was moderate democratic 
reforms, continued Soviet-era state attitudes toward religious organizations, and a pro-Russia 
orientation in setting policies. Rampant internal corruption added a decidedly arbitrary 
element to official determinations regarding freedom of conscience.  
For the Witnesses, the PMR‘s status created a serious obstacle to establishing their 
organization. In most democratic and semi-democratic states, the international organization 
prefers to use the existing legal system and international pressure to secure its right to 
practice. In the PMR, both of these options were limited. The Witnesses in Transnistria also 
had to take into account that they had no access to international redress in the European 
Court of Human Rights, in contrast to Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Equally important, the 
PMR received virtually no attention in the foreign press. The Watch Tower organization 
could therefore expect little media coverage of threats to religious freedom and other human 
rights matters. Although this situation may have resembled in some respects the isolation 
they experienced under Soviet rule, Witnesses now had greater access to support from the 
organization both in the Republic of Moldova and in Brooklyn.  
 The PMR‘s policy toward religion was in keeping with its general line of deferring to 
Russian example and Soviet precedent, with some modifications. A 1995 law affirmed 
religious freedom, but with several major reservations that reflected the broader regional 
backlash against foreign missionaries and proselytism. While providing a process for 
registration, the law allowed for the liquidation of religious organizations to protect state 
order and the morality and health of its citizens. In this aspect, it bore close resemblance to 
Russia‘s 1997 law that was already in draft form by 1995. However, the PMR law was 
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actually implemented two years earlier due to the repeated veto of the Russian law by 
Yeltsin.
1628
 Its 1996 constitution also guaranteed freedom of conscience and outlawed the 
forced imposition of religious beliefs on citizens.
1629
 
 Also in line with Russia, despite rather restrictive religious legislation, Transnistria 
registered the vast majority of the religious organizations on its territory. This included the 
Witnesses, who had a sizeable membership in the region by this time. Compared to the 
Republic of Moldova, the Transnistrian Witnesses consisted of smaller communities with 
more recent converts. Many of its new members joined for the same reasons as they did in 
Moldova. Personal tragedies often made people more responsive to the Witnesses‘ message 
of a coming earthly paradise. Sergei Vorobev‘s mother found comfort in a Bible study with 
the Witnesses after her friend was murdered in 2000.
1630
 Overall, ongoing political instability 
and widespread poverty made the Witnesses‘ strong community network appealing to 
Moldovans on both sides of the Dniester River. 
 Igor Azivov provides one portrait of a new convert. Born in 1961 in Ukraine, he 
studied acting and music at university in the 1980s. At about the same time, he experienced a 
serious desire for religious faith and decided to be baptized into the Orthodox Church. After 
the local priest failed to satisfactorily answer all of Igor‘s spiritual questions, however, he 
quickly left the church and dabbled in Adventism and Pentecostalism. Followng the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, he met American missionaries from a charismatic church and spent two 
years taking courses with them in the Baltic states before opening his own church in Ribniţa, 
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a city in the north of the PMR. There he served as pastor, publishing a church newspaper and 
even taping his sermons for local TV. Still not certain he had chosen the right faith, he 
continued to seek out biblical knowledge and came into contact with the Witnesses. Satisfied 
with their explanations of the Bible, he left his church and converted yet again. None of his 
former congregants followed him into his new faith.
1631
 Azizov‘s path to the Witnesses 
mirrors the larger religious revival in post-Soviet states. Many people experienced a renewed 
need for spirituality, or at least for a religious identity, and were often drawn to foreign, 
primarily American missionaries. As Azizov‘s story demonstrates, these initial and 
sometimes hasty conversions did not always endure. Many people experimented with several 
religions to determine which best fit their needs.  
 The story of Azizov, a formerly well-known city pastor, illustrates that Witnesses 
managed to find at least a few converts among the relatively prominent and successful strata 
of the population. This included Elena Efimova, the former presidential press secretary, and 
later Supreme Court press secretary. Soon after retiring in 2003, she announced in an 
interview with the Transnistrian newspaper Novaia gazeta that she had been baptized into the 
faith.
1632
 O. Didur, a former professional athlete and trainer, joined the Witnesses along with 
his wife in 1992.
1633
 As in Moldova, many of the younger members I met during my research 
had graduated from the university or technical schools or intended to do so.  
 As in Moldova, the conversion of one person frequently led to other conversions 
within the same family. The Golubenko family is typical in that respect. The parents began a 
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Bible study in 1996. The mother was baptized in 1997, the father in 1998. Their three 
children soon followed.
1634
 Elena Efimova‘s son also joined the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, and so 
did Didur‘s wife.1635 When Sergei Vorobev and his mother began their Bible study, the 
family patriarch, Sergei‘s grandfather, voiced such strong opposition that they had to meet at 
a neighbor‘s apartment. Yet, in the end, the grandfather relented and even began to show 
interest in the Witnesses. In 2003, both Sergei and his grandfather were baptized.
1636
 
Azizov‘s wife followed her husband into the faith and their two children regularly attended 
meetings and participated in proselytism work.
1637
  
By 2009, the Witnesses had 2,425 members in the PMR, comprising roughly 12 
percent of the total membership for Moldova that year.
1638
 Some areas, however, still had 
little Witness presence. A 1998 Yearbook report noted that ―large rural areas of Moldova . . . 
are virtually virgin territory as far as preaching the good news is concerned,‖ and cited two 
villages near Bender where proselytism led to several baptisms.
1639
 Hoping to expand their 
preaching work into this territory, the Witnesses resolved to establish a legal organizational 
structure, appoint elders, create new congregations, and build Kingdom Halls, as they had 
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done in Moldova. But the PMR presented challenges to implementing these plans and also to 
individual Witnesses seeking to freely practice their faith.  
Universal military service for men was the first major and enduring obstacle, as the 
state lacked an alternative military service law that granted exemptions on the basis of 
religion. The 1995 religious law specifically barred citizens from refusing to fulfill their civic 
duties as a result of religious belief. From the time they reached adulthood, every male 
Witness in the PMR entered a frustrating cycle that ended only once he aged out of military 
service. While the penalties no longer involved prison time, the court process itself was time-
consuming and sometimes costly.  Upon receiving the initial draft notice, the Witness 
typically reported to the military medical commission. This provided him with an 
opportunity to state his religious objections and to potentially receive a medical exemption, 
but such exemptions were rarely granted. Next, he received his date to report for duty. Once 
it passed and he failed to appear, the military transferred the matter to the legal system, which 
opened up a criminal case and held a hearing. The courts usually ordered probation, although 
in some situations it assessed fines or garnished wages. During the probationary period, the 
Witness reported regularly to the state; at the end of the period, the case was closed. Within 
weeks or months, he generally received a new military summons, and the process started 
over again. Some men went through three or more separate criminal cases, which strained 
their work and family life, while probation limited their mobility. Some young men chose to 
temporarily relocate to Moldova, or at least establish residency there in order to avoid 
prosecution.
1640
 Through these cases, the state basically extended the criminalization of 
religious belief that existed under Soviet rule.  
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 The importation of religious literature presented a second challenge to the 
organization‘s smooth operation. Despite the lack of any law barring mass importation of 
religious literature, Transnistrian Witnesses could not establish regular literature deliveries 
across the Moldovan border due to random and arbitrary search and seizures of publications 
by customs officials. Instead, Moldovan Witnesses had to drive the literature to the border 
area where they parceled it out in small quantities to Transnistrian members who then 
discreetly transported it to their congregations.
1641
 Given the central importance of literature 
to meetings and proselytism efforts, this placed a substantial burden on the organization. As 
with military service, the literature problem forced Witnesses to rely on Soviet-era practices, 
such as semi-clandestine literature deliveries.  
 Registration created an even more serious hurdle to free practice of their faith. Each 
individual congregation required local registration to obtain or rent property, hold public 
meetings, and distribute literature. In the early 1990s, the Witnesses succeeded in registering 
two of their primary religious communities: in Tiraspol, the capital, and in Ribniţa to the 
north.
1642
 However, most of their members operated in areas without local registration. This 
barred the organization from constructing enough Kingdom Halls to meet the needs of the 
growing membership. As a result, the vast majority of congregations met in private 
apartments. Without official recognition, the Witnesses also had less legal protection against 
harassment and opposition from local clergy and officials.  
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 The greatest obstacle, however, came in the form of the new commissioner in charge 
of religious and ―cultic‖ affairs, Petr Zalozhkov, appointed in 1997.  A man with no 
academic or professional training in religious matters, and a machinist prior to independence, 
he was a seemingly strange choice. In 1989, he headed the Tiraspol city strike committee, 
then briefly served as a Supreme Soviet deputy in Soviet Moldavia. From 1990 to 1995, he 
was a deputy in the PMR Supreme Soviet before accepting the position of religious 
commissioner in 1997.
1643
 His lack of qualifications did not prevent him from quickly 
establishing himself as the primary arbiter of religious life in Transnistria. Signaling his 
support of the growing anticult movement in Russia, he promptly voiced his opposition to the 
Watch Tower organization. In an interview with a Chişinău daily paper in 1998, he described 
how members of sects ―persecute us everywhere: on the street, knocking on apartment 
doors.‖ He then focused on the unique threat of Witnesses, who turn people into ―zombies,‖ 
and stated that such sects produce dependence in their members similar to alcoholism or drug 
addiction.
1644
  
For Zalozhkov, Russia provided clear guidance on how to deal with Western religious 
organizations and he eagerly cited Russian expertise in justifying his actions.  Allowed to 
write the section on religion for a PMR high school history textbook, Zalozhkov devoted an 
entire page to the Witnesses, using the Russian buzzword ―totalitarian‖ and declaring them a 
―pyramid scheme‖ out to fleece converts of their money.1645 Soon, not just Zalozhkov, but 
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others in the Transnistrian media began to borrow heavily from the language of Russia‘s 
anticult movement. The term ―totalitarian sect‖ appeared in articles on Western religious 
organizations, while Zalozhkov became the Dvorkin of Transnistria, appearing as a defender 
of gullible citizens against tyrannical cults.
1646
  One 1997 article called on Zalozhkov to 
intervene against the Witnesses‘ registration. The reporter claimed to have heard a Tiraspol 
Witness say, ―Jehovah is all-powerful and he has a lot of friends. Now we are registered and 
the city will be ours.‖1647  
 With Zalozhkov in power and waging a personal campaign against the organization, 
Witnesses faced an increasingly difficult and tenuous legal situation. Registration attempts 
for Witness congregations came to a standstill and the two communities in Ribniţa and 
Tiraspol faced opposition to their continued legal status. Major legal problems began first 
with the Tiraspol congregation, likely because of its location in the state‘s capital and the 
willingness of the city prosecutor to get involved with the matter. The city had registered the 
organization in 1991, and the Ministry of Justice issued a statute confirming the Witnesses‘ 
legal standing in 1994 and again in 1997.
1648
 In December 1997, however, the Ministry of 
Justice responded to a request by Zalozhkov and abruptly confiscated the organization‘s 
registration documents; it also issued a letter annulling their registration. This action violated 
Transnistria‘s own registration law, which required a court process to revoke registration. 
Nonetheless, the Witnesses soon found themselves on shaky ground, without the documents 
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necessary to prove their right to practice.
1649
 Circulating their name on a list of forbidden 
―destructive religious organizations,‖ Zalozhkov declared that the Witnesses no longer had 
legal status in Transnistria.
1650
 He intervened with the city architect to hinder construction of 
a Kingdom Hall in Tiraspol.
1651
  
Ten years and dozens of hearings later, the Witnesses won court decisions demanding 
that Zalozhkov cease his illegal measures against the organization, but the matter remained 
unresolved as of December 2009. The court system could not force Zalozhkov to obey its 
decisions, and he knew it. Instead of conceding, he began a second attack on the organization 
through the city procuracy. In 2002, the city prosecutor instigated liquidation proceedings 
against the organization for violations of freedom of conscience. According to the suit, by 
refusing to celebrate birthdays, befriend their neighbors, and accept blood transfusions, 
Witnesses damaged families and violated the rights of minors and the civil rights of all 
citizens. The suit described the organization‘s door-to-door proselytism as a violation of the 
right to private life guaranteed in the Transnistrian constitution.
1652
 In response, the 
Witnesses filed several complaints through the court system against the illegal measures by 
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Zalozhkov, the courts, and the prosecutor. Progress on the liquidation issue stalled due to 
repeated delays in the trial by the presiding judge.
1653
  
A parallel situation developed with the only other registered Witness community in 
Transnistria, Ribniţa, where the local government effectively barred Witnesses from using 
their newly constructed Kingdom Hall. In September 2009, local police conducted a raid on 
the site, arresting eighteen Witnesses for doing basic maintenance work. One of those 
arrested, Igor Azizov, wrote a report of the incident entitled ―How I spent my weekend,‖ 
detailing his brief imprisonment at the local jail without food, water, or access to a toilet 
before he and the others were finally brought before a court and found innocent of any 
wrongdoing.
1654
 Similar attempts to liquidate the community and revoke their legal status, 
also at the behest of Zalozhkov, began through the court system, but progress toward 
resolution has been slow. 
Ultimately, Witnesses in the PMR found themselves trapped in an unwinnable 
situation that reflected the unstable power dynamics within the government. Even when the 
national and local courts ruled in favor of the Witnesses, they lacked any power to force 
officials to abide by these decisions. Individuals within the government, instead, had nearly 
unlimited ability to pursue their personal politics with only minimal regard for the 
constitution or state laws. While Witnesses in Moldova enjoyed recourse to a higher court 
system, the ECHR, Transnistrian members had no such outlet and thus had no choice but to 
fight through a deeply flawed internal legal system.  
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The sustained legal battles also perpetuated Soviet-era notions of the Witnesses as a 
secretive, dangerous sect. This climate, and the clear signals sent by the government through 
Zalozhkov, made it easier for local officials to take measures against individual Witnesses. 
Not surprisingly, Witnesses faced growing police harassment during their door-to-door 
proselytism. In 2001, president of the Moldovan Witnesses Anatolie Cravciuc received a 
fifty-ruble fine for distributing The Watchtower in Tiraspol. A court, however, ruled in his 
favor and agreed with the Witnesses that their organization had never been legally deprived 
of registration.
1655
 This did not prevent similar incidents from occurring in the city and 
elsewhere. Like Cravciuc, Tiraspol Witnesses received fines or brief detainments for 
distributing religious literature without proper registration. Ironically, some Witnesses were 
fined for proselytizing outside of the territorial boundaries of the Tiraspol congregation as 
outlined in its 1994 registration.
1656
 In other words, sometimes they got fined for not being 
registered; other times they got fined for violating their own registration documents.
1657
  
Overall, Witnesses had to deal with sustained local police harassment, including raids of 
private homes in the PMR. In one 1999 case in the Bender suburb of Protiagailovca, roughly 
thirty police officers raided the home of a Witnesses and confiscated not only religious 
literature, but, with no explanation, a Russian dictionary and a medical encyclopedia as  
well.
1658
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 The state‘s opposition to the Witnesses reflected the preferential treatment granted to 
so-called traditional religions, particularly Russian Orthodoxy, whose clergy were vocal in 
their hostility toward new religious movements and Western Christian organizations such as 
the Witnesses. As in the Republic of Moldova, pressure from the Orthodox Church motivated 
many of the local police incidents against Witnesses. Zalozhkov‘s public stance against the 
organization also gave the Church relatively free reign to take its own measures without 
government interference. During a March 2008 Memorial service held at a private home in 
the village of Parcani, the local Orthodox priest led a group of citizens, some dressed in 
Cossack uniforms with Cossack whips, to protest the service. Having first gathered at a 
nearby church, they then traveled to the Memorial site carrying placards with slogans such as 
―Caution: Life-Threatening Sect!‖ and ―Today the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Tomorrow, NATO.‖ 
They passed out brochures telling random passerby and attendees not to ―betray the faith of 
your fathers and grandfathers for a kilogram of spoiled grain and used jeans.‖ Meanwhile, 
two police cars watched the entire event, making no attempt to control the crowd or ensure 
that Witnesses could enter the private home without harassment. The central government 
made it clear that such local actions would not be prosecuted, in effect giving others free 
reign to take similar initiatives to block Witness proselytism and even private meetings. 
Responding to a complaint about the Parcani incident, Zalozhkov defended the priest and the 
police inaction, calling the priest‘s involvement a ―positive factor‖ in the event. He then 
blamed the Witnesses for the conflict, since they were the ones distributing literature 
offensive to ―90 percent of the population.‖ Both Zalozhkov‘s statement and a separate 
response from the Ministry of State Security suggested that the Witnesses themselves had 
broken the law, given their lack of registration in the village.
1659
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 The PMR and Zalozhkov, however, diverged in some respects from the example set 
by the Russian state and by the Russian anticult movement. Most importantly, Zalozhkov 
proved willing to offend Orthodox sentiments in order to strengthen his own power over 
religious affairs. He pushed for legislative changes to the law on freedom of conscience to 
allow him to remove church leaders from their posts, close churches if found to be in a state 
of disrepair, and control the ability of foreign church leaders to visit Transnistria. In 2004, the 
Transnistrian bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church issued a public excommunication of 
Zalozhkov, calling his demands reminiscent of Soviet-era religious persecution. The same 
document acknowledged the need for changes to the law to deal with ―totalitarian 
organizations,‖ but nonetheless renounced the same intolerant attitude when applied to its 
church.
1660
   
Ultimately, the PMR did succeed in enacting a new religious law in 2008, but not the 
one demanded by Zalozhkov. In fact, the law abolished Zalozhkov‘s post. Lawmakers passed 
the law over a veto by PMR President Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov. Under the new legislation, 
all registration of religious organizations took place through the Ministry of Justice. Despite 
this, Smirnov quickly diluted the effects of the law by appointing Zalozhkov as his special 
advisor on religious affairs. The position had no constitutional or legal basis, but with 
backing from Smirnov, Zalozhkov used the title to retain most of his previous authority. The 
potential setback did not appear to change his negative view of the Witnesses. The court 
challenges in Ribniţa and Tiraspol remain unresolved as of 2010 and have forestalled 
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Witness attempts to openly practice their faith and legally register their organization 
throughout the PMR.
1661
 Major political changes are necessary to solidify rule of law and 
remove the arbitrary nature of its application. But, in the absence of any strong outside 
pressure, the PMR has little reason to reform itself and establish real freedom of conscience 
for its citizens.  
 
Witnesses in Ukraine 
 Although the transition to democracy in Ukraine evolved unsteadily, Ukrainian 
Witnesses encountered the least hindrance to their right to practice of the three post-Soviet 
Witness communities. While the state struggled to create a democratic government capable 
of responding to the needs of its citizenry, it nonetheless maintained a relatively stable 
religious policy based on perestroika-era legislation. The law and the 1996 constitution 
guaranteed basic rights to registered religious organizations, and provided a straightforward 
process for registration.
1662
 Second, the major churches in Ukraine after 1991 had more 
important concerns than the Witnesses. The Orthodox community had divided into three 
major factions: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate; the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 
each with its own clergy, congregants, and property holdings.
1663
 All of the churches sought 
control over the Orthodox community and church property in Ukraine, and made little 
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progress toward unification.
1664
 The threat of their Orthodox rivals pilfering their territory 
loomed far greater than the potential danger of relatively small Western Christian religions. 
Moreover, the factionalization of Orthodox life in Ukraine made it impossible for the state to 
follow the Russian model of alliance with the major church.
1665
 Ukraine also faced several 
popular homegrown new religious movements that further distracted much of the attention 
from Western religious organizations.
1666
 Thus, while the anticult movement did gain some 
presence in Ukraine, it never received the same level of attention from the state and churches 
that it did in Russia or Transnistria, nor was anticult fervor ever as focused on the Witnesses.  
 The Watch Tower organization quickly realized that Ukraine, with the highest 
concentration of Witnesses in the former Soviet Union, needed a strong administrative 
structure to meet the needs of its large membership base. In 1993, the Governing Body 
created a separate Ukrainian branch office that reported directly to the Brooklyn 
headquarters.
1667
 The Watch Tower organization estimates that it had 25,448 members in 
Ukraine in 1991—or more than in the rest of the entire Soviet Union.1668 Ukrainian 
membership rose to 55,660 in 1995, and to 108,184 in 2000.
1669
 Over the next decade, 
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growth slowed, but in 2010, the organization counted 146,387 members.
1670
 Large scale 
public events showcased the surge in converts to the religion. In 1993, Kiev hosted the 
Divine Teaching International Congress of Witnesses at its Olympic stadium, where 7,402 
Witnesses were baptized. The number broke the organization‘s record, set in 1958, for the 
most baptisms at any convention worldwide.
1671
 The organization held a second international 
congress in Kiev in 2003. Organizers connected six simultaneous gatherings of Witnesses 
elsewhere in Ukraine to the main event via Internet.
1672
  
 As the organization grew, it expanded outside of its traditional bases in villages and 
small towns, gaining converts in the major cities and in eastern Ukraine.
1673
 Just as during 
their initial entrance into Ukraine in the 1920s, Witnesses relied on local contacts and family 
connections to find new members. The preaching requirement for all members brought 
Witness beliefs to the doorsteps of most Ukrainians. It also gave Witnesses an edge on other 
faiths that shied away from such direct missionary methods. While the door-to-door method 
remained the standard preaching technique for members, they also used more public 
methods, such as passing out literature on the street and in public transit. Some members set 
                                                 
1670
 2011 Yearbook, 46. 
 
1671
 2002 Yearbook, 237-38, and P. L. Iarotskii, ed., Istoriia religii v Ukraini, vol. 6, Second ed. (Kiev: Surma 
2008), 613. The high-profile convention did not occur without some backlash from state officials. In advance of 
the event, the minister of sports and youth warned of the dangerous influx of ―nontraditional‖ beliefs in 
Ukraine, which he feared would cause increased ―religious fanaticism and extremism.‖ He expressed 
displeasure at the fact that youth and children would attend the event and urged the city‘s Religious Affairs 
Department to be more cautious in hosting such events in the future. TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 700, ark. 48-
49. 
 
1672
 Iarotskii, ed., Istoriia religii, 614-15. 
 
1673
 CRA statistics for 1989 list no Witnesses in the four oblasts of Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, and 
Chernihiv, and only one congregation in Kiev oblast. TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 441, ark. 95-96. By 1993, 
this had grown to four congregations in Zhytomyr, four in Kharkiv, and seven in Kiev (including both the city 
and the oblast) according to official statistics. TsDAVO, f. 4648, op. 7, spr. 716, ark. 37, 73, 83; spr. 717, ark. 
67. 
 
 504 
up display stands for their literature in public areas. Instead of approaching people, they 
waited for them to show interest in the literature, and then began a conversation.
1674
  
Ukrainian Witnesses attracted followers for many of the same reasons that the 
religion found converts in Russia and Moldova. Some new members felt dissatisfied with 
their previous religion. Boris, an elderly blind musician, found the Witnesses more appealing 
than either the Catholic Church, which he had been baptized into, or Baptism, whose 
meetings he had attended years prior.
1675
 He came from a village in Cherkasy oblast, which 
prior to 1991 had no Witnesses according to the official statistics.
1676
 Like Boris, some 
converts faced physical disabilities, personal tragedies, and other hardships and found hope 
in the Witnesses‘ message of an earthly paradise. One man struggled to earn enough money 
to provide food and heat for his home, but found a strong support network among the 
Witnesses.
1677
 To cite a second example, Tatiana, and her sister joined the Witnesses during 
an incredibly difficult situation. Their mother had recently been killed by their brother, a 
mentally unstable man, and their father committed suicide soon afterward. Unable to cope, 
Tatiana recalled in a 2000 article that she also considered suicide, but her sister introduced 
her to the Witnesses and soon they both were baptized. Tatiana worked as a translator for the 
organization and even attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to convince her brother to repent and 
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join the faith.
1678
 For people like Tatiana, the Witnesses offered a strong community of 
support, a clear religious interpretation of the world around them, and a prescription for 
eternal salvation.  
The rapid increase in their membership placed incredible demands on the 
organization. The vast majority of Witnesses no longer came from long-standing Witness 
families; most had never experienced any serious persecution for their faith. The organization 
had to appoint and train elders to minister to congregations that were filled almost entirely 
with neophytes. To meet these needs, the organization constructed a new administrative 
center outside L‘viv, in the suburb of Briukhovychi, to house their offices and full-time staff.  
Construction of Kingdom Halls began in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s as the 
organization struggled to provide adequate space for its expanding congregations.
1679
  
While the Watch Tower organization offers little information on this issue, it 
certainly had to deal with the task of convincing long-time oppositionist or neutralist 
communities to rejoin the organization. These efforts had already revived in the late 1980s as 
the Governing Body negotiated its initial registration with the Soviet state, and appeared to 
meet with success. During a 1990 trip to Rivne oblast, CRA inspectors noted that the 
organization had issued a call for unity among the factions and that the oppositionists 
responded favorably to this outreach.
1680
 The state‘s registration of the Witnesses through the 
Brooklyn headquarters designated the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society as the only 
recognized source of authority for Ukrainian Witnesses. The Soviet state did not pursue 
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separate registration for the rival factions. These communities largely disappeared in the 
post-Soviet period and there is no information to suggest they sought new members or 
formed their own organizational structures. Without any legal entity, those that remain are 
unlikely to survive past the current generation of adherents.  
All of the major religions in Ukraine experienced their own religious revivals after 
the fall of the Soviet Union.
1681
 As in Russia and Moldova, most Ukrainians identified 
themselves as members of one of the Orthodox churches. In a 2003 national survey, roughly 
75 percent of respondents described themselves as believers, while 22 percent did not. 90 
percent of those who said they believed in God identified themselves as Christian, primarily 
Orthodox.
1682
 Similarly, 2004 government statistics listed 918 Witness communities in 
Ukraine, compared with almost 15,000 communities for the three main Orthodox churches. 
In addition, the Greek Catholic Church accounted for 3,328 communities, and the Baptist 
Church, with its roots in Ukraine reaching back into the nineteenth century, for another 
2,311.
1683
 Simply put, the Witnesses remained a small, but growing religious minority in 
Ukraine.  
 The Witnesses‘ post-Soviet success was made possible in part by legislation passed in 
the final months of Soviet rule. In early 1991, Ukraine‘s Supreme Soviet enacted the Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which guaranteed basic freedom of 
conscience for all citizens through a non-discriminatory registration process for religious 
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organizations.
1684
 Under this law, the Witnesses received registration in Ukraine in February 
1991, a month prior to their registration in the Russian Federation.
1685
 The law remained in 
force following the Soviet Union‘s collapse.1686 The independent Ukrainian government 
registered the Witnesses in March 1992, and renewed this registration in 1999, and again in 
2006.
1687
 While a 1993 revision of the religious law included tougher visa restrictions for 
representatives of foreign religious organizations, it had little effect on the Witnesses.
1688
 In 
1992, Ukraine also guaranteed alternative service for religious believers who refused to 
complete mandatory military service.
1689
 As a result, Witnesses faced no major legal barriers 
to practice their faith.  
While the growth of minority religions put pressure in the mid-1990s on Ukraine to 
adopt more restrictive legislation, the state diverged from Russia in retaining its original law 
despite extensive parliamentary debate on the matter.
1690
 In 1998, the recently appointed head 
of the State Committee on Religious Affairs, Viktor Bondarenko, denied that Russia‘s 1997 
law had any effect on how his agency intended to conduct religious matters. He cited his 
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greatest challenge not as dangerous sects, but the ongoing inter-Orthodox conflict.
1691
 In 
another interview, Bondarenko acknowledged concerns about ―totalitarian‖ and ―destructive 
cults,‖ but cautioned that, until he received credible, actionable information on specific 
groups, he could do no more than suggest that Ukrainians trust their own judgment in 
choosing a religion.
1692
 These statements reflected the fact that while Ukraine was aware of 
Russia‘s legislative actions toward religious organizations, the government did not want to be 
seen as following Russia nor as taking measures against religious freedom. Further, the 
divided Orthodox community lacked the political power of the Russian Orthodox Church to 
force the government to endorse its views on minority religions.  
 Despite the newfound religious pluralism in Ukraine, the nascent free press failed to 
fully reflect this new climate of tolerance. Newspapers and journals, which for decades had 
printed sensationalist articles against the Witnesses, printed few, if any, retractions. One rare 
exception was the national atheist journal, Liudyna i svit, which refashioned itself into a 
religious studies journal in the final years of Soviet power.
1693
 In general, the journal kept its 
commitment to printing generally factual information on religious affairs in the post-Soviet 
period. In the late 1990s, it also published balanced accounts of the anticult movement that 
avoided inflammatory rhetoric and even criticized the press for uncritically employing terms 
like ―totalitarian cults.‖ Other than this journal, however, the press gave little indication that 
its Soviet-era depictions of the Witnesses had been inaccurate. This left Ukrainian citizens to 
assume that the Soviet press had correctly depicted Witnesses as dangerous fanatics. 
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Not surprisingly, then, anticult rhetoric spread rapidly to Ukraine in the mid-1990s 
and was directed against homegrown cults, Western religious organizations, and foreign 
missionaries.
1694
 The media was especially preoccupied with the Ukrainian White 
Brotherhood in the early 1990s, a fringe religion that it alleged planned to commit mass 
suicide in Kiev in 1993—an event that failed to take place.1695 In general, the press employed 
vitriolic anticult language with little reflection, including the reprinting of information 
against sects from the Russian Orthodox Church.
1696
 In his study of post-Soviet Ukrainian 
press coverage of the Witnesses, religious scholar Konstiantyn Berezhko noted the heavy use 
of quotes from anticult movement leaders and statements from former believers as evidence 
to support negative conclusions about minority faiths.
1697
  
The Witnesses garnered negative media attention that drew heavily from Russian 
anticult rhetoric, although the Witnesses appeared less frequently in the press in Ukraine than 
they did in Russia.
1698
 One 2008 Kievan newspaper article cited Dvorkin as an expert on the 
Witnesses, and related a case from the city of Sumy where a Witness mother allegedly 
neglected her child after joining the organization.
1699
 Another piece from a Chernihiv 
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regional paper praised a priest who assaulted two Witnesses on a city bus as a hero for 
standing up for his faith.
1700
 A sensationalist article in 2009 covered a gruesome murder in 
Dnipropetrovs‘k in which two Witnesses confessed to the crime. Without evidence, the 
journalist blamed the faith itself as the culprit and pointed to the hypocrisy of Witness claims 
that their religion forbids them to kill. The article contained speculation that the murder was 
motivated by the victim‘s unwillingness to convert to the faith.1701 
 While anti-Witness sentiments appeared more rarely in Ukraine than in Russia, they 
nonetheless perpetuated Soviet-era stereotypes of the Witnesses as dangerous fanatics and 
inhibited their integration into the broader community. Witnesses had to combat these 
impressions among their coworkers, neighbors, and classmates. A 2005 article in Awake! 
praised one eleven-year-old girl who used organizational literature to convince her 
classmates that the Witnesses were not a sect, as they had previously believed.
1702
 
Surprisingly, the sudden public presence of Witnesses and door-to-door proselytism occurred 
with only sporadic violent resistance and with a lesser degree of confrontations than in 
Russia and Moldova. Reported incidents of violence against Witnesses during their preaching 
work were rare, but did occur.
1703
 In 2005, a Russian Orthodox priest attacked a group of 
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Witnesses preaching in his village in Cherkasy oblast. A local court granted the priest 
amnesty, absolving him of responsibility. In fact, most of the assaults on Witnesses in the 
2000s involved local Russian Orthodox clergy, and law enforcement proved reticent to apply 
criminal charges.
1704
 
Some tensions arose between Witnesses and local governments wary of the 
organization. In 2006 in L‘viv, the oblast council appealed to the central government for 
permission to declare the Witnesses illegal, in part at the behest of other Christian churches. 
The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, rejected the council‘s request. Also in L‘viv, 
a city council moved to block construction of a Kingdom Hall based on complaints from 
Greek Catholic and Orthodox residents. The regional court ruled the council‘s action illegal. 
In both cases, attempts to prevent Witness activity or building construction have come from 
local government and been overturned or ignored by higher-ranking authorities.
1705
 
 One of the Witnesses‘ few conflicts with the central government occurred in 2008 
with the publication of a new eighth-grade health textbook, which included a brief section on 
―destructive cults‖ and named the Witnesses in a list of such ―banned‖ groups, along with 
Satanists, Scientologists, and Mormons. The text encouraged students to talk to adults before 
making any decisions about religion and warned against the threat of psychological 
manipulation. The book bore a stamp of approval from the Ministry of Justice, ironically the 
same body that had registered the Witnesses. At the Witnesses‘ behest, the Ministry of 
Education issued a retraction to schools asking them to cut out or paste over the offending 
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section in the book. Witnesses sent representatives to the schools to determine if they had 
complied with this demand.
1706
  
 The textbook issue suggests that, while the government itself proved ready to register 
and work with the Witnesses, the organization and its members confronted a considerable 
amount of hostility to or ignorance about their religion and its practices. Soon after the 
textbook publication, a private publisher released a supplement for teachers. The book 
includes information on teaching the section involving sects and lists three levels of 
dangerous sects (Witnesses were a ―category two‖ danger). The author described the 
Witnesses as a rich and ―aggressive‖ organization whose members use ―light hypnotic 
methods‖ to recruit, and told teachers to advise their students to avoid proselytizers. If 
children nonetheless expressed interest in a sect, the author suggested that parents should 
take them to an Orthodox Church to talk to a priest, and repeat this action several times if 
needed.
1707
 Not surprisingly, the Witnesses received reports of Witness children being 
harassed or bullied about their faith because of school health classes.
1708
  
In Ukraine, legal protections did not come about due to widespread public tolerance, 
but rather despite continued hostility to many minority religions. Also, as seen in Ukraine 
and Moldova, increased interaction with Witnesses did not necessarily lead to greater 
understanding and acceptance. In L‘viv, with its high concentration of Witnesses, members 
found fliers proclaiming ―Warning!!! The totalitarian sect, the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, is very 
active in your district!!‖ Other fliers detailed the alleged heresies of the faith and listed a help 
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line for victims of the Witnesses.  Residents even found brochures in their mailboxes in 2009 
criticizing Witness proselytism and stating that this time would be better spent adopting 
homeless children in Ukraine.
1709
 Acceptance of the Witnesses‘ place in religious life, and of 
their historical roots in Ukraine, remains a goal, not a reality. Until then, Ukraine‘s law will 
continue to protect Witnesses and other minority faiths. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the Moldovan and Ukrainian independent states diverged significantly 
both from their Soviet-era practices and the example set by Russia. Perhaps most remarkable, 
both countries implemented and maintained democratic religious policies despite continued 
popular hostility to minority religions and to the sudden influx of foreign-based religious 
organizations. Indeed, Ukrainian and Moldovan media borrowed much of the language of the 
Russian anticult movement in their national and regional presses and through Orthodox 
churches. Unlike in much of Russia, Witnesses also had to deal with the strong legacy of 
more than forty years of hostile propaganda from the Soviet state. Yet it was in these 
territories with a long history of public and official hostility to Witnesses that the 
organization faced fewer obstacles after 1991. 
There are two major factors that help account for this difference. First, the Orthodox 
Church in Russia enjoys greater political power and suffers less from internal divisions than 
in Moldova and Ukraine. This allows it to mount a more successful campaign to protect its 
interests and ward off competition from other religious organizations. In Moldova and 
Ukraine, infighting between various Orthodox churches overshadowed other religious issues, 
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 Fliers courtesy of Ukrainian branch office of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses on October 14, 2009. The fliers have 
been produced by multiple agencies, including the Russian Orthodox Church, Greek Catholic and Roman 
Catholic seminaries, and the anticult Institute of Research on Totalitarian Religions and Religious Knowledge.  
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preoccupied state institutions in charge of religious affairs, and made the anticult movement a 
phenomenon largely relegated to the media. Second, and perhaps equally important, the 
promise of European integration put pressure on Ukraine and Moldova to make their 
religious policies conform to European standards. Most major challenges to this process 
came from within the Orthodox community, as the states struggled to implement a fair, 
democratic procedure for treating the various Orthodox churches. The example of 
Transnistria represents the flip-side of this phenomenon. There, the stronger pull of Russia 
and the Russian Orthodox Church, combined with isolation from European institutions, led to 
a religious policy that bears strong resemblance to Soviet practices and Russian trends.  
 For the Witnesses themselves, religious freedom in Ukraine and Moldova had a 
transformative effect on their organization and fundamentally altered the practice of their 
religion. Members who had previously met only in secret could now gather en masse in city 
stadiums to proclaim their faith to the wider world. By 2010, first-generation Witnesses with 
no personal ties to Soviet-era persecution constituted the majority of members. Despite the 
advent of religious freedom, Witnesses retained the same basic theological principles and 
worldview that had previously protected them and helped them to make sense of life under 
Soviet rule. They celebrated their newfound freedoms, but also steeled themselves for the 
inevitable persecution that they believe will face all true Christians in the final days before 
Armageddon. This position solidified their faith as they encountered new obstacles in their 
door-to-door preaching and grappled with a lack of democratic progress in Transnistria.  
 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
―Then I saw another angel flying in midair, and he had the eternal gospel to proclaim to 
those who live on the earth—to every nation, tribe, language and people.‖ Revelation 14:6 
 
 When Charles Taze Russell visited the Russian Empire in 1891, he found ―no 
opening or readiness for the truth in Russia.‖ His Bible Students had begun to preach beyond 
America‘s borders, but Russell held out little hope for converts on Russian soil. Yet World 
War II brought the Bible Students (now called Jehovah‘s Witnesses) onto Soviet territory 
through border changes and the forced resettlement of ethnic Ukrainians from Poland to 
Soviet Ukraine. Once there, Witnesses actively resisted state pressure to abandon their faith. 
Instead, they to set up a complex, hierarchical underground network and continued to preach 
to find new converts. A hundred years after Russell‘s pessimistic prediction, his faith had an 
estimated 45,000 followers in the Soviet Union. In the two decades since the USSR‘s 
collapse, the Witnesses rapidly gained new members in conditions of relative religious 
freedom in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Today more than 380,000 Jehovah‘s Witnesses 
live and preach in these lands.  
Several elements set Witnesses apart from most other religious organizations. 
Understanding these unique features helps illuminate what makes the Witnesses‘ history in 
the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states important and distinct from those of other religious 
communities. First, the Witnesses follow a rigid interpretation of the biblical injunction for 
Christians to be in the world, but not of the world.
1710
 For them, Satan has corrupted human 
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 The call to be ―in the world, but not of the world‖ appears in multiple passages of the Bible. For example, 
Jesus says of the disciples: ―I have given them Your word; and the world hated them because they are not of the 
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society. The Bible instructs Witnesses that ―whoever therefore wants to be a friend of the 
world makes himself an enemy of God.‖1711 While most Christians are familiar with this 
verse, Witnesses have a much broader definition of ―the world,‖ one that includes all 
churches, governments, secular institutions, and individuals who do not belong to the 
Witnesses. This position has put Witnesses at odds with ―the world‖ and has fueled state 
repression, hostility from mainstream churches, and mob violence in countries worldwide 
throughout the twentieth century and into the next. 
Second, Witnesses carry the firm conviction that all Christians must expect and 
welcome this persecution as a sign of their loyalty to the true faith. This makes Witnesses 
remarkably resilient to state and social opposition. The belief that God will soon rectify the 
current, corrupt ―system of things‖ also helps Witnesses to withstand outside pressure to 
conform.
1712
 They feel confident they do not have to resist much longer before God 
intervenes. In fact, pressure on Witnesses to renounce or reform their beliefs and practices 
has often strengthened their resolve not to betray their commitment to God and the Watch 
Tower organization, which they believe to be God‘s instrument for true Christianity on earth. 
Once Witnesses appear in a country, no modern states have managed to eliminate them.  
Third, the call to preach compels Witnesses to engage with the world even as they 
reject it. For them, passive faith is no faith at all. Witnesses hold that a true Christian shares 
his beliefs with others, regardless of the danger. The requirement that Witnesses actively 
share their highly controversial beliefs to a mostly indifferent or hostile populace enhances 
                                                                                                                                                       
world; just as I am not of the world. I do not pray that You should take them out of the world, but that You 
should keep them from the evil one.‖ John 17:14. See also John 15:19, James 1:27, and 1 John 2:15. 
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 James 4:4. 
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 The Witnesses frequently use the phrase ―system of things‖ to refer to the current, corrupted state of human 
existence. This phrase comes from Matthew 13:49. Other Bible editions translate ―system of things‖ as ―age,‖ 
or a broad unit of time.  
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their persecution. It also motivates them to fiercely protect their right to freedom of 
expression to ensure that they can fulfill their preaching duties. 
Fourth, active membership means that, for Witnesses, state authority is second to the 
authority of their religious organization. All baptized Witnesses attend regular meetings to 
study the Bible and official Watch Tower publications. They must comply with the directives 
of their elders and the Governing Body. When secular law contradicts the organization‘s 
interpretation of God‘s law, Witnesses put God‘s law first. The Witnesses‘ need for literature 
and instructions from the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society in order to practice their faith 
requires a high level of organization that led to highly cohesive and uniform Witness 
communities worldwide.  
Fifth, as a result of the elements listed above, modern states have struggled over how 
to respond to the Witnesses. For both democratic and authoritarian states, Witnesses‘ beliefs 
and practices challenge the boundaries of civil liberties and religious freedom. Witnesses 
require a state to grant them the rights of citizens without requiring of them many of the basic 
duties expected of citizens, such as voting and military service. More broadly, Witnesses 
demand that a state grant freedom of expression to a religious organization that preaches the 
state‘s corruption and imminent destruction. Further, the Witnesses openly affirm that their 
first allegiance is not to the state, but to the Watch Tower organization, its community of 
believers, and its interpretation of God‘s laws. Not surprisingly then, Witnesses have 
frequently sought protection from the courts to guarantee their rights. The resulting court 
decisions have played a central role in several states in pushing the boundaries of civil 
liberties and religious freedom.  
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These unique features of the Witnesses, along with the specific nature of Soviet 
ideology and governance, made them the object of state persecution well out of proportion to 
their membership. For the Soviet state, the Witnesses‘ condemnation of secular governments 
and institutions was inherently political in that it rejected the promise of communism and the 
Soviet ideological project. Witnesses denied the Soviet state‘s authority over them and 
instead deferred to God‘s judgment in deciding when or if to participate in society and Soviet 
political life. The Witnesses‘ refusal to vote or to complete mandatory military service 
represented particular affronts to the state‘s authority and its ability to force citizens to 
participate in its institutions. Because the Soviet state viewed the Witnesses as political, it 
used many of the same measures it employed against other perceived political threats to 
repress Witness communities. 
The ideological clash between Witness belief in an imminent Armageddon and Soviet 
belief in the achievement of communism made it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to 
reconcile itself with this religious organization. Both ideologies promised the establishment 
of perfect governance and justice on earth. For the Soviet state, this made Witnesses a 
dangerous competitor for citizens‘ hearts and minds. Equally important, the Witnesses, not 
content with worshipping God in secret among fellow believers, established a vast, 
hierarchical underground network based on hundreds, and later thousands of local study 
groups of believers who met together to read and discuss the Bible and illegal Watch Tower 
publications. The underground organization had its own internal hierarchy, reporting 
procedures, and financial records that made possible an extraordinary degree of cohesion and 
control over the Soviet Witness communities. The Witnesses considered their illegal 
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activities, underground printing presses, smuggling channels, and preaching activities as 
requirements of true Christians. 
How the Soviet state responded to the Witnesses changed over time due to broader 
shifts in the Communist Party‘s leadership, ideological orientation, and key policy objectives. 
When the Witnesses first arrived in the Soviet Union under Stalin, their apocalyptic beliefs 
and denunciation of secular society posed a particular threat to the postwar Soviet order. The 
state, eager to implement sovietization of its newly acquired western borderlands, showed 
little tolerance of the Witnesses‘ refusal to participate in these efforts. The state saw the 
Witnesses‘ resistance to the military draft, collectivization, postwar elections, and other 
critical components of sovietization as anti-Soviet and dangerous, and marked them for 
sweeping state repression. In response, it carried out mass arrests and trials of Witnesses for 
anti-Soviet agitation and other state crimes. In 1949 and 1951, the state targeted entire 
Witness communities for exile to Siberia, a practice generally reserved for suspect economic 
classes, nationalities, and political opponents.  
With the death of Stalin in 1953, the new Party leadership committed itself to a much 
more limited use of hard-line coercive measures against perceived political threats. It 
asserted that the Soviet Union could achieve communism without violence, but it struggled to 
deal with groups such as the Witnesses who refused to buy into its ideology. Under 
Khrushchev‘s tenure, the state revived antireligious propaganda and agitation as part of a 
broader push to build communism in the near future, tasks that Khrushchev felt had been 
neglected during Stalin‘s last years. Further, the Khrushchev era saw the creation of two 
basic dichotomies in Soviet religious policy. First, the state extended the possibility of legal 
registration to most religious communities, albeit with major restrictions on what they could 
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and could not do. At the same time, it denied any legal standing to other religious 
communities, including the Witnesses. This created a semi-legal existence for mainstream 
churches, while singling out certain religions for repression. Second, the state drew a clear 
distinction between two groups of believers: the ordinary, rank-and-file believers and the 
leaders or fanatics. The former had to be convinced to renounce the faith and rejoin society, 
while the latter had to be removed from society by force. These policies fueled the state‘s 
increased attention to antireligious work among Witnesses and justified its continued 
criminalization of Witnesses, who received prison and labor camp sentences until the late 
1980s.  
In the post-Stalin period, state and Party institutions, Soviet media, and antireligious 
propaganda depicted the Witnesses as an anti-Soviet political organization guised as a 
religion. Official discourse portrayed the Watch Tower organization and its elders as anti-
Soviet fanatics and criminals who duped uneducated, vulnerable citizens into joining their 
illegal underground network. The Communist Party, Komsomol, and Knowledge Society 
helped transmit this view of Witnesses to the Soviet public, hoping to deter potential 
converts. The state felt confident that Soviet citizens, if given adequate information and 
education, would always choose communism over religion, even as its own reports and 
statistics suggested otherwise. This propaganda had the added goal of justifying to Soviet 
citizens and foreign observers that the Soviet Union did not persecute religious believers for 
their beliefs, but rather for their illegal actions. Party agitators and lecturers also worked 
among the Witnesses themselves to convince them to abandon their faith and embrace 
communist ideology. This work succeeded to the extent that it limited the Witnesses to a 
small community of believers on the margins of Soviet society. But the state failed in its 
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mission to wipe out religious belief and thus secure this necessary precondition for achieving 
communism.  
During Brezhnev‘s tenure, most of these state policies remained in force, but the state 
abandoned its campaignist call to wipe out religious belief in the near future for an emphasis 
on controlling and regulating Soviet religious life. By the late 1970s, the state lifted the 
official ban on registering the Witnesses, but refused to modify the conditions for legalization 
to make registration a viable option for Witnesses. While religion showed a remarkable 
ability to adapt to changing conditions, the Soviet state‘s religious policy betrayed a lack of 
dynamism that reflected the broader stagnation in Party leadership and the ossification of 
official rhetoric. Only under the energetic leadership of Gorbachev did relations between the 
state and the Witnesses undergo a serious transformation. The gradual introduction of 
democratic governance, free speech, and religious pluralism made it possible for Witnesses 
to practice their faith in the Soviet Union without fear of reprisal. In 1991, the state finally 
registered the Witnesses as a recognized religious organization.  
Throughout the Soviet era, Witnesses proved their capacity to adapt to changing 
conditions and to resist official attempts to destroy their communities. Their story provides a 
much broader image of dissent in the late Soviet era that contrasts to the more well-known 
urban, intellectual dissident movement. Witnesses constructed alternative communities based 
on strict biblical morality, mutual support, and obedience to their organization. Largely rural, 
most with only a basic education, Witnesses lived on the margins of Soviet society. They did 
not conform to even the most basic cultural norms of Soviet life. Their children did not 
participate in after-school activities and their young men did not serve in the military. 
Witnesses avoided movie houses, clubs, houses of culture, village and work meetings, and 
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refused to vote in elections. Their lives revolved around the practice of their faith in 
fellowship with other ―true Christians.‖  
Unlike other Soviet dissenters, Witnesses did not heavily invest themselves in Soviet 
cultural and political institutions and were already marginalized from society. This made 
them less guarded about speaking out against the system. While many critics of the Soviet 
political system advocated an alternative, but still Soviet, state, Witnesses prophesied the 
state‘s destruction. The history of Soviet Witnesses demonstrates the need to recognize and 
study the impact of religion on discussions of subjectivity in the Soviet Union, where religion 
could provide the foundations for stalwart resistance to the Soviet ideological project. The 
Witnesses show how religion provided some Soviet citizens with an alternative belief system 
and religiously-motivated critique of Soviet power that compelled citizens not to conform, to 
create communities and cultures outside of the official order, and to push the boundaries of 
state control.  
In the post-Soviet period, Witnesses encountered a new set of challenges in the 
former Soviet states. This dissertation has examined the three states with the highest 
concentrations of Witnesses: Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. There, Witnesses had to 
construct a viable legal organization that conformed to the worldwide administrative 
structure. This meant building or renting hundreds of spaces for Kingdom Halls where 
believers could hold weekly meetings. It required renewed attention to translating and 
distributing standardized versions of Watch Tower publications in all major regional 
languages. Newly created national branch offices needed trained full-time volunteers to lead 
the organization through this transition period. The massive influx of new members in the 
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first post-Soviet decade made these tasks all the more challenging. Still, this membership 
growth encouraged the Witness communities that hard work would yield rich rewards.  
With far more Witnesses preaching publicly in new regions throughout the former 
Soviet states, the Watch Tower organization soon faced renewed hostility to its beliefs and 
practices. The resurgent Russian Orthodox Church in particular called for limits on 
proselytism and the activities of new religious movements and minority faiths such as the 
Witnesses. Orthodox critics found support for their views in the broader European anticult 
movement, which they adapted to fit their needs and to reflect the major concerns of post-
Soviet citizens. By the late 1990s, anticult rhetoric, most of it based in Russia, permeated the 
regional media. In all three countries discussed in the dissertation, anticult supporters called 
for stricter measures against ―totalitarian sects‖ while still proclaiming their support for 
freedom of conscience. Membership growth slowed and Witnesses faced significant public 
antagonism, even sporadic acts of violence, as they went about their door-to-door preaching 
work. 
State actions regarding minority religious communities, however, differed in response 
to broader political and social concerns. In Ukraine and Moldova, the need to achieve some 
measure of integration with Europe limited the states‘ desire to impose legislative restrictions 
on religious freedom. Internal strife between various Orthodox churches also created a more 
divided Orthodox community for whom internal church unity was more important than 
secondary concerns about foreign missionaries and marginal religious organizations. These 
two case studies suggest that post-Soviet states were sometimes able to uphold basic 
religious freedoms in the absence of strong public support for many minority religious 
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communities. The Witnesses did not achieve wide social acceptance in these two countries, 
but they did win the right to practice their faith.  
In contrast, the Russian example demonstrates the difficulties in maintaining religious 
pluralism in the absence of strong state support. First, a united Orthodox Church yielded 
greater political power than in Ukraine or Moldova and the federal government could not 
easily ignore its demands. Yet, during the Yeltsin era, the state fostered closer relations with 
Europe that tempered its response to minority religious communities. Even the Russian 
anticult movement carefully framed its critiques within a pan-European discourse about the 
dangers of sects. As a result, the more restrictive 1997 religious law did not immediately lead 
to major limitations on freedom of religion. The major shift in church-state relations came as 
a result of new national leadership. During the Putin presidency, the Russian state showed 
waning interest in winning European and American support for its domestic policies and 
clamped down on civil liberties with increasing severity. New laws allowed the state to limit 
religious expression under the guise of protecting citizens and national security from 
dangerous extremists. Federal courts began to interpret these laws more broadly to include 
political opponents and minority religious groups such as the Witnesses in their definitions of 
extremism.  
As the Russian state‘s commitment to democracy slowly deteriorated, so too did its 
support for religious freedom. Russia‘s political developments found reflection in the 
Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR). The breakaway republic depended on the support 
of its only ally, Russia, and eagerly mimicked the state‘s crackdown on Witnesses. The 
example of the PMR shows the obstacles to protecting the basic rights of citizens in 
unrecognized states that exist outside of international institutions governing human rights. 
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Even when domestic courts ruled in favor of the Witnesses, they lacked any mechanism to 
enforce their decisions on a hostile executive branch with its own agenda. With no 
accountability to outside states and institutions, the PMR had even less reason than Russia to 
maintain a superficial commitment to freedom of conscience. Indeed, the PMR‘s actions at 
times exceeded those of the Russian government in regard to its response to the Witnesses. 
By the end of 2010, Witnesses have achieved a great deal since their initial arrival in 
the Soviet Union. In Ukraine and Moldova, despite considerable public hostility, they preach 
and worship Jehovah with few restrictions. At the same time, in Russia and the PMR, the 
Witnesses are on the brink of returning to a Soviet-style underground network of believers. 
Each day, new information emerges from Russia about the arrest, detainment, and trial of 
believers for practicing their faith. Signs suggest that the federal government may soon take 
action to de-register the Witnesses, which could lead to a new era of state repression. For the 
Witnesses, the tenuousness of the religious liberty won under Gorbachev confirms that 
secular authorities cannot be trusted to guarantee freedom for true Christians. Only God‘s 
destruction of worldly governments will bring about a permanent end to religious 
persecution. 
Still, there is reason for Russian Witnesses to take comfort in the current situation. 
When I started this project in the early 2000s, I believed that Russian federal court decisions 
regarding the Witnesses might well follow the model of other democratic countries. In the 
United States and Canada, for example, important case law protecting citizens‘ civil liberties 
emerged from disputes involving Witnesses. Now, nearly ten years later, the outcome in 
Russia has been slightly different than I expected. Russia courts have ruled against the 
Witnesses, marking them as outside the permissible boundaries of freedom of conscience. 
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The refusal of Russian courts to find in favor of the Witnesses has brought matters to the 
European Court of Human Rights. Ironically, the Witnesses‘ inability to set legal precedents 
in Russia has helped them set broader, European case law through landmark decisions in the 
ECHR. Thus, even as Russian Witnesses lose their rights at home, they may well protect 
these same rights for their European fellow believers.  
No matter what the post-Soviet states choose to do, however, Witnesses in these 
countries will find ways to practice their faith. Mass exiles, arrest, and KGB infiltration could 
not eliminate the Witness organization. The current challenges Witnesses face, which seem 
mild in comparison, can hardly succeed in destroying this stalwart religious community. For 
now, Witnesses await the establishment of the millennial kingdom. Until then, they will 
continue to push the limits of religious freedom in modern states. The story of Jehovah‘s 
Witnesses demonstrates that, even in the most repressive of societies, for those willing to risk 
their lives or livelihoods, there is always room to challenge, to create spaces for dissent, and 
to construct meaning outside of official norms. 
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